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Due to legal uncertainty surrounding the application of key provisions of European 
and UK data protection law, the public interest in protecting individuals’ informational 
privacy is routinely neglected, as are the public interests in certain uses of data. Consent 
or anonymisation are often treated as the paradigmatic example of compliance with 
data protection law, even though both are unable to attend to the full range of rights 
and interests at stake in data processing. Currently, where data processing may serve a 
realisable public interest, and consent or anonymisation are impracticable (if not 
impossible to obtain) the public interest conditions to processing are the rational 
alternative justifications for processing. However, the public interest conditions are 
poorly defined in the legislation, and misunderstood and neglected in practice. This 
thesis offers a much-needed alternative to the predominant consent-or-anonymise 
paradigm by providing a new understanding of the public interest concept in data 
protection law and to suggest a new approach to deploying the concept in a way that 
is consistent with the protective and facilitative aims of the legislation.  
 
Through undertaking legislative analysis new insight is provided on the purpose of the 
public interest conditions in data protection law, revealing critical gaps in 
understanding. By engaging with public interest theory and discovering the conceptual 
contours of the public interest, these gaps are addressed. Combined with the insight 
obtained from the legislative history, we can determine the reasonable range of 
circumstances and types of processing where it may be justifiable to use personal data 
based on the public interest. On this basis, and to develop a new approach for 
deploying the concept, other legal uses of the public interest are examined. The lessons 
learned suggest legislative and procedural elements that are critical to successful 
deployment of the public interest concept in data protection. The thesis concludes with 
the identification of key components to allow a clearer understanding of the public 
interest in this field. Further, these insights enable recommendations to be made, to 
reform the law, procedure and guidance. In doing so, the concept of the public interest 
can be confidently deployed in line with the aims of data protection law, to both protect 






Due to legal uncertainty surrounding the application of key provisions of European 
and UK data protection law, the public interest in protecting individuals’ informational 
privacy is routinely neglected, as are the public interests in certain uses of data. Consent 
or anonymisation are often treated as the definitive example of compliance with data 
protection law, even though both are unable to fully protect the rights and interests at 
stake when personal data are used. Currently, where the use of data may serve a 
realisable public interest, such as for research, and consent or anonymisation are 
impracticable (if not impossible to obtain) the public interest conditions are the rational 
legal justifications for processing. However, the public interest conditions are poorly 
defined in the legislation, and misunderstood and neglected in practice. This thesis 
offers a much-needed alternative to the predominant mode of compliance through 
consent or anonymisation by providing a new understanding of the public interest 
concept in data protection law.  
 
By analysing current data protection legislation, new insight is provided on the purpose 
of the public interest conditions, revealing critical gaps in understanding how the public 
interest in a use of data can be assessed. By looking to public interest theory and 
discovering the conceptual contours of the public interest, these gaps are addressed. 
Combined with the insight obtained from the legislative analysis, we can determine the 
range of circumstances where it may be justifiable to use personal data based on the 
public interest. To understand what is practically required to deploy the concept in law, 
other legal uses of the public interest are examined. The lessons learned suggest 
legislative and procedural elements that are critical to successful deployment of the 
public interest concept in data protection. The thesis concludes with the identification 
of key components to allow a clearer understanding of the public interest in this field. 
Further, these insights enable recommendations to be made, to reform the law, 
procedure and guidance. In doing so, the concept of the public interest can be 
confidently deployed in line with the aims of data protection law, to both protect and 
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Chapter 1 Addressing the Public 
Interest Gap in Data Protection 
Law and Practice 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the use of the public interest concept in data protection 
law. Under what conditions can an individual or organisation justify the processing1 of 
personal data2 based on the public interest? How is this public interest ‘claim’ to be 
assessed within data protection law? My focus is on the use of the public interest within 
the legal conditions for processing personal data in UK data protection legislation and 
practice. I consider the lack of a coherent understanding of 1) what the concept means; 
and 2) how it should be deployed by those who process personal data (‘data 
controllers’3) and those who must review (when legally necessary) these decisions, 
including the UK’s data protection supervisory authority – the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (‘ICO’)4 – and the courts. My contribution lies in offering a 
                                                
1 All websites in this thesis were accessed on 22 October 2017. 
In data protection law, the use of personal data is regulated if it involves any activity regarded as 
‘processing’. This is defined under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (‘DPD’) Art 2(b) as: 
‘…any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’. The UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 
(‘DPA 1998’) s 1(1) similarly defines processing as: ‘in relation to information or data, means 
obtaining, recording or holding the information or data or carrying out any operation or set of 
operations on the information or data, including— (a) organisation, adaptation or alteration of the 
information or data, (b) retrieval, consultation or use of the information or data, (c) disclosure of the 
information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, or (d) alignment, 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction of the information or data’.  
2 Understood within this thesis per the legal definition provided in the DPA 1998 s 1(1): ‘…data which 
relate to a living individual who can be identified— (a)from those data, or (b)from those data and 
other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data 
controller, and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the 
intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual’. 
3 A term defined under the DPA 1998 s 1(1): ‘…a person who (either alone or jointly or in common 
with other persons) determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, 
or are to be, processed.’  
4 The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (‘ICO’) (and Information Commissioner) are obligated 
‘to promote the following of good practice by data controllers and, in particular, so to perform his 
 
Chapter 1 Addressing the Public Interest Gap in Data Protection Law and Practice 
 
8 
new understanding and approach to the public interest concept in data protection law 
which is capable of attending to the public interests both in protecting informational 
privacy and in the undertaking of publicly beneficial uses of data. 
2. The Legal Context  
Over the last five years, European data protection law has been subject to an intensive 
reform effort, with the final text of the new General Data Protection Regulation 
(‘GDPR’)5 approved and set for implementation by Member States in May 2018.6 Since 
the enactment of the current Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (‘DPD’)7 , the 
growing use of personal data has raised significant practical, legal and ethical concerns. 
The DPD (effected by Member States’ implementing legislation) was to provide legal 
certainty and a level regulatory playing field for data controllers operating within the 
EU, which would simultaneously afford consistent protection to EU citizens.8 It is 
important to understand from the outset that the purpose of the DPD is twofold: to 
protect individuals’ rights and other interests in their data (most notably their 
informational privacy9) and to facilitate the free flow of personal data within the EU.10 
It is also important to distinguish between the protections offered under data 
protection law – discrete rights related to the use of an individual’s personal data – 
which are separate from (although potentially overlapping with) that same person’s 
right to respect for private and family life under both Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘CFR’) and Article 8 of the European 
                                                
functions under this Act as to promote the observance of the requirements of this Act by data 
controllers.’ DPA 1998, s 51. 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(‘GDPR’). 
6 ‘Reform of EU Data Protection Rules’ <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/reform/index_en.htm>. 
7 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data [1995] OJ L281 ‘Data Protection Directive’ (‘DPD’). 
8 DPD, Recitals 7-8. 
9 As distinguished from a broader right to privacy as, for example, enshrined in Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).  
10 For example, DPD, Recital 3. 
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Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).11 Anita Allen helpfully distinguishes between 
four types of privacy:  
 
(1) Informational privacy concerns access to personal information; (2) physical 
privacy concerns about access to persons and personal spaces; (3) decisional 
privacy concerns about governmental and other third-party interference with 
personal choices; and (4) proprietary privacy concerns about the appropriation 
and ownership of interests in human personality.12 
 
Of these, potentially the most relevant to this thesis is informational privacy, although it 
is acknowledged that uses of information (and specifically personal data) may impact 
upon the other types of privacy put forward by Allen. Consider the 2009 firing of 
‘Lindsay’ for berating her boss on Facebook while neglecting to remember he was one 
of her friends on the website;13 or the dire consequences for a family home and 
community when a 16-year-old’s birthday party invitation went viral;14 and finally the 
unfortunate outcome from bragging about your vacation when unsuspecting burglars 
are prowling your social media profile.15 It is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis 
to engage in a broader debate on the differences between rights to private and family 
life as enshrined in human rights law, versus the rights and interests protected within 
data protection (or as to ‘personal data’ under Article 8 of the CFR). Nevertheless, I 
would argue that the aims of human rights law vis-à-vis privacy are at least partially 
different to the aims of data protection legislation16. Whereas the former is charged 
                                                
11 The Treaty of Lisbon 2009 gives direct effect to the CFR which has its own discrete right to data 
protection (in its Article 8) and to privacy in Article 9. Thus, the CFR is the primary human rights law 
instrument that governs secondary EU law such as the DPD, forthcoming GDPR and any Member 
State’s implementing legislation on data protection. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 2012/C 326/02, Art 7-8 (‘CFR’). See discussion on distinguishing between rights to privacy and 
data protection law: Gillian Black and Leslie Stevens, ‘Enhancing Data Protection and Data Processing 
in the Public Sector: The Critical Role of Proportionality and the Public Interest’ (2013) 10 SCRIPTed 
1, 108–109.  
12 Anita Allen, ‘Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values’, Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and 
Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (YUP 1997) 33. 
13 Cathal Kelly, ‘Facebook Firing after “Friend” Boss Ripped’ 
<http://cybersmokeblog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/facebook-firing-after-friend-boss.html>. 
14 NBC News Staff and Wire Reports, ‘Thousands Descend on Tiny Dutch Town after Facebook 
Invitation Goes Viral’ (NBC News, 22 September 2012) 
<http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/22/14028638-thousands-descend-on-tiny-dutch-
town-after-facebook-invitation-goes-viral?lite>. 
15 Casey Johnston, ‘Post Smug Vacation Statuses on Facebook, Get Your House Burgled’ (Ars 
Technica, 2012) <http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/post-smug-vacation-statuses-on-
facebook-get-your-house-burgled/>. 
16 As argued throughout this thesis that the purpose of data protection is twofold and not solely about 
protecting informational privacy. For example, consider Recital 3 of the DPD. Thus, statements such 
 
Chapter 1 Addressing the Public Interest Gap in Data Protection Law and Practice 
 
10 
with protecting the private ‘life’ of an individual, the latter is concerned with the 
protection of privacy to the extent that it relates to personal data, whereby data 
protection law is equally focused on facilitating uses of data.  
 
A fundamental protection for individuals under data protection law is that data 
controllers must demonstrate their use of personal data is lawful.17 To be lawful, the 
processing of personal data must satisfy certain legal ‘conditions’.18 As stated above, I 
primarily concerned with the implementation of the public interest conditions for 
processing, and here I look in particular at the UK’s implementation of the DPD in 
the DPA 1998. 
 
In the UK, data controllers must independently determine what their legal basis is for 
processing personal data i.e. which legal condition for processing they will rely upon. 
Data controllers may establish their legal basis either by obtaining an individual’s 
consent or by demonstrating their use of personal data is necessary for a particular 
purpose (e.g. to carry out a contract).19 This determination is not reviewed unless the 
ICO later intervenes or there are subsequent adjudicative proceedings. In the DPA 
1998, the public interest concept is found within the legal conditions justifying the 
processing of both ‘ordinary’20 and ‘sensitive’21 personal data, but the term itself is not 
                                                
as by Buxton LJ in the Court of Appeal are simply incorrect (i.e. that ‘It is not easy to extract from this 
Directive any purpose other than the protection of privacy.’) Johnson v Medical Defence Union (No 1) 
[2007] EWCA Civ 262 [16]. 
17 DPD, Art 6(1)(a); DPA 1998, Sch 1, para 1. 
18 Throughout the thesis, I refer to these as the ‘conditions for processing’ personal data or ‘the public 
interest conditions’ for short. DPD, Recital 30; DPA 1998, Sch 1, paras 1(a)-(b). 
19 DPD, Art 7(a), (b).  
20 I use the term ‘ordinary’ where necessary to clearly distinguish between ‘personal’ and ‘sensitive’ 
personal data, which are subject to differing legal provisions within data protection legislation. I use 
the term ‘personal data’, on its own, to refer to both personal and sensitive personal data. For example, 
in the sentence on page 7 above (‘My focus is on the use of the public interest within the legal 
conditions for processing personal data in UK data protection legislation and practice.’) Here I am 
referencing both categories of data.  
21 In both the DPD and DPA 1998 certain types of personal data – called ‘special categories of data’ 
under the DPD and ‘sensitive data’ under the DPA 1998 – require data controllers to satisfy additional 
legal justifications to process. Under the DPD Art 8(1), special categories of data are defined as: 
‘personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life’. Under the DPA 
1998 s 2, sensitive data are defined as ‘…personal data consisting of information as to— (a) the racial 
or ethnic origin of the data subject, (b) his political opinions, (c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of 
a similar nature, (d) whether he is a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the M1Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992), (e) his physical or mental health or condition, 
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defined. Per Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d), the processing of ordinary personal data is 
justified if ‘[the] processing is necessary…for the exercise of any other functions of a 
public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.’ As to the legal conditions 
applicable to the processing of sensitive personal data,22 there is no blanket justification 
for processing based on the public interest. Instead, specific legal conditions were later 
added by the Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000 
(‘DPPSPD 2000’) to justify particular types of processing, such as for research 
purposes, based on it being in the ‘substantial public interest’.23  Even though the public 
interest is used as a final point of consideration when applying these legal conditions, 
the concept is undefined, as are other operative terms (e.g. ‘necessary’ and ‘public 
nature’).24 The public interest conditions have not been the subject of comprehensive 
guidance from the relevant supervisory authorities at the EU25 or UK level26, and have 
                                                
(f) his sexual life, (g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence, or (h) any 
proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him, the disposal of 
such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings’. Thus, the DPA 1998’s definition 
of sensitive data is more expansive, by explicitly including data on mental health, the commission or 
alleged commission of a crime/offence and on any proceeding regarding that offence. 
22 In DPA 1998, Sch 3. 
23 These were added to Sch 3 by the DPPSPD 2000. For example, under the DPPSPD 2000 Sch, para 
9, the processing of sensitive personal data for research is justified if: ‘the processing…(a) is in the 
substantial public interest; (b) is necessary for research purposes (which expression shall have the same 
meaning as in section 33 of the Act); (c) does not support measures or decisions with respect to any 
particular data subject otherwise than with the explicit consent of that data subject; and (d) does not 
cause, nor is likely to cause, substantial damage or substantial distress to the data subject or any other 
person.’ 
24 Considered in Chapter 3 Section 3. 
25 In reference to the Article 29 Working Party which is ‘composed of representatives of the national 
data protection authorities (DPA), the EDPS and the European Commission. It is a very important 
platform for cooperation, and its main tasks are to: Provide expert advice from the national level to 
the European Commission on data protection matters. Promote the uniform application of Directive 
95/46 in all Member States of the EU, as well as in Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland; Advise the 
Commission on any European Community law (so called first pillar), that affects the right to 
protection of personal data.’ The public interest conditions reflected in Article 7(e) and Article 8(4) of 
the DPD are briefly commented on by the Article 29 Working Party in early guidance on the reuse of 
data by public authorities. In this guidance, they merely state that the applicability of the public interest 
conditions is to be determined by the public authority in the first instance and that this 
‘…consequently leaves a certain margin of appreciation.’ No further direction is provided as to how 
this public interest in processing should be assessed. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
‘Opinion 7/2003 on the Re-Use of Public Sector Information and the Protection of Personal Data: 
Striking the Balance’ (2003) 5 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2003/wp83_en.pdf>; ‘Article 29 Working Party’ 
(European Data Protection Supervisor) 
<https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/site/mySite/Art29>. 
26 In reference to the ICO. The public interest conditions, as to either ordinary or sensitive personal 
data, are not addressed in the ICO’s most recent data protection guidance. ICO, ‘The Guide to Data 
Protection’ (2016) <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection-2-4.pdf>. 
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received relatively little critical attention within legal practice27 or academia28. Under 
what circumstances can an individual or organisation (whether public, private or third-
sector) lawfully process personal data because it is deemed to be ‘in the public interest’? 
Without a definition in the law or subsequent guidance, how can the ‘public interest’ 
in the processing of personal data be legitimately assessed? In other words, how can 
we prevent the use of the public interest, as a legal justification for processing, from 
becoming nothing more than empty rhetoric, meaning only what the individual making 
the claim wishes it to mean?  
 
3. The Problem: The Uncertain Role and Scope of the 
Public Interest Conditions for Processing Personal Data 
Since the enactment of the DPA 1998, a persistent problem for data controllers has 
been the uncertainty surrounding the legality of certain uses of personal data: it has 
been unclear what legal grounds they can (or should) rely upon to demonstrate the 
lawfulness of processing (e.g. such as through consent). Are the several alternative legal 
justifications in the conditions for processing ‘equal’ or is there an implicit hierarchy 
amongst these routes to legality?  
 
Neither the DPD nor DPA 1998 contains explicit or implicit preferences for any 
particular legal avenue to legitimise the use of personal data.29 However, the ambiguity 
over key terminology within the various conditions has led to pervasive legal 
uncertainty in practice.30 This legal uncertainty has proven inhibitive to the use of 
                                                
27 Considered by UK data protection practitioner, Rosemary Jay, to merely be a ‘mopping-up’ 
 provision that is likely to have its interpretation challenged through the courts by way of judicial 
review. Rosemary Jay, Data Protection Law & Practice (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 266. 
28 This lack of critical attention is discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, Section 2. Some notable 
exceptions are: Aileen McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual 
Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1999) 62 Modern Law Review 671, 671, 674; Graeme Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal 
Norms (CUP 2002) 279–298; David Townend, ‘Overriding Data Subjects’ Rights in the Public Interest’ 
in Deryck Beyleveld and others (eds), The Data Protection Directive and Medical Research Across Europe 
(Ashgate 2004); Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Data Protection and Genetics: Medical Research and the Public 
Good’ (2007) 18 King’s Law Journal 275; Mark Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on 
Privacy Protection (CUP 2012); Black and Stevens (n 11). 
29 DPD, Arts 7-8; DPA 1998, Sch 2 and Sch 3. 
30 For example, the meaning of the ‘public interest’ in Art 7(e) and ‘legitimate interests’ in Art 7(f). 
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personal data for research, the processing context I will make specific reference to 
throughout this thesis.31 The application of data protection law to research in the social 
sciences and humanities is of particular interest in light of the biomedical 
preoccupation of much of the literature.32		
	
The use of personal data for research is not ‘lawful’ in itself.33 This means that any use 
of personal data for research must be justified on one of the legal conditions for 
processing, such as consent.34 Furthermore where research requires the use of data 
originally collected for purposes other than research (e.g. reuse of data originally 
collected by a public body), the data controller must ensure that the reuse is 
compatible. 35  The legal uncertainty surrounding research uses of personal data is 
particularly problematic in the social sciences research context where there is a dearth 
of legal guidance or critical interpretation of the legality requirement, outwith 
                                                
31 Judith Strobl, Emma Cave and Tom Walley, ‘Data Protection Legislation: Interpretation and 
Barriers to Research’ (2000) 321 BMJ 890; Tom Walley, ‘Using Personal Health Information in 
Medical Research’ (2006) 332 BMJ 130; Graeme Laurie and Nayha Sethi, ‘Information Governance Of 
Use Of Health-Related Data In Medical Research In Scotland: Current Practices And Future 
Scenarios’ (The University of Edinburgh 2011) Working Paper No. 1 <http://www.scot-
ship.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reports/Working_Paper_1.pdf>; David Erdos, ‘Systematically 
Handicapped? Social Research in the Data Protection Framework’ (2011) 20 Information and 
Communications Technology Law 83; David Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket?  Social Research under the 
First Data Protection Principle’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
133; David Erdos, ‘Constructing the Labyrinth: The Impact of Data Protection on the Development 
of “Ethical” Regulation in Social Science’ (2012) 15 Information Communication and Society 104. 
32 Notwithstanding the following contributions which have influenced my thinking in this area: Robert 
Dingwall, ‘The Ethical Case against Ethical Regulation in Humanities and Social Science Research’ 
(2008) 3 21st Century Society: Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences 1; Erdos, ‘Systematically 
Handicapped? Social Research in the Data Protection Framework’ (n 31); Erdos, ‘Stuck in the 
Thicket?  Social Research under the First Data Protection Principle’ (n 31); Erdos, ‘Constructing the 
Labyrinth: The Impact of Data Protection on the Development of “Ethical” Regulation in Social 
Science’ (n 31); Andrew Charlesworth, ‘Data Protection, Freedom of Information and Ethical Review 
Committees’ (2012) 15 Information, Communication & Society 85. 
33 Although in the UK, the DPPSPD 2000 para 9 provides a legal ground for processing sensitive 
personal data for research if it is in the substantial public interest and meets other safeguarding 
conditions. There is no equivalent condition to processing ordinary personal data for research purposes. 
34 Although the DPD and DPA 1998 provide exemptions for research from compliance with certain 
provisions, including subject access and data minimisation. Art 13(2), DPD; s 33, DPA 1998. 
35  The second data protection principle, underlying both the DPD and DPA, is that of purpose 
specification and limitation. This principle requires that personal data are only ‘collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes [purpose specification] and not further processed in a way incompatible 
with those purposes [purpose limitation]’ (emphasis added). The reuse of personal data for research 
purposes is given an exemption from the purpose limitation requirement in the DPD, Art 6 6(1)(b) and 
the DPA s 33(2). I analyse the impact of purpose limitation on reuses of personal data for research in 
Chapter 2.  
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recommendations36 to rely upon individual consent or anonymisation.37 Even if many 
social sciences research projects are funded and carried out based on the promise of 
societal benefit and impact, the public interest conditions are disfavoured due to legal 
uncertainty regarding the scope and practical application of the public interest concept. 
The (legally and ethically) acceptable boundaries for applying the public interest 
conditions to research remain unknown. There is no legal precedent ‘testing’ the 
legality requirement in this context. How do data controllers prove the ‘public interest’ 
in their processing, if it has not happened yet? And what ‘proof’ will be sufficient?  
 
This uncertainty has fuelled a ‘culture of caution’, manifested in overly restrictive 
interpretations of the DPA 1998.38 A key example of this is the focus in research 
governance on obtaining informed consent, whereby the only alternative is considered 
to be the anonymisation of data – known familiarly as the consent-or-anonymise 
paradigm. 39 It is important to recognise this as the legal fallacy it is, given that the 
neither the DPD nor the DPA 1998 creates an explicit or implicit preference for 
consent – it is merely one of several avenues to legality. On the other hand, any 
                                                
36 Consent is treated as a ‘standard’ requirement for undertaking ethical social sciences research by 
leading stakeholders in the UK. JISC, ‘Processing Personal Data’ (2014) 
<https://www.jisc.ac.uk/guides/data-protection-and-research-data/processing-personal-data>; 
‘ESRC Framework for Research Ethics - Updated January 2015’ (2015) 
<http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/framework-for-research-ethics_tcm8-33470.pdf>; UK Data 
Archive, ‘Consent’ (2016) <http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/create-manage/consent-ethics/consent>. 
37 Additionally, the ‘legitimate interests’ condition is often recommended as an alternative to consent 
despite evidence that this condition is not applicable to public authorities, which under the UK 
includes universities (DPA, Part 1, s 1 and Sch 1, The Freedom of Information Act 2000 or a Scottish 
public authority as defined in Sch 1, The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002). EU case law 
supports this contention by providing that outwith consent, public authorities must rely upon Art 7(c) 
or (e) in the DPD, the equivalent of either Sch 2, para 3 (a legal obligation) or Sch 2, para 5 (exercise 
of a discretionary power) under the DPA 1998. Furthermore, under the final text of the GDPR the 
non-applicability of the legitimate interest provision to processing is confirmed in Art 6(1)(f). 
38 Walley (n 31) 130; Richard Thomas and Mark Walport, ‘Data Sharing Review Report’ (2008) 
<http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/infogov/links/datasharingreview.pdf>
; The Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘A New Pathway for the Regulation and Governance of Health 
Research’ (2011) 
<http://www.acmedsci.ac.uk/download.php?file=/images/project/130734957423.pdf>; Laurie and 
Sethi (n 31) 8–9; Graeme Laurie and Leslie Stevens, ‘The Administrative Data Research Centre 
Scotland: A Scoping Report on the Legal & Ethical Issues Arising from Access & Linkage of 
Administrative Data’ [2014] Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2014/35 12–23.  
39 See Chapter 2 Sections 2-4. Walley (n 31) 130; Sarah Clark and Albert Weale, ‘An Analysis of the 
Social Values Involved in Data Linkage Studies: Information Governance in Health’ (Nuffield Trust 
2011) 7–9 
<http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/sites/files/nuffield/information_governance_in_health_-
_research_report-_aug11.pdf>; Graeme Laurie and Emily Postan, ‘Rhetoric or Reality: What Is the 
Legal Status of the Consent Form in Health-Related Research?’ [2012] Medical Law Review 386. 
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perceived requirement that data must otherwise be anonymised (if consent is not 
obtained) entails adherence to a standard which remains subject to widespread 
confusion across Member States, with inconsistent interpretation 40  as to what is 
technically and practically required for data to be considered sufficiently ‘de-
identified’41 and thus outside the scope of data protection law. In Chapter 2, I will 
consider the impact of the consent or anonymise paradigm on the undertaking of social 
sciences and humanities research. 
 
Overall, while a helpful and potentially recognisable example for those of us working 
within academia, it is important to acknowledge that the practical impact of legal 
uncertainty in the research context is but one example of a widespread and pervasive 
overreliance on consent and anonymisation as a means to legal legitimacy under data 
protection law (e.g. it is also prevalent with commercial enterprises 42  and public 
authorities43).  
 
It is also crucial to understand, however, that my critical assessments are not undertaken 
with the view that data protection law is a mere ‘barrier’ to be overcome by the right 
legal advice. The legal uncertainty impacting on data controllers equally impacts upon 
individual data subjects.44 Individual consent and anonymisation have been treated as 
                                                
40 Compare: ICO, ‘Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk Code of Practice’ (2012) 6 
<https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf>; Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (2014) WP216 5 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf>. 
41 ‘De-identified’ data is a term used throughout the thesis to refer to data which are anonymised on an 
individual level (rather than creating aggregate/population level data) and where technical security and 
procedural mechanisms do not allow data to be traced back to an individual. Therefore, de-identified 
data are no longer directly or indirectly identifiable to the person processing data (such as a 
researcher), at least in a procedural and functional sense. This type of ‘de-identification’ is often 
deployed in academic research settings where public sector data (or ‘administrative data’) are used for 
research purposes. For example, ‘Getting Data for Research’ (ADRN, 2016) 
<https://adrn.ac.uk/getting-data/de-identification/>. 
42 Bart Custers and others, ‘Informed Consent in Social Media Use. The Gap between User 
Expectations and EU Personal Data Protection Law’ (2013) 10 SCRIPTed 435; Bart Custers, ‘Click 
Here to Consent Forever: Expiry Dates for Informed Consent’ (2016) 3 Big Data & Society. 
43 Thomas and Walport (n 38); The Law Commission, ‘Data Sharing Between Public Bodies - A 
Scoping Report’ (2014) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc351_data-sharing.pdf>. 
44 The terminology used in the DPD and DPA 1998 to refer to the individuals to whom personal data 
relate to. The DPD, Art 2(a) defines ‘data subject’ within the definition of personal data: ‘…any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
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panaceas for the protection of individuals’ rights and interests in their data. This is 
despite research demonstrating that even when consent is obtained it is seldom 
informed or indicative of a data controller fully respecting the rights of a data subject.45 
Furthermore, numerous (successful) scientific attempts at the re-identification of data 
previously considered ‘anonymised’46 demonstrate clear, residual and potential risks, 
risks exacerbated by the proliferation of publicly available personal data (e.g. from 
social media) and the rapid enhancement of data linkage technology. 47  As data 
collection and processing techniques have evolved over time so too have the risks and 
potential harms posed to individuals.48 Given the ubiquitous way in which personal 
data are now collected, it is unrealistic to expect that the obtaining of consent, at any 
fixed point in time, can accurately communicate to an individual the full spectrum of 
                                                
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity’. Whereas the DPA 1998, s 1(1) defines ‘data subject’ in a standalone provision: 
‘…means an individual who is the subject of personal data’. 
45 Roger Brownsword, ‘The Cult of Consent: Fixation and Fallacy’ (2004) 15 Kings College Law 
Journal; Solon Barocas and Nissenbaum, Helen, ‘On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent’ 
(2009) <https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/ED_SII_On_Notice.pdf>; Graeme 
Laurie and Shawn Harmon, ‘Through the Thicket and Across the Divide: Successfully Navigating the 
Regulatory Landscape in Life Sciences Research’ 2013/30 University of Edinburgh, Research Paper 
Series; Paolo Balboni and others, ‘Legitimate Interest of the Data Controller New Data Protection 
Paradigm: Legitimacy Grounded on Appropriate Protection’ (2013) 3 International Data Privacy Law 
244; Custers and others (n 42); Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Big Data’s End Run around 
Anonymity and Consent’ in Julia Lane and others (eds), Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks 
for Engagement (Kindle, CUP 2014). 
46 As provided by Khaled El Emam, a leading authority on anonymisation techniques, the term ‘de-
identification’ is used more frequently in North America whereas ‘anonymisation’ is used more 
frequently in Europe. In line with El Emam’s analysis, I use these terms interchangeably to refer to the 
process of de-identifying data. However, throughout the thesis I refer to my particular definition for ‘de-
identified data’ (note 41 above) when discussing data that results from the application of a specific 
anonymisation/de-identification process. Khaled El Emam, Sam Rodgers and Bradley Malin, 
‘Anonymising and Sharing Individual Patient Data’ (2015) 350 BMJ : British Medical Journal 1. 
47 Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller, ‘A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749 - New York 
Times’ <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>; 
Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, ‘De-Anonymizing Social Networks’, 30th IEEE Symposium on 
Security & Privacy (2009) <https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak09.pdf>; Melissa Gymrek 
and others, ‘Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference’ (2013) 339 Science 321; Latanya 
Sweeney and Ji Su Yoo, ‘De-Anonymizing South Korean Resident Registration Numbers Shared in 
Prescription Data’ [2015] Technology Science. 
48 Judith Rauhofer, ‘Round and Round the Garden? Big Data, Small Government and the Balance of 
Power in the Information Age’ (2014) 2014 University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper 
Series; Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, ‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55 BCL Rev. 93; Katherine J Strandberg, ‘Monitoring, Datafication, 
and Consent: Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context’, Privacy, Big Data, and the Public 
Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Kindle Edition, CUP 2014); Graeme Laurie and others, ‘A Review of 
Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical Data’ (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics and Wellcome Trust Expert Advisory Group on Data Access 2015) 
<http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evidence-gathering/>. 
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these risks and harms, not to mention the remote likelihood that 1) individuals will take 
the time to read the associated information 2) fully comprehend it or 3) have 
meaningful alternative options other than the disclosure of their data. 
 
The consent-or-anonymise paradigm unduly inhibits more holistic consideration of the 
protection of individuals’ rights and interests in their data, as data collection, processing 
and reuse practices continue to evolve over time and consequently present new types 
of risks and potential harms. However, this paradigm equally hinders fuller 
consideration of the potential benefits and public interests to be reaped by certain uses 
of personal data. The dual aims of data protection law are inclusive of two broad public 
interests – the protection of informational privacy and in certain uses of personal data. 
Current approaches which rely on consent or anonymisation to satisfy the 
requirements of data protection law are arguably misguided and unable to fully attend 
to these public interests. 
4. Scope and Contribution  
This thesis offers a new understanding of the public interest concept as applied to the 
context of data processing, grounded in extensive legal and theoretical analysis. I 
suggest legislative amendments and new procedures that can be used to deploy this 
new understanding of the concept in a way that facilitates both the public interests in 
protecting informational privacy and in certain uses of personal data. While any 
discussion of the public interest as a justification for processing is often focused on the 
idea of ‘proving’ the public interest in the proposed data use, I argue that the public 
interest is not capable of being ‘located’ or ‘proven’ in a singular and static way. It is, 
and always will be, a highly contested concept49 that can only be established through open 
                                                
49 The idea of an ‘essentially contested concept’ was developed by W B Gallie in 1955 and refers to 
‘concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the 
part of their users.’ Mansbridge, as do other theorists, use Gallie’s concept ‘essentially contested’ to 
analyse the public interest. See Chapter 4, Section 2. WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ 
(1955) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167, 168–169; Jane Mansbridge, ‘On the Contested 
Nature of the Public Good’ in Walter W Powell and Elisabeth S Clemens (eds), Private Action and the 
Public Good (YUP 1998); Ian O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating About the Public Interest’ (2010) 16 Res Publica 
299. 
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dialogue amongst and on behalf of the relevant ‘publics’50 who may be affected by the 
data processing in question.  
 
The original contribution of this thesis is to offer a legally and 
theoretically sound basis for data controllers to engage in discussions 
and considerations of the public interest as applied to their processing 
of personal data, where the public interest may be used to justify 
processing. I also suggest ways in which the ICO and courts would 
assess data controllers’ initial determination that their processing is 
justifiable in the public interest. 
 
While it is not my aim (and arguably not possible) to define the public interest 
exhaustively, data protection law uses the concept at important legal junctures without 
providing appropriate mechanisms to deploy it consistently with the aims of the 
legislation. The public interest is a critical legal concept in data protection that can be 
used to support and facilitate cooperative behaviour, and thus enable publicly 
beneficial uses of data, but is justifiable in that role only insofar as informational privacy 
is also protected and recognised as equally serving a distinct public interest. The 
approach developed in this thesis is capable of doing just this.  
 
4.1 Audience 
This thesis was undertaken with the research context in mind (social sciences research 
in particular), with a view to improving understandings of data protection law and its 
requirements in this context and therefore to positively impact the undertaking of 
research which serves the public interest. Nevertheless, the findings and insights 
generated have far wider application – to medical research, commercial and third sector 
research and for any use of personal data which may be justifiable based on the public 
interest conditions. Indeed, under UK data protection law, neither the concept of the 
public interest nor research is used solely in regards to the public sector but 
encompasses the commercial and third sectors as well.51 Thus, the audience for this 
                                                
50 The idea of the ‘public’ or ‘publics’ in the public interest is understood here to encompass both the 
ideas of ‘a’ public as ‘a concrete audience, a crowd witnessing itself in visible space, as with a theatrical 
public’ and ‘the’ public as ‘a kind of social totality … thought to include everyone within the field in 
question.’ See Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 Section 3.1. Michael Warner, ‘Publics and Counterpublics’ 
(2002) 14 Public Culture 49, 49–50. 
51 Per the DPA 1998 Sch 2 para 5(d), the public interest condition to processing ordinary personal data 
may be satisfied ‘by any person’. Under s 33 of the DPA 1998, research is broadly defined as including: 
‘statistical or historical purposes’. As discussed in Chapter 3, the scope of ‘research’ processing is 
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work includes individuals and organisations engaged in research (regardless of sector) 




The geographical context of my thesis is UK-centric but draws upon European primary 
and secondary resources given the connection between Member State data protection 
law as the required legislative implementation of the DPD. This connection with the 
EU is also relevant given the forthcoming GDPR, which despite the UK’s 2016 
European Referendum result, will come into force for a period in 2018 until the 
completion of UK exit negotiations from the EU.52 The thesis is therefore written per 
the current state of the law under the UK’s DPA 1998. However, where relevant, 
references will be made to provisions of the GDPR and how it may impact the status 
quo. 
 
4.3 Research methods  
This thesis is founded upon desk-based research from UK and EU sources within the 
fields of data protection and human rights law, information and research governance 
and political and legal theory on the public interest. Although there are clear legal cases 
of overlap between data protection law and ‘privacy’ as a human right under the ECHR, 
my focus is on the public interest conditions within UK and European data protection 
law. When relevant, I draw upon literature from other jurisdictions, most notably the 
US, a country with a rich history of debate and discourse surrounding the public 
interest concept. To inform my legislative and procedural suggestions made in Chapter 
                                                
inclusive of a wide array of purposes, including social sciences research per the discussions in the 
DPD’s travaux préparatoires.  
52 The UK Government confirmed this in October 2016: ‘We will be members of the EU in 2018 and 
therefore it would be expected and quite normal for us to opt into the GDPR and then look later at 
how best we might be able to help British business with data protection while maintaining high levels 
of protection for members of the public.’ ‘Oral Evidence - Responsibilities of the Secretary of State 
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6, I draw upon the Australian experience in authorising public interest uses of personal 
data.  
 
I have undertaken extensive work to examine the legislative history of the DPD and 
DPA 1998 to analyse underexplored interpretations of the public interest concept in 
data protection law and the relationship of the public interest provisions to processing 
personal data for research. The conceptual gaps on the public interest that I have 
identified in the law have been ‘filled’ through significant research into public interest 
‘theory’ spanning both historical (e.g. Plato, Hobbes53, Hume54 and Bentham55) and 
more contemporary accounts of the concept (e.g. Sorauf 56 , Barry 57 , Held 58  and 
Bozeman59). This combination of research into the legislative history on the public 
interest conditions and theoretical work on the concept is a novel undertaking in data 
protection, and in its application to the social sciences research context. The legal 
analysis of common and distinguishing features of the public interest as deployed in 
analogous areas of law, namely copyright, whistleblowing and freedom of information, 
is also an original undertaking when contrasted with data protection.  
 
Furthermore, a significant amount of supplementary evidence has been provided 
through my ongoing work with researchers, public authorities and regulators as a 
Research Fellow for the UK’s ESRC-funded Administrative Data Research Centre 
Scotland (‘ADRC-S’).60 This work and my involvement in consultancy projects for 
organisations such as NHS Education for Scotland, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
and Wellcome Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access, has contributed to my 
                                                
53 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (iTunes edition, Public Domain 1679). 
54 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Eighteenth Century Collections Online, 
Gale 2004). 
55 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Dover edition, Dove 
Publications, Inc 2007). 
56 Frank Sorauf, ‘The Public Interest Reconsidered’ (1957) 19 Journal of Politics 616. 
57 Brian Barry, Political Argument (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1965). 
58 Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970); Virginia Held, 
‘Justification: Legal and Political’ (1975) 86 Ethics 1; Virginia Held, Rights and Goods: Justifying Social 
Action (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 1989). 
59 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism (iTunes Edition, 
Georgetown University Press 2007). 
60 ‘Administrative Data Research Centre Scotland’ <http://adrn.ac.uk/centres/scotland>. 
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knowledge and experience in applying data protection law to both the social sciences 
and biomedical research context.  
 
Below I provide a brief outline of the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
 
4.4 Thesis outline 
 
Chapter 2: The Need to Develop the Public Interest Conditions for Processing: 
The Downside of Current Paradigms of Compliance 
In Chapter 2 I examine the reasons behind the predominance of the consent-or-
anonymise paradigm and its negative impact on the protection of informational privacy 
and on the undertaking of social sciences and humanities research. 
 
Chapter 3: Tracing the History and Application of the Public Interest in Data 
Protection Law – a UK and European Perspective 
In Chapter 3 I provide a deep analysis of the legislative history to the DPD and DPA 
1998 to examine the purpose and scope of the public interest conditions. 
 
Chapter 4: Reviving the Public Interest Concept in Data Protection Law 
In Chapter 4 I expand my legal and theoretical analysis beyond data protection law to 
address the gaps in understanding the meaning of the public interest concept.  
 
Chapter 5: Apples and Oranges? (In)consistencies of the Public Interest 
Concept in Freedom of Information, Copyright and Whistleblowing Law 
In Chapter 5 I consider the use of the public interest in analogous areas of law to 
further develop a conceptual and practical understanding of what is required to 
successfully deploy the public interest in legal settings. 
 
Chapter 6: Key Components and a New Approach to Making Public Interest 
Determinations in Data Protection Law 
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Based on the legal and theoretical analysis undertaken, I set forth key components to 
understanding the public interest in data protection and propose legislative 
amendments and procedures for deploying this new understanding.  
 
Chapter 7: The Meaning, Value and Utility of the Public Interest Concept for 
Data Protection Law 
I conclude the thesis by summarising how the new understanding and approach to the 
public interest concept developed can improve data protection law and practice in 
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Chapter 2 The Need to Develop 
the Public Interest Conditions for 
Processing: The Downside of 
Current Paradigms of 
Compliance 
1. Introduction 
This thesis offers a novel analysis of the public interest concept in data protection. The 
approach I will develop for analysing the public interest will shed light on currently 
unresolved questions regarding the resolution of tensions between protecting 
informational privacy and using personal data. The uncertainty which surrounds the 
public interest concept in data protection impacts negatively upon data subjects and 
data controllers. Under what conditions can a public, private or third-sector entity 
process personal data because it is deemed to be ‘in the public interest’? And by whom, 
and how, should this be decided? These are the questions I am most concerned with in 
this thesis and which are the focus of my contribution: to enhance the understanding 
of the public interest concept in data protection. 
 
Although the public interest is often invoked rhetorically to support various data 
initiatives,61 the actual legal provisions (in the DPA 1998) permitting the processing of 
                                                
61 For example, new research initiatives which require access to personal (or de-identified) data often 
describe the intended use of data in terms of the public interests served: ‘Benefits of Administrative 
Data’ (Administrative Data Research Network, 2016) <https://adrn.ac.uk/admin-data/benefits/>; ‘What 
Happens to Your Health Data?’ (The Farr Institute of Health Informatics Research) 
<http://www.farrinstitute.org/public-engagement-involvement/what-happens-to-your-health-data>. 
As a further example, the public interest in national security is often invoked in the context of 
justifying surveillance and the bulk collection of data, such as with the controversial Investigatory 
Powers Bill: ‘Investigatory Powers Bill’ (GOV.UK, 7 June 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investigatory-powers-bill>; ‘Investigatory Powers Bill: 
May Defends Surveillance Powers’ (BBC News, 15 March 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-35810628>; ‘“Leaked Report” Reveals Mass Data Fears’ (BBC News, 7 June 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36469351>; ‘Majority of UK MPs Back Investigatory 
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personal data on the basis of the public interest are rarely used in favour of the 
perceived ‘safe’ approach to data protection compliance, namely by obtaining 
individual consent or anonymising data prior to use.62 Indeed, since the enactment of 
the DPA 1998, interpretation of the law has been plagued by a ‘culture of caution’63 – 
risk averse interpretations and cautious data practices (although such ‘caution’ 
seemingly has had no impact on the prevalence of data security breaches, particularly 
by UK public authorities64). When data controllers consider their legal basis for using 
and sharing data for new purposes, the legal provisions requiring an exercise of 
discretion are often avoided for what are perceived as more straightforward means of 
compliance: seeking consent or anonymising data. Having data subjects tick-a-box to 
consent or anonymising data is perceived as simpler and safer (from a liability 
perspective) than engaging in uncertain balancing exercises weighing the rights and 
public interests in a given data processing context.  
 
This consent-or-anonymise paradigm of data protection has been criticised65 as being 
incapable of comprehensively addressing the rights and interests at stake; both in terms 
of individuals’ rights and interests in their data, and the public interests in 1) 
safeguarding privacy and 2) in processing data. Informational privacy is often treated 
as oppositional to the public interest in a use of data. Moreover, the ‘fetishisation of 
                                                
62 See Section 4 below. 
63 See Section 2 below. House of Lords, Science and Technology Committee, ‘2nd Report of Session 
2008-09, Genomic Medicine’ (2009) para 6.15 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldsctech/107/107i.pdf>; Nayha Sethi 
and Graeme T Laurie, ‘Delivering Proportionate Governance in the Era of eHealth: Making Linkage 
and Privacy Work Together’ (2013) 13 Medical Law International 168, 172–173; Graeme Laurie and 
Leslie Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the Governance and Use of Administrative 
Data in the United Kingdom’ (2016) 43 Journal of Law and Society 360, 362–365. 
64 For example, the UK’s health sector (including NHS trusts) continues to account for the most data 
breach incidents reported to the ICO. ‘Data Security Incident Trends’ (ICO, 2 December 2016) 
<https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/data-security-incident-trends/>; Leslie Stevens and others, 
‘Dangers from Within? Looking Inwards at the Role of Maladministration as the Leading Cause of 
Health Data Breaches in the UK’, Data Protection and Privacy: (In)visibilities and Infrastructures (Springer 
2017).  
65 Criticised in context of genetic, biomedical and social sciences research: Laurie (n 28) 279–296; 
Elizabeth Murphy and Robert Dingwall, ‘Informed Consent, Anticipatory Regulation and 
Ethnographic Practice’ (2007) 65 Informed Consent in a Changing Environment 2223; Dingwall (n 
32); Lee A Bygrave and Dag Wiese Schartum, ‘Consent, Proportionality and Collective Power’ in Serge 
Gutwirth and others (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer 2009); Mark Taylor, ‘Health Research, 
Data Protection, and the Public Interest in Notification’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 267; Heather 
Widdows, ‘The Individualist Assumptions of Ethical Frameworks’, The Connected Self: The Ethics and 
Governance of the Genetic Individual (CUP 2013); Barocas and Nissenbaum (n 45). 
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consent’, 66  for example, can wrongly characterise a perfectly lawful, ethical (and 
publicly beneficial) form of data processing as ‘unlawful’ or ‘unethical’ (or both) if 
consent is not obtained, even though consent is neither legally necessary under the 
DPA 1998 nor ethically sufficient to provide robust data protection to individuals. 
Nevertheless, the consent-or-anonymise paradigm reflects the dominant means of 
compliance with data protection law and this impacts upon stakeholders’ 
understanding of 1) what the relevant interests are and 2) how to best resolve the 
tensions between protecting and using personal data.  
 
Section 2 begins by considering why the consent-or-anonymise paradigm has 
dominated compliance efforts in the UK, reflecting upon the culture of caution and its 
role in influencing data protection practices. Section 3 unpacks the paradigm further 
to demonstrate why this approach to data protection is detrimental to the protection 
of individuals’ informational privacy. Section 4 continues by considering the impact 
upon public interest uses of data from the context of research. In examining the 
consent-or-anonymise paradigm, and the lack of meaningful engagement with the 
public interest route to processing, it becomes clear that the public interest conditions 
are an underexplored area of data protection.  
 
2. The Culture of Caution and the Dominance of the 
Consent-or-Anonymise Paradigm 
Navigating the UK’s DPA 1998 has been likened to weaving one’s way through a 
thicket67 and described as ‘… a cumbersome and inelegant piece of legislation.’68 It is 
not insignificant that these statements were made by judges (in this case Mr Justice 
Morland and Lord Phillips). If the DPA 1998 is cumbersome for the legal experts of 
the UK, what of the countless data controllers without expert legal advice, who must 
take decisions based on this legislation on a frequent, if not daily basis? What impact 
                                                
66 A phrase coined by Brownsword. Brownsword (n 45); Laurie and Postan (n 39). 
67 Naomi Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC 499 (QB), [72] (Morland J). 
68 Naomi Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ No: 1373, [72] (Phillips LJ). 
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does this have on the protection of individuals’ informational privacy and on the 
undertaking of publicly beneficial forms of data processing, such as research? 
 
2.1 Unpacking the culture of caution 
Since the enactment of the DPA 1998, the UK Government has commissioned various 
evidence reviews to assess the efficacy and impact of data protection law on particular 
sectors of activity. Of relevance to this thesis is Thomas and Walport’s 2008 ‘Data 
Sharing Review Report’, and the more recent 2014 England and Wales’ Law 
Commission report ‘Data Sharing Between Public Bodies - A Scoping Report’.69 The 
topic of ‘data sharing’ is of significance given that increasingly, researchers rely upon 
data which have been originally collected for other purposes and thus require data 
controllers to share data with them. Both reports contain evidence from consultation 
responses and in-person meetings with data controllers and other stakeholders across 
the UK.70 Overwhelmingly, the evidence revealed a culture of caution surrounding 
decisions to share or reuse data, within the UK’s public sector in particular.  
 
The term a ‘culture of caution’ was coined by Scotland’s current Chief Science Officer 
Professor Andrew Morris, when he gave evidence to the House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee for their 2008-09 Session.71 Regarding the regulation of the 
Generation Scotland Project, which provides ‘a bioresource of human biological 
samples available for medical research’ from 30,000 individuals across Scotland,72 
Professor Morris commented: 
 
The Department of Health guidance suggests that this domain is affected by 
43 relevant pieces of legislation. There were 12 sets of relevant standards and 
                                                
69Thomas and Walport (n 38); The Law Commission (n 43).  
70 Thomas and Walport’s review covered all sectors (public, private and voluntary) and the entirety of 
the UK, whereas the Law Commission focused solely on data sharing between public authorities in 
England and Wales. Both report views from data controllers, data protection professionals (such as 
data protection officers and legal counsel) and other stakeholders including researchers, academics 
with interest and expertise in data protection, healthcare providers and so forth. Thomas and Walport 
(n 38) 11–12; The Law Commission (n 43) 3–5. 
71 The report summarises the evidence received and an analysis of the legal, ethical and social (among 
other) issues surrounding genomic medicine and the undertaking of associated research. ‘Oral 
Evidence’ (UK House of Lords, Science and Technology Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2008-09, 2009) 58 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldsctech/107/107i.pdf>.  
72 The University of Edinburgh, ‘Generation Scotland - General Information’ (2016) 
<http://www.ed.ac.uk/generation-scotland/about/general-information>. 
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eight professional codes of conduct. What this has bred is a culture of caution, 
confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency ... so for us to interpret it and to have consistent 
interpretation from legal bodies who have data protection responsibilities is absolutely key. 
Currently this is the major issue in terms of the ability to safely link data in a 
way which is in the public good with appropriate security.73 
 
Although Professor Morris’ comment was made in specific reference to the 
overlapping regulatory regimes applicable to biomedical research, the culture of 
caution resulting (at least in part74) from legal complexity and ambiguity is also apparent 
in data practices far beyond this particular context. Thomas and Walport, whose review 
focused on uncovering barriers to data sharing between and across sectors, found that 
data controllers were operating within a fog of confusion surrounding the legal 
framework for data sharing resulting in a culture that is risk averse.75 Decisions to share 
data were eventually made but not without agonising delays which Thomas and 
Walport cited as ‘unacceptable’ given that they found few examples where the barriers 
(legal, resource, cultural or otherwise) to data sharing were insurmountable.76 Although 
often cited as the critical barrier to data sharing, they ‘… found that in the vast majority 
of cases, the law itself does not provide a barrier to the sharing of personal data.’77 To 
overcome barriers to data sharing, Thomas and Walport suggest an approach to 
decision-making based on the principle of proportionality, defined as: 
 
… the application of objective judgement as to whether the benefits outweigh 
the risks, using what some might call the test of reasonableness or common 
sense. Proportionality involves making a considered and high-quality decision 
based on the circumstances of the case, including the consequence of not 
sharing. Decisions must flow especially from the principles of relevance and 
necessity and the need to avoid an excessive approach.78 
 
                                                
73 ‘Oral Evidence’ (n 71) 58 (emphasis added).  
74 In research conducted for the ADRC-S, my colleague Professor Graeme Laurie and I have 
identified other key factors contributing to the culture of caution. For example, resource constraints, 
shortage of relevant technical and legal expertise, concerns with liability and reputational damage, are 
all factors, which in addition to legal complexity and uncertainty, contribute to cultures of caution 
surrounding the use and sharing of data. Graeme Laurie and Leslie Stevens, ‘Developing a Public 
Interest Mandate for the Governance and Use of Administrative Data in the United Kingdom’ (2016) 
43 Journal of Law and Society 360, 383; Graeme Laurie and others, ‘From a Culture of Caution to a 
Culture of Confidence: Lessons Learned from Implementing the Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011 - 
Workshop Report’ (2016) <http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/files//record-keeping/public-records-
act/prsa-adrc-report.pdf>. 
75 Thomas and Walport (n 38) 35–39; 54. 
76 ibid 54. 
77 ibid i. 
78 ibid 14 (emphasis added). 
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If Thomas and Walport’s extensive evidence gathering and engagement did not reveal 
insurmountable barriers to data sharing, the ‘agonising’ delays cited by consultees 
suggests that decision-making processes were not proportionate to the risks and 
benefits of the data sharing in question. In Section 4 below I consider the impact of 
the consent-or-anonymise paradigm – a manifestation of the culture of caution – on 
the undertaking of research. 
 
Like Professor Morris, Thomas and Walport cited the complex and overlapping legal 
regimes as a key contributing factor to the difficulties faced in taking decisions on data 
sharing, specifically referencing the ambiguity surrounding practical interpretation of 
the DPA 1998.79 Similar views were echoed six years later in the evidence gathered by 
England and Wales’ Law Commission; several public sector consultees did not find the 
DPA 1998 readily understandable80 citing various parts of the legislation which were 
particularly confusing to implement. This included references to difficulties faced by 
data controllers in interpreting the meaning of ‘necessary’ as it applied to various 
conditions for processing in Schedules 2 and 3; questions over when it was appropriate 
                                                
79 Barriers to data sharing stemming from inconsistent interpretation of data protection laws and legal 
‘grey areas’ are problematic in jurisdictions far beyond the UK including in Australia, New Zealand 
and the US. J Ramon Gil-Garcia, InduShobha Chengalur-Smith and Peter Duchessi, ‘Collaborative E-
Government: Impediments and Benefits of Information-Sharing Projects in the Public Sector’ (2007) 
16 European Journal of Information Systems 121; Thomas and Walport (n 38) 22, 35–36; Christine M 
O’Keefe and Chris J Connolly, ‘Privacy and the Use of Health Data for Research’ (2010) 193 The 
Medical Journal of Australia 537; Jane Fedorowicz, Janis L Gogan and Mary J Culnan, ‘Barriers to 
Interorganizational Information Sharing in E-Government: A Stakeholder Analysis’ (2010) 26 The 
Information Society 315; AMB Lips, RR O’Neill and EA Eppel, ‘Cross-Agency Collaboration in New 
Zealand: An Empirical Study of Information Sharing Practices, Enablers and Barriers in Managing for 
Shared Social Outcomes’ (2011) 34 Int J Public Adm; Jussi Sane and Michael Edelstein, ‘Overcoming 
Barriers to Data Sharing in Public Health: A Global Perspective’ (Chatham House: The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs 2015) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150417Overco
mingBarriersDataSharingPublicHealthSaneEdelstein.pdf>; Elizabeth Green and others, ‘Enabling 
Data Linkage to Maximise the Value of Public Health Research Data’ (Wellcome Trust 2015) 
<https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/enabling-data-linkage-to-maximise-value-of-public-
health-research-data-phrdf-mar15.pdf>.  
80 The Law Commission (n 43) 53.      
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to apply the section 33 research exemption;81 and how to determine whether data have 
been sufficiently anonymised to be taken outside the scope of data protection law.82 
 
2.2 Legal ambiguity 
The evidence gathered in both reports indicates widespread difficulties for data 
controllers in interpreting provisions of the DPA 1998, specifically where bright line 
rules do not apply (or are not provided) and an exercise of discretion is needed. For 
example, uncertainty arises when determining whether it is ‘necessary’ to share data, 
and if so, under what authority and what conditions sharing should occur. As provided 
by Thomas and Walport, the data protection principles in Schedule 1 of the DPA 1998 
are: ‘sound, balancing individual protection against the wider need to process and share 
information. They provide a sensible approach to handling and processing data, neither 
inhibiting nor promoting data sharing.’ 83  The problem lies in applying the principles in 
practice: ‘… the Data Protection Act does not, and maybe by itself cannot, provide a 
sufficiently practical framework for making decisions about whether and how to share 
personal data.’84  
 
The applicability of key provisions, notably the conditions for processing, rest upon 
the interpretation of concepts such as ‘necessary’ and the ‘public interest’ that are not 
defined in the DPA 1998. It is also unclear how other principles should apply to such 
determinations, notably the European jurisprudential principle of ‘proportionality’ that 
is referenced in UK cases where the ‘necessity’ of processing is considered. 85 
                                                
81 Which exempts the processing of ordinary personal data from complying with the second and fifth 
data protection principles and from subject access requests, so long as 1) the processing is not used to 
take decisions on individuals and 2) is unlikely to cause substantial damage and distress to the data 
subjects or any other person. Although not an exemption, the DPPSPD 2000 provides a legal basis for 
processing sensitive personal data for research purposes so long as it is 1) in the substantial public 
interest; 2) is ‘necessary’ for research purposes; 3) is not used to take decisions on individuals and 4) 
does not cause or is not likely to cause substantial damage or distress to the data subject or any other 
person. The DPPSPD 2000 was enacted by the UK per the derogations allowed by Article 8(4) of the 
DPD. 
82 The Law Commission (n 43) 53–54. 
83 Thomas and Walport (n 38) 36 (emphasis added). 
84 ibid. 
85 For example: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ex parte Daly) [2001] UKHL 26 [26]-[27] 
(Steyn LJ); R (Ellis) v Chief Constable of Essex Police [2003] EWHC 1321 (Admin) [1], [27]-[29] (Goldring 
J); Stone v South East Coast Strategic Health Authority [2006] EWHC 1668 (Admin)[60] (Davis J); Corporate 
Officer of the House of Commons v The Information Commissioner and Others [2009] 3 All ER 403 [59]; R (on the 
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Proportionality is neither specifically referenced in the DPA 1998 nor uniformly 
interpreted by UK Courts. In such circumstances, authoritative guidance could 
enhance data controllers’ confidence when taking decisions regarding data sharing 
which can help facilitate the use and sharing of data when it is in the public interest to 
do so. However, in the specific context of the use and sharing of data for research, that 
is the focus of this thesis, the legislation has not been tested and a myriad of sometimes 
conflicting professional, governmental and academic guidance proliferate.86  
 
Undoubtedly it is because the DPA 1998 applies to all processing of personal data 
within the UK, regardless of purpose or the sector of activity, that its provisions must 
be broadly formulated and applicable to the widest range of contexts. While it is outside 
the scope of this thesis to consider the merits of comprehensive data protection 
legislation versus a sectoral approach to regulation (as applied in the United States)87, 
the all-encompassing nature of the DPA 1998 inevitably leaves the legislation open to 
misinterpretation. I am arguing that the legal ambiguity surrounding key provisions of 
the legislation, which has gone unresolved for nearly two decades, puts at risk both 
                                                
application of Catt) (AP) (Respondent) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another (Appellants) [2015] 
UKSC 9 [6]; R (AB) v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [2015] EWHC 1238 (Admin). 
86 For example, each UK university will have its own data protection guidance for researchers that may 
differ from the guidance provided by a specific department or school within that university; this 
guidance might further differ from the guidance provided by a research funder or research centre. 
Consider the various data protection guidance documents from the University of Edinburgh 
applicable to researchers, compared to that of the funder for my research fellowship (the ESRC) and 
provided by my research centre the Administrative Data Research Centre Scotland. The University of 
Edinburgh, ‘Research and the Data Protection Act’ (2008) <http://www.ed.ac.uk/records-
management/data-protection/guidance-policies/research/act>; The University of Edinburgh, ‘Data 
Protection for Students’ (2014) <http://www.ed.ac.uk/records-management/data-
protection/guidance-policies/dpforstudents>; The University of Edinburgh, ‘University of Edinburgh 
Data Protection Policy’ (2015) <http://www.ed.ac.uk/records-management/data-protection/data-
protection-policy>; The University of Edinburgh, ‘Research Ethics and Data Protection’ (2016) 
<http://www.ed.ac.uk/records-management/data-protection/guidance-policies/research/ethics>; 
ESRC, ‘Data Protection’ <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-
ethics/frequently-raised-topics/data-requirements/data-protection/>; ADRN, ‘Data Protection Act’ 
<https://adrn.ac.uk/protecting-privacy/legal/dpa/>. 
87 Considered by: Patricia L Bellia, ‘Federalization in Information Privacy Law’ (2009) 118 Yale Law 
Journal 868; Paul M Schwartz, ‘Preemption and Privacy’ (2009) 118 Yale Law Journal; Kenneth A 
Bamberger and Deirdre K Mulligan, ‘Privacy on the Books and on the Ground’ (2010) 63 Stanford 
Law Review 247. See report commissioned by the European Parliament comparing the standard of 
data protection in EU versus the US in the law enforcement context which provides comprehensive 
comparisons: European Parliament, ‘A Comparison between US and EU Data Protection Legislation 
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aims of the DPA 1998 – to protect informational privacy and facilitate the use of 
personal data. 
 
In other work, myself and a colleague have argued that the law in itself is not the 
greatest barrier to data sharing within the UK’s public sector; rather, organisational 
cultural and sector-specific practices surrounding data are far more a hindrance to the 
use and sharing of data for research purposes. 88  Organisational cultures do 
fundamentally influence how data are viewed and handled.89 When cultures of caution 
predominate, decisions are taken from a risk averse position, prioritising the interests 
and risks perceived as important by a particular data controller organisation, in 
potential neglect of the wider public (and private) interests at stake. The ambiguity 
surrounding key provisions of data protection law in the UK contributes to this culture 
of caution and it is this legal deficiency which I am chiefly concerned with, as it is one 
which is resolvable through legislative change as opposed to reliance on divergent 
interpretations or ad hoc judicial decisions. The potential ‘success’ of legislative 
changes in this area of data protection law is evidenced by the successful deployment 
of the public interest concept in analogous areas of UK law and the legislative solutions 
employed in other common law jurisdictions.90  
 
Here, I am directly criticising the law and highlighting what is most problematic for 
those charged with interpreting and implementing the DPA 1998 on a regular basis. 
Initially, data controllers are required to determine their legal basis for processing 
personal data, often without the assistance of legal experts; yet, neither the law nor 
subsequent guidance has provided them with the interpretative tools to do this. My 
critique of the law is first based on the unresolved vagueness of terms in key provisions 
of the DPA 1998, notably those within the Schedules 2 and 3 conditions. These 
comprise critical provisions that data controllers must demonstrate compliance with if 
their processing is to be considered lawful. For the purposes of this thesis, there are at 
                                                
88 Laurie and Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the Governance and Use of 
Administrative Data in the United Kingdom’ (n 74). 
89 Thomas and Walport (n 38) 2. 
90 See discussion of the deployment of the public interest in analogous contexts in Chapter 5, and 
discussion of the Australian public interest determination procedure in Chapter 6. 
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least three research processing scenarios where the data controller must determine on 
their own, the appropriate legal basis for processing and which the arguments made 
within this thesis are directed at:  
 
1. Where a data controller collects data themselves for research;  
2. Where a data controller seeks to reuse data for research that they previously 
collected for different purposes; and  
3. Where a data controller seeks to share data with third parties that will reuse 
data for research, whereby both the original data controller and third party91 
must have their own separate legal basis (the original data controller must have 
a legal basis for sharing data, whereas the third party must have a legal basis for 
processing data for research).  
 
In each of these cases, and indeed any other data use situation, the data controller must 
determine their legal basis for processing,92 and the vagueness of the Schedule 2 and 3 
conditions to processing make it unclear whether data controllers can rely on anything 
other than consent when sharing or using data for research purposes. 
 
In reference to case three above, where a data controller shares their previously collected 
data for research, the data controller must find an appropriate legal basis for sharing 
(under Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 if sharing sensitive personal data) and ensure that 
the sharing of data further complies with the other data protection principles in 
Schedule 1 of the DPA 1998.93 Importantly, the sharing of data for research, which 
were originally collected for other purposes, must be not be incompatible with the 
original reasons for collection.94 (Note that this analysis would also apply to case two 
above, given that a data controller’s own reuse of data for research would 1) need an 
                                                
91 Within the research context the receiving data controller (who is in receipt of the previously collected 
dataset) will often be a University and/or Principal Investigator of a funded research project. 
92 Under the first data protection principle, all processing of personal data must be fair and lawful; this 
requires satisfying one of the conditions under Schedule 2, if ordinary personal data, or of both 
Schedules 2 and 3 if sensitive personal data. Therefore, the conditions in Schedules 2 and 3 are 
fundamental to data controllers satisfying their obligation of lawfulness under the Act. DPA 1998, Sch 
1, para 1(a)-(b). 
93 DPA 1998, Sch 1, paras 1-8. 
94 The second data protection principle requires 1) that when personal data are collected, that the 
purposes for collection be explicitly identified and legitimate (purpose specification) and that 2) any 
further use of personal data not be incompatible with the purposes for which data were originally 
collected (purpose limitation). When sharing data with a third party, such as a researcher, that sharing 
of data must not be incompatible with the reasons why the original data controller collected those data. 
DPA 1998, Sch 1, para 2. 
 
Chapter 2 The Need to Develop the Public Interest Conditions for Processing: The Downside of 
Current Paradigms of Compliance 
 
33 
appropriate legal basis and 2) not be incompatible with their original reasons for 
collection.) 
 
Focussing on the issue of incompatibility of reuses of data, critically, under both the 
DPA 1998 and DPD, processing for research is given an exemption from the purpose 
limitation principle,95 but importantly, only if 1) data are further processed for only 
research purposes and 2) the data controller provides the requisite safeguards to data 
subjects (i.e. data will not be used to take decisions on specific individuals nor will data 
be used in a way that is likely to cause substantial damage or distress to any data 
subject).96 Note, that further uses of data for research are not exempt from complying 
with the purpose specification principle – thus data controllers must be satisfied prior to 
sharing that the purposes for reuse are appropriately specified e.g. the research project 
would need to be defined in sufficient detail.97 
 
The breadth of the research exemption from purpose limitation is called into question 
by Article 29 Working Party guidance on this issue.98 For the Working Party, the 
exemption to purpose limitation for research is not absolute and is contingent on the 
adequacy of safeguards provided; the applicability of the exemption is determined from 
context sensitive analysis in each case, particularly to scrutinise the sufficiency of 
anonymisation or pseudonymisation techniques deployed so as to minimise any 
potential impact on specific data subjects.99 Looking to CJEU case law, there is a lack 
                                                
95 DPD, Art 6(1)(b); DPA 1998, s 33(2). 
96 DPD, Art 6(1)(b); DPA 1998, s 33(1)-(2), (5). In the UK, these safeguards are called ‘the relevant 
conditions’ of Section 33(1). To avail of the research exemptions provided in Section 33, data controllers 
must comply with these conditions which provide:  
(a)that the data are not processed to support measures or decisions with respect to particular individuals, 
and 
(b)that the data are not processed in such a way that substantial damage or substantial distress is, or is 
likely to be, caused to any data subject. 
97 The Article 29 Working Party’s guidance on purpose limitation provides that to satisfy the requirement 
of purpose specification, that ‘the degree of detail in which a purpose should be specified depends on the 
particular context in which the data are collected and the personal data involved.’ A clear description of 
the research project, along with information on how data would be processed, by whom and under what 
conditions, would be required on a practical basis in any event prior to data being shared with a 
researcher. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (2013) 
WP203 16 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf>. 
98 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (n 97). 
99 ibid 28–32. 
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of guidance to help assess when safeguards may be considered ‘adequate’ vis-à-vis 
reuses of data.  
The CJEU has considered this issue tangentially in cases focused on the reuse of data 
by public authorities (which has some relevance here given the reuse of public sector 
data for research contemplated throughout this thesis). In Willems and others,100 the 
Court side-stepped the issue of purpose limitation when it ruled that Council 
Regulation No 2252/2004/EC (requiring Member States to collect biometric data such 
as fingerprints to verify the authenticity of travel documents and individual identity) 
did not oblige Member States to guarantee that such data would not be reused for other 
purposes.101 Thus, in Willems, the CJEU failed to define what safeguards must be 
provided to data subjects when national/European law does permit the reuse of 
personal data for other purposes. In Bara and others, the focus was on the right of 
individuals to information prior to transfers of data between public authorities and not 
on whether the transfer was incompatible under Article 6 of the DPD.102 While the 
CJEU provided that such a transfer required a legal basis (under Article 7) and must 
comply with the principles in Article 6 of the DPD (including purpose limitation), the 
Court did not ultimately assess the compatibility of the transfer.103 Thus, the Working 
Party’s Opinion remains the most relevant guidance on the issue for the time being.  
 
From the perspective of the Working Party, it is likely that the sufficiency of the ‘relevant 
conditions’ or safeguards provided to data subjects in Section 33 of the DPA 1998 
would be questioned. Section 33 makes no reference to technical, procedural or 
organisational safeguards that could be deployed by researchers to minimise any 
potential impact to specific data subjects.104 However, it is arguable that these issues 
are impliedly dealt with and required of a data controller vis-à-vis their compliance with 
the other data protection principles, notably with the data minimisation principle and 
technical/organisational security principle.105  
                                                
100 Cases C-446/12 and C-449/12 Willems and others [2015], para 48. 
101 ibid paras 47-48. 
102 Case C‑201/14 Bara and Others [2015], para 31, 34. 
103 ibid para 30. The transfer of data being between a Romanian tax authority and the national health 
insurance fund.  
104 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (n 97) 32. 
105 DPA 1998, Sch 1, para 3 and 7. The data minimisation principle comprises the last part of the third 
data protection principle that ‘Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
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A further divergence from the UK approach to the research exemption is indicated by 
the Working Party’s view that the further processing of data on health, children, other 
‘vulnerable’ individuals and ‘highly sensitive information’ should ‘in principle’ only be 
reprocessed for research with the consent of the data subject.106 This particular point 
would be contentious, at least within the UK’s research community, given that Section 
33 of the DPA 1998 does not require different treatment for research processing 
involving health data, data on children, data on ‘vulnerable’ individuals or on ‘highly 
sensitive information’ (the latter two being undefined terms in either the DPA 1998 or 
DPD). Moreover, the Working Party qualified their stipulated requirement for consent 
by stating that ‘in principle’ research involving such data should not proceed without 
it. As to the other points made by the Article 29 Working Party, certainly, data 
controllers must ensure robust safeguards are in place prior to their own reuse of data 
for research, but particularly so where they share data with third parties for research 
purposes. Furthermore, the safeguards provided would likely be evaluated (at least 
outside of the UK) from a broader perspective than whether the relevant conditions 
of Section 33 of the DPA 1998 were complied with. 
 
Clearly, while there is guidance on these other legal principles that are relevant to the 
reuse and sharing of data for research, it remains unclear on what legal basis such 
activity can proceed.107 The Article 29 Working Party made the important point that 
                                                
purpose or purposes for which they are processed.’ The seventh data protection principle on technical and 
organisational security provides that ‘Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction 
of, or damage to, personal data.’ It could be argued that the type of technical, procedural and 
organisational safeguards discussed by the Working Party would be deployed in line with a data 
controller’s obligations under these third and seventh principles. Nevertheless, and at least within the 
UK, a data controller must only satisfy of the relevant conditions stipulated by Section 33(1) of the 
DPA 1998 to avail of the purpose limitation exemption (even if the adequacy of safeguards is later 
called into question upon future judicial review of a particular case). 
106 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (n 97) 32. 
107 Outside of reuses of personal data for research, it is far less clear whether the sharing and/or reuse of 
data for purposes other than those for which data were originally collected, would be compliant with 
the purpose limitation principle. For reuses and sharing of data for secondary purposes other than research, 
a data controller must consider whether that further use of data is incompatible with the reasonable 
expectations of the data subject in line with the context in which data were originally collected. Again, 
as to public sector data controllers, they must look at the new purpose for processing and whether it is 
required by law or otherwise to carry out a task ‘in the public interest’, which in the latter case the Article 
29 Working Party indicate that the public body must undergo this assessment themselves. Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 7/2003 on the Re-Use of Public Sector Information and the 
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even if a further use of data for research can satisfy the requirements of purpose 
limitation, that this further use must still be supported by an appropriate legal basis for 
processing.108 
 
The broad nature and terminology of the DPA 1998, and in particular the wording of 
Schedules 2 and 3, can: 
 
…allow too much scope to interpret the Act in different ways, while even the 
name of the Act gives the misleading impression that organisations should seek 
to protect information from use by other organisations or for any additional 
purposes.109 
 
Indeed, because of this legal uncertainty, the DPA 1998 is interpreted in a risk averse 
manner: ‘…the Act is frequently interpreted too restrictively or over-cautiously due to 
unfamiliarity, misunderstanding, lack of knowledge or uncertainty about its 
provisions.’110 In the context of using, reusing or sharing personal data for research, 
and specifically in finding the appropriate legal basis to do so under Schedules 2 and 3, 
this manifests in the predominance of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm as it is 
perceived as less legally and practically ambiguous. And as discussed above, satisfaction 
and compliance with the other data protection principles, notably with purpose 
limitation, is relatively straightforward, considering the research exemptions available 
in Section 33 of the DPA 1998.111 Thus, the culture of caution surrounding the use and 
sharing of data for research is likely to lie beyond the interpretation of these other data 
protection principles, and is at least more likely connected with the ambiguity 
surrounding the conditions for processing – which again represent the first data 
protection principle – that processing must be lawful. My second basis for critique of 
the current law, as indicated above, is that such ambiguity is resolvable through 
legislative amendments, as evidenced from efforts made in other areas of UK law as 
                                                
Protection of Personal Data: Striking the Balance’ (n 25) 6–8; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (n 97) 39–40. 
108 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation’ (n 97) 33. 
109 Thomas and Walport (n 38) 36. 
110 ibid. 
111 Section 33 of the DPA 1998 also provides an exemption from the fifth data protection principle 
(researchers can retain data indefinitely) and from Section 7 which exempts data held solely for research 
purposes from data subject access requests. DPA 1998, s 33, paras 3-4. 
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well as in other jurisdictions.112 Immediately below I consider the detrimental impact 
of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm on the protection of informational privacy. 
 
3. The Impact of the Consent-or-Anonymise Paradigm on 
the Protection of Informational Privacy 
A key reason why a new approach to data protection compliance is needed is because 
of the impact of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm on the protection of individuals’ 
informational privacy. This paradigm promotes a brand of data protection, one that 
equates sufficient protection of informational privacy with the obtaining of consent or 
the anonymisation of data. On this line of reasoning, individuals’ rights and interests 
in their data are adequately respected if their consent is obtained. Alternatively, if data 
are anonymised, individuals’ rights and interests in their data are no longer engaged. In 
the analysis below I will demonstrate how neither consent nor anonymisation on its own 
can guarantee that the rights and interests of individuals are adequately protected and 
thus the inadequacy of current approaches to data protection. I will first consider the 
fallibility of anonymisation and the extent to which individuals have residual rights and 
interests in even de-identified data. This discussion is followed by a more extensive 
analysis of the impact of the fetishisation of consent on protecting individuals’ 
informational privacy and on our understandings of informational privacy as it relates 
to the public interest. 
 
3.1 Informational privacy beyond identifiability – why anonymisation is 
not enough 
In the data processing context anonymisation can be understood as: 
 
…ensuring that the probability of assigning a correct identity to a record in a 
dataset is very small. This probability can be conditional on other factors, 
such as the skills required and resources available to an adversary seeking to re-
identify a record.113 
 
                                                
112 Discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
113 El Emam, Rodgers and Malin (n 46) 1–2; Citing: Khaled El Emam, Guide to the De-Identification of 
Personal Health Information (CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 2013). 
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Importantly, El Emam makes clear the technical limits of anonymisation: ‘[when] data 
is shared, it is not possible to ensure that the probability of re-identification is zero, but it is possible 
to ensure that the probability is very small.’114 Thus the reverse of anonymisation is: 
 
…reidentification or deanonymization. A person, known in the scientific 
literature as an adversary, reidentifies anonymized data by linking anonymized 
records to outside information, hoping to discover the true identity of the data 
subjects.115 
 
Under data protection law, if data are considered ‘anonymous’ they are no longer 
within the scope of regulation. Anonymisation is not defined in the DPA 1998, but is 
referred to in Recital 26 of the DPD: ‘whereas the principles of protection shall not 
apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer 
identifiable.’ This in turn references the concept of identifiability which is defined 
differently in the DPD than under the DPA 1998. The key difference being that the 
UK has created an ‘in the hands of the data controller’ concept whereby data subjects 
are considered identifiable only if identification is possible via data held alone or 
together with other data by the data controller himself.  
 
Under the DPA 1998 data are identifiable to the extent that a living individual can be 
identified ‘(a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is 
in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller’.116 
Under the DPD, the data subject is considered identifiable via data held by the data 
controller if that data is combined with other data held by a third party. This is provided 
in Recital 26 of the DPD whereby identifiability is defined in terms of ‘… all the means 
likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify 
the said person.’ 117  The consequence of this is that the UK’s conception of 
identifiability could limit the type of data treated as personal data under the DPA 1998 
compared to the DPD, a prospect clearly problematic in the age of Big Data and 
habitual data sharing. To this end, the UK has received criticism since the enactment 
                                                
114 El Emam, Rodgers and Malin (n 46) 2 (emphasis added). 
115 Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’ 
(2009) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701, 1707–1708. 
116 DPA 1998, s 1(1). 
117 DPD, Recital 26. 
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of the DPA 1998 as the legislation has been perceived as a deficient transposition of 
the Directive, resulting in a lower standard of protection than intended.118  
 
Nevertheless, the ICO published its Anonymisation Code of Practice in 2012, which 
seems to ignore this wording of the DPA 1998 and rejects the ‘in the hands of the data 
controller’ concept of identifiability, recognising that the prospect of re-identification 
must be far broader:  
…“other information” needed to perform re-identification could be 
information available to certain organisations, to certain members of the public 
or that is available to everyone because it has been published on the internet, 
for example.119 
 
This interpretation does not hinge on whether data are in the hands of the data 
controller, but rather the extent to which ‘other information’ is available to third parties 
that might identify an individual, aligning itself more closely to the DPD’s Recital 26.120  
 
Even with this broader understanding of identifiability in mind, the ICO’s approach to 
anonymisation recognises the technical realities of de-identification: ‘[the] DPA does 
not require anonymisation to be completely risk free – you must be able to mitigate 
risk of re-identification until it is remote.’121 Nevertheless, determining when the risk 
of re-identification is ‘remote’ and thus when data are effectively anonymised for the 
purposes of data protection law remains ‘difficult’.122 The ICO considers this difficulty 
to revolve around two key issues: 
 
                                                
118 Lilian Edwards, ‘Taking the “Personal” Out of Personal Data: Durant v FSA and Its Impact on the 
Legal Regulation of CCTV’ (2004) 1 SCRIPTed 341; Chris Pounder, ‘Question Answered: “Why Does 
the European Commission Think the UK’s Data Protection Act Is a Deficient Implementation of 
Directive 95/46/EC?”. - Hawktalk’ 
<http://amberhawk.typepad.com/amberhawk/2013/02/question-answered-why-does-the-european-
commission-think-the-uks-data-protection-act-is-a-deficient-implementation-of.html>; ‘Europe 
Claims UK Botched One Third of Data Protection Directive’ (Out-law.com: legal news and guidance from 
Pinsent Masons) <http://www.out-law.com/page-8472>. 
119 ICO, ‘Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk Code of Practice’ (n 40) 18. 
120 A point echoed in the ICO’s 2012 guidance on determining what is personal data, where they make 
clear their preference for interpreting personal data in line with the DPD’s Recital 26. The ICO, 
‘Determining What Is Personal Data’ (2012) 29 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1554/determining-what-is-personal-data.pdf>. 
121 ICO, ‘Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk Code of Practice’ (n 40) 16. 
122 ibid. 
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• the concept of ‘identify’ – and therefore of ‘anonymise’ – is not straightforward 
because individuals can be identified in a number of different ways. This can 
include direct identification, where someone is explicitly identifiable from a 
single data source, such as a list including full names, and indirect identification, 
where two or more data sources need to be combined for identification to take 
place; and 
• you may be satisfied that the data your organisation intends to release does not 
in itself, identify anyone. However, in some cases you may not know whether 
other data is available that means that re-identification by a third party is likely 
to take place.123 
 
3.1.1 Regulatory gaps and technology 
Not only are the technical boundaries between anonymous versus identifiable data 
uncertain and difficult to gauge by data controllers, technically speaking, it is becoming 
far more difficult to ensure re-identification is beyond a remote possibility. This refers 
to the proliferation of personal and supposedly de-identified data flows, the 
increasingly sophisticated ways seemingly innocuous data can be combined and 
‘repackaged’ as valuable individual and group profiles for commercial, governmental 
and more nefarious purposes. Considered in the context of big data, Barocas and 
Nissenbaum suggest that: 
 
…even where strong guarantees of anonymity can be achieved, common 
applications of big data undermine the values that anonymity traditionally had 
protected. Even when individuals are not ‘identifiable’, they may still be 
‘reachable’, may still be comprehensibly represented in records that detail their 
attributes and activities, and may be subject to consequential inferences and 
predictions taken on that basis.124 
 
The law is quickly outpaced in this context. The rapidity with which data processing 
technology evolves means that any attempt to regulate in this space, based on arbitrary 
definitions of identifiability, is fruitless. Moreover, it places individuals at risk who will 
not be able to benefit from the protection of law because their data might be legally 
considered ‘anonymised’ even if technically such data are still re-identifiable. Regulating 
based on data being identifiable is what Paul Ohm considers to be akin to: 
 
                                                
123 ibid. Again this passage from the guidance indicates that the ICO’s perspective reflects the DPD’s 
standard of identifiability under Recital 26 and not the UK’s under the DPA 1998.  
124 Barocas and Nissenbaum (n 45) 45. 
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…the carnival whack-a-mole game: As soon as you whack one mole, another 
will pop right up. No matter how effectively regulators follow the latest 
reidentification research, folding newly identified data fields into new laws and 
regulations, researchers will always find more data field types they have not yet 
covered.125 
 
While strides have been made to improve the anonymisation process,126 any façade of 
impenetrability has long since been shattered. Ohm’s seminal piece on anonymisation 
describes the nature and gravity of potential harms that can arise from the increasing 
amount of data available and the technical capabilities to re-identify supposedly 
anonymous data: 
  
Almost every person in the developed world can be linked to at least one fact 
in a computer database that an adversary could use for blackmail, 
discrimination, harassment, or financial or identity theft. I mean more than 
mere embarrassment or inconvenience; I mean legally cognizable harm. 
Perhaps it is a fact about past conduct, health, or family shame. For almost 
every one of us, then, we can assume a hypothetical database of ruin, the one 
containing this fact but until now splintered across dozens of databases on 
computers around the world, and thus disconnected from our identity. 
Reidentification has formed the database of ruin and given our worst enemies 
access to it.127 
 
To this end, Ohm, Schwartz and Solove advocate for the regulation of personal data 
that is not hinged upon current understandings of ‘identifiability’.128 As for Ohm, he 
advocates a risk-based approach to the regulation of data flows, where data are 
regulated according to the risks of re-identification posed by a particular type of 
processing.129  Schwartz and Solove propose a reconceptualisation of identifiability 
where different levels of regulation attach depending on where data fall on the 
identifiability spectrum: 1) identified; 2) identifiable; or 3) non-identifiable.130  
 
                                                
125 Ohm (n 115) 1742. 
126 Notably by: Latanya Sweeney, ‘K-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy’ (2002) 10 
International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems 557; Latanya Sweeney, 
‘Achieving K-Anonymity Privacy Protection Using Generalization and Suppression’ (2002) 10 
International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems 571. 
127 Ohm (n 115) 1748. 
128 Ohm (n 115); Paul M Schwartz and Daniel J Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information’ (2011) 86 New York University Law Review 1814. 
129 Suggesting five factors to assess the risks of re-identification and thus privacy harm: 1) data 
handling techniques; 2) private versus public release of data; 3) quantity (the size of the database held); 
4) motive to re-identify; and 5) trustworthiness of the data custodian. Ohm (n 115) 1764–1768. 
130 Schwartz and Solove (n 128) 1877–1879. 
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Both approaches attempt to ameliorate the inherent flaws of regulating by hard-and-
fast categories of ‘personal’ versus ‘anonymous’ data. What is important to recognise 
for the wider aims of this thesis is that current approaches to data protection, which 
strongly rely upon anonymisation, are not on their own able to offer sufficient guarantees 
of protection. Because of this uncertainty over what processing is outwith the DPA 
1998, data controllers are prodded (at least implicitly, if not at times explicitly) to take 
the cautious path and obtain individual consent for all data processing on the (albeit 
misconstrued) basis that it might be within the scope of the law.  
3.1.2 Interests in data beyond identifiability 
To conclude this discussion on anonymisation I want to briefly consider the idea that 
individuals may have valid, residual rights and interests in data that have been 
anonymised. If this is so, there are even stronger imperatives to consider and 
implement wider protections of individuals’ data beyond the technical security offered 
through anonymisation. In the UK, this proposition runs against the current legal 
position. In the English Court of Appeal case, R v Department of Health, ex parte Source 
Informatics Ltd., the Court held that there could be no breach of confidence if 
individuals’ privacy interests were protected by the anonymisation of their data.131 On 
this basis, the Court ruled that individuals did not have any legally valid, residual rights 
and interests in data that have been anonymised. Within the context of genetic research, 
Laurie convincingly argues against this position: 
 
When anonymisation occurs, the quality of the relationship that an individual 
has with her sample or her information is reduced, and this permits other 
interests to weigh more heavily in the balance. At no point, however, does that 
relationship cease to exist, for anonymisation is merely a process to ensure security.132 
 
For Laurie, informational privacy is broader than the mere issue of identification. 
Laurie contends that anonymisation alone ‘does not necessarily meet the ethical 
requirements of respect for individuals’ if we consider the fundamental interest 
individuals have with their genetic samples and associated data.133 What are the nature 
of these fundamental interests in personal data which go beyond identifiability?  
                                                
131 [2000] 1 All ER 786 [34]-[35] (‘Source Informatics’). 
132 Laurie (n 28) 294 (emphasis added). 
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Taylor also explores this question in the context of genetic research, where individuals 
have demonstrated concerns with the ‘… (perceived) misuse of the information that 
genetic research might yield’. 134  When it comes to patient health data, some are 
considered so ‘sensitive’ that they should not be reused, such as for research, even if 
anonymised. 135  In the social sciences context, as to the longitudinal study ‘Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children’ young people were interviewed about their 
views on data linkage research; some considered that consent should be required to 
reuse data for research even if data were anonymised.136 The interviews revealed issues 
with trust as interviewees expressed residual concerns about how anonymous data 
would be handled and the potential for data misuse.137 For others, anonymisation was 
not enough to signal respect to research participants, respect that could be engendered 
through the process of ‘being asked’:  
 
Even where this risk could be effectively mitigated through anonymization 
some individuals still felt it polite that their permission should be sought for 
secondary use of information they perceived they ‘owned’.138 
 
Barocas and Nissenbaum focus on the impact that the misuse of supposedly 
anonymous data can have on individuals:  
 
In this work, we argued that the value of anonymity inheres not in 
namelessness, and not even in the extension of the previous value of 
namelessness to all uniquely identifying information, but instead to something 
we called ‘reachability’, the possibility of knocking on your door, hauling you out of bed, 
calling your phone number, threatening you with sanction, holding you accountable – with or 
without access to identifying information.139  
 
The inferences gathered from the linkage of supposedly anonymous data sets can 
‘…curtail basic ethical and political rights and liberties.’140  
 
                                                
134 Taylor (n 28) 36. 
135 ibid. 
136 Suzanne Audrey and others, ‘Young People’s Views about Consenting to Data Linkage: Findings 
from the PEARL Qualitative Study’ (2016) 16 BMC Medical Research Methodology 34. 
137 ibid 11. 
138 ibid. 
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The extent to which ‘consent’ can offer meaningful respect and protection to 
individuals will be discussed at length below. It is appropriate to conclude here by 
stating that while anonymisation is clearly an important technical solution, it is not 
sufficient on its own.  
 
3.2 The impact of the fetishisation of consent on protecting 
informational privacy 
What is problematic with ensuring that individuals are given the opportunity to consent 
to the processing of their personal (or subsequently de-identified) data? Are there not 
many instances when there are strong practical and ethical reasons for offering 
individuals the opportunity to consent to a proposed use of their data? To be clear, I 
am not arguing that there is no role for consent, or that work should not continue to 
improve technologies that support more dynamic and informed notice and consent 
procedures. What I am arguing against is ‘the fetishisation of consent’141 where the obtaining 
of consent is treated as the critical indicator of robust protection of informational 
privacy. Crucial to my arguments regarding the important role to be played by the 
public interest conditions, is understanding that the obtaining of consent is neither 
legally necessary nor indicative of individuals’ rights and interests being respected. In 
fetishising consent:  
 
…it will be taken as axiomatic that, where there is no consent, there must be a 
wrong (that we do wrong if we act without consent); and, conversely, that 
where there is consent, there can be no wrong (that we do right if we obtain 
consent).142 
 
This is problematic not only from an informational privacy standpoint but also for 
public interest uses of data. As to the latter, regardless of the public interests served by 
a use of data or indeed any disservice to the public interest by not processing data, these 
interests would be (and are arguably at times143) overlooked simply because consent 
cannot be obtained. The lack of consent in data processing thus becomes a signature 
for unethical and potentially unlawful behaviour, which as stated above, is simply not 
                                                
141 Brownsword (n 45). 
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143 This point is considered below in relation to the failed NHS England scheme care.data. 
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true in a legal sense (as consent is not required under data protection law) nor, arguably, 
in an ethical one. This phenomenon is described by Roger Brownsword as ‘consent-
fetishism’, or a fixation on consent where ‘…consent is no longer seen as an element 
of a larger theory of ethical or legal justification; rather, consent becomes its own free-
standing justificatory standard.’ 144 This is certainly evident in the research context 
across disciplines including biomedical research 145  and social sciences 146  where 
oftentimes if consent is not obtained, research is postponed and at times abandoned 
altogether.147  
 
In the biomedical research context, a recent debacle involving the NHS demonstrates 
how a fixation on consent, when combined with poor public engagement and 
communications, can undermine potentially publicly beneficial uses of data. Here I 
refer to the public outcry regarding NHS England’s (now failed) data sharing scheme 
‘care.data’. This scheme was intended to (among other things) extract data from NHS 
England primary care medical records unless patients opted out; these data, would in 
part, be used for research.148 It is important to note that the scheme was considered to 
have a lawful basis via the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (‘HSCA 2012’) Section 259 
that empowered the Health and Social Care Information Centre (‘HSCIC’) to require 
GPs and other relevant bodies to disclose to them any information deemed ‘necessary 
                                                
144 Brownsword (n 45) 226. 
145 Graeme Laurie, ‘Evidence of Support for Biobanking Practices’ (2008) 337 BMJ; Laurie and Postan 
(n 39). 
146 Rose Wiles and others, ‘Informed Consent in Social Research: A Literature Review’ (2005) NCRM 
001 ESRC National Centre for Research Methods; Murphy and Dingwall (n 65); Rose Wiles and 
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Sociological Research Online wiles; Sarah Dyer and David Demeritt, ‘Un-Ethical Review? Why It Is 
Wrong to Apply the Medical Model of Research Governance to Human Geography’ (2009) 33 
Progress in Human Geography 46; Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket?  Social Research under the First Data 
Protection Principle’ (n 31); Erdos, ‘Systematically Handicapped? Social Research in the Data 
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the Development of “Ethical” Regulation in Social Science’ (n 31). 
147 In context of biomedical research: The Academy of Medical Sciences, ‘Personal Data for Public 
Good: Using Health Information in Medical Research’ (2006) 58–61 
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Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket?  Social Research under the First Data Protection Principle’ (n 31); Erdos, 
‘Constructing the Labyrinth: The Impact of Data Protection on the Development of “Ethical” 
Regulation in Social Science’ (n 31). 
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or expedient’ to undertake its functions.149 This was deemed to satisfy Schedules 2 and 
3 of the DPA 1998 (even if its legality could be challenged on other grounds, including, 
its potential incompatibility and thus violation of purpose limitation) and Section 35(1) 
as to disclosures required by statute.150 It is important to clarify at this juncture that it 
is not being argued that the public interest condition as an alternative to consent (in this 
case or similar cases) would be a self-standing solution that fully resolves the wider 
issues of legality of public sector data re-use in fields other than research. As care.data 
illustrates, even where a public sector data reuse scheme is technically lawful per 
Schedule 2 and 3 of the DPA, it can clearly still fall foul of other data protection 
principles. The point being made here is that a significant contribution to care.data’s 
failure stems from other (non-legal) defects inherent to the management of the scheme, 
namely deficient public engagement and communications.  
 
The legal basis for processing under Schedules 2 and 3 (via the HSCA 2012) is but one 
area where communication to the public could have been clearer. Without such 
communication, the lack of consent contributed to a perception of illegality151 and 
underscored the lack of ‘social licence’ to support the scheme.152 Although patients 
could opt-out of the scheme, this was not communicated clearly to the public. As to 
what was communicated to NHS England patients:  
 
Information is fragmented, full of NHS jargon and neither the benefits nor the 
risks, nor the details of the programme have been clearly communicated to 
                                                
149 HSCA 2012, s 259. The Health and Social Care Information Centre’s functions are described in 
Sections 254-273 of the HSCA 2012. See discussion on the legal basis for processing and specifically 
on the lack of consent: ‘Health and Social Care Information Centre: Information Governance 
Assessment’ (NHS Commissioning Board 2013) 3, 6 
<http://content.digital.nhs.uk/media/11469/Information-governance-assessment---caredata-version-
10/pdf/care.data_HSCIC_Information_Governance_Assessment_-_Feb_2013_(NIC-178106-
MLSWX).pdf>.    
150 Consent was not considered to be required because of the statutory authority given by the HSCA 
2012 to access the relevant data, including primary care data. This would satisfy Schedule 2 paragraph 
5(b) and Schedule 3 paragraph 7(1)(b) of the DPA 1998, as the legal basis for processing required by 
statute. The HSCIC further considered it lawful on the basis of the DPA 1998, s 35(1) which allows 
disclosures required by statute. ibid. 
151 Only in terms of the legal basis for processing under Schedules 2 and 3. The plausibility of wider 
legal challenges (such as based on incompatible processing) are acknowledged but this is unnecessary 
to more fully address for this discussion. 
152 Pam Carter, Graeme T Laurie and Mary Dixon-Woods, ‘The Social Licence for Research: Why 
Care.data Ran into Trouble’ [2015] Journal of Medical Ethics. 
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patients – the taxpayers who fund the NHS…The absolute crux of the issue 
seems to be what – exactly – you can and can’t opt out of.153 
 
A key justification for care.data was the potential for it to deliver various public goods, 
including improvements to NHS service delivery. However, this too was not explicitly 
communicated to the public. The scheme has since been cancelled following a UK 
Government review led by Dame Fiona Caldicott.154 The public discussion which 
unfolded since care.data’s inception, and following its recent closure, has focused on 
the lack of informed consent required to operate the scheme as opposed to the 
potential public interests served by it or the consequences of cancelling it.155 It cannot 
be said that care.data failed solely because of the lack of informed consent sought. What 
it does show is that where public engagement and communication as to new uses of 
data are as deficient (as they were in this case), that the lack of consent can irreparably 
taint a potential public interest use of data as illegal (specifically, without a legal basis 
for processing). This can foreclose any discussions which might account for the full 
range of interests at stake, both in favour of and against the processing in question.  
 
The fetishisation of consent is evident in far wider contexts beyond research, notably 
in the online and social media context. 156  Notwithstanding the implausibility of 
obtaining truly informed consent in modern data processing contexts, 157  the 
fetishisation of consent reflects the common conflation of the protection of 
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NHS England (n 148). 
155 Olivia Solon, ‘A Simple Guide to Care.data’ (Wired, 7 February 2014) 
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informational privacy with the safeguarding of autonomy. This conflation not only 
undermines the greater individual and social significance of informational privacy; it 
also detracts from the ways in which individuals’ rights and interests in their data may 
be put at risk even where supposedly informed consent is obtained. How exactly is 
informed consent intended to protect an individual’s informational privacy? 
3.2.1 What is informed consent intended to protect and is it capable of 
doing so? 
As the first of several alternative conditions for processing under Schedules 2 and 3 of 
the DPA 1998, the obtaining of consent (or ‘explicit’ consent if processing sensitive 
personal data) is one possible way data controllers can legitimise their use of personal 
data as ‘lawful’.158 Consent is not defined in the DPA 1998 but the DPD defines it as: 
‘… any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data 
subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.’159 
Given that the focus of this thesis is on the use and sharing of personal (or 
subsequently de-identified) data for research it is important to consider the historical 
origins of informed consent in that context. This brief historical detour explains the 
rationales underpinning the need to obtain consent in the research context. From this 
we can contrast the historical purpose of informed consent in relation to the context 
it was developed for (biomedical research) versus its modern-day manifestations in 
more varied data processing contexts. This exposes how consent, as it manifests in 
                                                
158 DPA 1998, Sch 1, para 1. ‘Lawful’ is not defined in the DPA 1998 but has been interpreted by the 
ICO to mean that processing is compliant with the Act and other applicable common and statutory 
law. To be compliant with the DPA 1998, the first data protection principle in Schedule 1, requires 
that a Schedule 2 condition for processing must be satisfied by the data controller (and a Schedule 3 
condition if processing sensitive personal data). Therefore the obtaining of consent is one way data 
controllers may substantiate their legal compliance with the Act. ICO, ‘Processing Personal Data Fairly 
and Lawfully (Principle 1)’ (2016) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/principle-1-fair-and-lawful/>. 
159 DPD, Art 2(h). However, as to sensitive personal data, Schedule 3 of the DPA 1998 requires that 
consent must be ‘explicit’. The ICO’s guidance provides that the term ‘explicit’ in Schedule 3 indicates 
‘…the individual’s consent should be absolutely clear. It should cover the specific processing details; 
the type of information (or even the specific information); the purposes of the processing; and any 
special aspects that may affect the individual, such as any disclosures that may be made.’ 
Unsurprisingly, there confusion between the requirements for obtaining consent under Schedule 2 for 
ordinary personal data and Schedule 3 for sensitive personal data. If UK data controllers take into 
account the DPD’s definition of consent (applicable to ordinary personal data) it is unclear what 
difference there is between ‘explicit’ versus ordinary consent. ICO, ‘The Conditions for Processing’ 
(2016) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/conditions-for-processing/>. 
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modern data processing, is incapable – on its own – of effectively protecting 
individuals’ informational privacy.  
3.2.1.A The biomedical origins of informed consent 
Arising out of the atrocities of Nazi research practices during the Second World War, 
the first principle of the Nuremberg Code provided that the obtaining of informed 
(‘voluntary’) consent was essential to conducting ethical research.160 The obtaining of 
informed consent was promoted, in part, as a means to avoid the individual from being 
sacrificed for the greater good. 161  The importance of alerting individuals to the 
potential hazards of a proposed research project was central to the early development 
of the informed consent concept in research.162 Under the Nuremberg Code’s first 
principle, the essential information to be communicated when seeking consent 
included: 
 
… the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means 
by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to 
be expected; and the effects upon his health or person, which may possibly 
come from his participation in the experiment.163 
 
Although it is not necessary for present purposes to delve more deeply into this 
history,164 it is relevant to contrast the role of informed consent as it was originally 
developed, with the way it is understood and used today. It is necessary to consider 
how we progressed from the uncontroversial position where it was (and is) considered 
necessary to obtain informed consent in the context of biomedical research involving 
physical interventions, to the translation of this norm into the more varied contexts of 
modern data processing. What purpose does informed consent play in modern day 
data processing? Is it also focused on alerting individuals to potential hazards from data 
processing or protecting the individual from being ‘sacrificed’ for the greater good? 
 
                                                
160 ‘The Nuremberg Code’ para 1 <https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf>. 
161 Heather Widdows, The Connected Self (1st edn, CUP 2013) 63.  
162 Paul Weindling, ‘The Origins of Informed Consent: The International Scientific Commission on 
Medical War Crimes, and the Nuremberg Code’ (2001) 75 Bulletin of the History of Medicine 37, 50. 
163 ‘The Nuremberg Code’ (n 160) para 1. 
164 On the historical origins of informed consent: Ruth Faden, Tom Beauchamp and Nancy King, A 
History and Theory of Informed Consent (OUP 1986); Weindling (n 162); Paul Weindling, Nazi Medicine and 
the Nuremberg Trials: From Medical Warcrimes to Informed Consent (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2004). And in 
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One potential answer to this question is provided by Ann Cavoukian, a strong advocate 
for enhancing notice and consent procedures online. Cavoukian describes in an 
idealised and somewhat unrealistic fashion, the purpose of consent: 
  
Consent empowers individuals to exercise additional privacy rights and freedoms, 
such as the ability to:  
• make consent conditional;   
• revoke consent;   
• deny consent for new purposes and uses;   
• be advised of the existence of personal data record-keeping systems;   
• access personal data held by others;   
• verify the accuracy and completeness of one’s personal data;   
• obtain explanation(s) of the uses and disclosures of one’s personal data; 
and   
• challenge the compliance of data users/controllers.165   
	
For Cavoukian, consent plays a crucial (if not primary) role in safeguarding individuals’ 
rights and interests in their data. She claims that the consent process contributes to the 
creation of ‘Informed and empowered individuals [that] serve as essential checks on 
the uses and misuses of personal data, holding data processors accountable in a way 
no law, regulation or oversight authority could ever do.’166  
 
At best, Cavoukian’s description of consent could be characterised as idealistic. 
Arguably, it is an example of the unrealistic role assigned to consent in modern data 
processing contexts, which is ultimately harmful to the individuals concerned. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to give a more detailed treatment of the burgeoning 
area of research into the flaws of the informed consent model.167 Nevertheless, it is 
possible to highlight the main arguments set forth against the fetishisation of consent, 
situate these within the appropriate theoretical context and highlight why consent is 
not a guarantee that individuals’ rights and interests in their data will be protected. The 
following section does this.  
                                                
165 Ann Cavoukian, ‘Evolving FIPPs: Proactive Approaches to Privacy, Not Privacy Paternalism’, 
Reforming European Data Protection Law (Springer 2015) 297. 
166 ibid. 
167 Brownsword (n 45); Laurie and Postan (n 39); Solove (n 157); Barocas and Nissenbaum (n 45); 
Edward Dove and Graeme Laurie, ‘Consent and Anonymisation: Beware Binary Constructions’ (2015) 
350 BMJ; Custers (n 42). 
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3.2.2 Conflating autonomy and privacy: the risks to informational 
privacy associated with the fetishisation of consent  
Those critical of the fetishisation of consent in data protection often attribute it to a 
particular theory of privacy, namely ‘control’ based theories.168 Control theories treat 
the safeguarding of the autonomy of individuals as the central aim of privacy; i.e. if we 
protect individuals’ ability to make ‘choices’ as to uses of their personal data, we can 
protect their privacy. Legitimising data processing based on consent is premised on the 
idea that it offers data subjects a means to control uses of their personal data. Through 
the purported control this offers, individuals can ‘protect’ their personal data, and thus 
informational privacy. The presumed ‘protection’ offered by consent is based on 
several flawed assumptions, including the presupposition ‘…that autonomous 
individuals when presented with adequate information and given time to assess it will 
subsequently make a conscious decision whether to participate.’169 
 
For the purposes of my exploration of the public interest in data protection, it is 
relevant to consider the inherent flaws to such theories and thus how they are 
problematic for the protection of individual informational privacy and broader 
understandings of its social value. 
 
3.2.2.A Control based theories of privacy 
Control-based theories of privacy conflate the aim of protecting privacy with the aim 
of safeguarding autonomy. It is useful to consider the plain meaning of both these 
terms. ‘Autonomy’ is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as the ‘liberty to follow 
one’s will; control over one’s own affairs; freedom from external influence, personal 
independence.’170 Less settled is the definition of privacy which is defined as the ‘state 
or condition of being alone, undisturbed, or free from public attention, as a matter of 
                                                
168 I would also include Julie Cohen’s term ‘privacy-as-choice’ theories under this categorisation. Paul 
M Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (1999) 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1607; Laurie (n 
28) 53–56; 69–85; Neil C Manson and Onora O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics: (CUP 
2007) 106; Charles Raab, ‘Privacy, Social Values and the Public Interest’, Politik und die Regulierung von 
Information (Nomos verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2012). 
169 Taken from Corrigan’s cited discussion of ‘empty-ethics’ where informed consent plays a central 
role. Oonagh Corrigan, ‘Empty Ethics: The Problem with Informed Consent’ (2003) 25 Sociology of 
Health & Illness 768, 770.  
170 ‘Autonomy’, Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition 2011).  
 
Chapter 2 The Need to Develop the Public Interest Conditions for Processing: The Downside of 
Current Paradigms of Compliance 
 
52 
choice or right; seclusion; freedom from interference or intrusion.’171 This definition 
focuses on both the conceptual and instrumental aspects of privacy i.e.  what privacy 
means in a substantive sense versus how one might secure or protect it. For Laurie, 
privacy is a state of being, a state of separateness from others.172 ‘Separateness’ is the 
relevant state as opposed to being ‘alone’ and in this sense the definition above is 
inaccurate: 
 
In order to be in a state of privacy there must be others from whom one can choose to be 
separate. This is not possible on a desert island, for one is alone. Isolation implies a state 
of enforced non-access to others. Privacy, on the other hand, is a state that can 
easily be relaxed or maintained because it occurs in a social context. Isolation 
concerns the removal of individuals from that context and therefore ought not 
to be described as privacy.173 
 
The critical point is that ‘…simply to be in the presence of others does not necessarily 
mean that privacy interests cannot be claimed.’ 174  I agree with Laurie that the 
conceptual and more instrumental aspects of privacy must be distinguished, the latter 
which can refer to the way individuals exercise control over or otherwise protect their 
privacy. Certain theories of privacy focus solely on this instrumental aspect, neglecting 
the wider role and value of privacy to groups, communities and society.  
 
Control theories of privacy focus on individuals’ choices and thus consent to effectuate 
their privacy preferences. Taylor summarises the theory of ‘privacy as control’ where 
privacy ‘represents control over transactions between person(s) and others, limiting or 
regulating access to individuals or groups, with the ultimate aim of enhancing 
autonomy or minimizing vulnerability.’175 Equating the protection of privacy with the 
safeguarding of autonomy conflates the instrumental value with the substance of privacy, 
the latter which refers to a state of being – of an individual, group or community – in 
relation to ‘others’. Whether and how individuals ‘control’ their privacy is an entirely 
separate matter from whether privacy does or does not exist in a particular context. 
                                                
171 ‘Privacy’, Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition 2007). 
172 Laurie (n 28) 6. 
173 ibid 68 (emphasis added). 
174 ibid. 
175 Posed by Taylor in summarising Stephen Margulis’ conceptualisation of privacy. Taylor (n 28) 16–
17. Citing, Stephen T Margulis, ‘Privacy as a Social Issue and Behavioral Concept’ (2003) 59 Journal of 
Social Issues 243. 
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Laurie argues along similar lines when distinguishing between the right to privacy and 
privacy simpliciter.176 
 
Control theories forge ‘the close connection between “privacy” and “consent”’ which 
neglects the broader public interests and social value in the protection of privacy.’177 
While it is not pertinent to delve further into debates on the different theories of 
privacy, it is sufficient to recognise ‘…that respecting the autonomy or individual 
liberty of an individual – allowing that individual to choose what information is given 
access to under what circumstances – is no guarantee of privacy.’178 It is important to state 
that there are logical overlaps between privacy and autonomy;179 in particular as to the 
ways in which individuals may be able to exert control or otherwise ‘protect’ their 
privacy. What is important to understand is that they are distinct concepts180 and have 
different aims. Thus, we can say confidently that there is nothing problematic, in 
principle, about offering individuals control over uses of their personal data, such as 
through the opportunity to consent to such uses. What is problematic is that the 
purported ‘control’ given to data subjects through informed consent is neither free 
from external influence nor often based on enough information to provide actual 
control over the processing they are consenting to. It is the mere perception of control 
that is offered through the modern-day manifestation of consent to data processing. 
Below I more specifically consider the risks to individuals’ informational privacy that 
are posed by the fetishisation of consent. 
 
                                                
176 Laurie (n 28) 52. 
177 Taylor’s conceptualisation of privacy is also based on control but differs significantly from 
Margulis’ consensus view on control theories, in that control can be exercised in many ways, such as 
through norms and preferences in social interactions (and thus does not rely upon control as exercised 
by the individual through consent). Taylor describes his theory of privacy accordingly: ‘…privacy is 
understood to represent control over transactions between person(s) and others) (rather than control 
over information per se), and relevant control (exercised in many different ways) can be evidenced 
through the norms of patterns and preferences in social interaction (rather than being understood to 
reside within the exercise of individual discretion)’. Taylor (n 28) 20–21. 
178 ibid 20 (emphasis added). 
179 Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (1st edn, CUP 1992) 20–21; Taylor (n 28) 19–
22. 
180 Although Taylor poses a theory of privacy which in part focuses on control, he too supports such a 
distinction. Taylor (n 28) 20; A distinction also supported by: Laurie (n 28) 80–85.  
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3.2.2.B What’s the harm in asking for consent? 
The efficacy of the consent transaction in data processing is legally premised on the 
idea that it is ‘freely given specific and informed’.181 It is helpful to consider what ‘freely 
given’ might mean. ‘Freely given’ in this context can be contrasted to the idea of 
‘freedom of choice’ in markets which ‘…requires accurate information about choices 
and their consequences, and enough power-in terms of wealth, numbers, or control 
over resources-to have choices.’182 To illustrate how current manifestations of consent 
are lacking as to these requirements, Schwartz provides a helpful illustration of the 
typical conditions in which consent is obtained in the online environment: 
 
…the act of clicking through a ‘consent’ screen on a Web site may be 
considered by some observers to be an exercise of self-reliant choice. Yet, this 
screen can contain boilerplate language that permits all further processing and 
transmission of one’s personal data. Even without a consent screen, some Web 
sites place consent boilerplate within a ‘privacy statement’ on their home page 
or elsewhere on their site. For example, the online version of one New York 
newspaper states, ‘By using this site, you agree to the Privacy Policy of the New 
York Post.’ This language presents the conditions for data processing on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. It seeks to create the legal fiction that all who visit this Web 
site have expressed informed consent to its data processing practices.183 
 
In considering such conditions (which undoubtedly will be all too familiar to the 
reader) 184 , consent to data processing will rarely be ‘freely given specific and 
informed’.185 Consent is often lauded as a panacea to data protection and a means to 
empower individuals to take control over their personal data.186 This view neglects the 
conditions in which consent is obtained. Individuals are too often stuck in what 
Schwartz aptly calls the ‘autonomy trap’.187 Individuals are ‘locked-in’ to a choice where 
they have surrendered their personal data ‘…with so little information about the uses 
                                                
181 DPD, Art 2(h). 
182 Julie E Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object’ (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 1373, 1396. 
183 Schwartz (n 168) 1661. 
184 In research, access to public services and most obviously in online, commercial contexts. Consider 
the NHS England care.data initiative where individual patients’ data were to be used unless they 
exercised opt-out consent; the process for opting-out was not made clear nor was it clear precisely what 
aspects of the data initiatives patients could opt-out of. Solon, ‘A Simple Guide to Care.data’ (n 153).  
185 The often-flawed approaches taken to obtaining consent is discussed exhaustively in the literature. 
My thinking has been influenced, in particular, by these discussions: Brownsword (n 45); Dingwall (n 
32); Laurie and Postan (n 39); Solove (n 157); Barocas and Nissenbaum (n 45); Custers (n 42). 
186 Cavoukian (n 165). 
187 Schwartz (n 168) 1662. 
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of personally-identified data, and their associated costs and benefits, that consent to 
these practices cannot plausibly be called “informed”’.188  
 
Thus, the harm lies not in asking for consent but in the false sense of comfort given by 
the act of asking which lulls individuals into surrendering their personal data with little 
understanding of what impact this can have on their informational privacy. If we 
consider the biomedical research underpinnings of informed consent, and the 
conditions in which consent is often obtained, it is clear that consent is unable to either 
sufficiently alert individuals to the potential hazards of data processing or to provide 
meaningful protection from being ‘sacrificed’ for far less compelling purposes than the 
‘greater good’. 
3.2.3 Privacy and the public interest - the problem with individualistic 
accounts of privacy 
Until now we have focused on the ineffectiveness of consent to protect individuals’ 
informational privacy. In this section I briefly consider how the fetishisation of consent 
and the control based theories of privacy it relates to, is problematic to deeper 
understandings of the relationship between the public interest and privacy and how 
this impacts negatively on the protection of informational privacy. The problem I am 
concerned with is described by Raab in his exploration of the social value of privacy: 
 
The protection of privacy and the achievement of the common good or the 
public interest are often perceived to be poles apart as societal or policy goals. 
On both sides of the argument, it has become commonplace to construct the 
relationship between privacy and the public interest as one of zero-sum 
opposition: one can only increase at the expense of the other.189 
 
As discussed above, the dominant approaches to data protection focus on the 
obtaining of consent which are most closely aligned with control-based theories of 
privacy. These theories view society in terms of ‘…relatively autonomous individuals, 
and holds an image of society as comprising their sum total: individuals who need 
                                                
188 Cohen (n 182) 1433 (emphasis added). 
189 Raab (n 168) 129; As argued by, Priscilla M Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social 
Values, and Public Policy (University of North Carolina Press 1995) 212; Similarly, Valerie M 
Steeves, ‘Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy’, Lessons from the identity trail : anonymity, 
privacy, and identity in a networked society (OUP 2009) 193.  
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privacy in order to perform citizen roles in a liberal-democratic state.’190Autonomy 
focused conceptualisations of privacy construe privacy as a purely individual matter. An 
individualistic framing of privacy automatically places the rights and interests of 
individuals at a disadvantage when decisions are taken based on a purported balance 
to be struck between privacy and ‘the public interest’.  
 
Where privacy is seen as protecting only individual interests, it can be difficult to 
envisage many situations where the individual rights of the data subject would outweigh 
the wider public interest in permitting the processing of data to go ahead.191 Simply 
put, the rights and interests of all of society will likely (if not always) outweigh those of 
one or a few individuals:  
 
It is all too easy for the proponents of certain public sector data processing, 
especially regarding surveillance and national security, to seek to down-play the 
importance of privacy for the community, and even to advance claims about 
the damage caused by privacy protection, such as ‘the common good is being 
systematically neglected out of excessive deference to privacy’.192 
 
The critical question is:193  
 
Raab suggests that one way to escape this zero-sum game is to reconceptualise privacy 
as a public interest itself. The value of privacy goes far beyond its meaning to the 
individual, serving distinct societal purposes.194 As Raab and Bennett describe it, ‘…the 
public value of privacy has to do with its instrumental worth in underpinning 
democratic institutions and practices.’195 Citing Regan’s important work on the social 
value of privacy, privacy is considered to prevent ‘…the fragmentation of the public 
realm by allowing individuals to operate within it on the basis of their commonality 
                                                
190 Raab (n 168) 131. 
191 Black and Stevens (n 11) 113. 
192 ibid; Citing Raab (n 168) 135. 
193 Raab (n 168) 129 (emphasis added). 
194 Regan (n 189). 
195 Colin J Bennett and Charles Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective 
(Ashgate 2002) 40. 
‘Is it possible to escape an “individual privacy v. public interest” 
formulation of the relationship between these two values?’ 
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rather than their differences.’196 Thus to avoid ‘the individual right of privacy [being] 
too often trumped by a concern for the greater social good’197 we must recalibrate our 
1) understanding of the public interest and its relationship to privacy and 2) our 
approach to decision-making which is intended to strike a balance between the two. 
To this end Taylor suggests that: 
 
Proper privacy protection is not simply consistent with the public interest – it 
is crucial to it. If privacy is a common interest, valued within a society, then it 
is one of the interests that public interest decision-making must be seen to take 
into account if decision-making processes intended to advance ‘the public 
interest’ are to retain legitimacy.198 
 
Crucially, as Raab provides, such an approach requires that we expand our current 
understandings of the public interest to explicitly incorporate the protection of individual 
privacy rather than treat it as in opposition to it.199 If we do so, privacy and public 
interests uses of data could both be supported or at least provide a ‘less biased terrain 
for arbitrating their opposition’.200  
 
It will be no surprise to the reader that I would also answer the critical question posed 
above (‘Is it possible to escape an “individual privacy v. public interest” formulation of 
the relationship between these two values?’), and argue that it is possible. The aim of 
this thesis is to set forth a legally and theoretically grounded way in which policy can 
be shaped to overcome the current paradigms of data protection where the right to 
privacy is too easily sacrificed for ‘the greater good’. Equally, however, I am concerned 
with public interest uses of data being hindered by the legal uncertainty surrounding 
routes to processing outwith the current consent-or-anonymise paradigm; something 
I consider in the section below. 
 
                                                
196 ibid 40–41; Citing: Regan (n 189) 225–227. 
197 Daniel J Solove, Understanding Privacy (Kindle Edition, Harvard University Press 2008) 78–79. 
198 Taylor (n 28) 32. 
199 Raab (n 168) 129. 
200 ibid 130. 
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4. The Consequences of the Consent-or-Anonymise 
Paradigm for the Undertaking of Research 
Developing a clearer basis for deploying the public interest conditions supports 
publicly beneficial uses of data, while offering more meaningful consideration of the 
impact of processing on informational privacy than permitted by current approaches 
based on the paradigm of consent-or-anonymise. The approach developed in this 
thesis can help ensure that public interest uses of data are not unnecessarily hindered 
or abandoned for lack of a workable public interest concept. It also supports a 
transparent and consistent use of the public interest concept that accounts more fully 
for the rights and interests at stake, including the public interest in protecting 
informational privacy. With a better understanding of the risks posed to informational 
privacy, it is now appropriate to turn our attention to the impact of the consent-or-
anonymise paradigm on publicly beneficial uses of data.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, I am particularly interested in examining the impact of data 
protection law on the undertaking of social sciences and humanities research. My 
interest in this area arose from consultancy work and grew after my appointment as a 
Research Fellow to the ADRC-S project where, for the past three years, I have engaged 
with stakeholders (researchers, data controllers and policy makers) to understand the 
barriers to accessing administrative data for research in the UK. In brief, administrative 
data refer to all public-sector data collected by public authorities while carrying out 
their duties. Administrative data include for example, data on income tax, welfare 
benefits, students’ exam scores, use of the health service and interactions with the 
criminal justice system. The problem as identified in the literature, which resonates 
strongly with my own experiences, is that where consent cannot be obtained or data 
cannot be ‘sufficiently’ anonymised, that research ‘approval’ (typically ethics approval) 
is significantly delayed or the project is eventually abandoned or otherwise scaled 
back. 201  These delays are notwithstanding those caused by the often-lengthy 
                                                
201 Julian Peto, Olivia Fletcher and Clare Gilham, ‘Data Protection, Informed Consent, and Research’ 
(2004) 328 BMJ 1029; Amy Iversen and others, ‘Consent, Confidentiality, and the Data Protection 
Act’ (2006) 332 BMJ 165; Wiles and others, ‘Informed Consent and the Research Process: Following 
Rules or Striking Balances?’ (n 146); Rose Wiles and others, ‘Ethical Regulation and Visual Methods: 
Making Visual Research Impossible or Developing Good Practice?’ (2012) 17 Sociological Research 
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negotiations with data controllers over access to data in the first place, negotiations 
stilted by the culture of caution. These delays occur even if the use of data is perfectly 
lawful, secure, ethical and understood to serve clearly articulated public interests. These 
issues arise frequently because of the insistence on obtaining informed consent.  
 
The impracticability of obtaining informed consent for social sciences and humanities 
research involving population-level samples (derived from administrative data) illustrates 
the difficulty if not impossibility in such contexts, but this issue equally impacts smaller 
scale studies where social sciences and humanities methodologies (often qualitative) 
make it inappropriate (or potentially harmful to the participants) to obtain consent.202  
 
Informed consent can be inappropriate203 for the group being researched (groups and 
individuals involved in illegal activities204) or because of the setting where research is 
taking place (young people in a club setting205). As to observational and ethnographic 
research (which are vitally important methodologies to social sciences and the 
humanities), informed consent is impracticable at best since it is often impossible to 
inform all participants that they are being observed, especially when research is 
undertaken in public spaces.206 More generally, an issue is the element of the ‘unknown’ 
                                                
Online 8; Sethi and Laurie (n 63); Laurie and Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the 
Governance and Use of Administrative Data in the United Kingdom’ (n 63). 
202 Roxanne Connelly and others, ‘The Role of Administrative Data in the Big Data Revolution in 
Social Science Research’ [2016] Social Science Research 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X1630206X>; Laurie and Stevens, 
‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the Governance and Use of Administrative Data in the 
United Kingdom’ (n 63). 
203 Wiles and others, ‘Informed Consent and the Research Process: Following Rules or Striking 
Balances?’ (n 146) para 4.5. 
204 In Hobbs et al, Bouncers: Violence and Governance in the Night-time Economy, ‘…using ethnography, 
participant observation and extensive interviews with all the main players, [the] book charts the 
emergence of the bouncer as one of the most graphic symbols in the iconography of post-industrial 
Britain.’ Given the nature of the subject matter, including bouncers’ working relationships with 
organised crime and their involvement in controlling access to drugs, it would be inappropriate and 
potentially dangerous during the course fieldwork to seek consent. Dick Hobbs and others, Bouncers: 
Violence and Governance in the Night-Time Economy (OUP 2003).  
205 Much of the participant observation undertaken in Phil Hadfield’s Bar Wars: Contesting the Night in 
Contemporary British Cities took place in a ‘club’ or bar setting, making the possibility of obtaining the 
type of consent required under data protection law both impractical and inappropriate. Phil Hadfield, 
Bar Wars: Contesting the Night in Contemporary British Cities (OUP 2006). 
206 The participant observation undertaken in Hadfield’s Bar Wars illustrates different environments 
that are not conducive to obtaining informed consent. His work is one example of the publicly 
beneficial research that can be undertaken with such methods. Similar difficulties are posed to visual 
image researchers: Rose Wiles and others, ‘Anonymisation and Visual Images: Issues of Respect, 
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in social sciences and humanities research. Unlike the prescribed nature of much 
biomedical and clinical research, social science and humanities research does not 
presuppose the outcomes of a project; rather, outcomes evolve and emerge 
throughout.207 This makes it particularly difficult to convey the level of information 
necessary for consent to be valid under data protection law. 208  
 
Below I will explore the ways in which publicly beneficial social sciences and 
humanities research is deterred, delayed, and at times abandoned altogether, due to the 
perceived need to obtain consent or to anonymise data. This exposes the lack of 
workable alternatives to consent or anonymisation to legally justify the use of personal 
data for social sciences and humanities research and emphasises the need for an 
alternative approach to data protection, namely based on the public interest. 
 
4.1. The consent-or-anonymise paradigm at work in the social 
sciences and humanities context 
In this section I consider the barriers posed by disparate and risk averse interpretation of 
the law by different data controllers. Most inhibitive to social sciences and humanities 
research is the misperception that consent or anonymisation are the only lawful means to 
access and use personal data for research, ignoring other lawful bases for processing, 
namely the public interest conditions. At least within the context of data protection 
law (as implemented in the UK), consent may be properly understood as one of several 
                                                
“voice” and Protection’ (2011) 15 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 41, 48. On 
the difficulty of obtaining consent in social sciences and humanities research generally: Wiles and 
others, ‘Informed Consent and the Research Process: Following Rules or Striking Balances?’ (n 146) 
para 4.5; Dyer and Demeritt (n 146) 56. 
207 Erdos considers that ‘ …the fluid, normative, individual and even identifiable nature of much social 
research ensures that it is in even profounder tension with core data protection rules than medical 
inquiries which are usually highly structured, generic and confidential.’ Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket?  
Social Research under the First Data Protection Principle’ (n 31) 134–135. 
208 In the UK, the ICO advises that an ‘…individual’s consent should be absolutely clear. It should 
cover the specific processing details; the type of information (or even the specific information); the 
purposes of the processing; and any special aspects that may affect the individual, such as any 
disclosures that may be made.’ If social sciences and humanities researchers cannot predict the precise 
outcomes of a research project, it is unlikely that any consent sought would be specific enough to 
satisfy this standard. ICO, ‘The Conditions for Processing’ (n 159). 
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legal grounds for processing (while acknowledging that consent may remain the default 
in other contexts like the law of confidence).209 
 
The impact of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm is evidenced more strongly in the 
biomedical research context210 , but in recent years, there has been an increase in 
discussions on the impact of data protection law (and misperceptions of what data 
protection law requires) on the undertaking of social sciences and humanities research. 
Dingwall’s discussion of the ‘perverse’ consequences of applying a biomedical and 
clinical style of regulation to social sciences research illustrates the problem under 
consideration here: 
 
At another UK university where this paper was presented, a researcher 
described how he had been welcomed for observational fieldwork in a large 
factory in an Asian country. He wanted to conclude this study by formally 
interviewing the plant management, but was required by his university ethics 
committee to obtain signed consent for this. The managers were grossly 
offended by the implied lack of trust and disrespect. The interviews produced 
meaningless data and his access to the plant was withdrawn. As he put it, a high 
trust society had been polluted by the low trust of the Anglo-Saxon world.211 
 
Dingwall’s example demonstrates how obtaining consent ‘for consent’s sake’ can do 
more harm than good. Here the insistence on informed consent was detrimental to the 
                                                
209 For example, when it comes to accessing confidential patient information, the default is to obtain a 
patient’s consent prior to access unless there is no other practicable alternative (referencing Section 
251 of the NHS Act 2006). See discussion on the operation of Section 251 as an exception to consent 
here: Benedict Rumbold, Geraint Lewis and Martin Bardsley, ‘Understanding Information 
Governance: Access to Person-Level Data in Healthcare’ (Nuffield Trust 2011) 
<http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/publications/access-person-level-data-health-care-understanding-
information-governance>; Nayha Sethi and Graeme T Laurie, ‘Delivering Proportionate Governance 
in the Era of eHealth: Making Linkage and Privacy Work Together’ (2013) 13 Medical Law 
International 168 <http://mli.sagepub.com/content/13/2-3/168.abstract>. 
210 Strobl, Cave and Walley (n 31); Peto, Fletcher and Gilham (n 201); The Academy of Medical 
Sciences (n 147); Rumbold, Lewis and Bardsley (n 209) 7–8; Laurie and Sethi (n 31); Kristian Pollock, 
‘Procedure versus Process: Ethical Paradigms and the Conduct of Qualitative Research’ (2012) 13 
BMC Medical Ethics 1; Green and others (n 79) 19–20. 
211 Most of Dingwall’s examples are based on experiences in the US, and illustrate the absurd results 
that can occur where consent is insisted upon without consideration of its merits or indeed the 
potential for it to cause harm in a particular context. ‘A linguist seeking to study language development 
in a preliterate tribe was instructed by the IRB to have the subjects read and sign a consent form 
before the study could proceed…A political scientist who had bought a commercial mailing list of 
names for a survey of voting behaviour was required by the IRB to get written informed consent from 
the subjects before sending them the survey…An IRB attempted to deny an MA student her diploma 
because she did not obtain prior approval for phoning newspaper executives to request copies of 
printed material generally available to the public.’ Dingwall (n 32) 6. 
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research participants (and researcher), which could have been avoided if a more context 
sensitive and pragmatic approach was taken. Laurie and Postan in their examination of 
the legal status of the consent form consider that ‘…the design and requirements of 
the clinical trials model of consent [has] become the expected ethical norm across the 
research spectrum.’212 Indeed, in Wiles et al review of informed consent in the social 
sciences, it was revealed that consent has emerged as an ethical norm for assessing the 
quality of such research.213 
 
Even if consent is not legally necessary under data protection law, ethical guidelines and 
codes of conduct in the UK often urge researchers in the social sciences and humanities 
to obtain informed consent, or at least do not make clear the distinctions between the 
appropriate role for consent as to reuses of previously collected data versus informed 
consent for human participation in research (e.g. for interviews). Under the heading of 
‘Relationships with research participants’, the British Sociological Association provides 
in its Statement of Ethical Practice that: 
 
As far as possible participation in sociological research should be based on the freely given 
informed consent of those studied. This implies a responsibility on the sociologist to 
explain in appropriate detail, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the 
research is about, who is undertaking and financing it, why it is being 
undertaken, and how it is to be disseminated and used.214 
 
Presumably this applies to research requiring human participation as opposed to reuses 
of previously collected data. Nevertheless, this distinction is not made, nor is there 
sufficient guidance provided to researchers who do primarily work with previously 
collected datasets, as opposed to collecting data directly from individuals. While the 
UK’s key funder of social sciences research, the Economic and Social Research Council 
(‘ESRC’) does address the issue of data reuse in its ‘Framework for Research Ethics’, 
there remains a focus on ‘consent’ as the basis for research (re)uses of data.215 In a 
‘checklist’ for researchers to consult prior to ethical review, the ESRC asks researchers 
                                                
212 Laurie and Postan (n 39) 18. 
213 Wiles and others, ‘Informed Consent and the Research Process: Following Rules or Striking 
Balances?’ (n 146) para 1.1. 
214 ‘Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association (March 2002)’ (British 
Sociological Association, 2002) <https://www.britsoc.co.uk/equality-diversity/statement-of-ethical-
practice/> (emphasis added). 
215 ‘ESRC Framework for Research Ethics - Updated January 2015’ (n 36) 24–25. 
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to consider when using ‘secondary’ data whether ‘the consent from the primary data 
cover further analysis’.216 By failing to indicate there are other (lawful) bases upon which 
reuse of data could be justified, they are implicitly prioritising consent and/or ignoring 
other routes to justification. 
 
A more nuanced approach is featured in the Social Research Association’s Ethical 
Guidelines from 2003, especially in its treatment of the relationship between informed 
consent and research using previously collected data.217 The guidance not only makes 
clear that informed consent is not legally necessary under the DPA 1998 for such 
research, but that regardless of the permission granted by a data controller to access 
such data, that the focus must be on ‘…the likely reactions, sensitivities and interests 
of the subjects concerned.’218 Here, it is made clear that assessing the impact of your 
research on individuals is a fundamental question of  research ethics, and thus obligates 
a researcher whether or not informed consent can be obtained in a particular 
circumstance. This pragmatic approach featured in the Social Research Association’s 
guidance is one to be applauded, 219  but numerous other social science research 
guidelines implicitly treat consent (or anonymisation) as the only plausible means to 
justify reuses of data for research; otherwise they fail to make any substantive attempt 
at issuing guidance on the ethics of data reuse in research as opposed to primary 
collection.220 
 
                                                
216 ibid 39. 
217 ‘Social Research Association: Ethical Guidelines’ (Social Research Association 2003) 26–27, 32 
<http://the-sra.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ethics03.pdf>. 
218 ibid 32. 
219 Similarly see the approach to consent in: Annette Markham and Elizabeth Buchanan, ‘Ethical 
Decision-Making and Internet Research: Recommendations from the AoIR Ethics Working 
Committee (Version 2.0)’ (Association of Internet Researchers 2012) 
<https://aoir.org/reports/ethics2.pdf>. 
220 ‘RESPECT Code of Practice for Socio-Economic Research’ (2004) 2, 4 
<http://www.respectproject.org/code/respect_code.pdf>; ‘Code of Practice for Research: Promoting 
Good Practice and Preventing Misconduct’ (UK Research Integrity Office 2009) para 3.7.6 
<http://ukrio.org/wp-content/uploads/UKRIO-Code-of-Practice-for-Research.pdf>; Government 
Social Research Unit, ‘GSR Professional Guidance: Ethical Assurance for Social Research in 
Government’ (2006) 10, 13 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150922160821/http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/ethics_guidance_tcm6-5782.pdf>; ‘Consent for Data Sharing’ (UK Data 
Service, 2012) <https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/manage-data/legal-ethical/consent-data-sharing>. 
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Applicable to both social sciences and humanities research is the Research Council’s 
UK Policy and Guidelines on Governance of Good Research Conduct, which provides 
that research organisations should ensure that ‘Appropriate procedures to obtain and 
record clearly informed consent from research participants should be in place.’ 221 
Research funded by the UK’s Arts & Humanities Research Council (‘AHRC’) and 
ESRC must further take account of Universities UK’s ‘concordat to support research 
integrity’ which characterises the lack of informed consent as a potential form of 
research misconduct.222  
 
What is the impact of this emphasis on obtaining consent (or anonymising data) to the 
undertaking of social sciences and humanities research?  
4.1.1 The costs of regulating social sciences and humanities research 
Wiles et al223 acknowledged the gap in empirical evidence to substantiate critiques on 
the regulation of social sciences research.224 Most discussion refers to the challenges 
social sciences researchers face during ethical review. 225  Indeed, social sciences 
researchers are most often ‘exposed’ to data protection law through the process of 
ethical review within their universities. Typically, ‘…scrutiny of academic research 
usually takes the form, not of an assessment of conformity with legal rules per se, but 
                                                
221 RCUK, ‘RCUK Policy and Guidelines on Governance of Good Research Conduct’ (2015) 4 
<http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/documents/reviews/grc/rcukpolicyandguidelinesongovernanceofgoodresear
chpracticefebruary2013-pdf/>. 
222 ‘The Concordat to Support Research Integrity’ (Universities UK, 2012) 17 
<http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/research-concordat.aspx>; A 
point echoed in: European Science Foundation, ‘The European Code of Conduct for Research 
Integrity’ (2011). 
223 Wiles and others, ‘Ethical Regulation and Visual Methods: Making Visual Research Impossible or 
Developing Good Practice?’ (n 201) para 1.7. 
224 Although most of the research discussed in this section refers to the social sciences context, in line 
with the AHRC’s understanding of the humanities, the lack of clear boundaries between research in 
the arts, humanities and social sciences means that the insight gained from consideration of the latter 
is also arguably informative as to the former subject areas, most certainly where methods and subjects 
overlap: ‘There is no clear boundary between the arts and humanities and many other subject areas – 
notably the social sciences – but a series of interfaces, and many areas of overlap. Moreover, 
disciplines and areas of study are continually evolving, as researchers develop new ways of 
approaching the study of human culture and creativity.’ ‘Subject Coverage’ (Arts and Humanities Research 
Council) <http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/funding/research/subjectcoverage/>. 
225 Wiles and others, ‘Informed Consent in Social Research: A Literature Review’ (n 146); Wiles and 
others, ‘Informed Consent and the Research Process: Following Rules or Striking Balances?’ (n 146); 
Murphy and Dingwall (n 65); Rose Wiles and others, ‘The Management of Confidentiality and 
Anonymity in Social Research’ (2008) 11 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 417; 
Dingwall (n 32); Dyer and Demeritt (n 146). 
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of conformity with a chosen set of ethical standards which overlap with the law to a 
greater or lesser extent.’226 While the aims of ethical review are broader and not focused 
on securing legal compliance, it seems that ethical review is becoming increasingly 
‘legalised’ in how it is applied by university research ethics committees (‘RECs’).227 This 
process of ‘legalisation’ reflects an increasing: 
 
…focus [by] researchers and reviewers on achieving conformity with the law, 
rather than taking a holistic view of the ethical context, [replacing] the process 
of considered ethical judgement by researchers and reviewers with an expert-
based legal interpretative process, and risks displacing it with inflexible 
adherence to ‘legal’ pronouncements.228 
 
The disquiet regarding the ‘legalisation’ of ethics review emphasises the possible 
ulterior motivations at work, including universities’ concerns with reputation, access to 
research funding and legal liability,229 as opposed to genuine ethical concerns with a 
proposed project.  
 
David Erdos is one of the few scholars in the UK who has investigated the impact of 
the ‘legal’ aspects of regulating social sciences research, namely the impact of data 
protection law and the effect of universities’ risk-averse interpretations of it which 
typically manifests itself during ethics review.230 Erdos illustrates how the premises and 
methodological foundations of many types of social sciences research are at odds with, 
in particular, an insistence on obtaining informed consent: 
 
The obtaining of data is the lifeblood of social research. A great deal of such 
information is obtained indirectly whether from published material or a third 
party. Beyond this there may also be a need to obtain data directly from data 
subjects but using clearly covert or even deceptive methodologies. Such data 
may shed critical light on socially problematic practices which would otherwise 
remain hidden from view (and possible remedy). These include discriminatory 
attitudes on the grounds of sex, ethnicity or race, the activities and outlook of 
                                                
226 Charlesworth (n 32) 92. 
227 Stefan Eriksson, Anna Högland and Gert Helgesson, ‘Do Ethical Guidelines Give Guidance? A 
Critical Examination of Eight Ethics Regulations’ (2008) 17 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
15; Charlesworth (n 32). 
228 Charlesworth (n 32) 92; Citing: Eriksson, Högland and Helgesson (n 227) 16. 
229 Charlesworth (n 32) 93. 
230 Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket?  Social Research under the First Data Protection Principle’ (n 31); 
Erdos, ‘Systematically Handicapped? Social Research in the Data Protection Framework’ (n 31); 
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members of extremist organizations, and police practices which conflict with 
the rule of law.231  
 
Erdos references university data protection guidance for researchers where it is 
considered that consent ‘must’ be obtained for the use of sensitive personal data and 
where research is ‘controversial’ – alternative justifications for processing data are given 
far less credence. 232 For example, the University of Edinburgh advises that researchers 
should only rely upon the public interest conditions for processing sensitive personal 
data ‘with caution’.233 Erdos considers that universities’ cautious interpretation of the 
first data protection principle (that processing be lawful and fair) has resulted in ‘…not 
only curtailed individual academic autonomy but, in preventing certain types of 
knowledge production, has inflicted a broader damage on society.’234 Where it is not 
possible, or potentially harmful, to obtain consent and this is insisted upon by 
universities, the ‘cost’ is that certain forms of publicly beneficial research will simply 
not be undertaken. 
 
There is no empirical ‘catalogue’ of social sciences or humanities research projects 
which have been unduly delayed or abandoned for the inability to comply with requests 
for informed consent or an inability to anonymise the relevant data in question 
(although I would hazard a guess that this is far from an uncommon occurrence). 
Anecdotally, in my own experience working with researchers in the UK, I am 
personally aware of several social sciences projects that had already received public 
funding but were delayed for years and at times abandoned altogether for the insistence 
by ethical reviewers or data controllers that they obtain informed consent or for the 
uncertainties surrounding alternative justifications for processing, namely, the public 
interest conditions. I have interacted with many social science and humanities 
researchers that have simply avoided certain topics for what they perceived would be 
                                                
231 Erdos, ‘Stuck in the Thicket?  Social Research under the First Data Protection Principle’ (n 31) 142. 
232 Erdos, ‘Constructing the Labyrinth: The Impact of Data Protection on the Development of 
“Ethical” Regulation in Social Science’ (n 31) 14–15; Citing ‘Research Data: Data Protection and 
Research’ (London School of Economics, 2016) 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/Legal%20Team/dataProtection/researchData.aspx>; 
‘Researcher’s Guide to the Data Protection Principles’ (The University of Edinburgh, 2015) 
<http://www.ed.ac.uk/records-management/data-protection/guidance-policies/research-and-the-
data-protection-act/research/guide-principles>. 
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an uphill and ultimately unsuccessful battle to obtain data and ethical approval. 
Colleagues involved in the ADRC-S allude to the difficulties in obtaining access to 
administrative data where it is not practicable or possible to obtain consent:  
 
Access issues limit the researcher in planning their research, often prevent 
exploratory data analysis, and limit the extent to which new cohorts of social 
scientists can be trained in the use of these data. The use of secure data, which 
cannot necessarily be accessed by the wider research community also has 
implications for replication and the development of cumulative social 
science.235 
 
Some of these issues resonate with the findings of Wiles et al who undertook a 
‘qualitative study of social researchers using visual methods in the UK …[to explore] 
the challenges they face and the practices they adopt in relation to processes of ethical 
review’.236 The study revealed evidence of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm at work 
in ethics reviews. One participant commented: ‘“all ethics committees care about is 
anonymity and consent and if you’ve got a form [for study participants] to sign.”’237 
Certain researchers designed their projects in ways to avoid particular regulatory 
interactions, specifically ethical review by NHS RECs which were considered to be 
‘…highly bureaucratic and standardised, allowing little room for variation from the 
norm of consent forms and anonymisation, and as being less sympathetic to qualitative 
research and visual methods.’238 In summarising their findings, Wiles et al found that: 
 
The concern that ethics committees have about the principles of informed 
consent and anonymity have impacted on researchers in subtle ways such that 
there appears to be a reluctance among some visual researchers to make full 
use of their data in publications or wider communications. The consequence 
of ethical assessment of research may thus be to encourage conservatism in the 
dissemination of research findings, and what Holland et al. (2008) refer to as 
‘sanitised’ findings.239  
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Further knock-on effects included negative impact upon the wellbeing of researchers, 
a shift in focus away from genuine ethical dilemmas and the curtailment of innovative 
research.240  
 
Dingwall’s scathing assessment of the situation focuses on the curtailment of social 
sciences and humanities research and the impact that this has on UK society.241 He 
asserts that biomedical and clinical models of research governance, which are based 
upon the primacy of informed consent, are being imposed without regard to the 
different risks posed by many forms of social sciences and humanities research.242 In 
contrast, Adam Hedgecoe accuses sociologists of potentially underestimating the risks 
posed by their work by over-emphasising the divide between sociological and 
biomedical research.243 Hedgecoe considers the risk of harm posed by sociological 
research is only a difference of degree. 244  Indeed, the nature of risks posed are 
differentiated by degree, but this must be (and is not currently) reflected in appropriate 
and context sensitive application of regulation to different forms of research.  
 
I am not arguing (nor do I think Dingwall is arguing) that social sciences and 
humanities research should be given a blanket licence to proceed without any scrutiny. 
Indeed, the literature exposes an overwhelming gap of evidence on the types of risk 
that social sciences and humanities research poses to participants, knowledge which is 
crucial to adequately protect informational privacy and regulate the use of data in a 
proportionate manner.245 Rather, what is called for is a more context sensitive approach 
that accurately reflects the nature of risks posed but equally the public interests served 
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by different types of research and the potential harms from not undertaking certain 
forms of research.246  
 
Returning to Dingwall, he focuses his analysis on the regulation of social sciences and 
humanities research through ethics review, where consent is often insisted upon 
regardless of its appropriateness in a particular context. He suggests that there are at 
least three distinct ‘costs’ associated with this: 1) the curtailment of publicly funded 
research; 2) decreasing amounts of academic research on vulnerable and socially 
marginalised groups; and 3) stifled innovation with knock-on effects to the prosperity 
of the UK.247  Dingwall illustrates how actual monetary costs are incurred (to the 
Government and thus tax payers) in reference to his and a colleague’s inability to carry 
out a piece of publicly funded research due to the need to obtain approval from 350 
NHS hospitals ‘potentially generating about 1600 signatures and 9000 pages of 
documentation’.248 As a result of this, they could not deliver on the original aims of the 
research and instead completed a significantly limited piece of work. It is worthwhile 
noting that this research (as originally commissioned) was to investigate harms arising 
out of the reuse of single-use devices in healthcare, which at the time was thought to 
lead to approximately seven deaths per year and several post-operative infections.249 
 
From this analysis, it is clear that we need even more evidence of the ways in which 
the consent-or-anonymise paradigm negatively impacts upon the undertaking of 
publicly beneficial research. Such evidence could support a more proportionate and 
context-sensitive approach to ‘regulating’ social sciences and humanities research. With 
an empirical catalogue of ‘impact’ on publicly beneficial uses of data, a sense of urgency 
could be created to persuade policy makers that the UK needs alternative approaches 
to data protection outwith the current consent-or-anonymise paradigm.  
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5. Moving Beyond Consent or Anonymisation 
In examining the predominance of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm, and the lack 
of meaningful engagement with the public interest conditions, it becomes clear that 
this is an underexplored area of data protection. Neither data protection law nor 
subsequent guidance has provided a clear basis for deploying the public interest 
conditions. The consent-or-anonymise paradigm is detrimental to both the protection 
of informational privacy and to publicly beneficial uses of data. 
 
Social value theories of privacy conceptualise privacy as serving a distinct and valuable 
public interest. Such understandings of privacy do not only focus on the benefits 
conferred on specific individuals, but also on the broader societal benefits gained from 
ensuring that privacy is protected. There is indeed a distinct and valuable public interest 
in protecting the informational privacy of individuals. Understanding the protection of 
informational privacy as a discrete public interest allows for the development of 
approaches to data protection which do not automatically create antagonistic 
relationships between the protection of individuals’ rights and interests in their data 
against those of society which may favour the use of data to achieve socially beneficial 
outcomes.  
 
The public interest is at stake both in the use and protection of personal data. It is with 
this more cooperative conceptualisation that I consider in subsequent chapters the role 
the public interest concept can play in new approaches to data protection which offer 
more transparent, dynamic and fairer resolution of the tensions between the protection 
and use of personal data. However, to successfully implement the public interest 
concept in a legal context, we must first establish a legitimate legal basis for doing so. 
In Chapter 3, through extensive analysis of the legislative history to the DPA 1998 and 
DPD, I consider the reasoning behind the inclusion of the public interest conditions. 
Through this analysis I expose the relevant legal contours that must be respected when 
deploying the concept in practice. 
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Chapter 3 Tracing the History 
and Application of the Public 
Interest in Data Protection Law – 
a UK and European perspective  
1. Introduction 
The underlying aim of this thesis is to develop a new understanding of the public 
interest concept in data protection and to suggest a new approach to resolving the 
tensions between the protection of informational privacy and use of personal data. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the consent-or-anonymise paradigm not only hinders the 
undertaking of publicly beneficial research but more broadly represents a flawed, albeit 
common, approach to data protection. This is incapable of ensuring individuals’ rights 
and interests in their data are fully accounted for. It is equally unable to ensure that 
public interest uses of data are facilitated. In this broader sense, the consent-or-
anonymise paradigm detracts from the dual public interests underpinning European 
and thus UK data protection law which is to promote both the use and protection of 
personal data.  
 
As briefly referenced in Chapter 1, it is important to highlight the dearth of 
understanding on the public interest conditions in data protection and the consequent 
need for this new approach. The public interest concept is not defined in either the 
DPD or DPA 1998. In the context of privacy injunctions and the media, Mr Justice 
Eady explained that:  
 
A decision on public interest must be capable of being tested by objectively 
recognised criteria. But it could be argued as a matter of policy that allowance 
should be made for a decision reached which falls within a range of reasonably 
possible conclusions.250  
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Without a legal definition or interpretation within subsequent and authoritative 
guidance, such ‘objectively recognised’ criteria are lacking within the data protection 
context. The ICO has attempted to unpack the application of the public interest 
concept251 to section 32 of the DPA 1998, which exempts processing for the ‘special 
purposes’ of journalism, literature and art from several provisions of the Act 252, if 
(among other requirements) the data controller ‘...reasonably believes that, having 
regard in particular to the special importance of the public interest in freedom of 
expression, publication would be in the public interest.’253 This guidance was developed 
specifically for interpreting section 32 and therefore cannot be directly applied to the 
public interest conditions; indeed there is no precedent to suggest this is, or would be 
appropriate (not least because the public interest conditions apply to a far broader 
range of processing). The existence of this guidance does, however, indicate the 
possibility of producing something similar on the public interest conditions.  
 
Given the absence of any such guidance or critical analysis on the public interest 
conditions in data protection literature, there is a fundamental lack of understanding 
as to the potential ‘range of reasonably possible conclusions’ which could lead to 
justifiable reliance on the conditions. The purpose of this chapter is to begin the task 
of unpacking the intended role and scope of the public interest conditions by tracing 
the reasons for its inclusion in the legislation. With this relevant historical and 
legislative grounding, a new approach to understanding and resolving the public 
interests in data protection can be developed. 
 
As the guiding instrument of data protection law in Europe, I first analyse the 
legislative history to the DPD, focusing on the discussions surrounding the inclusion 
of the public interest provisions. Although the legislative history clarifies the statutory 
role of the public interest provisions, uncertainty remains as to the substantive meaning 
                                                
251 ICO, ‘Data Protection and Journalism: A Guide for the Media’ (2014) 32–34 
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252 Comparing the breadth of exemptions available for journalism, literature and the arts versus those 
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of the public interest concept. To this end, in the second part of the chapter, I consider 
the UK’s implementation of the public interest provisions into the DPA 1998 to assess 
the extent to which these uncertainties are resolved. The chapter concludes by outlining 
what is ‘known’ and ‘not known’ as to the public interest provisions in the DPD and 
DPA 1998; the purpose and relevant procedure defining the scope for the provisions 
are known but the crucial public interest threshold and what it means to be ‘in the 
public interest’ remains undefined and unsubstantiated, a point to be addressed in 
forthcoming chapters. 
 
2. The Legislative History to the DPD: The Intended Role 
and Scope of the Public Interest Concept  
A logical first step to developing an understanding of the intended role and scope of 
the public interest provisions in European data protection law is to examine the reasons 
why legislators included the public interest concept in the first place and what their 
understanding of the term was at the time the legislation was being drafted. Although 
the geographical focus of this thesis is the UK in the main, given the guiding force of 
the DPD and its role in interpreting national implementing legislation,254 I consider the 
legislative history to the Directive first (the travaux préparatoires or in short form the 
travaux). Below I track the evolution of the public interest concept and its inclusion in 
relevant provisions from its introduction into the draft Directive until its final and 
enacted form.255  
 
As to my methodology, I first identified the sources of key material. This included 
documentation relating to each procedural step in drafting the DPD. Although some 
of the travaux was available on the Eur-LEX website, many documents were not.256  
This required further investigation on the public register of the Council of the European 
                                                
254 In the UK under the authority of HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA, Lord Denning held that in relation 
to laws enacted based on EU legislation (such as the DPA 1998), interpretation must not be confined 
to the ‘English text’ but to consider the intentions of the framers of the European instrument. [1974] 
EWCA Civ 14, [1974] Ch 401 [426]. 
255 A timeline of the travaux préparatoires to the DPD may be found here: ‘EUR-Lex - 1990_287 - EN’ 
(EUR-Lex: Access to European Union law) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/100979>. 
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Union257 containing ‘all non-sensitive documents submitted to the Council or to one of 
its preparatory bodies which are to serve as a basis for deliberations, could influence 
the decision making process or reflect the progress made on a given subject’.258 When 
it became clear that not all the travaux were available online, I made a freedom of 
information request per Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.259 In combining these 
sources, I searched each document (over 1,300 pages) for any mention of 1) ‘public 
interest’, 2) any analogous terms e.g. ‘general interest’ and 3) ‘research’. This analysis 
would unearth previously overlooked discussions regarding the public interest concept 
in data protection law and the role of the public interest provisions, especially in 
relation to research. 
 
2.1 1990 proposal for a Council Directive on the processing of 
personal data  
The DPD was preceded by the introduction of international provisions on the legal 
protections and principles of data protection. These included the 1980 Organisation 
for Economic Development’s (‘OECD’) Privacy Guidelines260 and the 1981 Council 
of Europe ‘Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data’ (‘Convention 108’).261 Convention 108 arose out of ‘the 
threat to individual privacy posed by computerisation; and the desire to maintain a free 
flow of information between trading nations.’262 To accede to the Convention a State 
                                                
257 ‘Search in the Register’ (European Council, Council of the European Union) 
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Erdos, ‘Freedom of Expression Turned on Its Head? Academic Social Research and Journalism in the 
European Union’s Privacy Framework’ (n 252). 
260 ‘OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data - 
OECD’ (as updated in 2013) 
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261 Though beyond this discussion, it is important to recognise the role of Convention 108 in being the 
first international instrument to establish the protection of personal data as a separate right when 
adopted by the Council of Europe in 1981. Currently there are 48 signatories to the Convention. 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
ET 108 1981. 
262 Ian Walden, ‘Privacy and Data Protection’, Computer Law: The Law and Regulation of Information 
Technology (7th edn, OUP 2011) 575. 
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would need to enact national data protection legislation, which the UK fulfilled with 
the Data Protection Act 1984 (‘1984 Act’). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
provide any in-depth analysis of the 1984 Act; I focus solely on the current state of the 
law which is based upon the DPD to be amended yet again in 2018 when the GDPR 
comes into force (although it remains unclear the extent to which UK data protection 
law will continue to fully align itself with the Regulation post-Brexit). For present 
purposes, it is enough to acknowledge that the 1984 Act was the first data protection 
legislation in the UK which remained in force until the passage of the DPA 1998.263 
This and other national data protection legislation enacted for the purposes of acceding 
to the Convention diverged greatly and thus the Convention was unable to attain 
consistency in application and implementation by signatory states.264 To achieve this 
uniformity in protection and, furthermore, to secure the development of the internal 
market in Europe, the European Commission submitted a ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of 
personal data’ (‘1990 Proposal’) in July 1990.265  
 
It is not necessary to examine the entirety of the 1990 Proposal and all successive 
amendments made therein. Of primary relevance to this discussion is the introduction 
of the ‘public interest’ concept into the legislation, especially in its iteration as a legal 
justification to process (ordinary) personal data and sensitive personal data. Although 
Convention 108 and the OECD Privacy Guidelines both allow for derogations based 
on various public policy grounds (ordre public),266 the later drafts of the DPD introduced 
                                                
263 In contrast with the DPA 1998, the 1984 Act only applied to the automatic (electronic) processing of 
data and not to manual records. 1984 Act, Pt 1, s 1(2). 
264 Discussed in the travaux as a key reason for introducing the Draft DPD: ‘The abovementioned 
Council of Europe Convention has not led to a reduction in this diversity because, firstly, it leaves 
open a large number of options as far as implementation of its basic principles is concerned, and 
secondly, it has been ratified by only seven Member States (Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Spain 
and the United Kingdom), of which one (Spain) still has no domestic legislation.’ European 
Commission, ‘Commission Communication on the protection of individuals in relation to the 
processing of personal data in the Community and Information Security: Explanatory Memorandum’ 
(13 September 1990) SYN 287, 15. (Unless a website is provided, all references to the travaux are held 
on file.) 
265 ‘Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the 
Processing of Personal Data 1990/C/277/03’ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1990:277:FULL&from=en> (hereinafter ‘1990 proposal’).  
266 OECD Guidelines (n8), Paragraph 4 ‘Exceptions to the Guidelines’; Convention 108 (n9), Art 
9(2)(a). 
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the public interest concept for the first time into data protection legislation. On this 
point, the legal grounds for processing personal data were more limited and structured 
differently under the original 1990 Proposal than in the finalised and current DPD, but 
were not necessarily negative for research processing.  
 
The lawful grounds for processing under the 1990 Proposal were divided between 
those applicable to public sector bodies and private sector entities.267 As to public 
bodies, the 1990 Proposal makes a distinction between the lawful grounds for the 
‘creation or any other processing of personal data’ and treats separately ‘the 
communication’ of personal data held by public bodies. As to the former category, the 
creation of files ‘or any other processing’ by a public sector body would be lawful if it 
was necessary for that public body to perform their tasks. Processing for any other 
purposes would only be lawful if 1) the data subject consented; 2) the processing was 
based on a further legal obligation; 3) the legitimate interests of the data subject did 
not preclude this further processing, or 4) the further processing was necessary to ‘… 
ward off an imminent threat to public order or a serious infringement of the rights of 
others.’268 As to the communication of personal data held by a public authority, more 
limited grounds were set forth such that it would be lawful only if it was 1) necessary 
for the public body to perform their tasks or 2) ‘requested by a natural or legal person 
in the private sector who invokes a legitimate interest, on condition that the interest of 
the data subject does not prevail.’269  
 
As to the processing of data by private sector entities, the grounds for processing were 
more limited. Processing by a private sector entity would need to be based on consent; 
if consent was not possible only three other grounds were provided: 1) that processing 
was required to carry out a contract; 2) that data were publicly accessible and used 
solely for correspondence; or 3) that the processing was in the legitimate interests of 
the controller ‘on condition that the interest of the data subject does not prevail.’270 
                                                
267 Articles 5-6 dealt with the grounds for processing data by public sector bodies, while Article 8 dealt 
with the grounds applicable to private sector bodies.  
268 1990 Proposal, Art 5(1). 
269 1990 Proposal, Art 6. 
270 1990 Proposal, Art 8.  
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The 1990 Proposal did not include a legal ground for the processing of personal data 
(for either public sector or private sector bodies) on the basis that it is in the public 
interest (although Article 8 of the Proposal does allow Member States to derogate 
further processing conditions).271 Article 17 did provide that Member States may for 
reasons of ‘important public interest’ allow the processing of special categories of 
personal data.272 The terminology ‘important public interest’ is not further defined in 
the 1990 Proposal, however Recital 16 elucidated that reasons of important public 
interest notably include those ‘in relation to the medical profession’.273  
 
Given that research is the primary example of data processing referred to throughout 
this thesis, it is worth noting that the 1990 Proposal did not make special provisions 
for research. However, it is possible that the mention of ‘the medical profession’ in 
Recital 16 may have been an early recognition of the importance of medical research 
and the use of personal data for such endeavours.274 Moreover, if considering the reuse 
of public sector data for research, the grounds for processing ordinary personal data in 
the 1990 Proposal would allow this if ‘the legitimate interests of the data subject did 
not preclude’ the research use in question. In combination with Article 17 and the 
potential for Member States to enact derogations for special categories of personal 
data, there were ways in which both ordinary and special categories of personal data 
could be processed for research. What is important to note is that even at this early 
point in the DPD’s history, Recital 16 and Article 17 demonstrated Member States’ 
concern that certain forms of data processing may not always be capable of satisfying 
other legal conditions such as ‘consent’ and may require justification on the basis of a 
particular public interest served.  
 
                                                
271 The 1990 Proposal did not have the equivalent of the DPD’s Article 7(e) (i.e. ‘processing is 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest’).  
272 Understood in the UK as ‘sensitive’ personal data.  
273 1990 Proposal, Recital 16. 
274 Although at this stage there are also exemptions made for freedom of expression and the press 
(albeit without explicit mention of the ‘public interest’ served by these) ibid Art 19.  
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2.2 1991 opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the 
processing of personal data 
In response to the 1990 Proposal, the European Council consulted with the Economic 
and Social Committee (‘ESC’) in accordance with usual procedures for the drafting 
process, 275  which subsequently provided its opinion on the draft Directive. 276  In 
relation to the ‘public interest’, they approved the notion of Member States derogating 
from the prohibition of processing special categories of personal data, such as for 
‘important public interest’ grounds (Article 17), so long as such derogations were 
subject to ‘specific regulations’ which at the time, they did not elaborate on further.277  
 
This presents the first of many inconsistencies in the treatment of the public interest 
concept in the draft Directive. Here the inclusion of ‘important’ before ‘public interest’ 
seems to suggest the prospect that there are unimportant public interests. However, more 
to the point is that the ESC found the legal grounds provided in the 1990 Proposal 
inadequate: ‘The Directive goes further than Convention 108278 by seeking to establish 
criteria for deciding whether processing is lawful. These criteria appear inadequate or 
open to differing interpretations’. 279  The use of vague terms, such as ‘legitimate 
interests’, without further explanation, was considered (even at this early stage) 
problematic 280  and is indicative of a desire to create legislation that rejects such 
ambiguity. Curiously, however, the use of equally vague terms such as ‘important public 
interest’ was not commented on regarding the processing of special categories of 
personal data. Overall, the ESC’s 1991 Opinion cements the idea that processing for 
reasons in the public interest should be allowed (at least for special categories of personal 
                                                
275 ‘Legislative Powers: Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ (European Parliament: About Parliament) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers>. 
276 ‘Opinion on: — the Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in 
Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, — the Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the 
Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in the Context of Public Digital Telecommunications 
Networks, in Particular the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile 
Networks, and — the Proposal for a Council Decision in the Field of Information Security’ 
(Economic and Social Committee 1991) C 159/38 
<http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/4ed85510-f142-461b-bd0d-
fc850f77fbf3.0004.01/DOC_1> (hereinafter ‘1991 Opinion’).  
277 1991 Opinion, 43. 
278 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
ET 108 (n 261). 
279 1991 Opinion, 41. 
280 ibid. 
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data and if ‘important’), if suitable (but as yet unspecified) safeguards for said 
processing were in place. 
 
2.3 1992 first reading of the European Parliament  
The DPD continued to evolve after the first reading of the European Parliament (‘First 
Reading of the European Parliament’) where significant amendments were made to the 
draft Directive.281 The amendments represented, at times, a stricter stance on the 
protection of personal data than the original 1990 Proposal. Importantly, Parliament 
completely removed the provisions allowing the lawful processing of special categories 
of personal data on the basis of ‘important public interest’ grounds.282 In its place, 
Parliament proposed a complete ban on the processing of special categories of personal 
data by the private sector: ‘The Member States shall provide in their law for a ban on 
the processing of data of a strictly private nature in the private sector.’283 No similar 
ban was made for public sector data controllers. 
 
The term ‘public interest’ is in fact entirely removed from the First Reading of the 
European Parliament. However, the public interest may have been introduced in a less 
explicit way through the amendments to Article 8(2) which covers the legal grounds 
for the ‘communication’ or reuse of ordinary personal data from a data controller to 
third parties. Article 8(2)(g) provides that a data controller may reuse personal data 
after collection: 
 
insofar as it is necessary to safeguard the legitimate interests of a third party or 
the general public, provided that the interests of the data subject that warrant 
protection are not harmed.284 
 
                                                
281 European Parliament, ‘Position of the European Parliament on Proposal for a Directive I COM 
(90) — C3-0323/90 — SYN 287/Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of 
Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, 11 March 1992 (First Reading)’ (1992) OJ 
C94/173 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOC_1992_094_R_0063_01&from=EN> (hereinafter ‘First 
Reading of the European Parliament’). Explanatory notes available here: 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/10375/1/10375.pdf >.  
282 First Reading of the European Parliament, Amendment No 63, Art 17(2). 
283 Here special categories of personal data were referred to as ‘data of a strictly private nature’. ibid 
Amendment No 63, Art 17(2). 
284 ibid Amendment No 32, Art 8(2) para (g) (emphasis added). 
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Here the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the ‘general public’ could be 
interpreted as an iteration of the public interest concept, representing a predecessor 
provision to the later inclusion of a standalone legal ground on the basis of the public 
interest. More likely, however, is that this provision represents a precursor and 
combination of both the public interest provision in the finalised Article 7(e) and the 
legitimate interests provision in Article 7(f).285  
 
Continuing with the analysis of Parliament’s Article 8(2)(g), the reuse of personal data 
is allowed in the interests of ‘the general public’ so long as the interests of individual data 
subjects are not harmed (the latter are not defined but presumably include their 
interests in privacy). This does not indicate that a balance may be struck between the 
interests of the general public and of the individual. Rather a stricter approach is 
required – if any harm would result from the ‘communication’ or reuse of data, reliance 
on this provision would become invalidated. Thus, and unlike the finalised public 
interest provisions in the DPD, considerations of harm to the data subject are explicitly 
required when considering justification for the reuse of personal data on this basis. 
However, as per the finalised DPD, the understanding of harm in the context of data 
protection is indeed a narrow one, equated with tangible harms causally connected to 
financial ‘damages’.286 This is despite the clear intention expressed by the European 
Commission, in its original communication on the DPD, that harm was intended to be 
broadly interpreted as including non-physical as well as physical damage.287  
 
The stricter approach taken by the European Parliament to regulating the processing 
of special categories of personal data, is juxtaposed by the apparent leniency granted 
to data controllers elsewhere within the draft Directive, for example, in the inclusion 
of new and broader legal grounds for processing personal data that were not in the 
                                                
285 In the final version of the DPD, Art 7(f) omits any mention of ‘the general public’ and instead 
merely refers to the safeguarding of the data controller’s legitimate interests. If safeguarding the 
interests of ‘the general public’ are indeed synonymous with the notion of the public interest, it is 
contended here that this was subsequently separated into a standalone legal basis in Art 7(e). 
286 ‘Damages’ are referred to but not elaborated upon in this iteration of the draft Directive. First 
Reading of the European Parliament, Recital 20 and Art 21. 
287 European Commission, ‘Commission communication on the protection of individuals in relation to 
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original 1990 Proposal. For instance, consider the addition of a legal ground which 
would have allowed data controllers to process personal data (for any reason) so long 
as ‘the data subject has been given an opportunity to object to the processing and has 
not done so’.288 Why would a data controller obtain consent if an even lesser standard 
than opt-out would suffice? Further, consider the amendments in Article 8(2)(i) which 
would legitimise the reuse of personal data ‘for research and statistical purposes on 
condition that the personal data is depersonalized’.289 While an interesting evolution of 
the DPD as a whole, the amendments proposed by the European Parliament do not 
further our understanding of the public interest concept and its intended role and scope 
for data protection; indeed they remove explicit use of this term from their version of 
the draft Directive. 
 
2.4 1992 European Commission compromise draft of the Directive 
Taking into account the First Reading of the European Parliament, the European 
Commission adopted a compromise version of the proposed Directive in October 
1992 (‘1992 Compromise Draft’).290 The 1992 Compromise Draft reinstated the 1990 
Proposal’s Article 17 (grounds for processing special categories of personal data), into 
Article 8. The revised Article 8 restored several exceptions to the prohibition on 
processing special categories of personal data including reinstating a legal basis for 
processing based on ‘important public interest grounds’. 291  In the explanatory 
memorandum to the 1992 Compromise Draft, the Commission seemed to indicate 
that the legal basis for processing on grounds of ‘important public interest’ should be 
given substance, as seen by their attempt to add context to this vague provision:  
 
Paragraph 3 reproduces Article 17(2) of the initial proposal, permitting 
exemptions on ‘important public interest grounds.’ An exemption should be 
given, for example, to international human rights organizations which require 
such data for their work, provided they can offer suitable safeguards.292  
 
                                                
288 ibid Amendment No 30, Art 8(1)(ca)(new). 
289 First Reading of the European Parliament, Amendment No 32, Art 8(2)(i). 
290 European Commission, ‘Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data’ 
(1992) OJ C311/30 <http://aei.pitt.edu/10375/1/10375.pdf> (hereinafter ‘1992 Compromise 
Draft’).  
291 1992 Compromise Draft, Art 8(3). 
292 ibid Explanatory Memorandum, 18. 
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This attempt to provide substance to the concept of the public interest is 
underwhelming. The explanatory memorandum provides only one example on what 
an important public interest may be aside from the mention of processing data related 
to the medical profession in their amended Recital 17.293 Thus, while the Commission 
implies their desire to avoid the use of ambiguous terminology in the Directive, no 
further explanation is provided as to what may be considered an important public 
interest for the purposes of the legislation or indeed what criteria might be used to 
assess the public interest in processing in each case.  
 
Not only does the Commission reinstate the ‘important public interest’ ground for 
processing special categories of personal data in the 1992 Compromise Draft, it goes 
further and introduces a separate legal ground for processing ordinary personal data 
based on the public interest. This is essentially the same as what is currently in the 
DPD, Article 7(e): 
 
processing is necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest or 
carried out in the exercise of authority vested in the controller or in a third 
party to whom the data are disclosed.294  
 
With the addition of this new public interest ground for processing ordinary personal 
data (and the complete reformulation of other legal grounds to processing without 
consent)295 the Commission makes clear that: ‘Consent is no longer the main criterion, 
subject to exceptions; it is now the first of several alternatives.’296 This is crucial as it rejects 
the primacy of consent and reflects a far more balanced and proportionate approach 
to the concept of lawful processing.  
 
                                                
293 ibid Recital 17. 
294 1992 Compromise Draft, Art 7(e) which is nearly identical to Art 7(e) in the current DPD bar 
certain grammatical changes i.e. the final version of the DPD includes the words ‘carried out’ prior to 
the words ‘in the public interest’. 
295 The 1992 Compromise Draft significantly modified the original 1990 Proposal’s legal grounds for 
processing, which were found in Articles 5, 6 and 8. The 1992 Compromise Draft combined all the 
legal grounds into a single Article 7 (mimicking the format we are familiar with under the current 
DPD). The legal grounds added in 1992 included processing necessary: for a contract (Art 7(b)); for 
compliance with a legal obligation (Art 7(c)); to protect the vital interests of the data subject (Art 7 
(d)); for a task in the public interest (Art 7(e)); and for the legitimate interests of the controller or third 
party (Art 7(f)). 
296 1992 Compromise Draft, Explanatory Memorandum, 16 (emphasis added). 
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With specific regard to the public interest ground for processing, the Commission 
states that: ‘The same applies to the new Article 7(e)’. A reference is then made to their 
previous statement that: ‘The reference to processing in order to comply with an 
obligation imposed by national or Community law has been maintained (new Article 
7(c))’. 297 This would mean that the Commission’s addition of a standalone public 
interest ground to processing was in fact considered a mere transposition of what was 
previously in the 1990 Proposal, even though the term ‘public interest’ was not used in 
relation to the processing of ordinary personal data. Although the Commission did not 
explicitly say, it is likely they were referencing Article 5(b) of the 1990 Proposal which, 
in pertinent part provided: 
 
…the creation of a file and any other processing of personal data shall be lawful 
in so far as they are necessary for the performance of the tasks of the public authority in 
control of the file’.  
 
…it is necessary in order to ward off an imminent threat to public order or a serious 
infringement of the rights of others. 298 
  
On this reasoning, in 1992 Article 7(e) was considered limited to processing by public 
authorities in the performance of their tasks or ‘to ward off an imminent threat to 
public order’, suggesting a rather high threshold for processing to be considered in the 
public interest. However, the plausibility of this restrictive interpretation can be quickly 
dismissed. First, Article 7(e) cannot be limited to public authorities given that it 
distinguishes between processing that is necessary: 1) ‘for the performance of a task in 
the public interest’; 2) ‘carried out in the exercise of public authority vested in the 
controller’; or 3) ‘in a third party to whom the data are disclosed’.299 Second, it is clear 
from Recital 17 (at least in regards to processing special categories of personal data) 
that the public interest can encapsulate far less pressing matters, such as those related 
to the medical profession, not merely ‘imminent threats to public order’.  
 
This is simply to say that the Commission’s 1992 Compromise Draft does not help 
advance any further understanding of what precisely a task ‘in the public interest’ might 
                                                
297 ibid 17 (emphasis added). 
298 Compare Art 5 of the 1990 Proposal to Art 7(e) of the 1992 Compromise Draft (emphasis added). 
299 1992 Compromise Draft, Art 7(e) (emphasis added). 
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be in the context of the myriad of possible purposes for data processing. Aside from 
the three examples mentioned (processing related to the medical profession, by human 
rights organisations and to ward off imminent threats to public order), no other 
examples or objective criteria are given to explain what may be considered sufficiently 
in the public interest or as an ‘important’ public interest in terms of data processing 
more generally. Interestingly however, the three examples provided do have some 
conceptual similarities in that they represent circumstances where consent may be 
impossible or impracticable to obtain and ‘the public interest’ nevertheless requires 
certain processing of personal data e.g. if a patient is critically injured, if a human rights 
organisation is providing aid in a war-torn country or if a sudden and severe threat to 
public safety arises. 
 
2.5 1993-1994 Council of the European Union readings of the 1992 
compromise draft 
The addition of Article 7(e) in the 1992 Compromise Draft was noticeably broader 
than the ‘equivalent’ provisions in the 1990 Proposal as public interest terminology 
presumably is used to encompass a wider range of processing scenarios, rather than 
previous and implicit references to processing within other legal grounds which may 
have a mere ‘flavour’ of the public interest. 300  Further consideration of the 1992 
Compromise Draft, reveals Member State reactions to the addition of a standalone 
public interest ground for processing in the new Article 7(e).301 For example, from the 
first reading of Articles 1-7 by the Working Party on Economic Questions, France 
wanted to make clear ‘the distinction to be made between “a task in the public interest” 
and “the exercise of public authority”’, given the notably broader scope of Article 7(e) 
than the processing encompassed by Article 5(b) of the 1990 Proposal (limited to the 
performance of the tasks of a public authority).302 If there would be two separate 
grounds, one limited to the actions of public authorities, and one with regard to 
                                                
300 Article 5(b) of the 1990 Proposal, only covers specific data processing scenarios which may be in 
the public interest, including data processing by a public authority or processing that ‘is necessary in 
order to ward off an imminent threat to public order or a serious infringement of the rights of others.’  
301 Council of the European Onion, ‘Outcome of Proceedings of: Working Party on Economic 
Questions (Data Protection) on 5 and 6 October 1992’ 9388/92 (‘Outcome of Proceedings 9388/92’. 
302 ibid 20. 
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processing in the public interest, there presumably would be a difference between the 
two but this distinction was as yet unclear.  
 
This uncertainty is shared and evidenced by Germany’s request for specific examples 
of what tasks in the public interest would be covered over and above those cases, that 
would fall under Article 7(c) which encompasses processing undertaken to comply with 
an obligation under EU or national law.303 Here, we again see a request to clarify what 
precisely the ‘public interest’ means if it is to be distinguished from other acts by the 
State or arising from legal obligations. Specific examples of ‘tasks’ in the public interest 
would eventually be provided in Recital 34 of the finalised DPD, which would include, 
for example, scientific research. However, these were not included in the Compromise 
Draft under consideration. Thus, it was left entirely unclear exactly what type of 
processing may be considered in the public interest. During the period between 1992-
1994, the travaux reveals Member States lobbying efforts to exclude or create 
exemptions for certain forms of processing, some of which are later included as ‘public 
interest’ examples in Recital 34.  
 
The lobbying which took place during this time represents inconsistencies in the 
treatment of the public interest as a concept and moreover, a lack of engagement with 
its substantive meaning. At no time did Member States or European legislators suggest 
or introduce criteria to assess the public interest in processing; descriptive examples 
are all that is ever provided. Below I examine the specific lobbying efforts of Member 
States in this regard, which demonstrates the lack of reasoning behind the eventual 
inclusion of certain forms of processing as examples of the public interest. This reveals 
the political role of the ‘public interest’ justifications for processing as a potential 
compromise for Member States who desired complete exemption from the scope of 
the DPD for certain processing activities. Rather, Member States ‘received’ lesser 
restrictions in the form of an alternative justification for processing without obtaining 
informed consent. 
 
                                                
303 Outcome of Proceedings 9388/92, 19-20. 
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2.6 Member States’ lobbying and the public interest  
During the remaining drafting process, various Member States lobbied for specific 
processing activities to be excluded or exempted under certain circumstances, from the 
scope of the proposed Directive. Many of these activities were eventually recognised 
as processing in the ‘public interest’ in Recital 34304 and justifiable on that basis as 
provided for in Articles 7(e) and 8(4)305 of the DPD. Before considering the specific 
types of processing lobbied for, noting especially those which were eventually 
categorised as ‘in the public interest’, it is important to consider the logic behind these 
lobbying efforts. As stated above, soon after the inclusion of the public interest 
justifications for processing ordinary and special categories of personal data, Member 
States, (for example, France, Germany and Greece), expressed confusion and 
uncertainty regarding the scope of the public interest concept.306  
 
Most of these concerns, and similar discussions recorded in the travaux, were focused 
on the public interest as a justification for the processing of special categories of personal 
data (i.e. in Article 8(4)). This is because the public interest justification for processing 
special categories of personal data was offered as a compromise to Member States who 
were concerned that certain forms of processing which required such data (for 
example, health data307 and trade union membership308) would be impeded if consent 
was required. It is interesting to note that early in these discussions (in October 1992), 
the Commission admitted defeat in their attempts to define the concept; as stated in a 
footnote, they ‘remained open to suggestions, although felt it difficult to clarify this 
notion further.’309  
 
Indeed, as the remaining travaux reveal (and as evidenced in the final text of the DPD), 
legislators were seemingly guided entirely by Member States’ lobbying efforts in 
                                                
304 Recital 17(a) during the drafting process. 
305 Article 8(3) during the drafting process. 
306 ‘Outcome of Proceedings 9388/92’, 19-20; ‘Outcome of Proceedings of Working Party on 
Economic Questions (Data Protection), 29 October 1992’ 9918/92, 5.  
307 ‘Note, from the Presidency, Subject: Use of personal-data files in medical research (Personal-record 
research)’ 6454/93. 
308 ‘Note from the German Delegation, 7 June 1993, to General Secretariat for the Council’ 7132/93, 
6. 
309 ‘Outcome of Proceedings 9918/92’, 5. 
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determining what categories of processing would be used as ‘examples’ of the public 
interest as eventually reflected in Recital 34. They recognised the need to substantiate 
the concept further,310 but no attempts were made (or at least documented in the 
travaux) to develop a set of objective criteria that would enable Member States and data 
controllers to determine what types of processing may be in the public interest, or 
indeed an ‘important’ public interest for the purposes of the Directive, beside those 
explicitly indicated examples. Member States continually expressed their concerns that, 
absent clearer explication of the public interest justifications to processing, certain (and 
important) forms of processing would be hindered by the Directive given the perceived 
inability to meet other conditions for processing, such as obtaining consent.  
 
The importance attributed to developing a clearer, substantive understanding of the 
concept is reflected in these lobbying efforts. Member States attempted to shape the 
scope of the public interest provisions to meet their own requirements for the concept 
in context of their own country’s data processing needs but also clearly their own 
contextual understanding of the public interest. This is crucial to the unpacking of the 
relationship between examples of the public interest given in the Directive and the 
concept itself – this relationship is devoid of any logic or reasoning aside from the fact 
that a certain Member State (or States) lobbied for that particular type of processing, 
either for complete exclusion or partial exemption. No efforts were made to otherwise 
develop an understanding of what the public interest meant in a fuller and substantive 
sense although it was clear that the public interest provisions were to play a crucial role 
                                                
310 Towards the end of the drafting process in 1994 the Presidency (then Greece) suggested the 
inclusion of examples of important public interests to interpret Article 8 as to special categories of 
personal data and as regards to data transfers also made on the basis of important public interests: ‘(1) 
To allay concerns expressed by a number of delegations, it is proposed to bring in a general recital on 
“important grounds of public interest” listing the interests covered by Article 8(3) and the 4th indent 
of Article 27(1)’. Their suggestion for a recital is similar to the now current Recital 34 in the finalised 
DPD: 17(a) ‘Whereas Member States must be allowed to derogate from some of the provisions of this 
Directive when justified on important grounds of public interest; whereas, however, they must provide 
suitable specific safeguards in order to protect fundamental freedoms and privacy; whereas, for 
example, the following activities must be deemed to constitute matters of important public interest: 
public health and social protection, scientific research, international exchange of data between tax or 
customs authorities or between police departments or departments with responsibility for national 
security’. ‘Note: from Presidency date: 14 April 1994 for: Working Party on Economic Questions 
(Data Protection) 6316/94, 3-4. 
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in justifying many forms of processing without consent, (e.g. for research, particularly 
health research, national security, public health etc.).  
 
In reviewing the travaux in full, it appears that several countries lobbied for specific 
types of processing to be excluded or exempt from full application of the Directive. 
Member States considered such processing critically important and as such that they 
should not be impeded by the implementation of the Directive. These lobbying efforts 
focused, in the main, on certain purposes for processing special categories of personal 
data but also at times focused on particular data controllers: 
 
• International human rights organisations;311 
• The medical profession;312 
• Employment and social security purposes;313 
• Research and statistics (especially medical research);314 
• Public safety and state security;315 
• Religious purposes;316 
• Political canvassing;317 and 
• Tax collection for funding of churches.318 
 
                                                
311 It is unclear from the travaux which Member State lobbied for its inclusion in the Commission’s 
1992 Compromise Draft. 1992 Compromise Draft, 18.  
312 It is also unclear what Member State lobbied for its inclusion, but medical research is consistently 
raised in regards to research activities more generally. ibid, Recitals 16-17. 
313 Lobbied for by Germany. ‘Note from the German Delegation, 7 June 1993, to General Secretariat 
for the Council’ 7132/93, 7-8.  
314 Lobbied for extensively throughout the legislative process. Considered, for example, in: ‘Note, 
from the Presidency, Subject: Use of personal-data files in medical research (Personal-record research)’ 
6454/93; ‘Addendum to Cover Note, from Belgian Delegation, 30 June 1993, to Mr Niels Ersbøll 
Secretary-General of the Council of the European Communities’ 7695/93; ‘Transmission Note, from 
the Irish Delegation, 8 July 1993, to Working Party on Economic Questions (data protection)’ 
7859/93, 3; ‘Transmission Note, from the Danish delegation, to Working Party on Economic 
Questions (data protection), 28 July 1993’ 8217/93; ‘Cover Note, from Presidency, to Permanent 
Representatives Committee, Subject: Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data - 
Progress report, 31 August 1993’ 8381/93, 3.  
315 Lobbied for by France. ‘Outcome of Proceedings of Working Party on Economic Questions (Data 
Protection) on 28, 29 and 30 March 1994’ 6153/94, 5. 
316 Lobbied for by Germany. ‘Outcome of Proceedings of Working Party on Economic Questions 
(Data Protection) on 28, 29 and 30 March 1994’ 6153/94, 5. 
317 Lobbied for by the UK. ‘Note from Presidency to Internal Market Council’ 11581/94, 5; Council 
of the European Union, ‘Report, from Permanent Representatives Committee, on 10 January 1995, to 
Council meeting (General Affairs), on 6 and 7 February 1995’ 4649/95, 2.  
318 Lobbied for by Germany. ‘Note, from Presidency, 14 April 1994, for Working Party on Economic 
Questions (Data Protection) 6316/94, 4. 
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By far the most lobbied for type of processing (insofar as the travaux reveal) was for 
research (especially medical research), for which discussions spanned over two years 
of the legislative history to the Directive.319 This merits a closer examination. 
 
2.6.1 The impact of the Directive on research and statistics 
The lobbying efforts made by Member States to secure certain derogations for research 
and statistics can be divided roughly into two camps: 1) those that wanted specific 
derogations to be added to the relevant Articles with further guarantees in the Recitals; 
and 2) those that wanted research processing to be addressed in a separate and distinct 
article within the Directive. It should be noted that not all Member States submitted 
written evidence as to their positions on this issue and at times various Member States 
will have changed their position and accepted compromises. Below I consider, 
chronologically, the various suggestions made and positions taken in regards to how 
research and statistics would be treated under the Directive. This is important to 
understand as the resulting compromises that were made involved the introduction of 
the public interest conditions and public interest examples in Recital 34 of the 
Directive. 
2.6.1.A Autumn 1992 – the public interest provisions as a ‘compromise’ 
solution for concerns over research 
After the release of the Commission’s 1992 Compromise Draft, the Working Party on 
Economic Questions (Data Protection) continued discussions with delegations on the 
proposed Directive. As time progressed, and more compromise positions were agreed 
by Member State delegations, we see that research and statistics continued to be an 
outstanding issue which remained unresolved until the end of drafting. In October 
1992, soon after the 1992 Compromise Draft was released, delegations (including 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK) had already expressed their concerns 
over the potential chilling effect of the Directive on research if written consent was 
required to process special categories of personal data, notably health data. 320  In 
reaction, the Commission provided: ‘while feeling that these concerns could be covered 
                                                
319 By the UK, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. 
320 ‘Outcome of Proceedings, of Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection), 29 
October 1992’ 9918/92, 3. (‘Outcome of Proceedings 29 October 1992’.) 
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by the text of Article 7(d) and 8(2)(c)(health), and Article 8(3) (grounds of important 
public interest), was open to suggestions from the delegations.’321 This is the first time 
that we see the public interest justifications for processing (special categories of 
personal data) considered as potential ‘solutions’ or compromises for concerns over 
research and other types of processing involving special categories of data.  
 
As to the public interest provision in Article 8(3) whereby ‘Member States may, [on 
grounds of important public interest] lay down exemptions from paragraph l [by 
national legislative provision or by decision of the supervisory authority]’322 Greece was 
the first of many Member States to raise concerns over the lack of clarity of the public 
interest concept (and indeed what may be considered an ‘important’ public interest).323 
As noted above, the Commission provided a rather disappointing response to this 
concern and indicated that while remaining open to future suggestions on how to 
clarify an ‘important public interest’ it ‘felt it difficult to clarify this notion further.’324 
 
2.6.1.B Mid-1993 – inconsistent treatment of the public interest provisions 
and introduction of a standalone research provision 
We see more focused discussions and considerations of the impact of the proposed 
Directive on research throughout 1993. In May 1993, the Presidency (then Denmark), 
submitted a ‘note’ for discussion asking delegations to specifically consider the impact 
of the Directive (and especially requirements for consent) on the undertaking of 
medical research as well as on processing for public health purposes and what (if any) 
exemptions are required.325 While this note considered the potential regulatory impact 
upon medical research, because the focus was drawn to ‘personal-record research’, or 
research conducted on the basis of records rather than direct contact with individuals, 
this meant that the implications of such discussions were broader and indeed 
implicated any research conducted on that basis. This demonstrates that research was 
                                                
321 ibid. 
322 Outcome of Proceedings 29 October 1992, 3. 
323 In a footnote, Greece is noted as requesting that the phrase ‘on grounds of important public 
interest’ be clarified. ibid 5 footnote 15. 
324 ibid. 
325 ‘Note, from the Presidency, Subject: Use of personal-data files in medical research (Personal-record 
research), 14 May 1993’ 6454/93, 3. 
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considered from a much broader perspective than from the narrow viewpoint of e.g. 
clinical research, involving physical interventions with individuals. The focus on 
records-based research has continued relevance to this day, given the prevalence of 
reuses of personal data for many forms of research across all disciplines. 
A standalone research provision – Article 9(a) 
In July 1993, the new Belgian Presidency suggested the introduction of a separate 
article, Article 9(a), to deal in full with the relevant derogations for research and 
statistics. However, they also attempted to remove the public interest justification for 
processing ordinary personal data (in Article 7(e)). Briefly, Belgium suggested that the 
term ‘public interest’ be removed and changed to ‘official authority’: 
 
 Article 7 
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if; 
 
 (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom 
the data are disclosed;326 
 
They explained this change as an ‘amendment designed to simplify the text by 
employing the concept which is more familiar in Community law (“the exercise of 
official authority”) and is used in Article 55 of the EEC Treaty.’327 This indicated that 
‘the public interest’ was interpreted by Belgium to be merely synonymous with 
‘processing carried out by public authorities and that carried out by persons or private 
bodies when exercising official authority.’328 Moreover, it represents a more restrictive 
interpretation of the public interest than most likely intended, given earlier indications 
by the Commission that the public interest was to encompass, for example, research 
processing where consent could not be obtained. This is an example of inconsistent 
understanding of the public interest concept – the Commission interpreted the concept 
in context of the purpose of processing to be undertaken (e.g. for research, for public 
health etc.) as opposed to Belgium’s understanding of the concept in context of who 
                                                
326 ‘Addendum to Note, from Belgian Delegation, 30 June 1993, to Mr Niels Ersbøll Secretary-General 
of the Council of the European Communities’ 7695/93 ADD 1, 2 (emphasis added) (‘Addendum 
from Belgian Delegation 30 June 1993’). 
327 Addendum from Belgian Delegation 30 June 1993, 2 footnote 3. 
328 ibid. 
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was eligible to undertake processing under the public interest ‘banner’.329 Curiously, 
although Belgium seemed concerned with the use of the term in Article 7(e) they did 
not object to its use in Article 8(3) or, arguably, a synonymous term in their proposed 
Article 9(a) when requiring research to be of ‘general interest’. 
 
Returning to the focus on research, as stated above, Belgium introduced a standalone 
provision for research and statistics which provided that such processing could be 
carried out without consent if certain conditions were met including: 
 
• The research was ‘in pursuit of an aim of general interest’; 
• The use of personal data was ‘necessary’; 
• Subsequent publication of research findings did not allow identification 
of individuals, unless approved by a supervisory authority; 
• Data be pseudonymised prior to allowing researcher access (direct 
identifiers swapped with identification numbers, which are then held 
separately from data to be used by researchers); 
• Prior to processing data for research, they must notify the supervisory 
authority as to data retention periods etc.330 
 
This article reveals that the Belgian Presidency considered research too important to 
be dealt with tangentially in other provisions under the Directive, such as in the public 
interest justifications in Articles 7(e) and 8(3). In Article 9(a), the justification for 
processing is conditioned upon research being of an aim of ‘general interest’ which 
arguably is synonymous with the ‘public interest’. Thus, although Belgium argued to 
remove the public interest justification for processing ordinary personal data, this did 
not mean Belgium did not believe in the public interest of research processing. Rather, 
Belgium’s position seemed to be that it is less likely for research to be impeded by the 
Directive if it is recognised explicitly in a standalone provision.  
 
Moreover, in conditioning the applicability of Article 9(a) upon a finding of ‘general 
interest’ in research, Belgium was implicitly making the public interest a key criterion 
for evaluating the justification of research without consent. They did so without 
suggesting any criteria that could be used to assess whether research was of ‘general 
                                                
329 ‘Outcome of Proceedings 29 October 1992’, 3. 
330 ‘Addendum from Belgian Delegation 30 June 1993’, 5. 
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interest’. Thus, while all the derogations applying to research would be clearly 
contained within the standalone Article 9(a), Belgium did nothing to alleviate the 
uncertainty surrounding the application of the public interest concept to research or 
indeed to any other processing contexts. Under Article 9(a) research would remain 
subject to the uncertain and ambiguous scope of ‘general interest’, a term synonymous 
with the Commission’s equally unclear suggested public interest justifications for 
processing. 
 
Support for a standalone research provision 
Subsequently, both the Irish and Danish delegations submitted notes in support of 
Belgium’s suggested research and statistic’s provision (Article 9(a)).331 Ireland found a 
lack of distinction between the level of protection needed when personal data were 
processed for commercial and administrative purposes versus for research and 
statistics.332 In Denmark’s note, there is again a change in public interest terminology, 
from Belgium’s ‘general interest’ to Denmark’s suggestion that the application of 
Article 9(a) be conditioned on the basis that research is of ‘paramount importance to 
society at large’.333 This is another example of the inconsistent treatment of the public 
interest concept, where the term is changed to one that is synonymous but equally 
vague and is left similarly undefined by the suggesting delegation. These discussions 
were considered far from resolved by the end of August 1993, when the Belgian 
Presidency flagged that the impact of the Directive on research, and the provisions of 
Article 8, required detailed discussions in a second reading of the draft Directive.334  
 
Discussions continued, with particularly strong lobbying on the use of health data and 
processing for medical research. Delegations wanted to ensure that Article 8 would be 
reworded to achieve ‘the conditional authorization of the processing of medical data 
                                                
331 ‘Transmission Note, from the Irish Delegation, 8 July 1993, to Working Party on Economic 
Questions (data protection)’ 7859/93, 3; ‘Transmission Note, from the Danish delegation, to Working 
Party on Economic Questions (data protection), 28 July 1993’ 8217/93, 2. 
332 ibid 3. 
333 Transmission Note, from the Danish delegation, to Working Party on Economic Questions (data 
protection), 28 July 1993’ 8217/93, 2. 
334 ‘Cover Note, from Presidency, to Permanent Representatives Committee, Subject: Amended 
proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data - Progress report, 31 August 1993’ 8381/93, 3. 
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and not the prohibition of their processing subject to derogation.’335 For example, 
France lobbied for much broader derogations for health data and medical research 
which would include the conditional permission to use health data for research (and 
other public health reasons) without consent, so long as data subjects do not object to 
processing. 336  They further suggested that, notwithstanding this conditional 
authorization and for reasons of ‘major public interest’, data controllers could also use 
health data without consent. Here we see the treatment of health data and medical 
research as ‘exceptional’337 and thus requiring ‘special’ treatment. The French did not 
believe it appropriate to regulate health data in the same way as other special categories 
of personal data, for example data on race and religion which are justifiably processed 
in far rarer circumstances. 338  As to the public interest, yet again inconsistent 
terminology is used. ‘Major public interest’ was used by France without definition and 
is as equally vague as previous iterations of the concept (‘important public interest’ 
versus ‘major public interest’ versus ‘general interest’ versus ‘of paramount importance 
to society’).  
 
The UK Department of Health also submitted a note to address the impact of the 
Directive on medical research.339 Their description of the potential, detrimental impact 
upon public health, improvement of health services and essential research, are a further 
example of delegations treating health data and medical research as exceptional and 
requiring ‘special’ treatment.340 They lobbied for the separate treatment of research in 
                                                
335 ‘Outcome of Proceedings, of Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection), 1-2 Dec 
1993’ 11254/93, 4. 
336 ‘Note, from French Delegation, to Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection) 17 
November 1993’ 10242/93, 2. 
337 In both the DPD and DPA 1998 health data are treated as special or ‘sensitive’ categories of data 
requiring further safeguards to process. Furthermore, in both legislations, processing data for medical 
research and related purposes are explicitly recognised. DPD, Recitals 33-34 and Art 8(1)-(3); DPA 
1998, s 2(e) and Sch 3, para 8. See discussion on the ‘exceptional’ treatment of health data in the US 
context: Nicolas Terry, ‘Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism’ (2014) 24 65, 87–97. 
338 The French delegation stated: ‘In the view of the French delegation it is not possible to treat in the 
same way: – on the one hand the processing of data on race, religion and ... infringing the fundamental 
rights of individuals and respect for their privacy, such processing being possibly justified only in very 
rare cases; – on the other hand the processing of data concerning health, which must clearly be flanked 
by appropriate guarantees but which is normally implemented in the interest of the data subject or of 
the community and is currently widespread in the EEC.’ ‘Note, from French Delegation, to Working 
Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection) 17 November 1993’ 10242/93, 2. 
339 ‘Fax, from Andrew P Holt, UK Permanent Representation to the European Communities by the 
UK Department of Health, to Enrique Gonzalez Sanchez, Council Secretariat, 1 December 1993’, 2. 
340 ibid. 
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a standalone provision such as the draft Article 9(a) introduced by the Belgian 
Presidency.341 As research and the use of data for various health purposes are included 
as explicit examples of ‘important public interests’ in the final DPD, it is important to 
understand the significant lobbying efforts made by various Member States for these 
types of processing. This also reminds us that the concept of the public interest 
remained undeveloped and undefined in a substantive sense – no criteria were 
suggested to assess the public interest in processing aside from the examples 
introduced by various delegations. At this stage in the draft Directive, the public 
interest merely reflected the lobbying efforts being described here. Indeed, after the 
issues raised by the French and UK delegations, Member States remained unclear 
precisely what the public interest meant beyond the processing explicitly included in 
Article 8 such as for public health grounds. 342  As a final note, it is worthwhile 
acknowledging that despite these lobbying efforts and the explicit mention of research 
in Recital 34 of the final DPD, research (at least in the UK) continues to be hindered 
by the culture of caution and legal ambiguity surrounding the use and sharing of data 
for research. 
 
2.6.1.C January 1994-December 1994 – final lobbying efforts for research 
The lobbying efforts for research, made during the last year of negotiations on the 
Directive, involved some Member States focusing on derogations to be included in 
various articles, whereas other Member States continued to argue for the separate 
treatment of research in a standalone provision. For the latter delegations, the public 
interest provisions (in particular Article 8 on the legal grounds for processing special 
categories of personal data) were considered insufficient to secure the continued 
processing of data for research (especially medical research). As an example of the first 
camp of delegations, Ireland and Portugal lobbied for derogations to be written into 
Article 14 (dealing with restrictions on data subject rights) that would exempt research 
processing from subject access requests, for example.343 
                                                
341 ibid. 
342 ‘Outcome of Proceedings, of Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection), 1-2 Dec 
1993’ 11254/93, 5. 
343 ‘Outcome of Proceedings, of Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection, on 20 and 
21 January 1994’ 4382/94, 6. 
 
Chapter 3 Tracing the History and Application of the Public Interest in Data Protection Law – a 




As to the second camp of Member States, and in line with their previous arguments 
for a standalone research provision, the UK delegation submitted a cost-analysis which 
detailed the potential impact of the Directive on the UK’s health service and the 
undertaking of medical research. 344  In a similar vein, the Spanish delegation also 
lobbied for the separate treatment of research given its inherent public interest which 
could only be secured by a standalone research provision: 
 
In view of the importance of scientific research and statistical studies which are 
valuable in themselves and as vital factors in social progress, and on the 
understanding that the Directive must never be used as a means of raising 
barriers or limiting exchanges of scientific information and is to have a 
considerable influence on such investigation and studies, they must be given 
special and independent treatment within the Directive. The proposal made by 
the Belgian Presidency within the Working Party on Economic Questions 
(7695/93 ADD 3 ECO 173 of 19 October 1993) which deals both with the 
processing of special categories of data (Article 8) and with the question of 
scientific and statistical research (Article 9), could be used as a working basis.345  
 
The public interest as a compromise for research 
In a critical development of the public interest provisions and the position that would 
ultimately be taken on research processing, the Greek Presidency suggested a 
reformulation of Article 8(3) that would explicitly list research and certain health 
purposes as examples of ‘public interest’ processing.  
 
Member States may, on important public interest grounds, grant derogations 
from paragraph 1, particularly in the areas of public health, public statistics or 
scientific research.346  
 
After this suggested reformulation, crucially, Greece suggested it would be the 
responsibility of Member States, (specifically their data protection supervisory 
authorities) to develop appropriate guidelines on how to determine when processing is 
an important public interest: 
 
                                                
344 ‘Note, from the United Kingdom delegation, analysis of costs, prepared by the Economic and 
Operational Research Division of the Department of Health, 4 February 1994’ 4495/94, 7-8. 
345 ‘Note, from the Spanish delegation, to the Working Party on Health Questions, 15 February 1994’ 
4859/94, 3. 
346 ‘Note, from the Presidency, to the attention of the Working Party on Economic Questions (Data 
Protection), 14 March 1994’ 5575/94, 3 (emphasis added). 
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The derogations referred to in the preceding subparagraph shall be granted by 
national legislative provision or by decision of the supervisory authority, stating 
the types of data which may be processed, the persons to whom such data may 
be disclosed and the persons who may be controllers, and specifying suitable 
safeguards.347  
 
This is critical because what the Greek Presidency did, and what the other delegations 
previously had not done, was to add substance (in the form of examples) and potential 
procedure for assessing the public interest concept. However, these examples seemed 
to be added only based on what had been lobbied for by other delegations. The use of 
the phrase ‘particularly in’, within Greece’s reformulation of Article 8(3), indicates that 
the intention was to introduce a non-exhaustive list of examples of what could be 
characterised as an important public interest. Although we finally see further substance 
added to the concept of the public interest in the form of these examples, Greece 
ultimately failed to offer the clarity needed, which would have required the inclusion 
of relevant criteria that could be used to determine what may be considered an 
important public interest if it is not explicitly mentioned as such in the Directive.  
 
Remaining conflicts over the public interest compromise 
In later considering Greece’s proposals, eight Member States348 were unsatisfied with 
the proposed Article 8(3) and the addition of examples to secure the processing of data 
for research and health purposes. 349  These Member States did not believe the 
reformulation of Article 8(3) was enough to guarantee the unimpeded processing of 
special categories of data for research and maintained their desire to have research 
covered by a standalone provision, such as in the Belgian Presidency’s suggested Article 
9(a).350 Their dissatisfaction was not further explained, but it is possible that these 
delegations remained uncertain over the scope of the public interest justifications given 
that the concept remained insufficiently defined aside from the three examples given. 
Specific concerns were indeed raised as to the uncertain scope for the suggested public 
                                                
347 ibid. 
348 Including Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. France and Italy noted 
being amenable to a standalone research provision. Only Germany supported the Greek Presidency’s 
reformulation of Article 8(3). ‘Outcome of Proceedings, of Working Party on Economic Questions 
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interest justification in Article 8(3). France asked that public safety and state security 
be named as examples of the public interest, whereas Germany wanted specific 
reference to processing for religious reasons/by religious communities.351  
 
This shows the utter lack of objective criteria being used to develop the public interest 
concept in the Directive. These suggested examples merely represent the interests of a 
particular delegation; however, they may suggest an important quality of the public 
interest – that it is inherently contextual and therefore difficult if not impossible to define 
in an exhaustive sense. Finally, we see another suggested change in public interest 
terminology proposed by the Netherlands; this delegation wanted the public interest 
changed to the ‘general interest’ (similar to Belgium) but again no definition was 
provided, meaning, one vague term would merely be switched for another. 
 
In regards to the concerns raised by the eight delegations, the Greek Presidency offered 
a further reformulation of the public interest provision in Article 8(3) and critically a 
new explanatory recital.352 First, Greece redrafted Article 8(3) to state: 
 
3. Member States may grant derogations from paragraph 1 on important 
grounds of public interest. 
 
The derogations referred to in the preceding subparagraph shall be granted by 
national legislative provision or by decision of the supervisory authority setting 
suitable safeguards. 
 
Thus, they removed the public interest examples encompassed in their initial 
reformulation of Article 8(3). Rather than develop criteria for determining whether 
processing is an ‘important public interest’ they instead added back the examples in a 
standalone recital:  
 
To allay concerns expressed by a number of delegations, it is proposed to bring 
in a general recital on ‘important grounds of public interest’ listing the interests 
covered by Article 8(3) and the 4th indent of Article 27(1): 
 
                                                
351 ibid 5. 
352 ‘Note, from Presidency, 14 April 1994, for Working Party on Economic Questions (Data 
Protection)’ 6316/94, 3. 
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17(a) ‘Whereas Member States must be allowed to derogate from some of the 
provisions of this Directive when justified on important grounds of public 
interest; whereas, however, they must provide suitable specific safeguards in 
order to protect fundamental freedoms and privacy; whereas, for example, the 
following activities must be deemed to constitute matters of important public 
interest: public health and social protection, scientific research, international 
exchange of data between tax or customs authorities or between police 
departments or departments with responsibility for national security’.353 
 
In this reformulation, the Greek Presidency acknowledged that Member States were 
not satisfied with the uncertainty surrounding the public interest concept, if the public 
interest provisions were to be the sole way of justifying certain ‘important’ forms of 
processing without consent. However, rather than developing criteria and a fuller 
substantive understanding of the public interest, the Greek Presidency merely included 
the processing types lobbied for by various delegations. This is an important passage 
in the travaux as it does demonstrate a desire to better understand and explicate the 
public interest concept however it only half-heartedly does so.  
 
Despite this disappointing attempt to clarify the public interest concept, we see that 
the public interest justifications for processing were intended to be more broadly 
interpreted than currently understood in practice. This is because the examples of 
public interests provided for in Recital 17(a) (and that eventually are included in Recital 
34 of the final DPD) are prefaced by the words ‘for example’ indicating a non-exhaustive 
list of public interests. However, without any objective criteria it would (and does) 
remain a difficult task to determine with any certainty what processing could be 
covered by this provision if not explicitly listed as an example.  
 
As a final demonstration of the arbitrary way in which the public interest justifications 
for processing developed, Germany once again lobbied for a public interest to be 
included within the scope of Article 8(3). The delegation asked that it be recorded that 
they would treat the processing of data for tax collection to fund religious organisations 
as an important public interest, regardless of whether it would be included in the new 
Recital 17(a).354  
                                                
353 ibid. 
354 ‘Working Document, from General Secretariat of the Council, 17 May 1994, to Delegations’ 
6285/1/94, 26.  
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At this stage in negotiations, it was clear that there was a divide between those States 
that wanted research treated in a standalone provision and those that were satisfied to 
have research come within the scope of the public interest grounds for processing, as 
suggested by the Greek Presidency. By May 1994, the Greek Presidency made it clear 
that they found a standalone research provision, such as Belgian’s suggested Article 
9(a), unnecessary:  
 
The Presidency has likewise opposed the introduction of over-detailed 
provisions aimed solely at clarifying the principles already enshrined in the draft 
Directive (see in particular the discussions of the Working Party on Scientific 
Research, Epidemiology and Statistics).355 
 
In this document, Greece indicated their belief that the public interest provisions, such 
as under Article 8(3), were enough to secure the processing of special categories of data 
for research. At this point eight delegations are recorded as generally in support of the 
public interest provision,356 whereas four delegations (Denmark, Germany, Ireland and 
the UK) found the provision too limiting and wanted Member States to be able to 
derogate from the prohibition on processing special categories of personal data for any 
reason – not just those in the public interest.357 Their reasons for objecting to the public 
interest provision in Article 8(3) is not further explained, but it is reasonable to presume 
that these delegations found the provision unacceptably vague and thus unreliable for 
the purposes of securing important forms of processing, such as for medical research, 
social security purposes etc. Nevertheless, the Presidency suggested retaining Article 
8(3) given its support by most delegations. As a ‘compromise’ the Greek Presidency 
again suggested that examples of the public interest be given to clarify the concept: 
 
In order to allay the concerns of various delegations, it may be useful, however, 
to provide several examples in order to clarify the idea of important public 
interest. These examples could be provided in either a recital or the actual text 
of the Article if it is thought that greater legal security is required. They should 
                                                
355 It seems this Working Party was established as part of the legislative process but was not 
mentioned elsewhere in the travaux. ‘Note, from Presidency, 10 May 1994, to Permanent 
Representatives Committee’ 6856/94, 4. 
356 Including, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Portugal, Sweden. 
357 ‘Note, from Presidency, 10 May 1994, to Permanent Representatives Committee’ 6856/94, 11. 
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include scientific research, in particular epidemiological research, and public 
statistics.358 
 
Again, these specific examples were provided simply because these were the types of 
processing lobbied for; no effort was given to better define the public interest or 
provide criteria which could be used to assess the public interest in processing if not 
explicitly listed as such. This characterisation of the public interest provisions as a 
compromise for research (among other processing types lobbied for) is made 
abundantly clear in the Presidency’s next statement: 
 
The Presidency reminds the Committee that the Health Council has pointed to 
the need to avoid endangering epidemiological research through excessively 
cumbersome constraints which might arise from this draft Directive. In the 
view of the Presidency the major concerns voiced in connection with important 
public interest could be fully satisfied by each Member State. This solution, 
proposed by the Commission, is supported by a number of delegations (in 
particular D/F and GR).359 
 
This passage is crucially important to understand the intended scope and role of the 
public interest concept in the DPD. First, it is clear from this statement that the public 
interest was intended to play a role in justifying several ‘important’ forms of processing, 
where consent was not possible (i.e. for research purposes). Second, the lack of clarity 
on the public interest concept was acknowledged and defining it was a task specifically 
assigned to Member States whether through guidance and/or legislation (‘In the view 
of the Presidency the major concerns voiced in connection with important public 
interest could be fully satisfied by each Member State.’360) This at least partially explains 
the current gap in knowledge on the public interest provisions and concept in data 
protection, as no Member State (to my knowledge) has defined the public interest 
concept, beyond the descriptive examples provided in the DPD or as a matter of 
procedure (e.g. in the UK that processing can be justified on the public interest if 
‘necessary’ and related to a function of a ‘public nature’). Third and finally, delegating 
the further refinement of the public interest provisions to the Member States 
represented an implicit recognition that the public interest concept is inherently 
context sensitive and impossible to define exhaustively. The context sensitivity of the 
                                                
358 ibid 12. 
359 ‘Note, from Presidency, 10 May 1994, to Permanent Representatives Committee’ 6856/94, 12. 
360 ibid. 
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public interest is something which plays an integral role in my development of the 
concept and is a factor I pay close attention to in Chapter 4 where I examine the 
normative dimension of the public interest within theory.  
 
In spite of the apparent compromise, Greece noted a remaining six delegations 
(Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK) did not think the public 
interest provision was enough, on its own, to secure processing for research; these six 
countries still advocated a standalone research provision.361 These delegations asserted 
that only a standalone provision would be able ‘…to preserve the balance between the 
protection of the rights of individuals and research and statistical requirements.’362 The 
Greek Presidency made their opposition to Belgium’s suggested Article 9(a) clear and 
dismissed it on the basis that: ‘…far too precise and detailed provisions … are not 
essential in view of the objectives of the draft Directive.’363 This reveals a further divide 
between Member States: 1) those that ascribed to the duality of objectives of the 
Directive, to not only protect personal data but to also facilitate its use versus 2) 
countries, such as Greece, that clearly found the facilitation of data processing, even for 
‘important’ purposes, as secondary.  
 
And so, negotiations continued in light of this divide, with various delegations 
continuing to lobby for the separate treatment of research in a standalone provision364, 
receiving pushback from other delegations on the basis that research and other 
important forms of processing were sufficiently provided for, specifically by the public 
interest justifications for processing and its explanatory Recital 17(a). No further 
compromises were offered to those delegations who believed the public interest 
provisions insufficient to secure processing for research. Indeed, the public interest 
                                                
361 ibid.  
362 ‘Note, from Presidency, 10 May 1994, to Permanent Representatives Committee’ 6856/94, 12. 
363 ibid. 
364 For example, by Spain, Belgium and the UK: ‘Extract from the Draft Summary Record of the 
1611th meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee (part 1) held in Brussels on Thursday 26 
May 1994’ 7191/94; ‘Report, from Permanent Representatives Committee, on 3 June 1994, to Internal 
Market Council’ 7500/94; ‘Note, from the UK Delegation, to the Working Party on Health Questions, 
21 September 1994’ 9415/94, 5-6; ‘Cover Note, from General Secretariat of the Council, to 
Permanent Representatives Committee/Council, 14 November 1994’ 10934/94; ‘Extract from the 
Draft Summary Record of the 1628th meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee Part 1 
held in Brussels on 14 November 1994’ 10957/94. 
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examples provided in Recital 17(a) were considered all that was needed to allay these 
concerns even though the Recital provided no objective criteria to assess the public 
interest in processing:  
 
The present text gives Member States the option of providing for additional 
derogations to the prohibition for reasons of major public interest. This idea 
of major public interest is, moreover, made clear in recital 17(a), which gives 
several examples and refers inter alia to scientific and statistical research. 
However, the [Belgian] and [Spanish] delegations, supported by UK, could not 
settle for scientific research and statistics being covered only by this paragraph, 
and wanted a separate Article for those fields. ([Spain] made particular 
reference to the need for legal certainty in those two areas).365  
 
The lobbying for the separate treatment of research reflected concerns over legal 
uncertainty if data controllers were forced to rely on the ambiguous public interest 
provision in Article 8(3). It was clear from the remainder of negotiations on the 
Directive that further clarification would not come – the public interest provisions and 
examples of important public interests in Recital 17(a) would need to be sufficient. 
Insofar as delegations continued to raise their concerns regarding the potential chilling 
effect of the Directive, and the perceived need to obtain consent for various forms of 
research: 
 
Article 7 of the amended proposal provides a clear response to this. The 
processing of data needed for research or statistical purposes will either require 
the consent of the data subject, be covered by the ‘balance of interest’ clause 
or be necessary for a task in the public interest that is to be performed by the 
controller.366 
 
As most discussions regarding the public interest were focused on Article 8(3) (the 
legal ground for processing special categories of personal data), this is notably one of the 
few (if not only) documents within the travaux that explicitly recognises Article 7(e) and 
thus the public interest as an alternative route to justifying the use of ordinary personal 
data for research. In this regard, the Presidency (then Germany) offers an example of 
processing that would be justified based on Article 7(e) in the public interest: 
 
                                                
365 ‘Report, from Permanent Representatives Committee, on 3 June 1994, to Internal Market Council’ 
7500/94, 6. 
366 ‘Working Document, from Presidency, concerning statistics/scientific research problems, 20 July 
1994’ 8525/94, 3. 
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Processing undertaken for the purpose of compiling statistics in the public 
interest - an exercise in which data subjects are obliged to take part - within the 
framework of programmes being implemented by the national statistical offices 
is obviously regarded as a task in the public interest.367 
 
Two things are important to note from this example. First, the example is not regarding 
research per se but rather government collection of statistics which may imply a 
narrower interpretation of the public interest provision in Article 7(e) as applicable to 
processing by a public authority. Second, even if this was not the intended 
interpretation of this example, no other guidance is offered as to what other forms of 
processing might meet the public interest threshold; the Presidency merely provides 
that such a task is ‘obviously’ regarded as in the public interest. 
 
The German Presidency attempted to further address concerns of the delegations 
regarding Article 8(3) by making absolutely clear the purpose of the public interest 
justification for processing: 
 
This criterion of important public interest, applied to research and statistics, 
refers precisely to the areas covered by the Danish delegation in the expression 
‘scientific and statistical research of major importance to society as a whole’. It 
is for the Member States to specify both the suitable safeguards and the 
decision-making procedures for such processing as is provided for in Article 
8(3) (authorization by law or by a supervisory authority).368  
 
Thus, the public interest provision in Article 8(3) was intended to justify, where 
necessary, the use of special categories of data for research and statistics as well as other 
important forms of processing. However, given the lack of criteria to independently 
assess the public interest in processing, the question remained as to how Member States 
were to determine precisely whether a type of processing was in the public interest. As 
applied to research, what could be considered of ‘major importance to society as a 
whole’? Furthermore, given the interplay between Articles 8(3) and 7(e) how does the 
public interest differ between the two provisions? What is the difference between an 
‘important public interest’ and an ordinary ‘public interest’? The latter likely implying a 
lesser standard. The German Presidency provided that Member States were 
                                                
367 ibid. 
368 ‘Working Document, from Presidency, concerning statistics/scientific research problems, 20 July 
1994’ 8525/94, 3. 
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responsible for ensuring that the public interest justifications were deployed with 
appropriate safeguards. In examining the text of the public interest conditions in the 
DPA 1998, the extent to which this task was fulfilled in the UK can be determined.  
 
2.7 Final position on the public interest provisions 
Those that desired further clarification of the public interest provisions were left 
disappointed in the concluding phases of drafting the Directive. The examples of the 
public interest provided in Recital 17(a) were considered sufficient to allay these 
concerns despite the lack of criteria to independently facilitate an assessment of the 
public interest in processing. It was considered that despite this crucial explanation 
being a mere recital, that: 
 
The Council and the Commission note that the elements set out in recital 17(a) 
of the Directive, which are intended in particular to clarify the concept of 
public interest in Articles 7 and 8 of the Directive, derive from the purpose of 
the latter and thus form an integral part of this legal act; it follows that those 
elements are to be taken into consideration by the Member States when they 
adopt the laws, regulations and administrative provisions required to comply 
with the Directive.369 
 
First, it must be acknowledged that this statement provides the clearest indication in 
the travaux as to the intent of the legislators on how the public interest should be 
interpreted. Second, this piece of interpretative information is meagre and fails to 
deliver the clarification needed on the substance of the concept. Although they refer to 
‘elements’, there are no criteria to guide independent assessments of the public interest 
in processing – there are only examples which are indicative of nothing more than the 
lobbying efforts of Member States. The only ‘elements’ to speak of in Recital 17(a) are: 
1) that the processing be an ‘important public interest’ and 2) the public interest 
justification must be subject to specific and suitable safeguards to protect the 
fundamental rights and the privacy of individuals. Without any indication of how to 
determine the public interest in processing, or indeed how ‘important’ a public interest 
must be to justify the use of special categories of personal data, Member States would 
fail to implement even the first of these supposed elements.  
                                                
369 ‘Extract from the Draft Summary Record of the 1628th meeting of the Permanent Representatives 
Committee Part 1 held in Brussels on 14 November 1994’ 10957/94, 9. 
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The quote above was requested to be entered into the Council’s minutes, presumably, 
to ensure that Recital 17(a) (finalised as Recital 34) was used to guide the interpretation 
of the public interest concept. Nonetheless, to my knowledge, this statement which 
provides essentially the only guidance (however meagre) for interpreting the public 
interest within this legislation (and Member State legislation) is not widely known, if at 
all. This would justify Denmark’s remaining concerns that important forms of data 
processing, such as for research370, should not have been dealt with tangentially in 
footnotes and recitals to the legislation: 
 
The Presidency has presented a compromise proposal attempting to take 
account of the special requirements for the processing of personal data in the 
areas of research and statistics. The compromise proposal is based on 
interpretations in the ‘Whereas clauses’ of the scope of the articles of the 
directive, and also on an interpretative statement in the Council minutes in 
relation to research and statistics. Denmark considers it unacceptable that such 
important decisions on derogations from the general rules should be based on 
interpretations in the preamble and statements in the minutes - which are 
normally not made publicly available, - but considers that they should be 
reflected directly in the Articles of the directive.371 
 
In summary, the final position taken on the public interest provisions was essentially 
to ‘pass the buck’ to Member States to legislate as appropriate to clarify the substance 
and necessary procedure for these provisions. The Council and Commission were 
satisfied that the public interest provisions offered sufficient legal certainty to allow 
important forms of processing, such as research, to proceed unimpeded. No 
standalone provision for research was ever adopted. The uncertainties which continue 
to plague subsequent implementation of the Directive across Member States, noting 
                                                
370 Denmark was the only delegation to explicitly raise concerns about the impact of the Directive on 
social sciences research: ‘Denmark has stressed strongly during the negotiations that the present wording 
is too restrictive. Basic research today is to a large extent based on the establishing and running of 
registers (databases), especially within medical research, and the directive as proposed may hinder 
important sociological, historical and medical research as well as statistical work.’ As stated in previous 
sections, discussions regarding research primarily focused on medical research. But discussions were at 
times broad enough to encompass other disciplines e.g. when personal record research was referenced. 
(‘Note from the Presidency, 14 May 1993, on ‘Use of personal-data files in medical research (Personal-
record research) 6454/93, 3.) Furthermore, the use of the term ‘scientific research’ in Recital 17(a) 
(and eventually Recital 34) is generic enough to encompass social sciences and humanities research as 
well. ‘Cover Note, from General Secretariat of the Council, to Permanent Representatives 
Committee/Council, 14 November 1994’ 10934/94, 3. 
371 Note from the Presidency, 14 May 1993, 3-4. 
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the predominance of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm to justify research uses of 
data, seems to validate the concerns of Denmark and other similarly-minded 
delegations.372 Moreover, it signifies the lack of legal certainty surrounding the public 
interest provisions in the Directive and the resulting lack of confidence that data 
controllers have to rely on them. 
 
2.8 Concluding thoughts on the DPD’s legislative history 
The protracted negotiations which comprise the legislative history of the DPD reveal 
the intended purpose of the public interest provisions while its scope was left more 
uncertain. The public interest provisions, from the earliest drafting stages, were 
intended to operate as justifications for certain ‘important’ forms of processing where 
the obtaining of consent was considered a disproportionate barrier. This reveals the 
integral role of the public interest justifications for processing and thus the imperative 
for developing a clearer understanding of the public interest concept in data protection 
which is the aim of my contribution.  
 
To clarify the public interest justifications for processing, examples were provided in 
Recital 17(a) which explicitly named the specific processing types that Member States 
lobbied for, including for research and statistical purposes. While the Council and 
Commission were explicit in their intentions for Member States to take specific account 
of Recital 17(a) (eventually Recital 34) when considering the public interest provisions, 
there remains legal uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the concept and its 
intended scope. They left this important instruction in the Council minutes and it has 
remained buried there to the detriment of affording more legal certainty around the 
public interest provisions. Regardless of the descriptive examples provided, no criteria 
were ever suggested as to how Member States could assess the public interest in the 
processing of data.373 Therefore what can and cannot be established, with any certainty, 
as to the public interest concept within the Directive? It is certain that: 
                                                
372 See Chapter 2 Sections 2 and 4. 
373 ‘Extract from the Draft Summary Record of the 1628th meeting of the Permanent Representatives 
Committee Part 1 held in Brussels on 14 November 1994’ 10957/94, 9. 
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• The public interest provisions were intended to play a role in justifying the 
processing of both ordinary and special categories of personal data where 
consent or other provisions were not able to be satisfied. 
• The examples of ‘important’ public interests provided in the explanatory 
recital were intended to guide interpretation of the public interest 
provisions in both Articles 7(e) and 8(4)374, but the list of examples were 
non-exhaustive. 
• The public interest provisions were applicable only insofar as Member 
States ensured ‘specific and suitable safeguards’ were provided ‘so as to 
protect the fundamental rights and the privacy of individuals’.  
• Member States were delegated the responsibility of determining and 
therefore clarifying the permissible scope of the public interest provisions, 
in terms of what safeguards were required to avail of the provisions (e.g. 
what type of data controller could justify processing under Article 7(e) and 
8(4)). 
 
However, the ‘substance’ of the public interest concept and how it applies to different 
processing contexts, remains more uncertain: 
• What objective criteria should be used to assess the public interest or 
‘important’ public interest in processing if the type of processing is not 
within the explicit list of examples in the Directive? 
• Indeed, is any processing of data that falls within one of the specifically 
listed types enough to meet the ambiguous public interest/important 
public interest threshold of Article 7(e) or Article 8(4)? 
• What is the difference between a ‘public interest’ and ‘important public 
interest’ for the purposes of interpreting Article 7(e) as to ordinary personal 
data versus Article 8(4) as to special categories of personal data? If differing 
standards apply to Article 7(e) and Article 8(4) how is this assessed? 
• What are the specific and suitable safeguards needed to protect individuals’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and precisely how are they implicated 
when decisions to process data are justified based on a public interest 
served? 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines the DPA 1998 to consider how the UK has 
implemented the public interest provisions and the extent to which these uncertainties 
have been resolved. 
 
                                                
374 Discussions until now refer to Article 8(3) as to the public interest provision for special categories of 
personal data. However, Article 8(3) was finalised as Article 8(4) in the DPD. 
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3. The DPA 1998’s Public Interest Conditions  
The ‘public interest’ provisions of Article 7(e) and 8(4) under the finalised DPD were 
indeed transposed into the UK’s DPA 1998. Article 7(e) was transposed into the 
conditions required for processing ordinary personal data under Schedule 2 paragraph 
5(d). Article 8(4) was later transposed into various conditions required for processing 
‘sensitive’ (synonymous with ‘special’) personal data under Schedule 3, some of which 
were only added when the DPA 1998 was amended with the DPPSPD 2000.  
 
In consideration of the legislative history of the DPD, Member States were to take 
specific account of Recital 34 when implementing their own public interest provisions. 
They were to provide specific and suitable safeguards, protective of individuals’ rights 
and freedoms, where the public interest provisions were used to justify processing. 
Moreover, further clarification of the public interest concept was a task specifically left 
to Member States. Did the UK parliament follow these instructions and provide the 
necessary clarity to the public interest provisions? 
 
3.1 DPA 1998, Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d) – ordinary personal data 
and the ‘public interest’ 
Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d) provides that the processing of ordinary personal data is 
lawful to the extent that it is necessary ‘for the exercise of any other functions of a 
public nature exercised in the public interest by any person’.375 Unlike the equivalent 
provision in the DPD Article 7(e), this provision provides safeguarding criteria while 
still not providing any definition of the public interest concept itself. Four separate 
elements can be extracted from Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d), each of which would need 
to be satisfied if data processing were justified on this basis. These four elements 
require that:  
 
1) The processing of personal data is necessary;  
2) The processing is undertaken as an exercise of a function of a public nature;  
3) The act is exercised in the public interest; and  
4) Can be undertaken by any person.376  
                                                
375 DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 5(d). 
376 ibid. 
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Each of these elements will be considered below to determine how these may relate to 
the required safeguarding of individuals’ rights and freedoms, and more generally, how 
their interpretation may resolve uncertainty surrounding the public interest concept. 
 
3.1.1 Is the processing of personal data ‘necessary’? 
This first element of Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d) requires that the use of personal data 
be ‘necessary’. The term is not defined within the DPA 1998 but there is brief 
discussion in the legislative history on the purpose of ‘necessary’ within the public 
interest condition. 377 Lord Williams of Mostyn provided: 
 
The amendment in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, would add a 
restriction to paragraph 5(d). We do not believe it is necessary because paragraph 
5(d) already contains safeguards. First, the processing must be necessary; secondly, the 
functions must be public functions; and, thirdly, they must be exercised in the 
public interest. 
… 
We do not see any benefit in the addition of the word ‘similar’. The amendment 
would require those other functions to be similar to those of the Crown and 
central government. I cannot presently think of any such functions. We feel it 
adds a restriction which is too restrictive and unnecessary. I hope that I have 
demonstrated that the safeguards are fully contained within sub-paragraph 
(d).378 
 
Thus, the qualification that the processing of personal data in the public interest must 
be necessary was added as a safeguard to individuals’ rights and interests where they are 
not consenting to the use of data.  
 
As to the meaning of ‘necessary’, the term must be interpreted according to the relevant 
rules of statutory construction. When it comes to interpreting UK law which is an 
                                                
377 In Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, [1993] 1 All ER 42 [64], Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that 
‘reference to parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation 
which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such 
cases references in court to parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material 
clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or 
obscure words.’ The term ‘necessary’ in the DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 5(d) is sufficiently ambiguous 
(undefined) to warrant examination of the relevant parliamentary material in Hansard and the material 
referenced here is clearly regarding this provision. The term’s ambiguity is highlighted extensively in 
Section 3.1.1. 
378 HL Deb 23 February 1998, vol 586, col 28gc (emphasis added). 
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implementation of EU law, courts are obliged to take a purposive approach to 
interpretation, as opposed to a literal approach where the natural and plain meaning of 
terms are adopted.379 A literal interpretation of ‘necessary’ would require that the use 
of personal data must be ‘indispensable, vital, essential; requisite.’380 However, with a 
purposive approach to interpretation, the purpose and intent behind the use of 
‘necessary’ by the framers of the Directive must be considered.381  
 
As under the DPA 1998, the term ‘necessary’ is not defined in the DPD, and the travaux 
does not reveal detailed discussions regarding its meaning. However, if we examine the 
context in which the term ‘necessary’ is situated within the DPD, the broader purpose 
for its inclusion can be assessed. In the DPD, ‘necessary’ is used to condition 
justifications for processing without consent.382 Data subjects are ‘protected’ because 
the use of personal data must not merely be convenient or desirable to the data 
controller; the use of personal data must be ‘necessary’ – it must be required to serve 
the relevant public interest. 
 
Similarly, under the DPA 1998, ‘necessary’ is a condition for the reliance on any other 
justification for processing without consent. However, subsequent interpretation of 
the term within the UK, in case law and various guidance materials, reveals divergent 
understandings of ‘necessary’. Case law and other guidance demonstrates uncertainty 
as to: 
 
Whether ‘necessary’ means the processing must be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ 
to meet the processing aims, or a lesser standard of being merely one 
appropriate route out of several; and whether there is any need for the 
processing to be proportionate.383 
 
                                                
379 On the authority of Bulmer (n 254) [425]. Per Lord Denning, courts must not ‘… examine the 
words in meticulous detail. No longer must they argue about the precise grammatical sense. They must 
look to the purpose or intent ... They must not confine themselves to the English text. They must 
consider, if need be, all the authentic texts ... They must divine the spirit of the treaty and gain 
inspiration from it. If they find a gap, they must fill it as best they can. They must do what the framers 
of the instrument would have done if they had thought about it’. 
380 ‘Necessary’ in Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn, 2003). 
381 Bulmer (n 254). 
382 DPD, Articles 7(a)-(f); DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 1-6. 
383 Black and Stevens (n 11) 103.  
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For example, the UK’s ICO has wavered on its own interpretation of necessary. The 
ICO provided in its 2001 guidance that ‘necessary’ means that the purposes for 
processing 1) must be valid and 2) can only be achieved through the use of personal 
data.384 This would on its own imply a literal interpretation of necessary in the most 
restrictive sense, however, a third condition provides that to be ‘necessary’, processing 
must be proportionate to the aim pursued, 385  thereby reflecting a more purposive 
approach in line with European jurisprudential principles.386  
 
Subsequently, the ICO modified its test for ‘necessary’. From 2010 onwards, their 
guidance provided that necessary should be interpreted as follows: 
 
This imposes a strict requirement, because the condition will not be met if the 
organisation can achieve the purpose by some other reasonable means or if the 
processing is necessary only because the organisation has decided to operate 
its business in a particular way.387  
 
This post-2010 guidance drops the provision that necessary means processing personal 
data must be the only way to achieve the purpose in question (as provided in the 2001 
guidance). Thus, this guidance may suggest a lesser standard: that data controllers must 
substantiate reasons for the use of personal data beyond mere convenience but this 
does not require strict necessity. This inconsistency was, however, resolved by case law 
interpreting the meaning of ‘necessary’ in the UKSC decision in South Lanarkshire 
Council v Scottish Information Commissioner.388 
 
This decision, from 2013, focused on the meaning of ‘necessary’ in Schedule 2 
paragraph 6 of the DPA 1998, otherwise known as the ‘legitimate interests’ condition. 
‘Necessary’ was considered in context of its meaning in European law. Citing Huber v 
                                                
384 This 2001 version of the guidance is now only available via the Internet Archive Wayback Time 
Machine. ICO, ‘Data Protection Act 1998 Legal Guidance’ (2001) para 3.1.6 (emphasis added). 
385 ibid. 
386 Specifically, as to the principle of proportionality. See Gillow v the United Kingdom (1986) Series A no 
109, para 55 as originally developed in Handyside v the United Kingdom (1976) Series A no 24, paras 48-
49. 
387 This refers to guidance updated on 11 May 2016; however, this change in approach to ‘necessary’ 
was made in 2010 – I have kept this version on file but it is also available via the Internet Archive 
Wayback Time Machine. ICO, ‘The Guide to Data Protection’ (n 26) 100. 
388 South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55. 
 
Chapter 3 Tracing the History and Application of the Public Interest in Data Protection Law – a 
UK and European perspective 
 
113 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland389, Lady Hale refers to Member States’ obligation to interpret 
‘necessary’ consistently and according to its independent meaning in European law: 
 
…the concept of necessity laid down by Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46… 
cannot have a meaning which varies between member states. It therefore 
follows that what is at issue is a concept which has its own independent 
meaning in Community law and which must be interpreted in a manner which 
fully reflects the objective of that directive, as laid down in Article 1(1) 
thereof.390 
 
Helpfully, Article 7(e), which was the focus in Huber, is the equivalent provision under 
consideration here i.e. Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d). Lady Hale adopts from the Advocate 
General’s opinion in Huber this definition of ‘necessary’: 
 
It is well established in community law that, at least in the context of 
justification rather than derogation, ‘necessary’ means ‘reasonably’ rather than 
absolutely or strictly necessary…391necessity is well established in community 
law as part of the proportionality test. A measure which interferes with a right 
protected by community law must be the least restrictive for the achievement 
of a legitimate aim. Indeed, in ordinary language we would understand that a 
measure would not be necessary if the legitimate aim could be achieved by 
something less.392 
 
On this authority, ‘necessary’ means that for the purposes of interpreting paragraph 
5(d), the processing must be proportionate such that the use of personal data is the least 
restrictive means of achieving the public interest aim sought. Although it is important to 
distinguish proportionality in its purest sense (i.e. ensuring a fair balance between 
different rights and interests) from its role as part of the test of necessity in EU law, a 
‘proportionate’ approach to ‘necessary’ aligns with the more recent guidance issued by 
the ICO (even if the explicit words proportionate are not used).393 Thus, ‘necessary’ 
can be taken to mean that the use of personal data is more than a matter of mere 
                                                
389 Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland C-524/06 (2008) ECR I-9705. 
390 ibid,  para 52 (emphasis added). 
391 Lady Hale cites: R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith (No 2) [2000] 1 All ER 857, 
[2000] IRLR 263, [2000] 1 WLR 435; Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Homer [2012] UKSC 15, 
[2012] 3 All ER 1287, [2012] ICR 704. 
392 South Lanarkshire Council (n 388) [27], Lady Hales cites the Opinion of Advocate General Poiarest 
Maduru in Huber (n 389) para 52. 
393 Proportionality, as a concept with its own independent meaning must be distinguished from whether 
the processing of personal data is 1) ‘necessary’ in the sense of requirement for the achievement of a 
particular goal and 2) whether the least restrictive means are deployed. 
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convenience to the data controller, but it need not be essential to the public interest 
aim sought. 
 
However, there are some caveats to the approach taken to ‘necessary’ in South 
Lanarkshire. First, Lady Hale cited the Advocate General’s definition of ‘necessary’ 
which was not ultimately adopted by the ECJ in Huber394 – rather the ECJ merely 
referred to the fact that the term had its own meaning in Community law and that this 
meaning must be used by Member States when interpreting the DPD and their 
implementing legislation, without defining the term themselves.395 Second, in South 
Lanarkshire, the circumstances of the case were not considered to engage Article 8 of 
the ECHR, as the identities of data subjects could not be discerned from the data at 
issue. Thus, it is possible that the balancing of interests and rights required in the 
‘legitimate interests’ condition reflects a lesser standard of ‘necessary’ than required 
where an individuals’ Article 8 Convention rights are clearly engaged. In sum, a 
different standard and meaning of ‘necessary’ could potentially be applied where 
Article 8 is engaged and overlaps with a case involving reliance on the public interest 
condition. This is possible given that unlike the legitimate interests condition in 
paragraph 6, paragraph 5(d) does not explicitly require a balancing of interests between 
the data controller and data subject.396 Nevertheless previous authorities agree that 
‘necessary’ must be interpreted according to its meaning in European Law, for example 
as provided in the opinion by Mr Justice Davis in the English High Court case Michael 
Stone v SE Coast Strategic Health Authority: 
 
It is common ground that the word ‘necessary’, as used in the Schedules to the 
1998 Act, carries with it the connotations of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: those include the proposition that a pressing social need is 
involved and that the measure employed is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
being pursued.397 
 
Again, more recent case law would seem to suggest the ‘reasonable’ approach to 
‘necessary’, one which incorporates the principle of proportionality, is the meaning 
                                                
394 Regardless, Lady Hale adopts the predominant definition of ‘necessary’ from European law and 
considers it ‘uncontroversial’ to apply to the case at hand. South Lanarkshire Council (n 388) [27]. 
395 Huber (n 389) para 52. 
396 Lady Hale makes this distinction herself in South Lanarkshire (n 388) [25]. 
397 Stone (n 85) [60]. 
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with the most support in the UK. In 2014, the Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal 
against the refusal to disclose photographs of a flat after a fire because disclosure was 
considered unfair and not ‘necessary’ for the claimant to prevent future fires in his 
neighbour’s flat.398 In line with Lady Hale’s opinion that ‘necessary’ be interpreted 
‘reasonably’, Judge Jacob considered that:  
 
…necessary does not mean that it must be essential or indispensable for him 
to see the material. That is too strict a test. It is not how the word is used in 
everyday language. To take a slightly factitious example, ‘I need a drink’ does 
not mean that I will die or suffer irreparable kidney damage if I don't have one. 
Lawyers usually convey this less stringent test by qualifying necessary with 
reasonably. In truth, this is not a qualification; it merely emphasises how the 
word is generally used. 399  
 
Judge Jacob goes on to distinguish between a stricter standard and the reasonable one 
he adopts: 
 
Necessary connotes a degree of importance or urgency that is lower than 
absolute necessity but greater than a mere desire or wish. As a word in everyday 
use, it does not require, or for that matter allow, further elaboration. It merely 
has to be applied, which I now do.400 
 
Here, Judge Jacob is explaining that to interpret ‘necessary’ reasonably is not indicative 
of a lesser standard; reasonableness merely reflects the approach to ‘necessary’ in 
European law. Although Judge Jacob does not directly mention ‘proportionality’, it is 
likely that he interpreted ‘reasonable’ to mean use of personal data that is proportionate 
to the aim sought. Indeed, he cites Lady Hale’s definition of ‘necessary’ in South 
Lanarkshire such that processing will not be considered necessary ‘if the legitimate aim 
could be achieved by something less’.401  
 
Even more recently, the UKSC held that certain data sharing provisions within the 
controversial ‘named person scheme’ in Scotland402 were incompatible with Article 8 
                                                
398 Farrand v Information Commissioner and another [2014] UKUT 310 (AAC). 
399 ibid [26]. 
400 ibid [27]. 
401 South Lanarkshire (n 388) [27]. 
402 ‘What Is a Named Person?’ (Scottish Government) <http://www.gov.scot/Topics/People/Young-
People/gettingitright/named-person>; Stuart Nicolson, ‘What Is the Named Person Scheme?’ (BBC 
News, 28 July 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35752756>. 
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of the ECHR on the basis of potentially disproportionate interferences with the rights 
and freedoms of young people and their families.403 Here, the UKSC again referenced 
the European approach to interpreting ‘necessary’ via the proportionality test.404 They 
further held that the application of the proportionality test and thus determining the 
necessity of data processing depends on the context of the circumstances. Where Article 
8 is engaged, ‘necessary’ must be deployed in a way that ‘[recognises] the need to weigh 
the importance of the disclosure in achieving a legitimate aim against the importance 
of the interference with the individual’s right to respect for her private and family 
life.’405  
 
It was not enough that the relevant provisions in Part 4 of the Children and Young 
People (Scotland) Act 2014 allowed the disclosure of personal data to a third party if it 
was considered that data are ‘likely to be relevant’ to the exercise of certain statutory 
functions by the third party and ‘ought to be provided for that purpose’.406 The UKSC 
emphasised: 
 
Disclosure where the data processor considers that the information is likely to 
be relevant cannot be regarded as necessary if the legitimate aim could be 
achieved by something less. It cannot be ‘necessary’, in that sense, to disclose 
information merely on the ground that it is objectively relevant, let alone on 
the ground that a particular body considers that it is likely to be relevant. 
Relevance is a relatively low threshold: information may be relevant but of little significance. 
A test of potential relevance fails to recognise the need to weigh the importance 
of the disclosure in achieving a legitimate aim against the importance of the 
interference with the individual’s right to respect for her private and family life. 
That deficiency is not made good by the requirement that the data controller 
considers that the information ought to be provided.407  
 
It is unclear how the assessment of necessary via the test of proportionality in The 
Christian Institute case differs from the ‘reasonable’ approach suggested by Judge Jacob 
in Farrand (‘Necessary connotes a degree of importance or urgency that is lower than 
absolute necessity but greater than a mere desire or wish’).408 The UKSC does not seem 
                                                
403 The Christian Institute and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland) [2016] UKSC 51 
[100]-[101]. 
404 ibid [56]. 
405 ibid. 
406 ibid citing Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, Pt 4, s 26(2)(a)-(b). 
407 ibid (emphasis added). 
408 Farrand (n 398) [27]. 
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to advocate a standard of strict necessity, but at least where Article 8 is engaged, the use 
of data must not be merely objectively relevant but be ‘significant’ to the public interest 
aim sought.409 This introduces yet another term without a clear definition. However, 
the lack of safeguards within the legislation, to protect individuals from 
disproportionate interferences with their rights under Article 8, appeared to heavily 
influence the UKSC’s reasoning. 410  This suggests that the provision of suitable 
safeguards is critical to relying upon justifications for using data without consent, 
regardless of the public interest aim sought. It demonstrates a judicial focus on the 
safeguards surrounding the application of the public interest to a particular set of facts 
rather than whether a use of data is substantively in the public interest.411  
 
The requirement that processing be ‘necessary’ is clearly a complex topic that has been 
subject to disagreement over a literal or ‘strict’ definition of the term. Moreover, recent 
case law would suggest that in applying the European test of proportionality to the 
assessment of necessity, that this must be interpreted in context. Therefore the 
standard that applies may vary depending on the nature of the factual circumstances, 
including if Article 8 is engaged. Ultimately, to rely on paragraph 5(d), what is clear is 
that data controllers’ must establish reasons for needing to process personal data beyond 
mere convenience or desire to do so. What is less clear is the precise threshold to be 
met if the use of personal data is to be established as ‘necessary’.  
 
After The Christian Institute, what does it mean for data to be ‘significant’ to a particular 
use? ‘Necessary’ as assessed via the test of proportionality will always require close 
inspection of the facts in each case, what safeguards are provided, and whether 
anonymised data could be used instead. In summary, ‘necessary’ is indeed intended to 
provide safeguards to data subjects when their consent is not obtained, most recently 
evidenced by the overturning of the data sharing provisions of the Scottish named 
                                                
409 The Christian Institute (n 403) [56]. 
410 ibid [100]-[101]. 
411 The UKSC swiftly dealt with the issue of the ‘public interest’ as being ‘obvious’: ‘As to the first of 
those questions, it can be accepted, focusing on the legislation itself rather than on individual cases 
dealt with under the legislation, that Part 4 of the 2014 Act pursues legitimate aims. The public interest 
in the flourishing of children is obvious. The aim of the Act, which is unquestionably legitimate and 
benign, is the promotion and safeguarding of the wellbeing of children and young persons.’ ibid [91]. 
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person scheme.412 In assessing whether processing is ‘necessary’, one can disqualify 
uses of data that are unable to meet the safeguarding requirements of the public interest 
conditions. Similar to issues in defining the ‘public interest’ in a substantive sense, it is 
also difficult to define ‘necessary’ any more precisely. Thus, it offers little in the sense 
of clarifying the substantive meaning of the ‘public interest’. 
3.1.2 Is the processing a function of a ‘public nature’? 
The second element to satisfying the public interest condition for ordinary personal 
data is that processing must be ‘undertaken as an exercise of a function, of a public 
nature.’413 What is essential to this requirement is that the processing be a function of 
a public nature, which is yet another undefined term within paragraph 5(d), although it 
has been considered in analogous areas of law, discussed below. First, however, there 
is brief discussion relevant to the meaning of ‘public nature’ by Parliament when 
drafting the DPA 1998.414 In discussing the purpose of paragraph 5(d), Lord Williams 
of Mostyn provided: 
 
Schedule 2 follows Article 7 of the directive very closely. That article sets out 
conditions which must be met if processing is to meet the fair and lawful 
requirement in the first data protection principle. Paragraph 5 deals with 
processing which is necessary in the public interest. The first three paragraphs are 
intended to cover processing such as that carried out by the courts, by central government and 
by those exercising statutory functions. There may be other circumstances where the public 
interest requires data to be processed. That is the purpose of paragraph 5(d).415 
 
Importantly, Lord Mostyn is distinguishing between processing carried out by public 
authorities such as courts, government departments and others carrying out statutory 
functions on the one hand, and processing carried out in the public interest on the 
other. Therefore, processing of a ‘public nature’ is not confined to processing which is 
carried out by a particular public authority or under a statutory mandate. However, it 
remains unclear precisely who (the type of data controller) may satisfy the ‘public nature’ 
requirement, and what type of processing this encompasses. 
                                                
412 ibid [106]. 
413 DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 5(d). 
414 The term ‘public nature’ in the DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 5(d) is sufficiently ambiguous (undefined) to 
warrant examination of the relevant parliamentary material in Hansard and the material referenced 
here is clearly regarding this provision (see Pepper note 377 on consideration of parliamentary material). 
415 HL Deb 23 February 1998, vol 586, col 28gc (emphasis added). 
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As to answering the question of who may carry out processing of a ‘public nature’, the 
literature suggests that the use of the term ‘public’ does not preclude use by a non-
public entity,  especially in light of the fact that ‘any person’ can satisfy the condition 
per the fourth element of paragraph 5(d).416 The Ministry of Justice supports this 
interpretation in its 2012 data-sharing guidance, which provides that the public interest 
condition encompasses: 
 
processing by voluntary organisations or private bodies, provided that it is in 
support of a public function that is in the public interest – for example, the 
reservation of beds in hostels run by a voluntary body for persons registered 
with local authorities as homeless.417 
 
This means that to establish the public nature of processing, it is less about who 
undertakes the processing and more that it relates to a public function in the public interest. 
The guidance does not indicate the extent to which the function must be one that is 
typically ‘public’ or, in other words, typically undertaken by a public authority, even if 
outsourced to a commercial organisation. Indeed, what are categorically ‘typical’ public 
functions for the purposes of paragraph 5(d)? 
 
Given that 1) ‘public nature’ and ‘public functions’ are left undefined and 2) there is a 
lack of case law on this issue, it is useful to consider how this terminology is interpreted 
in analogous areas of law. Under the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’), which 
extends the application of the ECHR to the actions of public authorities in England 
and Wales, similar terms are used.418 In section 6, public authorities are defined as: 
 
(a) a court or tribunal, and 
                                                
416 Rosemary Jay suggests that ‘It is possible, however, for some private or quasi-private bodies to 
exercise public functions and therefore rely on this condition’. Indeed, this is increasingly the case with 
the prevalence in outsourcing public functions to private sector organisations. Jay (n 27) 215. This 
interpretation finds further support in Scotland where the Scottish Government has provided that Sch 
2, para 5(d) would support processing undertaken by ‘voluntary organisations or private bodies 
provided that it is in the public interest’. Scottish Executive, ‘Data Sharing: Legal Guidance for the 
Scottish Public Sector’ (2004) 30 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/10/20158/45768>. 




418 Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’). 
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(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature, but does 
not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in 
connection with proceedings in Parliament.419 
 
Section 6 further clarifies that persons do not become a public authority by virtue of 
undertaking a function of a public nature if ‘the nature of the act is private’.420 
 
‘Functions of a public nature’, as used in the HRA 1998, has been narrowly interpreted 
by the courts. In YL v Birmingham City Council, the House of Lords determined that a 
private care home was not carrying out ‘functions of a public nature’, because its 
functions were in pursuance to private law contractual obligations, as ‘[it] is necessary 
to look also at the reason why the person in question, whether an individual or 
corporate, is carrying out those activities.’421 Thus the purposes for action must be 
‘public’. However, what precisely does a ‘public’ purpose mean in this context? 
 
Lord Mance explained that the care home’s functions were private, and to be 
distinguished from functions of a public nature because whereas the latter involve a 
‘statutory source or underpinning for its operations’ the former arises out of an 
‘essentially contractual source’ even if it is ‘a matter of public concern and interest’.422 
This would mean that functions of a public nature must be mandated by statute which 
imposes a restrictive view of the terminology. In agreement with this, Lord Neuberger 
considered that the HRA 1998, ‘Section 6(3)(b) is primarily concerned with functions 
and what is entailed with them (e.g. statutory powers and duties) rather than to whom 
they are provided, or indeed who provides them.’423 Furthermore, ‘The fact that a 
service can fairly be said to be to the public benefit cannot mean, as a matter of 
language, that it follows that providing the service itself is a function of a public 
nature’. 424  Could a similarly restrictive interpretation be extrapolated to the 
interpretation of ‘public nature’ in paragraph 5(d)? 
 
                                                
419 HRA 1998, s 6(3)(a)-(b) (emphasis added). 
420 HRA 1998, s 6(5). 
421 YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27 [31] (Lord Scott).  
422 ibid [120] (Lord Mance).  
423 ibid [165] (Lord Neuberger). 
424 ibid [135] (Lord Neuberger). 
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The significant criticism in the literature425 which followed YL is worth mentioning 
here (as is the fact that Parliament specifically abrogated the part of the ruling that held 
a private care home was not exercising functions of a public nature)426. Critics of YL 
generally question ‘The conceptual coherence of the division [between private and 
public bodies] ... when private bodies are deeply involved in fulfilling the responsibility 
of government through the provision of public services.’427  As advocated by the 
minority in YL (Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale), a purposive approach is required 
to assess whether a function is ‘public’, looking to the intention behind the function; 
in YL the minority stated: 
 
The intention of Parliament is that residential care should be provided, but the 
means of doing so is treated as, in itself, unimportant. By one means or another 
the function of providing residential care is one which must be performed. For 
this reason also the detailed contractual arrangements between Birmingham, 
Southern Cross and Mrs YL and her daughter are a matter of little or no 
moment.428 
 
The minority placed far more weight on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ a function is carried out, 
whereas the majority focused on the question of ‘who’. Given that Parliament 
subsequently amended the law (in section 73 of the Care Act 2014) to reflect the 
minority’s view point, what might this mean for a broader interpretation of the ‘public 
nature’ under paragraph 5(d)?  
 
First, outside of YL, there is no direct authority on the meaning of this term for the 
purposes of paragraph 5(d). In support of a broader interpretation than provided by 
the majority in YL, it is crucial to consider that Schedule 2 provides standalone 
provisions to justify the processing of personal data pursuant to statutory powers and 
duties in paragraphs 5(b) and 5(c).429 Indeed Lord Mostyn raised this specific point with 
                                                
425 Stephanie Palmer, ‘Public Functions and Private Services: A Gap in Human Rights Protection’ 
(2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 585; Alexander Williams, ‘YL v Birmingham City 
Council: Contracting out and “Functions of a Public Nature”’ (2008) 4 European Human Rights Law 
Review 524; Donnelly Catherine, ‘Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 5 Law 
& Ethics of Human Rights 337. 
426 Reflected in the Care Act 2014, s 73. 
427 Palmer (n 425) 598. 
428 YL (n 421) [16] (Lord Bingham). 
429 Rosemary Jay submits that Sch 2, para 5 and the scope of its provisions, refer to ‘processing carried 
out under a discretionary power rather than a legal obligation’. The Scottish Government in its 
guidance on data sharing in the public sector provides that para 5(b) encompasses processing ‘that is 
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regard to paragraph 5(d) in order to distinguish its scope from the other provisions 
within paragraph 5.430  If the public interest condition is to have any independent 
meaning from 5(b) or 5(c) (which Lord Mostyn’s brief discussion indicates it has) 
functions of a public nature would need to encompass processing outside explicit 
statutory powers and duties. Certainly, if considering the legislative history to the DPD, 
all discussions regarding the public interest provisions indicate a distinct separation 
between justification based on explicit statutory mandates and the public interest on 
the other hand.431  
 
Government guidance further supports a broader interpretation of ‘public nature’. For 
example, the Scottish Government considers paragraph 5(d) as encompassing 
processing that ‘is not carried out pursuant to express or implied statutory functions 
or as part of the functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government 
department’.432 The Ministry of Justice’s guidance on data sharing would similarly 
support this broader interpretation.433 What little guidance exists presupposes that 
processing of a public nature is processing aimed at some sort of ‘public’ benefit, as 
opposed to a solely private benefit. Even though this is not explicitly provided for in 
guidance or case law, it is likely that processing would need to be undertaken with the 
purpose of benefiting the ‘public’ to be considered of a ‘public nature’. It is less certain 
whether and if it is sufficient to allege an intended benefit to the public as a non-
descript whole i.e. the population of the UK, or that data controllers must demonstrate 
specific and tangible benefits such as to their constituency or service users. The critical 
point being made here is that to be considered of a ‘public nature’, processing cannot 
be undertaken for the sole purpose of private benefit. 
 
                                                
carried out pursuant to express statutory powers or that is reasonably required or ancillary to the 
exercise of express or implied statutory functions’, whereas para 5(c) refers to processing ‘relating to 
functions carried out by central government departments and the Scottish Ministers that derive from 
the Crown’s common law, prerogative or statutory powers’. Jay (n 27) 215; Scottish Executive (n 416) 
29–30.  
430 HL Deb 23 February 1998, vol 586, col 28gc. 
431 Article 7(c) in the DPD provides a justification for processing based on the legal obligations of the 
data controller and the second clause of Article 7(e) separately provides justification based on the 
‘exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are 
disclosed’.  
432 Scottish Executive (n 416) 30. 
433 Ministry of Justice (n 417) 16. 
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In summary, without a clear authority on the meaning of ‘public nature’ it remains 
uncertain the extent to which the purposes for processing must be ‘public’ and precisely 
how much benefit to the public must be pursued by the processing. It is even more 
confusing if we consider the fourth element of paragraph 5(d) which provides that the 
condition can be satisfied and relied upon by ‘any person’. ‘Public nature’ is clearly 
intended to act as another safeguard, such that data controllers can only rely on 
paragraph 5(d) if their processing is compliant with this and the other requirements. 
However, even if we accept that ‘who’ processes the data is less important than the 
‘how’ and ‘why’, there is simply no guidance on how the public nature of processing is 
to be objectively assessed. What is the threshold that must be met for processing to be 
determined as ‘sufficiently’ of a public nature? Does processing of a ‘public nature’ 
mean that the processing must be intended to benefit the public in some way? If public 
nature is tied to an idea of public benefit, how does this relate to the ‘public interest’ 
in processing, if the public interest is also about conferring a benefit in the interests of 
the public? 
3.1.3 Is the processing ‘in the public interest’? 
The third element to consider is whether processing is ‘in the public interest’. As the 
analysis below will reveal, the scope and meaning of the public interest in the context 
of the conditions for processing remains entirely unsubstantiated. The meaning of the 
public interest in the conditions for processing is undefined and it was not elaborated 
upon by the UK Parliament while drafting the DPA 1998.434 Consideration of the first 
two elements – that processing be ‘necessary’ and an exercise of a function in the 
‘public nature’ – partially aids the interpretation of this question in terms of eliminating 
forms of processing that would not meet the safeguarding requirements of paragraph 
5(d). Processing could not be justified by the public interest condition if the use of 
ordinary personal data was merely convenient for or advantageous to the data 
controller when other means of processing which were less intrusive and risky (such 
as using anonymised data) could achieve the intended aim. Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that processing would meet the ‘public nature’ threshold if it was serving a ‘private’ aim 
                                                
434 Discussion is limited to the broad purpose of paragraph 5(d) and not focused on substantively 
defining the ‘public interest’. HL Deb 23 February 1998, vol 586, col 28gc. 
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and purpose, with an intended outcome solely or mainly for the benefit of the data 
controller.  
 
Thus, while the interpretation of both ‘necessary’ and ‘public nature’ can help eliminate 
processing by procedure, it offers no aid to interpreting what is meant substantively by 
the public interest in paragraph 5(d). Significant questions of substance remain:  
 
How does the ‘public interest’ relate to the ‘public nature’ of processing if the 
latter also revolves around ‘publicness’ as it relates to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of 
processing?  
 
If the public nature of processing is assessed in terms of the benefits to be 
accrued as a result, how does this impact upon an assessment of the public 
interest in processing which could also reasonably be interpreted in light 
‘public’ benefits?  
 
In terms of which ‘public’ should benefit from the processing, how ‘public’ does 
the public interest have to be, meaning, how shared are ‘public’ interests and 
how is this to be assessed?  
 
Subsequent amendments to the DPA 1998 provide specific examples of processing 
which may be considered in the public interest but answers to questions regarding the 
substance of the ‘public interest’ concept remain lacking. These amendments are now 
considered. 
3.1.3.A The DPPSPD 2000 
Several examples of public interest processing were provided in the amendment of the 
DPA 1998 with the introduction of the DPPSPD 2000. The Schedule to the DPPSPD 
2000 introduced several new conditions for processing sensitive personal data on the 
basis that such processing serves the ‘substantial’ public interest. These were adopted 
on the basis of Article 8(4) of the DPD which permits Member States to create 
derogations from the conditions for processing otherwise included in Article 8:  
 
Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States may, for reasons 
of substantial public interest, lay down exemptions in addition to those laid 
down in paragraph 2 either by national law or by decision of the supervisory 
authority.435 
 
                                                
435 DPD, Art 8(4). 
 
Chapter 3 Tracing the History and Application of the Public Interest in Data Protection Law – a 
UK and European perspective 
 
125 
Importantly, Article 8(4) of the DPD provides that the processing of special categories 
of personal data based on the substantial public interest must be contingent on the 
provision of ‘suitable safeguards’. The practical effect of this is that it is not enough for 
the processing to be ‘in the substantial public interest’ but for there to also be provision 
of suitable safeguards.  
 
Under the DPPSPD 2000, specific forms of processing sensitive data would now be 
justifiable and may be considered as examples of processing in the ‘substantial’ public 
interest: 
 
• To prevent or detect unlawful acts;436 
• To protect members of the public from malpractice, dishonesty or acts of 
maladministration;437 
• To disclose data for the ‘special purposes’ regarding the commission of a 
crime, revealing dishonesty, etc. if the data controller reasonably believes 
that disclosure is in the public interest;438 
• To facilitate confidential counselling or advice and support services;439 
• For research purposes.440 
 
Not all the conditions added by the DPPSPD 2000 are explicitly based upon the 
substantial public interest. Nevertheless, the specific processing types included, such 
as for insurance441 and equal opportunity purposes,442 were clearly important enough 
to warrant explicit justification. It is worth recalling the lobbying efforts of Member 
States on precisely this point and the role the public interest provisions played to 
address concerns over processing for various ‘important’ purposes. Note that at least 
one provision in the DPPSPD 2000 (not conditioned on the substantial public 
interest), regarding the processing of sensitive data for the political canvassing, was 
specifically lobbied for by the UK to be included as a ‘public interest’ in the DPD.443 
                                                
436 DPPSPD 2000, Sch, para 1. 
437 ibid Sch, para 2. 
438 ibid, Sch, para 3. This provision refers to disclosing data for the ‘special purposes’ as defined in s 3 
of the DPA 1998. Special purposes include processing for journalistic, artistic and literary purposes. 
439 ibid, Sch, para 4. 
440 ibid, Sch, para 9. 
441 DPPSPD 2000, Sch, para 5. 
442 ibid, Sch, para 7. 
443 See Section 2.6 above. ‘Note from Presidency to Internal Market Council’ 11581/94, 5; Council of 
the European Union, ‘Report, from Permanent Representatives Committee, on 10 January 1995, to 
Council meeting (General Affairs), on 6 and 7 February 1995’ 4649/95, 2. 
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Processing for research444 was also lobbied for by the UK (among other delegations)445 
and this was included in the DPPSPD 2000 as processing conditioned on the 
substantial public interest. Given the focus in this thesis on processing for research 
purposes, it is worth examining in closer detail this provision. What substantive 
difference is there, if any, between processing ordinary personal data based on the 
public interest in paragraph 5(d) versus processing sensitive personal data in the 
‘substantial’ public interest under the DPPSPD 2000? 
 
Research in the ‘substantial’ public interest 
‘Research’ (which is defined in the DPA 1998 to broadly include statistical or historical 
purposes446) requiring the use of sensitive personal data was provided a separate legal 
basis for processing in the DPPSPD 2000. Under this provision, sensitive personal 
data can be lawfully processed for research if it is in the ‘substantial public interest’, 
and suitable safeguards are provided: 
 
The processing— 
(a) is in the substantial public interest; 
(b) is necessary for research purposes (which expression shall have the same 
meaning as in section 33 of the Act); 
(c) does not support measures or decisions with respect to any particular data 
subject otherwise than with the explicit consent of that data subject; and 
(d) does not cause, nor is likely to cause, substantial damage or substantial 
distress to the data subject or any other person.447 
 
‘Substantial public interest’ is not defined in the DPPSPD 2000, however this 
terminology mirrors the DPD’s Article 8(4).448 Although ‘substantial public interest’ is 
not ‘novel’ to the DPA 1998, as discussed at length in Section 2 above, there are no 
factors discussed by Member States in the travaux that would help to distinguish 
                                                
444 Note, that processing for medical purposes, including for medical research, was already provided a 
justification in the main text of the DPA 1998, Sch 3, para 8. Research, more generally, was given 
justification with the adoption of the DPPSPD 2000, para 9. 
445 See Section 2.6.1 above. 
446 DPA 1998, s 33. 
447 DPPSPD 2000, para 9. 
448 DPD, Art 8(4) (emphasis added). 
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between ‘substantial’449 public interests and ordinary public interests for the purposes of 
processing ordinary personal data.  
 
The most reasonable interpretation is this: given that only substantial public interests 
can justify the processing of sensitive personal data (versus public interests which can 
justify the processing of ordinary personal data) the term ‘substantial’ merely indicates 
the generally higher threshold for processing sensitive personal data. Indeed, the 
lawfulness of paragraph 9 (and any of the other derogations represented within the 
DPPSPD 2000) are contingent upon suitable safeguards being provided as required by 
Article 8(4) of the DPD. Paragraph 9’s requirements b-d set forth above, represent the 
safeguards required by Article 8(4) of the DPD, while the requirement that processing 
must be in the ‘substantial public interest’ appears to be little more than a restatement 
of the requirement set out in Article 8(4). ‘ 
 
To further understand what if any substantive difference there is between research in the 
‘public interest’ versus in the ‘substantial public interest’, consider the explanatory 
notes to the DPPSPD 2000. Although explanatory notes to UK legislation are not 
legally binding, the term ‘substantial public interest’ is not defined and therefore this 
explanation can be used to interpret the provision.450 The notes provide an example of 
research considered to be in the ‘substantial’ public interest:  
 
Paragraph 9 of the Schedule covers, for example, processing in the course of 
maintaining archives where the sensitive personal data are not used to take 
decisions about any person without their consent and no substantial damage 
or distress is caused to any person by the keeping of those data.451  
 
Here the maintenance of an archive is an example of processing that is ‘in the 
substantial public interest’. The crucial focus is not on the substance of this example 
                                                
449 To add further inconsistency, the explanatory recital to Article 8(4) speaks of ‘important’ public 
interests, not substantial ones. 
450 In R (Westminster CC) v NASS [2002] UKHL 38, it was considered ‘whether in aid of the 
interpretation of a statute the court may take into account the Explanatory Notes and, if so, to what 
extent’. In Lord Steyn’s judgment, it was held that ‘... insofar as the Explanatory Notes cast light on 
the objective setting or contextual scene of the statute, and the mischief at which it is aimed, such 
materials are therefore always admissible aids to construction. They may be admitted for what logical 
value they have’.  
451 DPPSPD 2000, Explanatory Notes.  
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(i.e. the type of the research provided). Rather, the emphasis is on the safeguarding 
requirements of paragraph 9: that the processing is not used to take decisions about 
individuals without their consent and that no substantial damage or distress is caused 
to individuals by archiving data. Thus, we see again (as with ‘necessary’ and ‘public 
nature’ for paragraph 5(d)) the emphasis on safeguards, which if not provided, would 
eliminate processing from being considered in the ‘substantial’ public interest. The 
explanatory notes reinforce the interpretation suggested above; that the ‘substantial’ 
public interest terminology reveals little about the substantive parameters for 
determining what is in the substantial public interest and more about the type of data 
at issue and the required safeguards for processing per Article 8(4) of the DPD. We 
lack objective criteria to positively determine what can be considered processing in the 
‘substantial’ public interest as this higher public interest threshold is not further 
explained.  
 
Although examples of processing in the substantial public interest are provided in the 
DPPSPD 2000, which could also arguably meet the elusive ‘public interest’ threshold 
for ordinary personal data452, we still lack the ability to substantively assess whether 
processing which is not explicitly mentioned, is or is not in the public interest. Even if 
the enumeration of specific ‘substantial’ public interest examples in the DPPSPD 2000 
seem to indicate an exhaustive list of ‘substantial’ public interests for the purposes of 
processing sensitive personal data (expressio unius est exclusio alterius),453 the same cannot 
be said about paragraph 5(d) as to ordinary personal data, which is an open-ended 
provision.454 This brings us back to the question of what precisely does the public 
interest mean in context with processing personal data – what processing purposes are 
‘public’ enough and what ‘interests’ are encapsulated by these provisions aside from 
the explicit examples provided? 
                                                
452 Subject to the requirements of ‘necessary’ and ‘public nature’ in the DPA 1998 Sch 2 para 5(d). 
453 However, if we read the DPPSPD 2000 purposively and in line with the intended purpose and scope 
for the equivalent provisions in the DPD, Article 8(4) and Recital 34 were not drafted to provide an 
exhaustive list of ‘substantial’ public interests.  
454 In the case of Sch 2 para 5(d), no examples of the ‘public interest’ are provided. Furthermore, the 
use of the term ‘any’ (‘for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public 
interest by any person’) indicates the open nature of the provision as opposed to the specific, 
enumerated list of ‘substantial’ public interests in the DPPSPD 2000. This interpretation is supported 
by the Parliamentary discussions on the provision and moreover by a purposive reading which should 
reflect the non-exhaustive nature of the equivalent provisions in the DPD. 
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3.1.4 Processing by ‘any person’ 
The fourth and final element of paragraph 5(d) is not necessarily one to be satisfied, 
but instead is a device to support the interpretation of another requirement – that 
processing be related to the undertaking of functions of a public nature. As discussed 
above, paragraph 5 distinguishes between processing ‘in the public interest’ and 
processing justified based on serving official statutory functions and obligations. Thus, 
the main elements of the public interest condition are: 1) that the processing is 
necessary; 2) related to functions of a public nature and 3) in the public interest. The 
fact that the provision can be satisfied by ‘any person’ merely permits that, for example, 
quasi-public organisations or voluntary organisations, could meet these 
requirements.455 Moreover, the use of the term ‘any person’ is indicative of the broader 
purposes of this provision, not confined or restricted to specific examples as may be 
the case with sensitive personal data under the DPPSPD 2000,456 or indeed by the 
restrictive ruling on ‘public nature’ by the House of Lords in YL.  
 
3.2 Interim conclusion on the public interest conditions 
The public interest conditions seemingly focus on the proportionality, ‘publicness’ and 
safeguarding of processing. Does the public interest being served require the use of 
personal data, or would anonymised data suffice (‘necessary’)? Furthermore, does the 
purpose for processing arise out of a typically public function and is the purpose for 
processing intended to benefit the ‘public’ or is it predominantly for private gain 
(‘public nature’)? If sensitive personal data are being used, will decisions be taken based 
on such processing, without the consent of individuals, or is the processing likely to 
cause great harm or distress to anyone? While these requirements can certainly eliminate 
certain circumstances of processing where sufficient safeguards are not provided to 
individuals, a key element – that that the processing must be ‘in the public interest’ (or 
‘substantial’ public interest for sensitive personal data) – remains uncertain in scope 
and undefined.  
 
                                                
455 Ministry of Justice (n 417) 16. 
456 See note 454. 
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In summary, while the DPA 1998 does indeed provide safeguards to individuals where 
the public interest is relied upon to justify processing of personal or sensitive personal 
data, 457  the public interest conditions do not ultimately resolve the uncertainty 
regarding the substantive meaning of the concept. The required ‘publicness’ of the 
‘public interest’ and what ‘interests’ may meet this threshold remains uncertain. 
Understanding these components are crucial to assessing whether a given form of 
processing is sufficiently in the public interest to satisfy these conditions. Given the 
use of the term ‘public interest’, and in understanding the purpose behind the 
provisions in considering the legislative history of the DPD and DPA 1998, it cannot 
be that mere procedure qualifies a given form of processing as ‘in the public interest’. 
In other words, data controllers must be able to substantiate more than just that their 
use of personal data is ‘necessary’ and of a ‘public nature’. The public interest 
conditions in the DPA 1998 require data controllers to establish that their processing 
is in the public interest, but currently, they are without a means for doing so. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have considered the long and protracted legislative history of the 
DPD to examine the purposes for including the public interest provisions within the 
Directive and to better understand the provisions’ intended role and scope. The travaux 
do reveal the intended purposes for the public interest provisions – to legitimise certain 
important forms of processing where consent cannot be obtained. The provisions 
arose out of the concerns of many delegations regarding the chilling effect of the 
Directive on certain forms of data processing, such as research. The public interest 
provisions developed into a ‘compromise’ where these forms of processing were not 
fully exempt or excluded from the Directive but could proceed ‘unimpeded’, mainly 
meaning that consent would not be required. Although we get a sense of the types of 
processing that could meet the requisite ‘public interest’ threshold, through the 
lobbying efforts of Member States, and the eventual inclusion of these lobbied for 
processing types in Recital 34 of the Directive, no objective criteria are provided to 
facilitate data controllers’ assessment of the public interest in their processing.  
                                                
457 Per DPD, Recital 34 and Article 8(4). 
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The DPA 1998, and the transposition of the public interest provisions into the legal 
conditions for processing in Schedules 2 and 3, were then examined to determine 
whether these uncertainties were resolved and what safeguards were provided when 
the public interest would be relied upon to justify processing. Safeguards are indeed 
embedded within the public interest condition for processing ordinary personal data in 
Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d). Under this condition, the processing of ordinary personal 
data is lawful so long as it is necessary, related to a function of a public nature and in 
the public interest; this justification is not limited to public authorities but can be 
satisfied by ‘any person’.458 As to the processing of sensitive personal data, specific 
provisions were later added which justified processing based on the ‘substantial’ public 
interest. Although examples of processing in the ‘substantial’ public interest are 
provided, such as processing for research, the focus of the provisions remains on the 
safeguards (e.g. not taking decisions based on processing and ensuring no harm or 
distress will occur as a result) as opposed to the public interests at stake.  
 
The safeguards built into the public interest conditions do assist in eliminating certain 
processing circumstances which could not be considered in the public interest. 
However, satisfying the safeguarding requirements of the public interest provisions 
simply does not indicate whether processing is substantively in the public interest. The 
effect of this has been that data controllers are without relevant guidance to determine 
whether a given form of processing is in the public interest or not, unless it is one of 
the types explicitly mentioned in the DPPSPD 2000 or the DPD. Even where a type 
of processing is specifically mentioned, the predominance of consent or anonymisation 
indicates that the public interest provisions are not routinely being relied upon, and 
arguably this is due to this lack of definition and consequent uncertainty. 459 
Furthermore, in light of the insight gained from my analysis of the travaux, it is highly 
unlikely that merely because a type of processing is mentioned as an example in the 
DPD, that this automatically qualifies it as justifiable ‘in the public interest’ in a 
normative sense. 
                                                
458 DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 5(d). 
459 See Chapter 2 Section 2.2 and 4. 
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While it is admittedly an impossible task to define exhaustively every possible form of 
public interest processing, it is my contention that that the public interest conditions 
in the DPA 1998 and DPD require data controllers to substantiate and establish more 
than just their compliance with the required safeguards. If the opposite were true, this 
would mean the public interest is an empty term. Public interest processing would 
mean nothing more than the sum of its procedural parts – that if processing is 
‘necessary’ and of a ‘public nature’ with the appropriate safeguards in place, it is in the 
public interest. However, processing arising out of public functions and obligations are 
dealt with separately in both the DPA 1998 and DPD,460 and in light of the extensive 
discussion delineating the broader purposes for the public interest provisions in the 
travaux of the Directive, it is far from likely that this was the intention.461 As the travaux 
of the Directive also make clear, the task of further refining the public interest 
provisions was left to Member States.462 As seen by examining the DPA 1998 and 
related guidance, this task has not been undertaken.  
 
In Chapter 4 I explore whether it is possible to more clearly define the public interest 
in a substantive and thus normative sense, beyond mere procedure. To do this, I expand 
the legal evidence base on the operation of the public interest by considering how the 
concept is interpreted in context with Article 8 of the ECHR, given the frequent 







                                                
460 In the DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 5(b)-(c); and the DPD, Art 7(c) and second phrase in Art 7(e) which 
provides that ‘processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or 
in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed’ (emphasis 
added). 
461 See Section 2.6 above. 
462 ‘Note, from Presidency, 14 April 1994, for Working Party on Economic Questions (Data 
Protection)’ 6316/94, 3; ‘Note, from Presidency, 10 May 1994, to Permanent Representatives 
Committee’ 6856/94, 12. 
 
Chapter 4 Reviving the Public Interest Concept in Data Protection Law 
 
133 
Chapter 4 Reviving the Public 
Interest Concept in Data 
Protection Law  
1. Introduction 
The public interest conditions for processing require data controllers to engage with 
the substantive meaning of the public interest but, as discussed in Chapter 3, the law fails 
to provide any basis for doing so. The travuax préparatoires revealed that the types of 
data processing included as examples of data use in the public interest, such as medical 
research, were no more than the result of political negotiation. The travaux further 
indicated that these are merely examples and do not represent an exhaustive list of the 
types of processing that can be justified in the public interest. Without the provision 
of criteria or other means for assessing the public interest in processing, it remains 
entirely unclear what the public interest can mean in a substantive sense in this context. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to develop a deeper conceptual understanding 
of what the public interest means in data protection and consider how we might define 
the concept in a substantive and thus normative sense, beyond mere procedure.  
 
To emphasise the task at hand, the chapter begins by first considering why, on a 
conceptual level, it is difficult to define the public interest. By adopting W B Gallie’s 
concept of ‘essential contestability’463 I outline reasons why defining the public interest 
is problematic in the data protection context. This provides the appropriate backdrop 
for later assessing current understandings of the public interest within the law.  
 
I follow this with an overview of what is understood as ‘the public interest’ under the 
current legal framework. From the analysis in Chapter 3, this includes the ‘list’ of 
various types of processing which are examples of the public interest enumerated under 
the DPD and DPA 1998. To further our understanding of the public interest concept, 
I expand this list of public interests to include those from Article 8 of the ECHR, given 
                                                
463 Gallie (n 49) 169. 
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the common overlap of Article 8 and data protection claims. I consider what Article 8 
jurisprudence can offer in terms of explaining the substantive meaning of the public 
interest, in context with the conditions for processing in data protection. While this 
analysis offers insight on the safeguarding aspects of the public interest conditions, 
ultimately, only a descriptive understanding of the public interest remains without any 
criteria which could be applied objectively and consistently to different processing 
circumstances.  
 
The next part of the chapter draws upon political and legal theory to fill the conceptual 
gaps identified from the legal analysis on the public interest in data protection and 
Article 8 jurisprudence. I use theory to interrogate the legal iterations of the public 
interest to determine 1) the appropriate conceptual boundaries of the concept and 2) 
what criteria may be relevant to assessing whether the processing of personal data is 
justified in the public interest. Combining this legal and theoretical analysis reveals key 
components to reframe our consideration of the public interest concept in a way that 
improves upon current understandings and practices in data protection.  
2. The Difficultly in Defining the Public Interest: The 
Essential Contestability of the Concept 
Why is it so difficult to define the public interest? Since the enactment of the DPD and 
the DPA 1998, the concept has received relatively little critical attention. This being 
said, the insight that has been offered from law464 and other disciplines465 often focus 
on the ambiguity of the concept. As such, theoretical development and understanding 
of the concept as it is used in data protection is lacking. Why is it difficult to delineate 
the types of processing or circumstances in which it is justifiable to rely on the public 
interest? The key theoretical issues or typical ‘pitfalls’ of relying upon the public interest 
concept are articulated in Jane Mansbridge’s work on the public good (a term she uses 
synonymously with the public interest).466 Mansbridge presents three vulnerabilities of 
the public interest concept: 
 
                                                
464 McHarg (n 28) 671, 674; Townend (n 28); Beyleveld (n 28); Taylor (n 28). 
465 Bozeman (n 59). 
466 Mansbridge (n 49). 
 
Chapter 4 Reviving the Public Interest Concept in Data Protection Law 
 
135 
• The public interest is an essentially contested concept467: We can never know in 
advance and with certainty what the public interest is in any given case468 
and this is most unsettling in the legal context given the normative weight 
of legal decisions and judgments. 
• The public interest is vulnerable to demagogic exploitation: Dangers lurk in the 
emotional bases of appeals to the public interest, which are associated with 
historical examples that demonstrate various and nefarious motives 
couched in public interest terminology. These undermine further appeals 
to the concept.469 
• The public interest is vulnerable to control by dominant groups: Given the 
ambiguity of the concept, dominant and elite sectors of society have the 
advantage to construct reigning understanding of the public interest to the 
disadvantage of other groups.470 
 
It is the public interest’s essentially contested nature, its uncertainty in any given 
context, and its susceptibility to exploitation by a decision maker that make the concept 
‘suspect’ when used as a justification for action in any context, but especially in data 
protection where such decisions and reasoning are made in private and are not currently 
subject to public scrutiny.471 (Currently, data controllers may independently determine 
their processing is justifiable based on the public interest without any scrutiny, legal or 
otherwise.) Exploring the idea of ‘essential contestability’ as it applies to the public 
interest illustrates the complexity involved when attempting to define it and therefore 
the issues that arise when attempting to use the concept in a legal context. W B Gallie 
introduced ‘essential contestability’ in 1955, to explain ‘concepts the proper use of 
which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their 
users.’472 Gallie defines essentially contested concepts according to four criteria:  
 
• Appraisive: ‘it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement’;  
• Internally complex: ‘achievement must be of an internally complex character, for 
all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole’;  
• Variously describable (i.e. component features are in dispute): ‘explanation of its worth 
must therefore include reference to the respective contributions of its various 
parts or features’; 
                                                
467 Mansbridge and other theorists used W B Gallie’s concept of ‘essential contestability’ to analyse the 
public interest. Gallie (n 49) 168–169; Mansbridge (n 49); O’Flynn (n 49). 
468 Mansbridge (n 49) 4. 
469 On this Mansbridge explains: ‘Yet, after Hitler and Freud, the present generation’s heightened 
sensitivity to the dangers of drawing on the emotions tends to undermine appeals to public spirit or 
the public good.’ ibid 4–5. 
470 ibid 5. 
471 ibid. 
472 Gallie (n 49) 169. 
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• An achievement subject to change over time: ‘accredited achievement must be of a 
kind that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing 
circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in 
advance.’473 
 
The public interest, when used in data protection, is indeed an appraisive concept, 
intended to signify a valued achievement pursued by the data controller e.g. processing 
data on behalf of public health or social protection.  
 
The value or achievement associated with the public interest in data protection is 
internally complex given the contextual nature of the concept and vast subject matter it 
can represent – any innumerable types of data processing as well as the protection of 
informational privacy. This complexity is particularly difficult to grapple with in making 
legal decisions given the demands of the Rule of Law in terms of 1) generality; 2) public 
accessibility; 3) prospective quality; 4) intelligibility; 5) consistency; 6) practicability; 7) 
stability and 8) congruency between rules and their administration.474 As it stands, the 
public interest concept, as used in the conditions for processing, fails on all these 
counts. 
 
The public interest’s various component features remain in dispute, with rival conceptions 
revolving around the following questions: In whose interest? What public or publics are 
relevant? How do we ensure those interests are representative of the ‘public’ and not 
of the self-interest of the decision-makers? At least three theories claim to define the 
core features of the public interest and offer the ‘true’ meaning of the concept, yet no 
single theory dominates in data protection.475  
 
Finally, understandings of the public interest are necessarily contextual matters, subject 
to change over time and dependent upon the relevant public(s) in question.476  
                                                
473 ibid 171–172 (emphasis added).  
474 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised Edition, YUP) 39. 
475 This would include preponderance theories, common interest theories and unitary theories of the 
public interest, examined in Section 4 below. 
476 Fifth and sixth elements were convincingly disregarded by Waldron as unnecessary to maintain the 
essential contestability of a concept, these were: (5) the previous existence of an exemplar of the 
concept and (6) awareness by those who use the concept, of its essential contestability. Gallie (n 49) 
 




The essential contestability of the public interest477 undoubtedly presents difficulties in 
making justifiable legal decisions. The ambiguity surrounding the public interest 
challenges the legal agenda, which presumes and relies upon facts being ‘knowable’ and 
amenable to making concrete, legal decisions. Furthermore, legal decisions justified in 
the public interest are likely to be attacked not only because of the ambiguity of the 
concept, but because of how such decisions are arrived at – suspicion of self-interest 
being masked as ‘the public interest’. Nevertheless, it is in fact this ‘contestation 
between rival conceptions [that] deepens and enriches our sense of what is at stake in 
a given area of value.’478 The uncertainty that surrounds the public interest and that 
which makes it problematic in the data protection context invites a level of dialogue 
that is necessary to affect a ‘marked raising of the level of quality of arguments in the 
disputes of the contestant parties.’479  
 
Problematically, such dialogue has not been happening within the data protection 
context, a point which will be addressed in Chapter 6 when recommendations are made 
for improving current practices around public engagement. Furthermore, while 
legitimate decision making procedures are clearly required to decide in matters of 
conflict between the use of personal data and the protection informational privacy, this 
must be based upon some understanding of the range of circumstances in which 
processing is justifiable ‘in the public interest’. This requires an understanding of what 
the public interest means on a conceptual level and thus what criteria can be used to 
assess the public interest in processing to determine when processing is justifiable in a 
normative sense: When is processing justified in the public interest despite any conflicts 
with the public (and private) interests in protecting informational privacy and any other 
interests opposed to processing?  
 
                                                
171–172; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?’ (2002) 
21 Law and Philosophy 137, 158–160. 
477 Also considered by: Mansbridge (n 49). 
478 Waldron (n 476) 162. 
479 Gallie (n 49) 193. 
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In the section below I consider how the public interest concept is currently understood 
in the law revealing the conceptual gaps that must be filled to achieve an improved 
understanding and more legitimate deployment of the public interest in data 
protection.  
3. Legal Understandings of the Public Interest  
Currently in data protection law, to determine whether a given form of processing is 
justifiable in the public interest, one would need to take account of: 
 
• The safeguarding requirements of the public interest conditions: that the 
processing is ‘necessary’ and related to a function of a ‘public nature’; 480 
• The ‘list’ of public interests provided under the DPD and DPA 1998 as to the 
processing of sensitive personal data.481  
 
While considering whether the processing of personal data is ‘necessary’ or sufficiently 
of a ‘public nature’ are far from straightforward tasks, there are simply no criteria for 
determining what types of processing are ‘in the public interest’. What processing 
purposes are ‘public’ enough and what ‘interests’ are encapsulated by the public interest 
provisions?  
 
As examined in Chapter 3, the DPD provides a legal justification for the processing of 
personal and ‘special categories’ of personal data based on the public interest.482 The 
DPD provides more explicit detail (in the Recitals) as to what types of processing may 
be justified based on the public interest when processing special categories of personal 
data (sensitive data in the UK), which analysis of the travaux revealed, also applies to 
ordinary personal data483: 
                                                
480 Which has been interpreted in the UK in line with the meaning of ‘necessary’ in context of Article 8 
ECHR jurisprudence. For example: Daly (n 85) [26]-[27]; Ellis (n 85) [1], [27]-[29]; Stone (n 85) [60] 
(Davis J); Corporate Officer (n 85) [59]. 
481 DPD, Recitals 34-36. 
482 DPD, Article 7(e) provides legal justification for processing personal data where the ‘…processing 
is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed’. As to sensitive 
personal data, the DPD Article 8(4), when read in conjunction with the associated Recitals 32, 34-36, 
provides more explicit grounds of ‘important’ public interest which would justify the processing of 
special categories of personal data (‘sensitive data’ under the DPA 1998).  
483 ‘Extract from the Draft Summary Record of the 1628th meeting of the Permanent Representatives 
Committee Part 1 held in Brussels on 14 November 1994’ 10957/94, 9: ‘The Council and the 
Commission note that the elements set out in recital 17a of the Directive, which are intended in 
 




Whereas Member States must also be authorized, when justified by grounds of 
important public interest, to derogate from the prohibition on processing 
sensitive categories of data where important reasons of public interest so justify 
in areas such as public health and social protection - especially in order to ensure the 
quality and cost-effectiveness of the procedures used for settling claims for 
benefits and services in the health insurance system - scientific research and 
government statistics; whereas it is incumbent on them, however, to provide 
specific and suitable safeguards so as to protect the fundamental rights and the 
privacy of individuals.484 
 
This ‘list’ of potential public interest uses also includes: 
 
Whereas, moreover, the processing of personal data by official authorities for 
achieving aims, laid down in constitutional law or international public law, of officially 
recognized religious associations is carried out on important grounds of public 
interest;485 
 
Whereas, in the course of electoral activities, the operation of the democratic 
system requires in certain Member States that political parties compile data on 
people’s political opinion, the processing of such data may be permitted for reasons 
of important public interest, provided that appropriate safeguards are 
established.486 
 
Therefore, the DPD presents a descriptive understanding of the public interest 
processing, meaning the public interest is defined only by reference to the following 
examples:  
 
• public health; 
• social protection; 
• scientific research; 
• government statistics; 
• membership records of officially recognised religious organisations; and 
• electoral activities. 
 
                                                
particular to clarify the concept of public interest in Articles 7 and 8 of the Directive, derive from the 
purpose of the latter and thus form an integral part of this legal act; it follows that those elements are 
to be taken into consideration by the Member States when they adopt the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions required to comply with the Directive.’ This refers to what eventually 
became Recital 34 of the DPD. See Chapter 3 Section 2.7.  
484 DPD, Recital 34 (emphasis added).  
485 ibid, Recital 35 (emphasis added). 
486 ibid, Recital 36 (emphasis added). 
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Crucially, as revealed in Chapter 3, no logical explanation is provided as to the 
examples’ specific relationship to the public interest.487 Investigation of the travaux 
illustrates the political agendas driving certain forms of processing to be considered 
‘exempt’ from the full force of the Directive on grounds of public interest.488 There 
were significant lobbying efforts made to include research and statistics into this broad 
category but no guidance is provided as to how, in specific cases, the processing of 
data for research or statistics could be assessed in terms of the public interest; rather, 
it seems that it was generally and uncritically assumed that such activities were ‘clearly 
vital’ to the public interest.489  
 
Upon implementing the DPD into national data protection laws, Member States such 
as the UK have sought to fill these gaps on the public interest by adopting European 
jurisprudential principles related to cases engaging Article 8 of the ECHR. However, 
Article 8 is only relevant when an individual’s Article 8 rights are at issue, which is not 
necessarily true in all data protection disputes. Indeed, data protection law offers a 
discrete right to protect an individual’s personal data, which is separate from (although 
potentially overlapping with) that same person’s right to private and family life under 
Article 8 of the ECHR.490 Nevertheless, Article 8 provides its own ‘list’ of public 
interest examples, which are relevant to examine and expand our understanding of the 
public interest at work where there is overlap between data protection law and the 
ECHR.  
 
                                                
487 See Chapter 3 Section 2.6. 
488 For example, with the lobbying efforts to exempt the processing of personal data for research by 
the UK, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. See Chapter 3 Section 
2.6.1 - 2.6.1.C. 
489 For example, in regards to the processing of personal data for statistical purposes, the German 
Presidency of the Council of the EU provided ‘Processing undertaken for the purpose of compiling 
statistics in the public interest - an exercise in which data subjects are obliged to take part - within the 
framework of programmes being implemented by the national statistical offices is obviously regarded as a 
task in the public interest.’ Whereas the justification of processing data for research purposes is based on 
the assumption that such research is of ‘major importance to society as a whole.’ ‘Working Document, 
from Presidency, concerning statistics/scientific research problems, 20 July 1994’ 8525/94, 3 
(emphasis added). 
490 As I have considered elsewhere: Black and Stevens (n 11) 108–109.  
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3.1 The public interest under Article 8 of the ECHR 
Given the overlap between notions of data protection and the right to respect for 
private life conferred by Article 8 of the ECHR, Member States have deferred to the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and its interpretation of key terms which 
apply in both legal contexts.491 The ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 provides other 
potential meanings of the public interest concept in the context of data processing and 
has strongly influenced the UK’s interpretation of terms within the DPA 1998, notably 
the meaning of ‘necessary’ within the conditions for processing and its relationship 
with the principle of proportionality.492 The analysis below considers the ‘list’ of public 
interests which may be considered ‘legitimate’ interferences with an individual’s Article 
8 rights and the associated procedure for assessing this in each case. 
3.1.1 The public interests added by Article 8 
At the outset, it is important to note that the exact term ‘the public interest’ is not used 
in Article 8 of the ECHR. Rather, ‘legitimate purposes’ and ‘pressing social need’ are 
used. However, the term ‘public interest’ is used synonymously by the ECtHR in cases 
determining Article 8 issues, for example in LH v Latvia. 493  Furthermore, it is 
contended here that the text of Article 8 can reasonably be read to encompass the 
concept of ‘the public interest’ (or some other analogous concept) with for all practical 
purposes, the same meaning in data protection.  
 
Article 8(2) sets forth a framework for deciding situations of conflict between wider, 
collective interests, served by a Member State and the protection of an individual’s 
right to a private and family life.494 Article 8 provides that an individual’s right to private 
and family life are not to be interfered with by a Member State unless it is: 
                                                
491 For example, in the UK: Daly (n 85) [26]-[27]; Ellis (n 85) [1], [27]-[29]; Stone (n 85) [60]; Corporate 
Officer (n 85) [59]; Catt (n 85) [6]; AB (n 85).  
492 See Chapter 3 Section 3.1.1. 
493 Where the Republic of Latvia justifies their interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights to 
protect public health: as a ‘provider of health care services, “with the aim of protecting public 
interests, is also entitled to request the assessment of the quality of medical care” in order that, should 
any irregularities be found, they might be eliminated and their recurrence with respect to other patients 
avoided in the future.’ LH v Latvia App No 52019/07 (ECtHR, 29 July 2014), paras 34, 52. 
494 This view is supported by: McHarg (n 28); Bart van der Sloot, ‘How to Assess Privacy Violations in 
the Age of Big Data? Analysing the Three Different Tests Developed by the ECtHR and Adding for a 
Fourth One’ [2015] Information & Communications Technology Law 1. 
 




…in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.495 
 
Here, we see at least two examples of the public interest which overlap with those 
provided in the DPD: public health and social protection (listed in Article 8 as ‘the 
protection of health’, whereby ‘social protection’ from the DPD could be read into the 
provision for ‘national security’, ‘public safety’, ‘prevention of disorder or crime’, or 
‘the protection of morals’). Article 8’s more detailed description of social protection 
indicates more broadly the types of processing that could be justifiably encompassed 
within the context of data protection law. Given the non-exhaustive nature of the 
examples of public interest processing provided in the DPD,496 it can only be assumed 
that a valid meaning of the public interest (or analogous concept) in the human rights 
context is also valid under the DPD, where informational privacy is at stake (considering 
Member State’s obligations under the ECHR vis-à-vis implementation of their national 
data protection legislation). Therefore from Article 8, we add to the ‘list’ of public 
interests introduced in above, the processing of data which serves the following 
purposes: 
 
1. National security;  
2. Public safety; 
3. Economic wellbeing of a Member State; 
4. Prevention of disorder or crime; 
5. Protection of health or morals; and 
6. Protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
While Article 8 uses broader language to describe these public interests, the examples 
provided are only descriptive and do not tell us how to assess the public interest of 
each case. Under the DPA 1998, the fact that processing ordinary personal data is ‘in 
                                                
495 ECHR, Article 8(2) (emphasis added). 
496 As discussed in Chapter 3 Section 2.6.1.C and 2.7, the final drafting of Recital 34 of the DPD was 
framed as an explanatory device to guide Member State’s understanding of the public interest 
provisions and to provide examples for this purpose. The examples of processing in Recital 34 were not 
intended to be exhaustive. ‘Note, from Presidency, 14 April 1994, for Working Party on Economic 
Questions (Data Protection)’ 6316/94, 3; ‘Extract from the Draft Summary Record of the 1628th 
meeting of the Permanent Representatives Committee Part 1 held in Brussels on 14 November 1994’ 
10957/94, 9. 
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the public interest’, is not in itself enough to justify that processing, as it must also be 
necessary and related to a function of a public nature. Similarly, under Article 8, the 
undertaking of an activity from the list above does not in itself justify an interference 
with an individual’s rights; the Member State must also demonstrate that their actions 
are ‘[In] accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society.’  
 
On the face of Article 8, we are left in the same position as under data protection law: 
without any means for going beyond mere description or procedure to understand how 
to assess and apply the public interest concept in each case. However, Article 8 is the 
subject to a wide body of case law, which has been used in the UK to interpret key 
terms within the public interest conditions of the DPA 1998. It is instructive to now 
examine the extent to which the European case law interpreting Article 8 can be used 
to develop a conceptual understanding of the public interest in data protection law.  
 
3.1.2 The procedure of assessing the public interest in Article 8  
In the context of Article 8, the validity of a Member State’s claim that their interference 
with an individual’s rights is justifiable is assessed in terms of the sufficiency of 
procedural guarantees provided to the person. The public interest claim is represented 
by ‘interferences’ by the State in their pursuit of achieving a ‘legitimate aim’. For a 
Member State to not be considered in breach of their obligations under Article 8, any 
interference ‘must be in accordance with the law and deemed necessary in a democratic 
society’. These requirements correspond easily with the data protection context which 
requires any form of processing (without consent) to be necessary and lawful, requiring 
general legal compliance but also adherence to a specific legal basis for processing, as 
provided in Articles 7 and 8 of the DPD, for personal and ‘special categories’ of 
personal data respectively.497  
 
However an important distinction is that the public interest provisions under data 
protection law are ‘positive’ in that they support a data controller’s processing in an 
action-promoting sense. In contrast, Article 8 cannot be said to support a Member 
                                                
497 DPD, Articles 7-8, transposed in the DPA 1998, Schs 2 and 3. 
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State’s interference with an individual’s rights; rather Article 8 prohibits such 
interferences unless they abide by the conditions in which they would be defensible: 
‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as…’.498 Under data protection law, the processing of personal data is not a de facto 
interference or violation of an individual’s rights unless it is e.g. unlawful (undertaken 
without a legal basis), is otherwise unfair or in breach of one of the other data 
protection principles. Thus the threshold for substantiating processing based on the 
public interest would be markedly different than that for substantiating a de facto 
interference with an individual’s human rights.  
 
Nevertheless, the UK has adopted the ECtHR’s interpretation of key terms within the 
DPA 1998’s public interest conditions (i.e. ‘necessary’), making the case law of Article 
8 a relevant area to examine. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an 
in-depth examination of Article 8 jurisprudence, what is of relevance to the aims of 
this thesis are the two following areas: 1) how the ECtHR has assessed the ‘legitimacy’ 
or ‘public interest’ of a Member State’s actions and 2) how it has assessed the ‘necessity’ 
of that action in proportion to the public interest aim sought. These two aspects of Article 
8 jurisprudence will be examined in depth below. 
 
3.1.2.A The ECtHR’s assessment of the public interest 
Once the ECtHR has established that a Member State’s actions have interfered with 
an individual’s Article 8 rights,499 the Court considers whether their actions were ‘in 
accordance with the law’. The ECtHR would next consider whether a Member State’s 
actions were in pursuit of a ‘legitimate aim’ or in other words, whether they served a 
legitimate public interest. This consideration receives a relatively light touch 
assessment, which I argue is because the relative ‘public interest’ of a Member State’s 
claim is restricted to the defined set of circumstances prescribed by Article 8(2). Rather 
than engage in broad and conceptual considerations of what ‘legitimate aim’ can or 
                                                
498 ECHR, Article 8(2) (emphasis added). 
499 Which is a relatively low threshold to meet in the context of Article 8. The mere storage of personal 
data, regardless of whether and how data are later used, is considered enough to engage an individual’s 
Article 8 rights. Leander v Sweden (1987) Series A no 116, para 48, reconfirmed in S and Marper v The 
United Kingdom App nos 30562/04 and 30566/04 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008), para 69. 
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cannot mean in the context of Article 8, the Court merely confirms that a Member 
State’s actions fall within the list of public interests under Article 8. For example, in S 
and Marper v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR provided that:  
 
The Court agrees with the Government that the retention of fingerprint and 
DNA information pursues the legitimate purpose of the detection and, 
therefore, prevention of crime. While the original taking of this information 
pursues the aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of which 
he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader purpose of assisting in 
the identification of future offenders.500 
 
Here the ECtHR connects the legitimate aim sought by the UK to the examples of 
public interest provided under Article 8(2), namely the prevention of crime. This 
suggests a strict interpretation of the public interest under Article 8(2); that the 
legitimate aim sought by a Member State must fall within the discrete categories 
enumerated. Indeed, in the case of Funke v France, the ECtHR provided that the public 
interest ‘exceptions’ provided in Article 8(2) had to be interpreted narrowly. 501 
 
This approach would contrast with the public interest examples provided in data 
protection law, which as revealed in Chapter 3, were intended to be non-exhaustive. 
Thus, in Article 8 it seems that the substantive meaning of the public interest is 
specifically confined to the list of examples provided in Article 8(2). As indicated 
above, this is appropriate for the aims of the ECHR which focuses on protecting 
individuals from arbitrary interferences from Member State action. Nevertheless, 
Member States’ actions are not justifiable solely on the basis that they serve the public 
interest. Rather, the Court intensely scrutinises the justifiability of a Member State’s 
public interest claim in terms of whether their actions are lawful and necessary. Thus, 
under Article 8 the public interest is assessed descriptively (in terms of the examples 
given) and through procedure. Although it is my contention that data protection law 
requires a deeper conceptual and substantive understanding of the public interest, 
beyond description and procedure, analysing the operation of procedure under Article 
8 case law can nonetheless reveal insights into the range of circumstances in which the 
public interest can justify action.  
                                                
500 Marper (n 499) para 100. 
501 Funke v France (1993) Series A no 256-A, para 55.  
 




3.1.2.B ‘In accordance with the law’ 
The ECtHR spends far more time analysing whether a Member State’s actions are ‘in 
accordance’ with the law, than in their consideration of the public interest. The Article 
8(2) requirement that an interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’ necessitates 
compliance with all relevant domestic and international obligations, but Member States 
must also demonstrate a specific lawful basis for the interference. However, this 
requirement is not merely about legal compliance or a lawful basis for action – ‘in 
accordance with the law’ requires the assessment of several related considerations. 
 
• Are there safeguards provided in the law to prevent arbitrary interferences by 
the State?502 
 
• Is the law accessible to those who would be affected by it?503 
 
• Is the law sufficiently clear with predictable consequences for individuals?504 
 
The legality requirement is considered with varying emphasis in each case.505  For 
instance, in Evans v the United Kingdom, the actions of the UK were in furtherance of the 
protection of societal morals and medical ethics, whereby the law itself (the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) was alleged to be in violation of Article 8.506 
In Evans, the legal accordance requirement was intensely scrutinised, with the ECtHR 
finding that the legal certainty afforded by the 1990 Act, and its provisions on consent, 
positively indicated the foreseeability and predictability of the law, consistent with 
Article 8’s requirements.507  
 
Intense scrutiny of this requirement is also observed where the State’s discretion to act 
is considered too broad and not sufficiently precise. Such was the case in LH v Latvia 
                                                
502 Malone v the United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August 1984), para 67: ‘there must be a 
measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities’. 
503 Silver and Others v the United Kingdom (ECtHR, 25 March 1983), para 87: ‘the law must be adequately 
accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate, in the circumstances, of the 
legal rules applicable to a given case’. 
504 Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (1979) Series A no 30, para 49. See McHarg (n 28) 685; van der 
Sloot (n 494) 4.  
505 McHarg (n 28) 685–686. 
506 Evans v the United Kingdom App no 6339/05 (ECtHR, 10 April 2007).  
507 ibid para 89. 
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where the ECtHR found imprecision in the law governing a Latvian public authority’s 
ability to process the applicant’s medical data – this was crucial to the reasoning of the 
decision and ultimately finding a violation of Article 8.508 The legal remit of the public 
authority in question (‘MADEKKI’509) was not clear in terms of what public interest it 
was carrying out in processing the applicant’s personal data; the ECtHR thus found 
the applicable Latvian law without sufficient precision or protection against arbitrary 
interferences by the State.510 The Court emphasised the fundamental importance of 
protecting an individual’s personal (medical) data as ‘It is crucial not only to respect the 
sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve confidence in the medical profession 
and in the health services in general.’511  
 
Therefore it seems where a public interest justification is used to process sensitive 
personal data (especially health data), the ECtHR will more intensely scrutinise the 
precision, foreseeability and the provision of safeguards in the law; the fact that data 
are kept safe and confidential is not likely to be enough.512 Following the reasoning 
employed by the ECtHR in LH v Latvia, it would be critical to substantiate how data 
processing will specifically achieve the public interest aim relied upon (that data 
collected were potentially decisive, relevant or important to achieving that aim) – not 
dissimilar to considerations of the necessity of action.513 As this is one of the few cases 
that involve both Article 8 and data protection issues, as well as specific consideration 
of the public interest, the approach taken in LH v Latvia is influential in sketching an 
overview of the requirement ‘in accordance with the law’ and its potential role in 
developing a new approach to determining what the public interest means in data 
protection.  
 
                                                
508 Latvia (n 493) paras 47-60. 
509 ibid. ‘MADEKKI’ being the public authority charged with monitoring the quality of medical care 
provision in Latvia. 
510 ibid paras 52, 59. 
511 ibid para 56.  
512 ibid para 58. 
513 ibid. Although the UKSC in The Christian Institute case held that as to a data sharing provision 
implicating a Scottish public authority, the use of data must not be merely objectively relevant but be 
‘significant’ to the public interest aim sought. The Christian Institute (n 403) [56]. 
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3.1.2.C ‘Necessary in a democratic society’ 
Once the legitimacy and lawfulness of a Member State’s actions are established, the 
ECtHR assesses the necessity of action. Within the context of Article 8, and the ECHR 
generally, necessity implies:  
 
[A] pressing social need; in particular, the measure employed must be 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In addition, the scope of the 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities will depend not only 
on the nature of the aim of the restriction but also on the nature of the right 
involved.514 
 
There are varying degrees of intensity with which the Court applies the ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ test. As indicated previously, the ECtHR’s interpretation of 
‘necessary’ is of importance for the data protection context in the UK, as courts have 
adopted this approach when interpreting the DPA 1998. 515  The relative intensity 
applied to assessing the necessity of State action corresponds to the margin of 
appreciation afforded to States in a particular area such as security, economic welfare 
or morality. Generally, Member States are afforded a margin of appreciation to engage 
in ‘the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion 
of “necessity” in this context.’ 516  The ECtHR’s assessment of ‘necessity’ is best 




A wide margin of appreciation is afforded to States in cases involving national security 
which can correspond to a laxer interpretation of necessity (as compared with cases 
involving other subject matter, such as economy security).517 The wide margin of 
appreciation granted in matters of national security can be understood in the sense that 
individuals have no legitimate right to threaten a Member State’s national security, such 
                                                
514 Gillow (n 386) para 55 as originally developed in Handyside (n 386) paras 48-49 (emphasis added). 
515 For example: Daly (n 85) [26]-[27]; Ellis (n 85) [1], [27]-[29]; Stone (n 85) [60]; Corporate Officer (n 85) 
[59]; Catt (n 85) [6]; AB (n 85). 
516 Handyside (n 386) para 48. 
517 For example: Klass and Others versus Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR, 6 September 1978); Leander 
(n 499) paras 59, 67; Dalea v France App no 58243/00 (ECtHR, 1 July 2008); Kennedy v The United 
Kingdom App no 26839/05 (ECtHR, 18 May 2010); Uzun v Germany App no 35623/05 (ECtHR, 2 
September 2010). Similar analysis by van der Sloot (n 494) 13–14. 
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as through criminal activity. Where the crimes committed by an individual are 
particularly serious, the necessity of the State’s interference plays a minimised role in 
the reasoning of the ECtHR decision, with more intense focus on the legality of action 
and proportionality; necessity is easier to justify where threats to the State and the 
public are more severe.518 However, this wide margin of appreciation can be observed 
even in cases where the seriousness of the security threat posed is significantly less. In 
Leander v Sweden the Court accepted: 
 
that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent State in assessing 
the pressing social need in the present case, and in choosing the means for 
achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.519  
 
The margin of appreciation was wide enough to justify the maintenance and use of a 
secret police-register to assess the applicant’s suitability for employment in a position 
implicating apparent issues of national security; however it should be noted that his 
employment was for a temporary post in a museum merely adjacent to a secured naval 
base.520 The decision in Leander suggests a level of deference to the Member State’s 
own assessment of what is and is not a relatively ‘important’ threat to national security.  
 
However, this supposed pattern of deference to matters of national security is called 
into question when in other cases the margin of appreciation appears to be narrowed, 
and necessity interpreted more strictly – even in light of what may be considered 
objectively ‘serious’ threats to national security, such as terrorism.521 Stricter scrutiny 
of State claims to protect national security is also identified in cases where an 
unacceptable level of discretion is afforded to the State – here the focus is usually not 
on ‘necessity’ but the lack of precision in a Member State’s law (and therefore whether 
the interference was ‘in accordance with the law’).522 These observations suggest that 
even within a particular category of public interest justifications, such as ‘national 
                                                
518 For example, in Uzun v Germany the applicants were alleged to have taken part in a series of bomb 
attacks. Uzun (n 517). Also: Kennedy (n 517). 
519 Leander (n 499) paras 59, 67. 
520 ibid paras 10, 21. 
521 For example: Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden App no 62332/00 (ECtHR, 6 June 2006); Nada v 
Switzerland App no 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012). 
522 For example: Rotaru v Romania App no 28341/95 (ECtHR, 4 May 2000); Liberty and Others v The 
United Kingdom App no 58243/00 (ECtHR, 1 July 2008). 
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security’, the ECtHR takes a very fact-sensitive and ad hoc approach to their decision-
making. In the words of van der Sloot, the Court ‘rather seems to use a rule of thumb’ 
test for assessing necessity when it involves national security,523 and thus the only 
pattern that can be deduced is the lack of any pattern at all. 
 
Morality 
The second category of ‘public interest’ cases examined involve issues of morality 
whereby a State’s interference may impact upon extremely intimate aspects of 
individuals’ lives, notably their sexuality.524 Many historically prominent Article 8 cases 
involved the criminalisation of homosexual activity by Member State legislation.525 In 
such cases, the ECtHR has adopted reasoning on the interpretation of ‘necessity’ from 
freedom of expression cases under Article 10 of the ECHR, which also involve issues 
of sexuality and morality.526 When confronted with issues of sexuality, the ECtHR has 
shown a level of deference to Member States, affording a generally wide margin of 
appreciation because the ‘requirements of morals varies from time to time and from 
place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching 
evolution of opinions on the subject.’527 (There is an interesting parallel here with the 
contextual nature of the public interest concept and inability to ‘pin it down’ and 
predefine it in any particular context, a point to be considered in more depth in Section 
4.) In this sense, States have been considered better placed to assess and act upon the 
moral sentiment of their society: 
 
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their 
countries… [and] to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements 
as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet 
them.528  
 
                                                
523 van der Sloot (n 494) 14. 
524 Evans v the United Kingdom (n 506) paras 59-60, 69; SH and Others v Austria App no 57813/00 
(ECtHR 3 November 2011), paras 113-118. 
525 Dudgeon v The United Kingdom App no 7525/26 (ECtHR, 22 October 1981); Norris v Ireland Series A 
no 142 (ECtHR, 26 October 1988); Modinos v Cyprus Series A no 259 (ECtHR, 22 April 1993). 
526 From Handyside (n 386) para 48. But also: Mu ̈ller And Others v Switzerland Series A no 133 (ECtHR, 
24 May 1988) paras 31-37. 
527 Handyside (n 386) para 48. 
528 Handyside (n 386) para 48 (emphasis added). Similarly, Evans v United Kingdom (n 506) para 77. 
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Nevertheless the ECtHR has insisted upon their role in supervising this discretion 
afforded to Member States not least because of the potential impact upon the most 
intimate of areas in individuals’ lives, such that ‘there must exist particularly serious 
reasons before interferences on the part of the public authorities can be legitimate for 
the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8.’529 In Dudgeon v The United Kingdom, while the 
ECtHR does acknowledge the generally wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
Member States in this area, the moral sentiment on homosexuality in Northern Ireland 
was not dispositive of a determination of necessity.530 The ECtHR took specific account 
of the changing tide of European sentiment on homosexuality and generally increased 
tolerance,531 which was critical to their finding of a violation of Article 8.  
 
Ultimately, as with cases involving national security, no bright line rules can be 
formulated. While European consensus on a particular issue may at times result in 
stricter scrutiny of necessity (e.g. as in Dudgeon), in other cases (involving freedom of 
expression) the Court gives more weight to local sentiment despite wider (and 
potentially divergent) transnational/national views on a topic.532 This inconsistent body 
of case law has invited criticisms of a ‘missed opportunity’ for the ECtHR to adopt a 
more robust standard of protection of rights.533 The ad hoc approach taken may be an 
inherently ‘flimsy’ basis for protection of Article 8 as it applies to individuals’ sexuality, 
but for present purposes the point is that this analysis underlines the unsystematic way 
the Court adjudicates rights versus public interests.534  
 
The implications of the ECtHR approach for the concept of the public interest more 
generally indicates their contextually based understanding of the ‘public’ in the ‘public 
interest’, as distinct from ordinary usage which is associated with aggregate notions of 
the concept, including what is ‘good for everyone’ and ‘good for most’.535 The attention 
                                                
529 Dudgeon (n 525) para 52. 
530 ibid para 58. 
531 ibid para 60. 
532 These Article 10 cases are relevant as the ECtHR has adapted such reasoning into Article 8 
decisions involving issues of morality. Handyside (n 386) paras 54-57; Mu ̈ller (n 525) para 40. 
533 Steven Greer, ‘The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(Council of Europe 1997) 25–29 <http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-
EN-HRFILES-15(1997).pdf>; McHarg (n 28) 691. 
534 McHarg (n 28) 691. 
535 Mansbridge (n 49) 9. 
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paid to the multiplicity of ‘publics’ and stakeholders in making public interest 
determinations is indeed something to be regarded for developing a new understanding 
of the public interest concept in data protection. 
 
Economic well-being 
A similarly unsystematic approach is found in the ECtHR’s evaluation of public 
interest justifications of an economic nature. Within this body of case law, the Court took 
an extremely narrow approach to the test of necessity, in the first string of cases to 
consider the issue. First, in Funke v France, the ECtHR indicated that the public interest 
‘exceptions’ under Article 8(2) were to be interpreted narrowly. The Court required that 
a convincing case be established to justify the need for the interference in question, 
which in Funke was the ‘need’ to prevent capital outflows and tax evasion for the overall 
well-being of France’s economy.536 The Court’s reasoning in Funke, and the related 
cases Crémieux and Miailhe, can be characterised by a ‘priority to rights’ approach, which 
results in stricter scrutiny of necessity. 537 These cases are in stark contrast to the much 
wider margin of appreciation given to State’s economic interests in later cases such as 
MS v Sweden.538  
 
In MS v Sweden, although the interference involved the applicant’s sensitive personal 
data, data regarding previous abortions, the reasons for disclosure were considered 
relevant and sufficient to evaluating her application for compensation due to industrial 
injury (and thus necessary).539  The stance taken in this case suggests a rather low 
threshold for States to justify action in pursuit of the economic well-being of a country, 
as opposed to the stricter standard imposed in cases such as Funke, Crémieux and 
Miailhe.  
 
                                                
536 Funke (n 501) para 55. This stricter line of reasoning was also adopted in the decisions of: Cre ́mieux 
v France (1993) Series A no 256-B, para 38; Miailhe v France (1993) Series A no 256-C, para 36.  
537 Greer (n 533) 23. 
538 For example, MS v Sweden (ECtHR 27 August 1997), para 38; Kennedy (n 517) para 155. Van der 
Sloot contends that the ECtHR generally affords a wide margin of appreciation in cases involving 
economic well-being. van der Sloot (n 494) 16–17.  
539 MS (n 538) para 44. 
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This divergence in the interpretation of necessity merely reflects the similarly varied 
approach taken to the concept within the UK.540 However, even if we are unable to 
extract clear patterns of a definitive standard for necessity from Article 8 jurisprudence, 
it clearly remains a crucial consideration where the rights of individuals are 
compromised. ‘Necessary’ is already consecrated within data protection law. The only 
way a data controller can lawfully process personal data, outside of obtaining an 
individual’s consent, is if the processing is necessary. What is left unresolved, and cannot 
be determined from Article 8 jurisprudence, is precisely what standard of necessity is 
required if we are to deploy the concept in acknowledgement of both the public interest 
in protecting informational privacy and using personal data. 
 
3.1.2.D Summary of the ECtHR approach to the public interest   
Although the substantive meaning of the public interest in Article 8 is confined to the 
descriptive examples provided, the case law reveals crucial insights into the relationship 
between the public interest and 1) the relevant public(s) and 2) related procedural 
principles such as legality, necessity and proportionality. Even if the examination of 
Article 8 jurisprudence revealed an unsystematic approach to the public interest, the 
cases shed light on the reasonable range of circumstances where processing may be 
justified in the public interest. 
 
From the analysis of cases involving issues of morality, the ECtHR demonstrated an 
understanding of the public, in the ‘public interest’, in a more dynamic way than 
conventional understandings of the term. In Dudgeon, the ECtHR displayed an 
understanding of the public interest which was beyond the mere majority interest, 
when it overrode the wide margin of appreciation afforded to Member States, the 
majority ‘interest’ in the UK that may be in favour of criminalising homosexuality, and 
ruled based on the wider, European sentiment and tolerance.541 More generally, if we 
consider the Court’s flexible (albeit unsystematic) approach to Article 8 cases, this 
reveals the extent to which the public interest, as a concept, must always be examined 
                                                
540  Ministry of Justice (n 417) 13; Black and Stevens (n 11) 103–108; ICO, ‘When Is Processing 
Necessary?’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/conditions-for-
processing/>. 
541 Dudgeon (n 525) para 60. 
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in context. The Court’s treatment of morality, reveals the importance of context when 
assessing the public interest: ‘requirements of morals varies from time to time and from 
place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching 
evolution of opinions on the subject.’542 
 
As to procedure, we can extract from Article 8 case law the importance of legality, 
necessity and proportionality when deciding matters involving conflicts between public and 
individual interests (and arguably conflicts with other public interests). While the case 
analysis above considered the ECtHR’s specific interpretation of ‘in accordance with 
the law’ and ‘necessity’ in line with the requirements of Article 8, the principle of 
proportionality can be discerned from the seemingly ad hoc and disparate approach 
taken by the ECtHR to different Article 8 cases. 
 
Consider McHarg’s explanation of the disparity in the ECtHR’s approach to 
interpreting necessity. According to McHarg, the Court decides Article 8 cases either 
according to a ‘priority to rights’ approach or a ‘priority to the public interest’ approach; 
and I would contend that this approach is guided by the underlying principle of 
proportionality. Under the former approach, the Court is primarily concerned with the 
effect of the interference on a right. In such cases the margin of appreciation is narrowed and 
the necessity test is more strictly applied.543 In such cases the Court finds the intrusion 
upon the individual greater than the public interest aim served and therefore the 
Member State’s actions are disproportionate (and not necessary). Under the latter 
approach, the ECtHR is more concerned with the implications for the exception (the public 
interest being carried out). Here a more purposive analysis is undertaken as to the necessity 
of a State’s interference and a wider margin of appreciation is afforded.544 Again, I 
would argue that proportionality ultimately guides this difference in approach – the 
intrusion upon the individual in such cases may be considered slight or at least 
proportionate and necessary to the achievement of the public interest aim in question.  
                                                
542 Handyside (n 386) para 48. 
543 McHarg (n 28) 688. Seen in cases Dudgeon (n 525); Funke (n 501); Rotaru (n 522); Liberty (n 522). 
544 Seen in cases Leander (n 499); Klass (n 517); Handyside (n 386); Mu ̈ller (n 525).  
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Proportionality has its own distinct meaning in the context of the ECHR and Article 8 
jurisprudence and I acknowledge that there are also differences in how the ECtHR 
interprets proportionality.545 Rather, my point is that proportionality is an underlying 
principle which guides both the application of ‘in accordance with the law’ and 
‘necessity’ and goes some way in explaining why such variance in approach is required, 
aside from the obvious contextual nature of such determinations. 
 
However, we must return to the key question – what can Article 8 jurisprudence offer 
to developing a new understanding of the public interest concept in data protection? 
Principles for guiding procedure? Yes. But the Court’s haphazard consideration of ‘in 
accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is not sufficiently 
precise or predictable. While their approach to balancing individual privacy and the 
public interest is rightly context sensitive, recognising the dangers in ‘fixing’ any 
definition of the public interest, there have indeed been missed opportunities to 
provide more standardised guidance on how to deploy concepts such as necessity and 
legality where there is European consensus on a given issue. Furthermore, the 
procedural understanding and evaluation of the public interest under Article 8 is 
fundamentally flawed for the purposes of data protection because these assessments 
are made on the basis that protecting privacy serves only private, individual interests, and 
does not implicate broader, public interests. This requires a balance to be struck between 
protecting individual privacy on the one hand and the public interest on the other, 
which (wrongly) pegs the two against each other in a zero-sum game of opposition.546  
 
In data protection, to consider the protection of privacy and the ‘public interest’ as 
poles apart, will always place the individual’s interest at a disadvantage unless the harm 
caused to the individual can somehow be shown as carrying at least the same weight as 
the counter public interest at stake.547  The risk is that this ‘balancing’ will, ‘often 
[produce] unconvincing results that serve mainly the interests of whoever does the 
                                                
545 McHarg (n 28) 686–688. 
546 See Chapter 2 Section 3.2.3. Raab (n 168) 1. 
547 Black and Stevens (n 11); van der Sloot (n 494). 
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balancing: typically, those who value privacy less than other desirable qualities’.548 A 
crucial component to developing a new understanding of the public interest in data 
protection is to first and foremost acknowledge the broader public interests, not only 
the private interests, served by protecting an individual’s informational privacy. In this 
sense, this is where the approach to privacy and the public interest taken in regards to 
Article 8 diverges from what is being developed here for data protection. While Article 
8 jurisprudence aids our understanding of procedure and the meaning of certain key 
concepts within the public interest conditions, we remain without a sense of the fuller, 
substantive meaning of the public interest in data protection or a means to normatively 
evaluate when the processing of personal data is justified in the public interest.  
3.1.3 Deficient understandings of the public interest in the law 
The analysis above, in combination with the previous chapters’ examination of data 
protection law, illustrated the lack of a substantive understanding of the public interest 
in either the data protection or human rights context. The DPD, DPA 1998 and Article 
8(2) merely provide an arbitrary and descriptive list of ‘public interests’. These 
examples are provided without any criteria that can be used to explain what 
characterises a type of processing549 as ‘in the public interest’ and others not.  
 
Article 8 jurisprudence tells us that public interest determinations are context sensitive 
and that the public interest is not always equivalent to what is in the interests of the 
majority; the public interest may lie in the protection of a deeply important but minority 
held interest. This body of case law also reveals important insight into the role of 
procedural principles (legality, necessity, and proportionality) in deciding on matters of 
conflict between public and individual interests. While the UK courts have already 
adopted this approach for interpreting key aspects of the public interest conditions in 
the DPA 1998, it remains that we lack a substantive understanding of what the public 
interest means if a given form of processing does not fall within the list of examples 
provided. Assessing whether processing is in the public interest is a separate 
determination to addressing whether processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. 
                                                
548 Raab (n 168). Also: Solove (n 197) ch 4; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2013) 239–241.  
549 Or Member State ‘action’ in context with Article 8(2) of the ECHR. 
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On this basis, we are left with the unacceptable prospect of future litigation to ‘test’ 
each case of data processing, and each unique set of facts, based on the public interest 
conditions. What role is there for drawing upon legal and political theory to inform a 
new conceptual understanding of the public interest in data protection? 
4. Consulting Theory to Understand the Public Interest 
as a Concept in Data Protection Law 
In this section I will draw upon legal and political theories of the public interest to 
address the conceptual inadequacies identified in the legal framework. Political and 
legal theory reveal the boundaries of the public interest as a concept, which can further 
our substantive understanding from the limited basis offered from the previous legal 
analysis. Although the public interest concept is similarly imbued with an element of 
uncertainty within these disciplines550, the public interest nevertheless maintains an 
important space – in political science, philosophy and theory in particular – as 
demonstrated by the robust history of dialogue and analysis devoted to the concept.551 
This contrasts with the less frequent engagement with the substantive meaning of the 
concept in data protection. Furthermore, the methods used in these disciplines are not 
subject to the same constraints as the ‘Rule of Law’,552 and thus alternative approaches 
are found for determining the substantive content of the public interest in a ‘legitimate’ 
way – legitimate in the sense that where the concept is used, supporting theory and 
explanations are indicative of more than mere compliance with the law; it indicates 
justification in a normative sense. I use these theories to interrogate the public interest 
conditions in data protection law and later use these explanations to derive criteria for 
assessing the public interest in each case. 
 
                                                
550 Sorauf (n 56) 617; Glendon A Schubert, The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept 
(The Free Press 1960) 223–224; Robert Dahl and Robert Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare 
(Second, Transaction Publishers 2000) 503–504. 
551 ‘No deliberation of politics and political theory claims a more venerable heritage than the dialogues 
on the existence, nature, and requirements of the “public interest” or the “common good”’. Bozeman 
(n 59) 15. Both Held and Bozeman provide valuable literature reviews on the study of the public 
interest in political science, theory and philosophy: Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 
203–228; Bozeman (n 59) 187–220. 
552 As understood in terms of Fuller’s internal morality of the law, while recognising the competing 
conceptualisations of ‘Rule of Law’ not least including those proposed by Friedrich von Hayek, Albert 
Dicey and John Rawls. Fuller (n 474) 39.  
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In exploring theories of the public interest, a body of authoritative texts emerge. 
Through the lens of political philosopher Virginia Held’s typology of the public 
interest, the dominant theories on the concept can be set forth within an accessible 
framework for the present analysis.553 The relative strengths and weaknesses of each 
theory will be assessed for its capability to explain the ‘logic’ for including certain public 
interests explicitly in the law, and whether it can provide criteria to assess the public 
interest in processing more generally (especially where processing is unrelated to the 
examples specifically provided in the law). To be clear, my end goal is not to define a 
fixed concept. As indicated in the context of Article 8 jurisprudence, the public interest 
must always be examined in context and this limits the extent to which it can be defined 
in advance. It is only by examining and better understanding the various rival 
conceptions of the public interest that we can approximate the legitimate boundaries 
of the concept in data protection law, and ensure its use is confined to only appropriate 
circumstances.  
 
4.1 A typology of the public interest 
The starting point for our analysis begins with Held’s typology of the public interest, 
where she classifies three main theories, the proponents of which each claim to provide 
the ‘true’ definition and understanding of the concept. These are: 
 
Preponderance theories: 
The public interest is equivalent to the majority of individual interests. It is 
equivalent to what provides the most pleasure and least pain to individuals. 
Although individuals and groups may have valid, conflicting interests, the 
public interest always lies with the preponderance of individual interests.554 
 
Common interest theories: 
The public interest is an interest that all members of the relevant public have 
in common. Individuals may have other justifiable interests, which conflict 
                                                
553 Held is widely recognised for her contribution to the study of the public interest. McHarg (n 28); 
Kadri Simm, ‘The Concepts of Common Good and Public Interest: From Plato to Biobanking’ (2011) 
20 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 554; van der Sloot (n 494).While there are critiques 
offered by Held’s peers, as to her 1) methodology in developing the classification scheme and 2) own 
theory of the public interest and its relation to individual interests, Held’s typology remains valuable to 
the study of the concept. For peer review of Held’s analysis: Barry M Mitnick, ‘A Typology of 
Conceptions of the Public Interest’ (1976) 8 Administration & Society 5. David Braybrooke, ‘Review: 
The Public Interest and Individual Interests. Virginia Held.’ (1972) 69 The Journal of Philosophy 192. 
554 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 42–43, 49–98. 
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with this common interest, but the public interest serves such individuals as 
well; if not in the present, in the long run.555  
 
Unitary theories of the public interest: 
What is in the public interest for the community as a whole, is in the interest 
of the individual. Therefore, if ‘x’ is in the public interest, it cannot also be true 
that ‘x’ is not in the interest of any individual. If individuals interests conflict, 
their interests are invalid, given that the public interest is singular in nature and 
overrides any such conflict. 556 
 
Below, each of these theories will be assessed in terms of its ability to: 
• explain and define the logic behind the existing ‘list’ of public interests provided 
in data protection law; 
• identify public interests which do not fall explicitly within the text of existing 
law; and 
• provide a legitimate procedure for deciding conflicts between two public 
interests, namely the public interest in protecting informational privacy and in 
certain uses of personal data. 
4.1.1 Preponderance theories  
Preponderance theories are most closely associated with aggregative and utilitarian 
conceptions of the public interest which equate the concept with the majority interest – 
the public interest lies with the course of action which delivers the most pleasure and 
least pain. Preponderance theories therefore include the work of Hobbes (the public 
interest arises once a preponderance of individuals’ interests are best served by that 
interest)557, Hume (the public interest lies in that which has utility for a preponderance 
of individuals)558 and Bentham (there is no public; the public interest is merely the sum 
of the interests of its individual members)559. In a cruder but effective illustration, 
Sorauf equates preponderance theories with an exercise in counting noses,560 meaning 
that this conception of the public interest does nothing more than indicate what the 
majority opinion is. This theory therefore translates to a form of utilitarianism whereby 
‘the public interest is equivalent to the greatest good for the greatest number’.561  
 
                                                
555 ibid 44–45, 99–134. 
556 ibid 45–46, 135–162. 
557 Hobbes (n 53). 
558 Hume (n 54). 
559 Bentham (n 55). 
560 Sorauf (n 56) 625. 
561 Bozeman (n 59) 209.  
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Applying the preponderance theory to the context of data protection would mean that 
the categories of public interests provided under the DPD and DPA 1998 were 
included because a preponderance of individuals believed (or were thought by 
decision-makers to have believed) that ‘x’ processing was in their interest. From the 
examination of the travaux to the DPD, we know this not to be true. The types of 
public interest processing enumerated under the DPD were included based on political 
negotiation between representatives of Member States, not because majority consensus 
was found for that type of processing. Where lobbying efforts were made, such as in 
the case of research, 562 it was not in response to an objective finding or a claim that 
such processing was in the interest of a preponderance of individuals. While it could 
be argued that by a population’s election of their Member State’s European Parliament 
representatives, that majority’s opinions are expressed through these elected 
representatives and thus through their lobbying efforts during the drafting process, a 
preponderance theory remains at least an incomplete explanation, given the other 
political factors at work in negotiating and finalising a directive.563  
 
If we accept that the types of processing designated as public interest examples in data 
protection law are not best understood through preponderance theories, what can these 
theories offer for determining whether other types of processing are justified in the 
public interest? It is entirely foreseeable that the views of a ‘preponderance of 
individuals’ might be offered as evidence, by a data controller, of the public interest in 
processing. However, to say that ‘x’ is in the interests of a preponderance of individuals 
means only that ‘x’ is one type of reason why we might find that it is also in the public 
interest1 and does not mean that ‘x’ is necessarily and normatively in (or therefore justified 
by) the public interest. 
                                                
562 From the DPD’s travaux: ‘Note from the UK Delegation to the Health Working Group: 
Implications for Health Research’ (21 September 1994) 9415/94 3-5; ‘Note from Denmark: ‘Research 
related issues’ (12 October 1994) 10934/94, 2-4. 
563 Which involves the Council of the European Union and European Commission; only the views of 
European Parliament could be said to (potentially) implicate the majority opinion of its constituents in 
each Member State. ‘EU Institutions and Other Bodies’ <http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/>. Equally, the same reasoning could be rejected as to the public interest examples in the UK, 
per the DPPSPD 2000. 
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Under this theory ‘x’ is merely an empirical fact and does not provide a method to 
determine whether ‘x’ is in the public interest in a normative sense. If we are to determine 
whether a given ‘x’ is normatively in the public interest, Held asserts that:  
 
we want to know something else than the empirical fact that it is in the interests 
of a preponderance of individuals, although being in the interests of a 
preponderance of individuals may well be among the possible good reasons for 
believing that such an x is in the public interest.564  
 
There are situations where majority opinion is dispositive on an issue, such as in the 
election of political representatives. However, the public interest is logically and 
necessarily distinct from what can be verified through empirical fact. The critical point 
being made here is that although the majority interest is one such factor that can be 
considered important to determining where the public interest lies, it cannot derive any 
normative value on its own – empirical facts do not answer why ‘x’ is or is not in the 
public interest.565 
 
Preponderance theories are also unsuitable for application to the data protection 
context because such theories always favour the majority interest in situations of 
conflict, regardless of good contextual reasons to the contrary. To unpack this, let us 
first clarify what is meant by a ‘preponderance of interest’. According to Held’s 
taxonomy, preponderance theories describe the public interest by reference to ‘…a 
magnitude of some kind, either a degree of force, or a greater amount of sentiment, or 
a stronger level of opinion, or a numerical quantity of utility, or simply, a “higher” 
number.’ 566  By reference to an extreme but illustrative example let us consider 
preponderance in terms of a numerical majority: If ‘x’ research use of data benefits 
only 49.5% of the public in question, this would not be in the public interest, while ‘y’ 
research use of data that benefits 50.5% would. This, one could argue, is prima facie 
absurd and cannot account for any normative difference in this 1% when the qualitative 
difference might be a matter of life or death for the individuals involved. (This is 
notwithstanding the undoubtedly countless issues that one would face if attempting to 
                                                
564 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 84. 
565 As also argued by: ibid. 
566 ibid 49.  
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derive the appropriate methodology to aggregate all the relevant set of individual 
preferences on an issue.) 
 
To answer why this interpretation of the public interest (as the majority) is unsuitable 
for the data protection context we must consider the wider socio-legal context in which 
data protection law operates. Julius Cohen considered the relationship between the 
meaning of the public interest to a community and that community’s basic values (as 
an element of the wider socio-legal context in which the public interest concept derives 
its meaning). 567 Cohen illustrates this by considering how the denial of something to a 
minority group, while in the interests and/or favoured by the majority, can nevertheless 
be counter to that community’s values and thus interpretation of the public interest: 
 
To suggest, for example, that the public interest would not be involved if the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were denied freedom of expression by a statute supported 
by a majority of the population would fly seriously in the face of experience. 
For our community values include not only concern for the majority, but under 
certain circumstances, for the minority as well. Our values have a qualitative as 
well as a quantitative dimension. To put it another way, there is a public interest 
in the private rights of those who elect not to follow the crowd, because it is 
consistent with one of our basic community values.568 
 
Applied to the UK and EU context, relevant community values for data processing 
decisions include those enshrined by human rights law, which in its broadest sense can 
be understood to protect individuals against tyranny by minority groups (dictatorships), 
tyranny by the majority, or mob rule, by giving individuals rights against the 
collective.569  For the public interest conditions to processing to have any internal 
consistency with the other data protection principles (e.g. fairness, data minimisation 
and so forth), or external coherence with human rights legislation, intrusions by the 
collective into the sphere of the individual (via data processing) cannot be defensible 
merely because the numbers weigh more heavily in favour of the ‘public’ which a 
                                                
567 I use the term ‘values’ in its most basic and traditional sense; and although a discussion on ‘values’ as 
a concept is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is pertinent to note Cohen’s interpretation which I would 
adopt for this discussion: ‘They are values held by humans; they concern the relational aspects of man 
in his social capacity; they are shared by humans, and in this sense take on the aspect of common or 
community values.’ Julius Cohen, ‘A Lawman’s View of the Public Interest’ in Carl J Friedrich (ed), 
Nomos V: The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1962) 157. 
568 ibid. 
569 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bloomsbury Academic 2013) 116–119, 432. 
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preponderance theory of the concept would allow. This would be prima facie inconsistent 
with the purpose and values enshrined by both data protection and the overarching 
system of human rights law in the EU. What is needed is not mere head counting, but 
an understanding of the public interest that is both quantitatively and qualitatively 
informed.  
 
Even if only a small number of individuals would benefit from a processing initiative, 
it may still be justifiable ‘in the public interest’. For example, certain types of scientific 
research, such as that involving rare diseases, will only ever directly benefit a specific 
and small portion of the public, not a ‘preponderance’ of individuals if understood as 
a crude majority. It is arguable that such research still embodies what the public interest 
concept means, if quantitative factors are not treated as dispositive on the issue. 
Additionally, a further reason to reject preponderance theories not based on an intuitive 
appeal to fairness to the vital interest of a minority, is a Rawlsian argument of 
enlightened self-interest. According to his view, a distribution of goods (and also risks) 
is fair if we would choose it under a condition of ignorance – that is without knowing 
if we would personally benefit.570 Even this type of second order reasoning about ‘fair 
preferences’ remains precluded by the type of preponderance theory discussed here. 
 
Considering the public interest through the lens of deliberative democracy, Ian Flynn 
provides that ‘deliberative democracy is well placed not just to deliver the public 
interest, but also to identify those exceptional cases where a special interest justifiably 
overrides a public interest.’571 While I am not arguing that informational privacy is a 
‘special interest’, distinct from the ‘public interest’, it is important that any theory of 
public interest is capable of identifying cases where the public interest in protecting 
informational privacy must outweigh the public interest benefits of processing, even if 
the majority opinion sides with the latter. Interpreting the public interest conditions to 
processing according to a preponderance theory would perpetually place the protection 
of informational privacy at a disadvantage when weighed against the public interest as 
representative of a majority that may benefit from a form of data processing. Such 
                                                
570 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 2009) 11, 75, 118. 
571 O’Flynn (n 49) 311. 
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theories cannot account for important nuances, such as the intensity with which an 
interest is held, even if by a minority of individuals – again speaking to the inability to 
derive any normative understanding of the concept. Any theory which equates the 
public interest with calculations ‘…for the aggregation or maximization of interest 
satisfaction are inherently incapable of taking adequate account of consideration of 
justice and of rights’572 which data protection law must capable of doing to remain 
consistent with its own principles and with external community values such as those 
enshrined by human rights legislation.  
 
A new understanding of the public interest in data protection must indeed account for 
the interests of ‘publics’ and whether the preponderance of individuals is for, or against, 
particular uses or methods of using data. There is a need for significantly more public 
dialogue over the constantly evolving uses of personal data by both private and public 
actors. However, empirical facts are not in themselves dispositive of what is or is not 
in the public interest in a normative sense even if increased public dialogue on an issue 
is an important part of the process for determining how a decision based on the public 
interest should be taken.573 The interests of individuals as to any data initiative may 
represent one aspect or vision of the public interest, which should be considered as 
part of the resolution of the relevant spectrum of public (and private) interests at stake. 
A different theory is required to explain and decide on matters of the public interest in 
data protection law even if the preponderance of individuals’ interests is one 
component to consider.  
 
4.1.2 Common interest theories  
Following Held’s typology, the second theory includes common interest theories which 
reason that the public interest lies where interests are unanimously held, ‘…interests 
which all members of a community have in common.’574 Common interest theories 
include Rousseau’s conception of the public interest. This refers to Rousseau’s idea of 
                                                
572 Held, Rights and Goods: Justifying Social Action (n 58) 144. 
573 Richard E Flathman, ‘34. The Public Interest: Descriptive Meaning’, Concepts in Social and Political 
Philosophy (Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc 1973) 531; Bozeman (n 59) 226–235 citing John Dewey, The 
public and its problems (1927).  
574 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 99. 
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‘the general will’ derived from all the ‘pluses’ and ‘minuses’ of individual wills which 
when balanced always give way to the common interest.575 A contemporary account of 
common interest theory is found in Bart van der Sloot’s analysis of Article 8 
jurisprudence. 576 Van der Sloot characterises the ECtHR’s approach to the public 
interest as a ‘common interest’ approach whereby interferences by a Member State are 
justified on the basis that they are ultimately in the interest of all members of a 
society.577 Similarly, Aileen McHarg considers that the ‘list’ of public interests provided 
in Article 8 are ‘pure public interests’ given their ‘exclusively collective nature’ or that 
they ‘benefit the public generally as well as identifiable individuals.’ 578 
 
A well-known account of common interest theory is Brian Barry’s in Political Argument 
(1965), where he defines the public interest as ‘equivalent to “those interests which 
people have in common qua members of the public.”’ 579  Barry understands the 
meaning of ‘public’, for the purposes of determining the common interest, as decisively 
context sensitive:  
 
Instead of speaking in blanket terms about people or groups with common or 
opposed interests, we should speak of people or groups whose interests 
coincide or conflict with respect to the adoption of x rather than y.580  
 
For Barry, ‘We cannot therefore speak of what “the public interest” requires until we 
know the particular context in which the question is being raised.’581 A context sensitive 
approach to understanding the ‘public’ in the public interest is seemingly taken at times 
by the ECtHR, identifying the relevant public more or less broadly depending upon 
the facts of a case.582 For Barry, a starting point for determining the common interest 
would be to determine which people, groups or public is involved in the adoption of a 
particular course of action; who supports ‘x’ rather than ‘y’?  
 
                                                
575 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On The Social Contract (Drew Silver ed, GDH Cole tr, Dover Publications, 
Inc 2003) 17–18. 
576 van der Sloot (n 494) 24. 
577 ibid. 
578 McHarg (n 28). 
579 Barry (n 57) 190 (emphasis added). 
580 ibid 196. 
581 ibid 192 (emphasis added).  
582 Handyside (n 386) paras 54-57; Mu ̈ller (n 525) para 40. 
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As to the commonality requirement of this theory, Barry concedes the impossibility of 
‘true’ unanimity on any given interest,583 and ‘overcomes’ this by suggesting (along 
similar lines to Rousseau) the idea of common net interests. Common net interests are 
determined by reference to how an individual is affected overall, striking a balance 
between the pluses and minuses incurred in his various capacities.584 Barry (as did 
Rousseau) focuses on the different roles individuals play in society and that in 
accordance with those different capacities, their interests might diverge from the 
‘common interest’. However, ‘One of the roles in which everyone sometimes finds 
himself or herself is that of “a member of the public.”’585  
 
When individuals identify themselves in the role of a ‘member of the public’, they ‘will 
naturally tend to favour goods or policies that are in the interest of everyone in society, 
rather than goods or policies that benefit us in some more particular role.’586 Thus for 
both Barry and Rousseau, any conflict between individual interests, which are specific 
to a particular role or capacity individuals play in society, is logically distinct from an 
individual’s ‘net interest’ in a policy which relates to their role as a member of the 
public. Despite any conflict that may arise on an ‘individual’ (specific role/capacity) 
level, conflict is disintegrated when appropriate balancing is undertaken and an 
individual’s ‘net’ interest as a member of the public is revealed. However, absent true 
unanimity, it is arguable that common interest theories come dangerously close to 
preponderance theories. The difference here is that individuals are idealised – the focus 
is not on the preponderance of individuals’ views or preferences on a matter, rather, it 
is about what individuals should want if they understood fully the long-term benefits 
and disadvantages.587  
 
Pareto’s criterion of optimality for economic changes corresponds with the rationale 
of ‘net common interest’, whereby the public interest is understood in terms of changes 
where at least one individual in a group is made better off (in terms of their utility 
                                                
583 Barry (n 57) 195–196. 
584 ibid 196. 
585 O’Flynn (n 49) 305. 
586 ibid. 
587 Which might be considered as ‘paternalistic preponderance theory’, a point made originally by my 
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values) without anyone being made worse off.588 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock 
adopt a similar theory in The Calculus of Consent (1962) which discerns ‘better’ from 
‘worse’ changes, and thus the public interest, on the basis of a unanimous decision by 
all members of a group.589 However, for Buchanan and Tullock, ‘The “public interest” 
becomes meaningful only in terms of the operation of the rules for decision-making’590 
and therefore their work focuses on the procedure involved in determining the common 
interest.  
 
In a contemporary account of the public interest, providing one of the few analyses on 
the concept within data protection, Mark Taylor considers the public interest in the 
research use of genetic data.591 Taylor focuses on the role of the public interest in 
decision-making:  
 
if you tie the idea of the public interest to the idea of common interests, then 
the legitimacy of public interest decision-making is dependent upon the ability 
of the system to account for common interests within the decision-making 
processes.592  
 
Taylor considers whether the common interest may be the most plausible of theories 
on the concept,593 however he does not ultimately favour any single theory, except to 
say that legitimate public interest decision-making must be able to transparently and 
justifiably account for the displacement of one interest over another (i.e. displacing an 
individual interest for a common interest or vice versa).594  
 
The importance of procedure to determining the public interest finds synergies with 
theories on deliberative democracy. These are important to consider, albeit briefly, to 
acknowledge theories which equate the procedural legitimacy of deliberative 
democracy as a decision-making tool and the public interest as one in the same: 
  
                                                
588 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 107–108. Per Vilfredo Pareto, Cours d’Economie 
Politique (Lausanne, 1897) II, 90ff. 
589 James M Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (Library of Economics and Liberty 1999). 
590 ibid 285. 
591 Taylor (n 28). 
592 ibid 30. 
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[individual interests] can be filtered and transformed through a well-designed 
deliberative process so that the decisions that emerge will be in the public 
interest. On this pluralist view, therefore, deliberative democracy is treated as 
definitive of the public interest - i.e., the public interest cannot be determined 
until deliberation concludes and a decision has been reached.595  
 
Unlike this procedural view on the public interest, others within this field find that the 
public interest remains identifiable and separate from related decision-making 
procedures.596 Any new approach to understanding the public interest concept in data 
protection must offer substance and not merely more procedure. A new approach must 
indeed be capable of legitimately determining what processing is justifiable in the public 
interest when considering conflicts with the public and private interests in protecting 
informational privacy. However, a level of justification is needed beyond mere 
(substantiation of) compliance with legal procedure. The conceptualisation of the 
public interest being developed in this thesis certainly treats a claim that a certain form 
processing is in the ‘public interest’ as being indicative of something more than mere 
compliance with a given decision-making procedure. The entire reason for exploring 
theories on the public interest is to provide a deeper understanding of the public 
interest concept and thus the appropriate limits within which it can be relied upon by 
data controllers. By offering a clearer account of what may or may not be considered 
in the public interest, in a substantive sense, procedures can be designed in a way that is 
true to an agreed understanding of the concept. This could better account for the full 
range of interests and would be developed to avoid the conceptual vulnerabilities 
highlighted by Mansbridge’s work on the essential contestability of the public 
interest.597 
 
When applied to the data protection context it would therefore seem that common 
interest theories, both historical and contemporary, fall short of providing a 
                                                
595 O’Flynn (n 49) 302. In reference to Seyla Benhabib’s approach to deliberative democracy: Seyla 
Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed), Democracy 
and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (PUP 1996) 73. 
596 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage more fully in the area of deliberative democracy; it is 
merely used here to indicate the presence of theories which equate procedural legitimacy with the 
public interest i.e. if the decision-making procedure is legitimate, the result of that procedure will be ‘in 
the public interest’. O’Flynn (n 49).  
597 Mansbridge (n 49). 
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comprehensive explanation for the meaning of the public interest. First, the key feature 
of common interest theories, the idea of unanimity or ‘net’ unanimity, is inherently 
problematic as it implies the existence of a public (common) interest over and above 
any conflicting individual interests. 598  The current ‘list’ of public interests are not 
provided in data protection law on the basis that any given interest, such as in research, 
would always be in the interest of all individuals and was commonly accepted as such – 
not even ‘in the long run’. Rather, it is the nature of law to deal with conflicts and to 
offer a framework for making decisions in particular cases.  
 
The legal framework in data protection recognises that for any use of personal data, an 
individual’s interests and rights to informational privacy are at stake, but as I suggest, 
this should also recognise the public interests in the protection of informational privacy 
among any other interests which run counter to the use of personal data. The inherent 
conflict between the protection and use of data is recognised in cases involving Article 
8 where the mere collection or disclosure of personal data can constitute an 
interference with an individual’s privacy.599 The list of public interests provided under 
the law are examples of processing which may justifiably interfere with an individual’s 
informational privacy – they do not represent a unanimous consensus on the matter, 
or declare in any final sense, that a particular type of processing will always be justifiable 
in the public interest. Hence the procedural requirements under both data protection 
law and Article 8, for lawfulness, necessity, and proportionality. 
 
A second ground for rejecting common interest theories is that they wrongly reduce 
considerations of the public interest to individual interests. The common interest is 
derived from the interests of individuals. What makes them ‘public’ is the extent to 
which they are ‘common’ amongst those individuals. Common interest theorists would 
ask: What would be good for individuals in that public? As opposed to: What would 
be good for the public, to which a group of individuals belong? This denies any aspect 
of the public interest which may be comprised of functions different from the function 
of its component parts i.e. individuals.600 Motivations other than self-interest are thus 
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excluded from explaining what may be considered as ‘in the common interest’. An 
individual’s support of the ‘common interest’ is always explained in terms of their 
potential gain (no matter how unlikely).  
 
One strategy to give additional reasons against common interest theories has drawn on 
the prisoner’s dilemma.601 Held uses this scenario to argue that ‘One cannot justify 
socially cooperative behavior – or mutual trust – solely in terms of individual 
interest.’602  
  
If both [prisoners] choose the riskier course of not confessing, both will be 
better off than if both choose the purely self-interested course of confessing. 
But any justification for doing so must be based on something else than 
individual interest.603 
 
Thus, Held is making the argument that as an empirical fact, we may have motivations 
that conflict with the prisoner’s dilemma. Admittedly, Held’s use of the prisoner’s 
dilemma diverges from other analyses, notably David Gauthier’s.604 Gauthier’s account 
of the prisoner’s dilemma is premised on the idea that individuals have rational and self-
interested reasons for acting in a cooperative manner, that in fact ‘The moral man is no 
less concerned with his own well-being than is the prudent man, but he recognizes that 
an exclusive attention to that well-being would prevent him from participation in 
mutually beneficial agreements.’605 Even if we accept that there are rational and self-
interested reasons why an individual might choose cooperative courses of action, the 
conditions required by the prisoner’s dilemma (notably the lack of communication and 
lack of enforcement) mean that it cannot be directly applied to the context under 
consideration here as decisions on the processing of personal data occur within an 
environment where dialogue and relevant enforcement is in place.  
 
                                                
601 Originally devised by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 as part of the Rand Corporation’s 
research into game theory; however, the name ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ was given by Albert Tucker when 
delivering a talk at Stanford University in 1950. Tucker A. W. (1950) A two-person dilemma 
(unpublished notes) 
602 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 129. 
603 ibid 128 (original emphasis). 
604 David Gauthier, ‘Reason and Maximization’ (1975) 4 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 411, 425 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1975.10716949>.  
605 ibid 432. 
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Moreover, common interest theories of the public interest remain inappropriate for 
the data protection context for the other compelling reasons already set forth above. 
Most crucially, the public interest concept in data protection cannot be reduced to or 
resolved by a decisive common interest. Even if ‘x’ data processing has been previously 
understood as being in the public interest that does not imply that ‘x’ will always be in 
the public interest in a final sense and therefore always give reason to override the 
public (and private) interest in protecting informational privacy. Any understanding of 
the public interest, however commonly accepted, must be routinely scrutinised within 
the context at hand, which is something common interest theories would not provide 
for once the apparent unanimity in the relevant public interest is established. 
 
As such, a more valuable conception of the public interest would be able to ‘apply to 
a situation of conflicting, rather than common, individual interests’ which is not 
possible based on the unanimous (or even ‘net’ unanimous) quality of common interest 
theories.606 Data protection law exists in light of the inevitability of conflict between the 
protection of informational privacy and in the use of personal data.  
 
In this sense, conflicts between multiple visions of the public interest are 
unavoidable and what we are reminded of from this analysis is that neither the 
public interest in protecting informational privacy nor in certain uses of data 
will be dispositive in all situations. Unanimity and the public interest do not go 
hand in hand.  
 
4.1.3 Unitary theories  
The final category in Held’s typology are unitary theories, which focus on the 
normative quality of the public interest and centre around issues of morality.607 Unitary 
theories are epitomised by Plato’s theory on the common good, which provides that a 
greater good for society exists ‘such that no member of it can have a genuine interest 
contrary to it.’608 At the essence of unitary theories lies ‘an overriding interest which 
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transcends and reconciles apparently conflicting individual or sectional interests.’609 It 
can be said that unitary theories make no claim at being public: ‘Its validity as the public 
interest depends not on the amount of acceptance it has, but on the superiority of its 
claim to rationality or wisdom.’610 Therefore individual interests hold no relevance to 
this theory – how commonly held individuals hold an interest is irrelevant. Moreover, 
any individual interest which is contrary to the public interest is considered invalid 
under a unitary scheme of moral judgments.611 The irrelevance of individual interests 
is what differentiates unitary theories from common interest theories. Individual 
motivations or interests simply do not factor into the calculation of the public interest 
(even if individuals would agree that ‘x’ is unitarily in the public interest); the public 
interest is beneficial for everyone even if individuals do not recognise it as such.612 In 
other words, individual interests can never create imperatives concerning the public 
interest.613  
 
Unitary theories offer something appealing to the approach being developed in this 
thesis: namely, that the public interest is not reduced to the mere counting of noses (in 
the words of Sorauf) and therefore may be able to explain why something is in the 
public interest beyond what can be explained in terms of offering direct benefit to any 
individual or segment of society. Unitary theories define the public interest by reference 
to an absolute system of values, which provide ‘a unitary scheme of moral judgments 
which should guide every individual at a given time and place, although these 
individuals may be unaware of it.’614  
 
A particularly good example of this would be religious value systems which aim to give 
guidance for correct behaviour in all aspects of life. However, for pluralist, secular 
societies, an equivalent system is difficult to envisage. It is true that in some countries, 
constitutions or human rights legislation may hold importance equivalent to the status 
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of religious doctrines that could potentially provide this system of values. Concepts 
such as ‘constitutional patriotism’ embody this idea.615 Others may even try to add to 
the constitutional provisions some additional substance to the concept of a ‘dominant 
culture’ (Leitkultur) 616 which brings this ‘constitution plus’ model closer to Rousseau’s 
notion of the general will. But even in these cases, at least in Europe and its liberal 
democracies, these socio-political artefacts hold their position of importance because 
they facilitate different conceptions of ‘the good life’ and thus different conceptions of 
the public interest to flourish.  
 
Unitary theories are highly problematic for the context at hand given that it demands 
‘a valid judgment that a given measure, decision or arrangement is in the public interest 
rules out the possibility that conflicting individual claims of interest … may also be 
valid.’617 In data protection law it is fundamental that conflicting claims of individual 
and public interests remain valid even where a particular decision may favour one or 
the other – the public interest in a particular form of data processing does not cancel 
out the public interest in protecting the individuals’ privacy in question, nor does it call 
into question that the side that ‘lost’ are citizens of equal standing. As a result, unitary 
theories that are compatible with the vision of a liberal democracy will inevitably be 
too general and abstract to allow adjudication of conflicting public interests (note the 
plural) in a given case, while more substantive unitary conceptions inevitably are in 
conflict with the basic ideal of pluralist democracy of which data protection law is one 
expression.  
 
In data protection (as in any other context) there is simply no ‘philosopher-king’ who 
knows in an absolute sense what the public interest is. Indeed, as just argued in the 
previous section, the approach and understanding being developed here singularly 
rejects the idea that the public interest is representative of anything in an absolute or 
final sense. The idea of a universal moral order that governs determination of all 
                                                
615 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘A General Theory of Constitutional Patriotism’ (2008) 6 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 72 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/mom037>; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT Press 1996) 491–515, 566–567. 
616 ‘A Leitkultur for Germany - What Exactly Does It Mean?’ ((German) Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2017) 
<http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Interviews/EN/2017/namensartikel-bild.html>. 
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judgments (in a final sense), and thus distinguishes in a fixed black and white manner 
that which is on the side of goodness, and on the other badness, must be rejected. Such 
an approach is contrary to the fundamental aims of data protection law which 
recognises both the public interest in certain uses of data and in the protection of 
informational privacy. Just as a majoritarian approach (under preponderance theories) 
may lead to marginalisation of minority interests, unitary theories can also result in ‘an 
increase of intolerance and righteous indignation’ justifying disproportionate 
interferences with individuals’ privacy in the name of national security for example.618  
 
In the data protection context, the protection of informational privacy and certain uses 
of personal data must both be capable of being considered ‘in the public interest’ (the 
latter within restricted means i.e. in the UK, if considered ‘necessary’ and related to the 
function of a ‘public nature’). No use of data will always be justifiable in the public 
interest, hence the importance of the procedural safeguards within data protection law. 
Equally, the protection of informational privacy is not absolute – the processing of 
personal data can proceed subject to a data controller’s adherence to the relevant legal 
and procedural principles. Neither a proposed use of data nor the protection of 
informational privacy will always be on the side of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the sense 
demanded by unitary theories, which make all such conceptions unsuitable for the task 
at hand.  
 
Finally, unitary theories of the public interest are most susceptible to misuse in data 
protection by those that would invoke them, and thus run counter to the understanding 
of the public interest being developed here which is to avoid the vulnerabilities of the 
concept highlighted in Section 2 above.619 Any conception of the public interest in data 
protection must value individuals’ interests (and society’s interests) in informational 
privacy as valid, allowing for conflict with the public interests in certain uses of data. 
Furthermore, public interest determinations cannot be solely informed by the views of 
an ‘authority’ that claims to know the singular truth of what is or is not in the public 
                                                
618 ibid 155. 
619 ‘The public interest as superior wisdom is often held by no larger a group than countless other 
interests in American politics…Their identification with the public interest reveals only brazen self-
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interest. As argued by Taylor, if decisions based on the public interest are to be legitimate, 
the decision-making processes must be transparent and justifiably account for the 
displacement of one interest over another (e.g. giving acceptable reasons for displacing 
an individual interest for a public interest). 620 When it comes to the public interest in 
data protection there are necessarily multiple interests, which will often result in 
conflict between valid claims of public and private interests that unitary theories cannot 
cater to. 
 
4.1.4 Held’s theory of the public interest 
Although not directly attributed to any theory within her typology of the public interest, 
the main premise of Held’s work was to consider how claims of the public interest 
relate to individual interests. Her intention was to: 
 
indicate the ways in which claims of public interest and individual interest may 
be related to each other, and to suggest that an adequate conception of the 
public interest should indicate that ‘x is (is not) in the public interest’ is a 
normative judgment, but that the validity of it should not imply or require the 
invalidity of the judgment ‘x is not (is) in the interest of I’, which may also be 
a normative judgment.621 
 
It is through the lens and understanding of individual interests that Held develops an 
understanding of how the public interest interacts with conflicting individuals’ 
interests. On this she proposes that individual interests may be understood as:  
 
‘X is in the interest of [the individual]’ is equivalent to ‘a claim by or in behalf 
of [the individual] for x is asserted as justifiable.’622  
 
Held extends this reasoning to the concept of the public interest, similarly finding that 
the public interest may be understood as: 
 
‘X is in the public interest’ is equivalent to ‘a claim by or in behalf of the political 
system for x is asserted as justifiable.’623  
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621 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 190.  
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This theory emphasises the normativity of both individual and public interests; to say 
something is or is not in the interest of an individual or the public, is to say something 
is justifiable – capable of being proven or demonstrated as ‘just’, ‘right’ or ‘reasonable’624.  
 
Central to Held’s theory is the idea that those with ‘authority’ make public interest 
claims on behalf of a political system because such claims are justifiable. 625  The 
requirement that a public interest claim be justifiable is what Held considers to be the 
normative element of the public interest. According to Held, ‘Anyone asserting a public 
interest claim is asserting that a given action, decision, or policy ought to be effected or 
maintained by the polity; he is asserting that it is justifiable’.626 This means, public interest 
determinations must be based upon reasons which would be acceptable to those whose 
rights are in the balance.627  This relates to the need for legitimate procedures for 
determining the public interest while not conflating mere procedure with what is or is 
not in the public interest in a substantive and normative sense.  
 
Held takes a practical approach to legitimacy, recognising that, ‘In a political system, as 
in a legal one, decisions are and have to be made’ and such decisions ‘may appeal to a 
wide variety of justificatory considerations, some strong and reasonable, some weak 
and foolish.’628 Decisions may be based upon the majority opinion of individuals, upon 
legal rules and reasoning, acceptable precedents, or a combination of these, but what 
is crucial to Held’s theory is that ‘a valid judgment that x is in the public interest does 
not … imply that judgments of individual interest in conflict with it are invalid.’629 This 
raises a critical point for the context of data protection given that a claim that ‘x’ form 
of data processing is justifiable in the public interest does not invalidate the public 
interest and importance in protecting informational privacy. A decision procedure 
cannot claim to resolve the public interest in a final sense. Rather, an agreed procedure 
can only offer a decision to the extent that one is needed. The public (and private) 
                                                
624 Justify is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as ‘to prove or show to be just, right, or 
reasonable’.  
625 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 184; Taylor (n 28) 30–32. 
626 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 185. 
627 Also as argued by Taylor. Taylor (n 65) 7–8; Taylor (n 28) 30–32.  
628 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 185. 
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interests at stake will continue as conflicting afterwards, which is consistent with an 
understanding of the public interest as an essentially contested concept that reflects the 
multiplicity of the public interest. A legitimate procedure for assessing the public interest 
in data processing must recognise the public interests in both protecting informational 
privacy and in certain uses of personal data. 
 
While Held’s focus is on the relationship between individual interests and public 
interests, she does consider the potential resolution of ‘rival’ claims of the public 
interest. In this regard, she suggests that ‘any dispute between them can only be settled 
by going beyond the systems of both, even when a preponderance of individuals may 
give weight to one side or the other.630 This would require ‘A more inclusive system, 
containing both a political system and separate individual systems … in order to 
consider the relations between such rival claims.’631 Held suggests appeals to ethical 
norms as an example. In later work, Held considers appealing to moral theories to 
resolve such conflict: 
 
we ought to appeal to moral theories that do connect with specific contexts, 
especially with some areas of applied ethics in which we have a grip on what 
some problems are and what some solutions to them might be like.632 
 
Held is emphasising the important contextual element of assessing the public interest; 
that such decisions must be made from the perspective and context at issue. Held 
further contends that what is problematic for public interest determinations in law is 
that it necessarily involves political reasoning. Political reasoning requires teleological 
considerations whereas deontological justifications are characteristic of and appropriate 
to legal systems.633 Whereas the law revolves around obligations and rights, the public 
interest concept raises issues that cannot be adequately resolved by reference to legal 
rules and principles.634  
 
                                                
630 ibid 188. 
631 ibid. 
632 Held, Rights and Goods: Justifying Social Action (n 58) 2–3.  
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There are no clear rules or a deontological basis for assessing the public interest in 
processing under data protection law, except to the extent that Article 8 and its 
procedural framework applies to a given case (in terms of assessing ‘in accordance with 
law’ and ‘necessity’). The solution may lie in making ‘…a prior moral decision that a 
given procedure is appropriate for a given kind of issue’, namely for determining when 
the processing of personal data is justifiable based on the public interest.635 While no 
such decision has been made, a new approach could be devised that accounts for both 
the acceptable legal and conceptual parameters of the public interest. Such an approach 
could provide a more legitimate basis for assessing the public interest in processing – 
one that caters to the full range of public and private interests involved while remaining 
true to the legal, conceptual and normative dimensions of the concept. The chapter 
will conclude by briefly reviewing those features of public interest theory that can 
supplement the current and deficient legal understanding of the concept, which I later 
use to develop my own new approach to understanding the public interest in data 
protection. 
 
5. Conclusion: Combining Law and Theory  
The current state of data protection law is such that the public interest conditions are 
explained only in terms of descriptive examples and procedures (which are not even 
widely understood in practice). The public interest conditions require data controllers 
to independently determine in the first instance whether their processing of personal 
data is ‘in the public interest’ but there is no commonly accepted understanding of 
what the public interest means as applied to these conditions. The travaux in Chapter 
3 revealed clearly that the public interests in the DPD were included for political 
reasons and were not subject to any assessment criteria to determine whether the 
processing was in the public interest in a substantive sense. Similarly, no criteria were 
provided in the UK’s transposition of the DPD in the DPA 1998. This means that the 
current understandings of the public interest in data protection, which are based merely 
on examples and procedure, fall prey to the conceptual vulnerabilities highlighted in 
this chapter. In expanding the legal analysis in this chapter to Article 8 jurisprudence, 
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we learned more about the relationship between the public interest concept and the 
procedural principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. The ECtHR’s approach 
to different public interest justifications in Article 8 cases emphasised the inherently 
contextual nature of the public interest. Nevertheless, we were left without any further 
direction on the substantive meaning of the public interest. 
 
To fill the conceptual gaps identified from the foregoing legal analysis, political and 
legal theory of the public interest was examined. From preponderance theories, we can 
acknowledge that the public’s views on any given form of data processing is an 
important element or even potentially one iteration of the public interest. However, we 
must also recognise the importance of not equating the public interest with the majority 
interest. This is to ensure that the ‘individual’ aspect of protecting privacy is not 
consistently overridden by apparent collective benefits to be reaped from a use of data 
(which ignores the broader, societal interests in protecting privacy).  
 
Common interest theories helped to address the question of how ‘public’ a public 
interest must be. Of significance is Brian Barry’s work which rightly identifies the first 
order of business in making public interest determinations – to find out ‘which public’ 
or ‘publics’ are implicated by a particular course of action. Also persuasive is Barry’s 
recognition of the conflicting nature of individual interests and public interests because 
of the multiplicity of roles we each play in society. His theory on ‘net common interests’ 
can be used to overcome the impossibility of unanimity while recognising that there 
are certain ‘interests’ which are indeed public, but possibly only in a narrower and 
context sensitive sense.  
 
Consideration of unitary theories revealed understandings of the public interest that 
appeal to a higher order of values, which determine in a final sense, what is or is not in 
the public interest. While unitary theories do not allow for multiple public interests to 
exist (and therefore are inappropriate for the purposes of data protection), they do 
offer an alternative explanation for defining the normative content of the concept 
without resorting to majority opinions or requiring unanimous consensus on a given 
matter. Such theories provide an explanation for the public interest beyond the 
individual, and thus beyond self-interest, which could be helpful in explaining the more 
 
Chapter 4 Reviving the Public Interest Concept in Data Protection Law 
 
180 
altruistic elements behind the public interest in certain uses of data. However, unitary 
theories fail to acknowledge the individual at all, and this is problematic if we consider 
as integral, the presence of a legitimate decision-making procedure for deciding cases 
of conflict; a procedure that must be justifiable to the relevant publics affected by a 
given type of processing. 
 
Finally, in considering Held’s work on the public interest, what is valuable is not only 
her typology of the concept, but her interpretation of the relationship between public 
and individual interests. Held acknowledges the undeniable normative element of the 
public interest, which explains the utmost importance of routine scrutiny of both 
commonly accepted understandings of what the public interest means in a particular 
context but also of transparent decision-making procedures. Her conception allows for 
justifiable conflicts between interests, something that is necessary in data protection, 
where decisions must be made that impact both the public interest in protecting 
informational privacy and in certain uses of personal data. Overall, the theoretical 
analysis undertaken has informed my development of key components to 
understanding the public interest concept in data protection, which are presented in 
Chapter 6.  
 
Until now, the legal focus has been on the application of the public interest concept in 
data protection with the addition in this chapter of the often-overlapping context of 
Article 8 jurisprudence. Given the little case law and guidance on the public interest 
conditions it is prudent to expand our ‘evidence base’ and consider further examples 
of the public interest in cognate areas of law. The following chapter will examine how 
the public interest is deployed in the analogous legal contexts of freedom of 
information law, copyright and whistleblowing. From this analysis, we can further test 
the new conceptual understanding of the public interest being developed in this thesis 
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Chapter 5 Apples and Oranges? 
(In)consistencies of the Public 
Interest Concept in Freedom of 
Information, Copyright and 
Whistleblowing Law 
1. Introduction 
Considering the conclusions reached in Chapter 4, we may have to accept that the 
public interest is not capable of precise definition and that it may be counter to the public 
interest to claim to have defined it in a final sense. Nevertheless, is there not something 
that can be done to help address the uncertainty surrounding the concept in data 
protection? The forthcoming the GDPR poses greater requirements for obtaining valid 
consent while simultaneously broadening the definition of personal data, making it 
more difficult to rely on anonymisation.636 The changing landscape will provide even 
greater incentives for practitioners and regulators alike to engage with the public 
interest conditions, hence the significance of my contribution of redeploying the public 
interest concept in a more accessible but theoretically and legally sound manner.  
 
In this chapter I examine how the public interest has been implemented in cognate 
areas of law with greater and lesser ‘success’ in comparison to the uncertainty that 
surrounds the public interest conditions in data protection. This offers an opportunity 
to further refine our substantive understanding of the public interest as a concept while 
expanding the legal basis for developing a new approach to the public interest 
conditions in data protection. I will examine the operation and interpretation of the 
public interest test in freedom of information law, the public interest defence in 
copyright and the public interest test in whistleblowing law to determine: 
 
                                                
636 I have considered the impact of these changes (GDPR Art 7; Art 4(1) and Recital 26) as applied to 
the social sciences research context. Leslie Stevens, ‘The Proposed Data Protection Regulation and Its 
Potential Impact on Social Sciences Research in the UK’ (2015) 1 European Data Protection Law 
Review. 
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• What, if any, features of the public interest concept are common and can be 
generalised across these different legal domains? 
• What features of the public interest are specific to these different legal contexts? 
(i.e. what features must be distinguished from data protection?) 
• To what extent can the common features identified be applied to improve the 
deployment of the public interest concept in the data protection context? 
 
The comparisons drawn in this chapter are justified on several grounds. First, each of 
these areas of law regulate the use of information which is ‘protected’ to greater and 
lesser extents. Second, within these domains the public interest acts either as an 
exemption or final point in consideration for applying the relevant legal provisions as 
to the use or disclosure of the information in question. Third, the public interest is not 
defined in any of these areas of law but is interpreted within regulatory and court 
decisions as well as in some instances in authoritative guidance.  
 
I will first examine the successful deployment of the public interest test in freedom of 
information law as a close legal ‘relative’ to data protection, followed by consideration 
of the rather unsuccessful implementation of the public interest defence in copyright. 
The public interest test in whistleblowing is the final area of law analysed. Within each 
area of analysis, I will weave in relevant contrasts and comparisons to the data 
protection context. Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that the public interest is 
being used by actors in other legal fields and therefore is capable of being effectively 
implemented – it is not unreasonable that we might expect to use it successfully in the 
data protection context as well. I conclude by summarising a list of elements of the 
public interest which I have extracted from analysing these legal domains; these 
elements are capable of generalisation and therefore potentially applicable (and helpful) 
to understanding and applying the concept in data protection. 
2. The Public Interest Test in Freedom of Information 
Law 
In freedom of information law, the public interest plays a central role in determining 
whether a public authority is required to disclose information.637 The aims of freedom 
                                                
637 Both freedom of information and data protection legislation implicate citizens’ information rights. 
Data protection law regulates the handling of personal data, whereas freedom of information law is 
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of information law are important to understanding what the public interest 
encapsulates in this context. In the UK, freedom of information law is premised on 
the idea that citizens have a general right of access to information held by public 
authorities.638 In freedom of information law, this general right to access is limited by 
a set of exemptions including for reasons of national defence, 639  international 
relations,640 confidentiality641 and the health and safety of individuals.642 Exemptions 
from disclosure are either ‘absolute’643 or ‘qualified’644.  
 
As to qualified exemptions, section 2(2)(b) of the FOIA 2000 and section 2(1)(b) of 
the FOISA 2002 provides that a public authority must still disclose information (even 
if a qualified exemption applies) unless in all circumstances the public interest in 
maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the requested 
information. This is known as the ‘public interest test’. Absolute exemptions are not 
subject to the public interest test which is ‘testing’ the public authority’s claim that in all 
circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs 
the public interest in disclosure. As per, section 17 of the FOIA 2000 and section 16 
of the FOISA 2002, the public authority must notify the requester of their refusal to 
disclose the information and state the reasons for this claim, for example if they 
                                                
intended to promote transparency in government by making certain records available to the public. An 
important distinction is that freedom of information law does not give citizens the right to access their 
personal data; such requests must instead be made via a section 7 subject access request under the 
DPA 1998. Indeed, under s 40(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (‘FOIA 2000’) (and the 
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (‘FOISA 2002’), s 38(1)(a)) requests for records which 
contain personal data of the requester must be treated as subject access requests under data protection 
law. Furthermore, under s 40(2) (and s 38(1)(b) in Scotland) an absolute exemption from disclosure 
exists for records containing personal data of third parties. Nevertheless, disclosure which is found 
compatible with data protection law is generally still possible i.e. the absolute exemptions do not 
equate to an absolute bar on disclosing personal data. See, for example, House of Commons v Information 
Commissioner and Leapman, Brooke, and Thomas (EA/2007/0060, 26 February 2008) where the 
Information Tribunal required disclosure of personal data even when this could cause significant harm 
and distress to the individuals involved (in this case, MPs and disclosures over their expenses). 
638 FOIA 2000, s 1(1) and FOISA 2002, s 1(1). The ‘right of access’ in data protection law cannot be 
directly equated as in data protection, access is always conditional upon the requirements of s 7 of the 
DPA 1998 being met. 
639 FOIA 2000, s 26 and FOISA 2002, s 31. 
640 FOIA 2000, s 27 and FOISA 2002, s 32. 
641 FOIA 2000, s 41 and FOISA 2002, s 36. 
642 FOIA 2000, s 38 and FOISA 2002, s 39. 
643 For example, there is an absolute exemption for reasons of confidentiality (s 41 FOIA 2000 and s 
36 FOISA 2002) and for court records (s 32 FOIA 2000 and s 37 FOISA 2002). 
644 All exemptions not explicitly designated as ‘absolute’ per s 2(3) of FOIA 2000 and s 2(2) of FOISA 
2002 are ‘qualified’. 
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consider a qualified exemption to apply and that the public interest lies in maintaining 
the exemption.  
 
As to enforcement, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the ICO is charged with 
enforcing the FOIA 2000. The ICO ‘…can overrule a public authority’s application of 
the public interest test and form his or her own view of where the balance lies.’645 In 
Scotland, the Scottish Information Commissioner (‘SIC’) is responsible for enforcing 
the FOISA 2002646 and can similarly override a Scottish public authority’s application 
of the public interest test on grounds that the authority has not dealt with a request in 
accordance with the requirements of Part I of FOISA 2002.647 In England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, the public authority (or requester) can appeal the Information 
Commissioner’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal on Information Rights (‘FTTIR’) 
and onwards (in certain circumstances). In Scotland, appeals may be made to the Court 
of Session per section 56 of the FOISA 2002, which again may go further depending 
on the case.  
 
With nearly a decade of decisions taken by the Information Commissioner, the SIC, 
and subsequent appeals to the FTTIR and Court of Session, a wealth of guidance has 
been produced on how the public interest test operates and is interpreted (unlike the 
dearth of guidance on the public interest conditions under the DPA 1998). Below I 
will consider potential reasons why the public interest has been more successfully 
implemented in the freedom of information context and what lessons might be learned 
for improving understanding and deployment of the concept in data protection. In the 
main, my analysis will focus on the public interest test as it applies and is interpreted 
regarding the FOIA 2000 but I will acknowledge, where relevant, important differences 
in the way the test is interpreted in Scotland.648  
                                                
645 Note: the ICO has authority over all UK-wide public authorities including when operating or based 
in Scotland. FOIA 2000, s 50; Megan Carter and Andrew Bouris, Freedom of Information: Balancing The 
Public Interest (Second, The Constitution Unit University College London 2006) 17. 
646 And other freedom of information legislation in Scotland including the Environmental Information 
(Scotland) Regulations 2004 and the INSPIRE (Scotland) Regulations 2009. 
647 FOISA 2002, s 47. 
648 For example, as to the interpretation of certain exemptions which seem to require a Scottish public 
authority to prove a higher standard of ‘harm’ if disclosure were to occur than under the FOIA 2000 
(i.e. as to sections: 27(2)(b), 28(1), 30, 31(4), 32(1)(a), 33(1)(b), 33(2), 35, and 40). When claiming these 
exemptions, the FOISA 2002 requires that a Scottish public authority demonstrate that disclosure 
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2.1 A presumption for disclosure: the prioritisation of the public 
interests at stake in freedom of information law 
As stated above, under section 2(2)(b) of the FOIA 2000, even where information has 
been properly found to be exempt under one of the qualified exemptions listed in Part 
2 (such as the qualified exemption for trade secrets and commercially sensitive 
information in section 43), the duty to disclose continues unless, in all the 
circumstances, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public 
interest in disclosing the information. The public interest test does not apply to any of 
the absolute exemptions649 such as the exemption for parliamentary privilege (section 
34). 
 
Thus, unlike data protection where there are two (non-absolute) public interest aims 
of the legislation, section 2(2)(b) demonstrates that freedom of information law 
prioritises the disclosure of information. Indeed, the purpose of freedom of information 
law is ‘…to make provision for the disclosure of information held by public 
authorities.’650 On this point the ICO’s guidance on the public interest test provides 
that:  
 
If the public interest is equal on both sides, then the information must be 
released. If the public interest in disclosure is greater than the public interest in 
maintaining the exemption, then the information must also be released. In this 
sense, we can say that there is an assumption in favour of disclosure in FOIA.651  
                                                
would or would be likely to ‘prejudice substantially’ the function of government involved. This contrasts 
with the equivalent provisions under the FOIA 2000 which only require that disclosure would 
‘prejudice’ the government function in question. Therefore, where such exemptions are applied, 
Scottish public authorities would necessarily need to demonstrate a stronger case for maintaining the 
exemption as opposed to their English, Welsh and Northern Irish counterparts. Discussed in Carter 
and Bouris (n 645) 81.  
649 Except for section 41 of the FOIA 2000 where ‘disclosure of information amounts to an actionable 
breach of confidence.’ Discussed by Carter and Bouris: ‘…even though section 41 is not subject to a 
statutory public interest test, the question of public interest still forms part of the analysis as to 
whether disclosure of the information to the public would constitute an actionable breach of 
confidence under section 41(1)(b).’ This is because of the equitable principles applicable to obligations 
of confidence which calls for a balance between the public interest in protecting confidentiality and the 
public interest in disclosure. Where the obligation of confidence arises ‘at law’, the Court would 
instead consider the rights between the parties as stipulated in the contract. ibid 23–24. 
650 FOIA 2000, Introductory Text. 
651 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (2016) 5 
<https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1183/the_public_interest_test.pdf>. 
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This prioritisation of the public interest in disclosure over any conflicting public 
interests (favouring non-disclosure) offers important conceptual clarity on the meaning of 
the public interest and balance to be struck between competing public interests in the 
freedom of information context. The difficulty in deciding conflicts between two 
public interests is partially lessened since from the outset one public interest is 
normatively understood to be privileged over another; where the balance is ‘close’ and 
there appears to be a ‘tie’ the privileged public interest must prevail. For example, 
consider the delicate balancing undertaken by the Information Commissioner in The 
Complainant v the Department of Health (DoH).652 In this case the complainant requested a 
copy of the legal advice procured by the DoH on the application of competition law 
to a provision of the Health and Social Care Bill. The Information Commissioner 
found that although there was a ‘very strong’ public interest in public authorities 
receiving full and frank legal advice without the fear that it could be disclosed publicly, 
that any harm caused by disclosure did not ultimately outweigh the also ‘very strong’ 
public interests in favour of it.653  
 
This finely balanced public interest determination in The Complainant v the DoH is one 
example where the prioritisation of disclosure can be seen even with strong public 
interests in favour of maintaining an exemption. Even if we acknowledge the numerous 
grounds upon which public authorities can avoid disclosure under Part II of the FOIA 
2000, and thus the acknowledgement of the other public interests in the balance,654 the 
legislation is unambiguous in the application of the public interest test that disclosure is 
privileged within this legal regime.  
 
How does this contrast with the data protection context? No such prioritisation is 
found in the DPA 1998 or DPD. While the text of the DPA 1998 does not explicitly 
                                                
652 ICO, Decision Notice FS50402010 Department of Health (2011), reconsidered in ICO, Decision 
Notice FS50429566 Department of Health (2012) coming to the same conclusion.  
653 Decision Notice FS50429566 Department of Health (2012) [31]-[35]. 
654 In the words of then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Mr Mike 
O’Brien, during the Parliamentary Debate on the Freedom of Information Bill: ‘…the public interest is 
also served by some recognition of a right to privacy, some rights to commercial confidentiality and 
the right to develop an efficient policy advice system within Government—as well as the right to 
know.’ HC Deb 7 December 1999, vol 340, col 788.  
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transpose the aims as provided in the DPD655, the recitals to the Directive do stipulate 
that the purpose of data protection law is to protect informational privacy and facilitate 
the use of personal data.656 This means that in data protection where there are strong 
public interests both in favour of and against the processing of personal data, and 
where the law is largely silent as to how to strike an appropriate balance between the 
two,657 that it is not possible to determine in advance which interest should prevail. If 
a use of data is perfectly lawful, ethical and ‘in the public interest’, when might the 
interests of the data subject(s), a particular group or wider society nevertheless override 
this? If we also accept that there is a public interest in the protection of informational 
privacy there are surely circumstances where even if a use of data is necessary and in 
the public interest, the public interest in privacy may nevertheless require that data not 
be processed. 
 
The way in which the public interest conditions are worded658 does not offer any 
assistance here. There is no explicit balancing of interests required in the public interest 
conditions. And while the UK Courts have deferred to the procedural principles from 
European jurisprudence, on how key terms within the public interest conditions should 
be interpreted, there currently is no settled approach to ‘balancing’ in this context.659 
Things are arguably even more confused if we contrast the wording of the public 
interest conditions to the legitimate interests condition. Under the DPA 1998, Schedule 
2 paragraph 6 (and the DPD Article 7(f)), a prioritisation is made between the legitimate 
interests of the data controller in processing versus any impact upon individuals. Where 
processing is ‘unwarranted’ and it prejudices the rights and freedoms or legitimate 
interests of the data subject(s), reliance on this condition would not hold.660 In such 
                                                
655 Only that it is ‘An Act to make new provision for the regulation of the processing of information 
relating to individuals, including the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure of such information.’ DPA 
1998, Introductory Text. 
656 DPD, Recitals 2-10. 
657 Bar specific provisions such as in the DPD, Art 7(f) (and DPA 1998, Sch 2, para 6), where a data 
subject’s rights and interests are prioritised over the data controller’s legitimate interests in processing 
if ‘…the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and 
freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.’ 
658 DPA 1998, Sch 2 para 5(d); DPPSPD 2000, Sch, paras 1-4, 9; DPD, Art 7(e); Art 8(4).  
659 See Chapter 4 Section 3.2.3. 
660 DPA 1998, Sch 2 para 6. 
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circumstances, the rights and interests of the data subject are prioritised over the 
legitimate interests of the data controller in processing. 
 
When would the balance tip in favour of the data subject if the data controller can meet 
all the requirements of the public interest conditions? In other words, when is the 
processing of personal data normatively justifiable based on the public interest? Although 
to rely upon the public interest conditions processing must be ‘necessary’ and of a 
‘public nature’, there remains no guidance on when the public interest in protecting 
informational privacy may nevertheless override a necessary, public interest use of data 
especially when it comes to research uses. A clearer indication of the circumstances where 
the protection of informational privacy or the use of data would be prioritised would 
help to alleviate some of this uncertainty. 
 
2.2 The importance of function and perception: how the role of the 
public interest concept differs in freedom of information versus data 
protection  
The public interest test is the subject of at least fifty-one FTTIR cases 661  and 
undertaken in up to 1,018 decisions by the SIC662. While the FTTIR cases are not 
directly comparable to the decisions by the SIC (given that the former represents a 
second external review versus the latter as a first external review) the plethora of 
decisions has facilitated the publication of comprehensive guidance by the ICO663 and 
SIC on the public interest test664. As stated throughout this thesis, a key issue inhibiting 
the successful use and fuller understanding of the public interest concept in data 
protection is the dearth of case law and guidance on the public interest conditions. 
Two questions thus emerge: 
 
                                                
661 A search performed on the First-tier Tribunal on Information Rights website (on 26 September 
2016) for cases implicating the FOIA 2000 on the subject of the public interest test provided a total of 
51 decisions. 
662 A search performed on the SIC website (on 26 September 2016) for cases containing the exact 
phrase ‘public interest test’ filtering for decisions regarding only qualified exemptions (Sections 27-35, 
36(1), 38(1)(b), 39-41) provided a total of 1,018 decision results cumulatively. 
663 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651). 
664 Scottish Information Commissioner, ‘The Public Interest Test in FOISA: Briefing’ (2016) 
<http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lID=9842&sID=684>. 
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• Why have public authorities more readily and regularly engaged with the public 
interest concept in the freedom of information context, as evidenced by the 
extensive case law examining public authorities’ application of the public interest 
test? 
• Why has the ICO chosen to provide comprehensive guidance on the public interest 
concept in the freedom of information context but not on the public interest 
conditions for processing under the DPA 1998? 
 
Answers to these questions can reveal reasons why the role of the public interest 
conditions may have been marginalised and ultimately neglected in the data protection 
context. The insights gained from this analysis emphasises the important role played 
by the public interest conditions and thus the need for authoritative guidance. 
 
The answer to both questions posed above arguably lies in the central role and function 
of the public interest concept in freedom of information law as opposed to the role of 
the concept as perceived by data controllers in data protection. Under freedom of 
information law, public authorities must engage with the public interest concept if they 
want to rely upon a qualified exemption to prevent disclosure of information under 
the FOIA 2000 or the FOISA 2002. This is because the public interest test operates as 
a final point of consideration in determining whether to uphold an exemption to 
disclosure under the legislation. This creates the ultimate incentive for a public 
authority to engage with the public interest concept; indeed, they have no other choice. 
As for the ICO’s and SIC’s provision of guidance, the public interest test plays such 
an integral role to the functioning of the legislation that it would be a dereliction of its 
duties to not provide guidance as both are required to promote observance of the 
FOIA 2000 and FOISA 2002, and disseminate guidance on best practice.665  
 
In comparison, the public interest conditions are one of several lawful routes to 
legitimising the processing of personal data. Put simply, data controllers have more 
options – other routes to legitimising processing. As such it is arguable that the public 
interest conditions are not as integral to the functioning of the DPA 1998. This 
apparent marginalisation is compounded by the common misperception of data 
controllers that the public interest conditions are ‘exemptions’ from the need to obtain 
                                                
665 This is references section 47 ‘General functions of Commissioner’ of the FOIA 2000 and section 
43 ‘General functions of Commissioner’ under the FOISA 2002. 
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consent; in other words, the public interest conditions are only relevant where consent 
is impracticable and disproportionate to obtain. As I have argued in Chapter 2, by 
misconceiving the public interest (and all other conditions for processing) as exemptions 
to obtaining consent, this perpetuates the current risk averse culture that narrows the 
legitimisation of research to the confines of consent or anonymisation, neglecting any 
potentially valid (and lawful) reliance on the public interest. The public interest 
conditions are wrongly perceived by data controllers (and arguably others including 
members of the public) as a marginal provision within the broader scheme of the DPA 
1998 and thus not necessarily important enough to be used by data controllers or be 
the subject of dedicated guidance by the ICO.  
 
To counter this, I would argue first that the conditions for processing, more generally, 
are integral components to the functioning of the DPA 1998. Consent and the other 
conditions will often not be relevant for research uses of data, in particular where 
research relies on the reuse of administrative data. 666  Here, the public interest 
conditions are relevant for public authorities to justify their own use and/or sharing of 
administrative data for research (while clearly, this condition cannot resolve issues 
related to the legality of reusing public sector data for purposes other than research).667 
Neither publicly beneficial research nor the use of data by public authorities can be 
ignored as trivial to the aims of data protection law; consider the significant attention 
paid to these forms of processing in the legislative history to the DPD. 668  The 
importance of the public interest conditions may be further underscored if we consider 
new provisions introduced by the forthcoming GDPR. Here the requirements for 
relying upon consent are significantly increased669 whereas the circumstances in which 
a data controller can rely upon the legitimate interests provision are being tightened 
and may no longer be available to public authorities such as universities.670 As such, the 
                                                
666 See Chapter 2 Section 4. 
667 For example, issues of incompatibility of processing may arise where administrative data are being 
shared for non-research purposes and thus cannot enjoy the benefits of Article 6(1)(b); in such 
circumstances consent may be the only appropriate legal basis, subject further to DPD, Article 13’s 
exemptions. Stevens (n 636); Laurie and Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the 
Governance and Use of Administrative Data in the United Kingdom’ (n 63). 
668 See Chapter 3 Section 2.6. 
669 GDPR, Art 7-8. 
670 GDPR, Art 6(1)(f) which provides: ‘Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing 
carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.’ On 7 August 2017, the UK 
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public interest conditions may play an enhanced role under the GDPR, without the 
necessary guidance to interpret it. Thus, to answer the two questions posed in the 
beginning of this section:  
 
• Public authorities more readily and regularly engage with the public interest test in 
freedom of information law because they have no other choice but to do so when 
relying upon a qualified exemption; and 
• The integral role of the public interest test to freedom of information law and the 
more regular engagement and reliance on it (and thus proliferation of decisions and 
case law interpreting its application) obliges the ICO and SIC to compile and 
disseminate best practice guidance on the issue. 
 
As discussed above, despite the apparent marginalisation of the public interest 
conditions, these provisions do play an important role within the wider scheme of data 
protection law. Moreover, considering the forthcoming GDPR, these provisions are 
likely to be relied upon more often by public authorities, which in the UK includes 
universities (i.e. research producing institutions). Herein lies a renewed opportunity 
and call for the level of guidance the ICO has already provided in the freedom of 
information sphere.  
 
2.3 The importance of authoritative guidance: the provision of action 
guiding principles and context specific examples 
To conclude my analysis of the public interest test in freedom of information I will 
review key aspects of the guidance provided by the ICO and SIC. I will consider: 
 
                                                
Government released a Statement of Intent for their release of the UK Data Protection Bill in 
September 2017. Within the annex to this, the position was taken that UK derogations will define 
‘public authorities’ in line with the definition in FOIA 2000, which includes universities. This means 
that in the UK, that universities would not be able to rely on the legitimate interests condition (Article 
6(1)(f) of the GDPR), making consent or the public interest condition the key alternatives for 
processing. Department for Digital, Culture Media & Sport, ‘A New Data Protection Bill: Our 
Planned Reforms’ (2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/635900/2017-
08-07_DP_Bill_-_Statement_of_Intent.pdf>; Ruth Boardman, James Mullock and Emma Drake, ‘The 
UK Government Publishes Its Statement of Intent for Data Protection Bill and GDPR’ (Bird & Bird) 
<https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2017/uk/uk-government-publishes-its-statement-of-
intent-for-data-protection-bill-and-gdpr>; ‘Annex - Summary of GDPR Derogations in the Data 
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• How have the ICO and SIC defined the public interest concept in freedom of 
information? 
• To what extent would data protection law benefit from similar guidance? 
• In what respects is the development of such guidance plausible in the data 
protection context? 
 
2.3.1 Defining the public interest: context is key 
During the Parliamentary Debates on the Freedom of Information Bill, the then Home 
Secretary, Mr Jack Straw, considered the range of public interests served through 
freedom of information legislation: 
 
The Bill will lead to cultural change throughout the public sector. There will be 
more information about how health authorities, local councils and the police 
deliver services. It will give citizens a right to know and a right to appeal to the 
commissioner if they do not get the information that they have sought. That is 
a fundamental change in the relationship between the citizens and the state.671 
 
It is clear that Parliament was intent on ensuring that despite the numerous exemptions 
in the Freedom of Information Bill, that these would not ultimately prevent disclosure 
where it is in the public interest to do so.672 To ‘protect’ disclosure they also ensured 
that the Information Commissioner as an independent arbiter would have the ‘final’ 
word on where the public interest lies,673 and hence, that the Bill would become ‘an 
effective weapon of modernising government and to make government more open, 
responsible and accountable to citizens.’ 674  Although the public interest was not 
explicitly defined under the FOIA 2000 or FOISA 2002, Mr Straw’s statements, as well 
as those within subsequent ICO and SIC guidance, give a clear indication of the 
conceptual contours of the public interest in the context of freedom of information 
law.  
 
The ICO considers that the public interest in freedom of information ‘…can cover a 
wide range of values and principles relating to the public good, or what is in the best 
                                                
671 HC Deb 7 December 1999, vol 340, col 725. 
672 HL Deb 20 April 2000, vol 612, cols 823-93. 
673 HC Deb 7 December 1999, vol 340, cols 751-52; HL Deb 20 April 2000, vol 612, cols 838, 848, 
860. 
674 HL Deb 20 April 2000, vol 612, col 884. 
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interests of society’. The ICO goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of examples 
including: 
 
…there is a public interest in transparency and accountability, to promote 
public understanding and to safeguard democratic processes. There is a public 
interest in good decision-making by public bodies, in upholding standards of 
integrity, in ensuring justice and fair treatment for all, in securing the best use 
of public resources and in ensuring fair commercial competition in a mixed 
economy. 
 
The ICO clarifies that even if these examples represent strong public interest reasons 
for disclosure, that the facts of each case must be examined to determine the 
appropriate balance between withholding information and disclosure. In sum ‘This 
suggests that in each case, the public interest test involves identifying the appropriate 
public interests and assessing the extent to which they are served by disclosure or by 
maintaining an exemption.’675 This reinforces the important point made in Chapter 4 
that the public interest can never be exhaustively defined or determined in a final sense. 
Because the public interest is inherently context sensitive, what is in the public interest 
in one set of factual circumstances may not be in another. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to provide examples which typify the public interest in a particular context and derive 
principles from previous cases which can guide application of the term. This point is 
proven by the comprehensive guidance provided by both the ICO and SIC on the 
public interest test. The examples of relevant public interests, provided in the ICO’s 
guidance, can be used to illustrate the reasonable range of interests relevant to the 
public interest test. How does this compare to the data protection context?  
 
The DPD provides a list of public interest examples, but these are not all directly 
transposed into UK law; nor are they commonly accepted by the relevant publics or 
understood as public interest uses of data by data controllers.676 More problematically, 
data controllers do not have an agreed procedure for assessing the public interest in 
their processing. A clear barrier to creating such a ‘catalogue’ of examples and a 
procedure for assessing the public interest in processing is that data protection lacks 
the significant body of case law and decisions that exist in the freedom of information 
                                                
675 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 6. 
676 See Chapter 4, Section 3.1. 
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context. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 3, the ICO has provided guidance on 
the application of the public interest concept in the section 32 exemption for 
journalism, literature and art, demonstrating the possibility of providing such advice 
for data controllers in context with the public interest conditions. 
 
Turning to the SIC guidance, the SIC defines the public interest as follows: 
 
[The public interest] has been described elsewhere as ‘something which is of 
serious concern and benefit to the public’, not merely something of individual 
interest. It has also been described as ‘something that is ‘in the interest of the 
public’, not merely ‘of interest to the public.’ In other words, it serves the 
interests of the public.677 
 
Thus, for the SIC the ultimate question is: ‘When applying the test, the public authority 
is deciding whether, on balance, it serves the interests of the public better to withhold 
or disclose information.’678 And unlike the ICO guidance, the SIC considers how 
‘public’ the public interest must be to successfully meet the required public interest 
threshold: ‘The “public” in this context does not necessarily mean the entire 
population. It might relate to a relatively localised public (e.g. a small community or 
interest group) or to the wider public at large.’679 This aspect of the SIC definition 
highlights an important feature of public interest theory examined in Chapter 4: the 
inherently contextual nature of the concept but also the importance of how you frame 
‘the public’ when assessing the public interest in a particular matter.680 The SIC rightly 
emphasises that ‘the public’ in the public interest will not necessarily refer to what is in 
the interests of the population as a whole; rather, how ‘public’ the public interest must 
be is determined by the relevant context of a particular case and especially in light of 
any impact caused to particular individuals, groups or wider society.681 
 
How do these understandings of the public interest differ from what is understood of 
the concept in data protection? One critical difference is that in freedom of information 
                                                
677 Scottish Information Commissioner (n 664) 1. 
678 ibid. 
679 ibid. 
680 See Chapter 4 Section 4.1.2. 
681 This approach to ‘publics’ echoes Article 8 jurisprudence of the ECtHR. See Chapter 4 Section 
3.2.2.C. 
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law the private interests of the individual requesting the information ‘…are not in 
themselves the same as the public interest and what may serve those private interests 
does not necessarily serve a wider public interest.’682 While this is a valid point and 
internally consistent with the aims of freedom of information law, this must be 
contrasted to the data protection context where the protection of individual 
informational privacy is in itself a public interest. It must be treated as such to remain 
consistent with the dual aims of data protection law and to ensure that the rights and 
interests of many (e.g. in a publicly beneficially form of data processing) are not always 
overriding the rights and interests of a few data subjects.683 This highlights an important 
and generalisable feature of the public interest – that although the facts in every case 
may change, the legitimate interpretation of the public interest within a particular legal 
context, should be directed by the aims of the legislation in question: 
 
Indeed, the expression ‘in the public interest’, when used in a statute, classically 
imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined 
factual matters, confined only ‘in so far as the subject matter and the scope and 
purpose of the statutory enactments may enable ... given reasons to be 
(pronounced) definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have 
had in view’[.]684 
 
Next I consider in more detail the practical aspects of the ICO and SIC guidance on 
the operation of the public interest test. 
2.3.2 Factors to consider in the public interest test 
As noted by the UK solicitor Estelle Dehon, addressing the public interest test in 
freedom of information law is not a matter of ‘divining’, but rather: 
 
There is now a rich framework of tribunal and court decisions within which 
decision-makers can operate to discern and evaluate the factors relevant to the 
public interest in disclosure and the public interest in maintaining the various 
exemptions. So, while the actual exercise of judgment may remain challenging, 
                                                
682 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 7. 
683 Or, alternatively, that understandings of the public interest in processing are confined only to 
processing which benefits a ‘preponderance’ of individuals. Both ideas must be avoided. See Chapter 4 
Section 4.1.1. 
684 O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) HCA 61 [13], cited by Carter and Bouris (n 645) 5. Although this quote is 
from a High Court of Australia decision, this statement exemplifies the role often attributed to the 
public interest by the courts in common law jurisdictions. 
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it is a task at which decision-makers, and their advisers, should become 
increasingly adept.685  
 
Those navigating the public interest conditions in data protection have reason to be 
jealous of their freedom of information colleagues. Not only has the ICO and SIC 
guidance attempted to define the conceptual contours of the public interest, both have 
outlined ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ factors for public authorities to consider (or 
disregard) when addressing the public interest test. While the public interest must be 
considered in context, certain principles or factors can be generalised to help decision-
makers take public interest decisions in the first instance as they must do in both the 
data protection and freedom of information contexts. Both the ICO and SIC created 
its guidance based on decisions and case law where the public interest test has been 
addressed, outlining factors that were considered to support an exemption or 
disclosure. Below I consider the key factors the ICO and SIC have extracted from the 
wealth of decisions they have taken and from case law.  
 
2.3.2.A Arguments for and against disclosure – the Information 
Commissioner’s Office Guidance 
I have created the table below, which outlines a non-exhaustive list of factors that the 
Information Commissioner considered ‘relevant’ or ‘irrelevant’ to the application of 




Public interest in favour of 
disclosure 
Public interest in 
maintaining the 
exemption 
Transparency Arguments must 
be context specific 
to the exemptions 
claimed; no general 
public interest 
arguments  
Public interest in the issue Public interests 
may be aggregated 
if several 
                                                
685 Estelle Dehon, ‘Divining the Public Interest’ (2016) 12 Freedom of Information 8, 10. 
686 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 9–21. 
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Public interest in the information  
Suspicion of wrongdoing  
Presenting a full picture  
Irrelevant Factors 
Identity of requester 
Private interests of requester 
Information may be misunderstood 
Other means of scrutiny 
Interests of people in other countries 
 
While the substance of the arguments for and against disclosure is not necessarily 
relevant to the data protection context, the way these factors were evaluated by the 
Information Commissioner is. In considering this list of factors, the ICO has focused 
on providing a list of the principles underlying certain arguments e.g. the public interest 
in presenting a full picture of an issue where more specified examples are given and 
then a specific case is referenced in order to illustrate the principle in action.687 A 
further noteworthy observation is that the factors in favour of maintaining an 
exemption are fewer (consistent with the prioritisation of disclosure under the 
legislation) and are not substantively defined. Here the ICO has directed the reader of 
its guidance to the appropriate procedure.  
 
As to the appropriate procedure for applying the public interest test, public authorities 
must support their case for maintaining an exemption with arguments specific to the 
public interests involved regarding the particular exemption claimed.688 For example, if 
arguing that the qualified exemption in section 27 of the FOIA 2000 applies, the public 
                                                
687 For example, as to an argument in favour of disclosure, that the information would present the full 
picture, the ICO specifies that ‘For example, this may well be a public interest argument for disclosing 
advice given to decision makers. The fact that the advice and the reasons for the decision may be 
complex does not lessen the public interest in disclosing it and may strengthen it.’ The ICO then 
illustrates the principle further by presenting a FTTIR case note on Cabinet Office and Christopher Lamb v 
Information Commissioner. The case concerned a request for Cabinet meeting minutes where the Attorney 
General’s advice on the Iraq war was discussed. In deciding that the minutes should be disclosed, ‘the 
majority considers that the value of disclosure lies in the opportunity it provides for the public to make 
up its own mind on the effectiveness of the decision- making process in context.’ EA/2008/0024 
AND EA/2008/0029 (2009) [82]. 
688 Based on Christopher Martin Hogan and Oxford City Council v Information Commissioner (‘Hogan’) 
EA20050026 and 0030 (2006) [59] cited with approval in ICO, Decision Notice FS50488117 Ministry of 
Justice (2013) [26]-[27]. 
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authority must assert specific reasons why disclosure would prejudice, or would likely 
prejudice, the relations between the UK and a particular state. In such a case, it would 
be irrelevant that disclosure would also prejudice the formulation of government policy 
unless the section 35 exemption was also being claimed. The guidance alerts public 
authorities to the stricter scrutiny of their public interest claims for maintaining an 
exemption: 
 
While the public interest considerations against disclosure are narrowly 
conceived, the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure are broad-
ranging and operate at different levels of abstraction from the subject matter 
of the exemption.689 
 
This stricter scrutiny is made clear when considering the more extensive and broadly 
construed list of factors in favour of disclosure. Also indicative of the high standard to 
meet are the factors which are considered ‘irrelevant’ or should be disregarded when 
applying the public interest test; these ‘irrelevant’ factors include, for example, the 
extent to which other public authorities might be able to provide scrutiny and oversight 
on the situation, and the motivations of the requester and thus the potentially vexatious 
nature of the request.690 
 
In addition, the ICO’s explanation of how to attach weight to the public interest 
arguments for or against disclosure is instructive.691 Factors that may tip the balance in 
one way or the other include: 1) the likelihood of prejudice to occur to the public 
authority; 2) the severity of that prejudice; 3) the age of the information; 4) the nature 
of the specific information and public interest in disclosure; and 5) whether the 
information is already in the public domain. More generally as to the ‘weighting’ 
process, the ICO provides that: 
 
Once the public authority has identified the relevant public interest arguments 
for maintaining the exemption and for disclosure, it must then assess the 
relative weight of these arguments, to decide where the balance of public 
interest lies. This is not an exact process, but the authority should try to 
approach it as objectively as possible. If the Commissioner is dealing (sic) the 
case, we will consider these arguments, or consider other public interest 
                                                
689 Hogan (n 688) [60]. 
690 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 16–20. 
691 ibid 22–26. 
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arguments that the authority did not include, and may reach a different 
conclusion.692 
 
Although this is hardly explicit, the Information Commissioner is indicating the 
standard to which they will evaluate a public authority’s application of the public 
interest test; that their claims will be evaluated on an objective rather than subjective 
basis. In other words, the Information Commissioner might ask: are the public 
authority’s claims that disclosure would, or would likely, prejudice them, the 
government or the public, an objectively reasonable claim? This passage also alerts the 
public authority to the fact that the Information Commissioner will consider the public 
interest test de novo without deference to the public authority’s own findings. Thus, it is 
in their best interests to identify and document their consideration of the public interest 
on both sides and as objectively as possible. The prospect of an objectively reasonable 
standard being applied, de novo review and the clear prioritisation of disclosure 
supported elsewhere in the guidance (and in the legislation), provides public authorities 
with an unambiguous steer on the way in which their decisions to not disclose 
information will be evaluated. 
 
In considering this section, taken together with the other guidance provided, the ICO 
goes some way to providing public authorities a principled basis for applying the public 
interest test to their own circumstances. They have prescribed an approach capable of 
application by public authorities in a way that is consistent and internally coherent with 
the aims of freedom of information law. Their guidance can be said to instil confidence 
in decision-makers; confidence that they can apply the public interest test robustly as 
they are aware of the standards which will apply if the Information Commissioner 
reviews their decisions. As argued in Chapter 4, even if we have a descriptive 
understanding of the public interest – in the form of examples – to make a legitimate 
public interest determination on subject matter beyond these factual confines, 
decision-makers need criteria to assess the public interest in their own context. In 
considering the entirety of the ICO guidance on the public interest test, I would suggest 
that the following set of principles have been provided to guide public authorities when 
                                                
692 ibid 22 (emphasis added). 
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applying the public interest test to their own freedom of information circumstances. 
These principles are represented in the table on the following page. 
Table 2 
Prioritisation of disclosure  The primary purpose of freedom of 
information law is to facilitate the 
disclosure of public-sector information. 
The duty to disclose continues unless the 
public interest in maintaining an exemption 
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. 
The public interest v what interests the 
public  
The public interest can cover a broad range 
of values and principles related to the 
public good, but should be distinguished 
from what interests the public. 
Context sensitivity Even if certain public interests are inherent 
to matters related to freedom of 
information, such as the public interest in 
transparency and accountability, their 
presence are not dispositive. The public 
interest in disclosure and in favour of 
maintaining an exemption must always be 
examined in context of each case. 
Identify and document public interest 
determination 
Public authorities must identify the public 
interests in favour of disclosure and in 
favour of maintaining the exemption – 
there are always arguments to be made on 
both sides and these must be considered as 
objectively as possible. Public authorities 
should document their consideration of 
these issues. 
Narrow understanding of the public 
interests in favour of non-disclosure  
Whereas the public interests in favour of 
maintaining an exemption must be 
construed narrowly, the public interests in 
favour of disclosure can be more broadly 
understood. Arguments in favour of 
maintaining an exemption must be specific 
to the exemption(s) claimed. 
In the event of a ‘tie’, disclosure prevails Once the public interests on both sides 
have been identified, and appropriate 
weight given to the different factors at 
issue, if the balancing seems equal, 
disclosure must prevail. 
 
While these principles are generic, when coupled with the more detailed list of relevant 
and irrelevant factors (with even more detail added by their reference to specific cases), 
public authorities are well equipped apply the public interest test without the 
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uncertainty which plagues application of the public interest conditions in data 
protection law. Below I will briefly consider how the SIC guidance differs and 
contributes to Scottish public authorities’ understanding of the public interest test in 
freedom of information law in Scotland. 
 
2.3.2.B Arguments for and against disclosure – the Scottish Information 
Commissioner’s Guidance 
I have created the following table, which outlines a non-exhaustive list of factors the 
SIC has considered ‘should’ or ‘should not’ be relevant when a Scottish public authority 
applies the public interest test; these are based on decisions taken by the SIC.693 
 
Table 3 
Factors which should be taken into account  
Factors which should not be 
taken into account 
Public interest in 
maintaining the 
exemption 





national security or 
international 
relations 
General public interest that 
information is accessible 
Embarrassment to Government 
or Public Officials 
Disclosure would 
impact negatively 
on an individual’s 
right to privacy 
Disclosure contributing to 
the administration of justice 
and enforcement of the law 
The ‘seniority’ of officials 
involved 
Ensuring effective oversight 
of public expenditure and 
that the public obtain value 
for money 
Potential loss of confidence in 
Government or specific public 
authorities 
Public adequately informed 
of dangers to public health, 
safety or environment 
Risk of the requester 
misinterpreting the information 
once received 
Ensuring public authorities 
adequately discharge their 
duties 
 Ensure fairness in regards to 
applications, complaints, 
reveal malpractice or correct 
misleading claims 
  
 Contribute to debates on 
matters of public interest 
  
                                                
693 Scottish Information Commissioner (n 664) 3–4. 
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The SIC has provided a more descriptive list of factors which can be contrasted to the 
broader list of principles provided by the ICO. Despite being more descriptive, the 
SIC makes clear that ‘This is not an exhaustive list, but gives an indication of the sort 
of issues authorities should be considering.’694 Whereas the ICO guidance refers to the 
apparently ‘inherent’ public interest in transparency (in favour of disclosure) or in 
preventing ‘prejudice’ (in favour of non-disclosure) no such categorical statements are 
made within the SIC guidance as to any example of the public interest. What is of great 
value is the SIC’s detailed guidance on each of the qualified exemptions, where they 
reference cases where both disclosure and non-disclosure prevailed. For example, 
consider the guidance as to section 27 of the FOISA 2002 which provides a qualified 
exemption from disclosure on the basis that 1) a public authority plans to publish the 
information within the next 12 weeks or 2) a university has obtained information in, 
or derived from, a ‘programme of research’, provided they are planning to publish the 
research.695 The guidance poses key questions that a public authority should consider 
when seeking to maintain this exemption. Thus, the SIC appears to offer more 
contextually-based considerations than the ICO, which is helpful for public authorities 
in identifying the specific public interest arguments in favour of maintaining particular 
exemptions.  
 
A further contrast is that the SIC guidance does not explicitly state that the public 
interests favouring non-disclosure must be narrowly construed (as provided in the ICO 
guidance 696 ). However, a high threshold still clearly applies to Scottish public 
authorities who wish to withhold information based on several of the qualified 
exemptions.697 Under certain exemptions, Scottish public authorities must demonstrate 
that the prejudice from disclosure would be ‘substantial’. 698 Carter and Bouris consider 
that ‘ …making the exemption provisions in the Scottish FOI Act more difficult to 
satisfy… a likely result [is] that more information will be released under the Scottish 
                                                
694 ibid 3. 
695 Scottish Information Commissioner, ‘Information Intended for Future Publication’ 
<http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/Law/FOISA-EIRsGuidance/section27/Section27.aspx>. 
696 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 11. 
697 FOISA 2002: s 27(2)(b); s 28(1); s 30; s 31(4); s 32(1)(a); s 33(1)(b); s 33(2); s 35; s 40. 
698 ibid. 
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legislation than will be the case under the UK legislation.’699 If we consider that the 
primary aim of freedom of information law is to provide citizens with a general right 
to access public authorities’ records, it is arguable the SIC’s handling of qualified 
exemptions is something to be emulated within the rest of the UK. 
 
2.4 Generalisable and distinguishing features of the public interest in 
freedom of information law 
Much can be learned from the way in which the public interest test has been 
successfully deployed in the freedom of information context. The ICO and SIC have 
created comprehensive guidance on the public interest test arguably providing the 
maximum amount of detail and guidance possible for a determination as inherently 
context sensitive as the public interest is. The ICO’s approach has been to provide a 
more principled basis for understanding the operation of the test; defining an approach 
that is more generally applicable to a wide variety of factual circumstances. In contrast, 
the SIC provided more succinct guidance on the public interest test with a detailed 
analysis of each exemption; this too is of great value when considering that the public 
interest must always be examined within the relevant context and facts of each case. 
Combining the set of principles provided in the ICO guidance with the context-based 
analysis of each exemption by the SIC, provides an exemplar of guidance on the 
implementation of the public interest concept. Admittedly, decisions on the public 
interest test in freedom of information law are not taken in this hybrid manner. 
However, in the analogous context of data protection, with the dearth of case law and 
guidance on the public interest conditions, there is an opportunity to develop and take 
such an approach which is made possible by the current activities and capabilities of 
the ICO. 700  
 
The ICO already conducts voluntary ‘advisory visits’ to data controllers across the 
UK.701 During these visits the ICO provides ‘…practical advice to organisations on 
                                                
699 Carter and Bouris (n 645) 81 (emphasis added). 
700 In Chapter 6 I propose various ‘solutions’ to the dearth of guidance and interpretation of the public 
interest conditions. 
701 ‘Advisory Visits’ (ICO, 2016) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/improve-your-
practices/advisory-visits/>. 
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how to improve data protection practice. It normally involves a one-day visit from the 
ICO and a short follow up report.’702 Alongside such advisory visits, which proactively 
support and promote good data protection practices, the ICO also provides data 
controllers with the opportunity to apply for more formal audits of their information 
handling practices703 and undertakes various enforcement actions.704   
 
These engagements activities are not only about what the organisations receive. From 
these activities, the ICO obtains rich information on data controller practices, from 
which they can document the types of contexts in which the public interest conditions 
are most relevant and typically arise. The ICO is therefore in a prime position to extract 
the broader principles that should govern an approach to the public interest conditions. 
These interactions would also allow the ICO to offer more contextualised guidance 
with examples on the applicability of the conditions in specific sectors by drawing upon 
its experience in working with a wide range of data controllers. Under section 51 of 
the DPA 1998 the ICO is already obliged to develop and disseminate codes of practice. 
As argued in Chapter 2, guidance on alternatives to consent or anonymisation, which 
would include the public interest conditions, is long overdue. Even though such 
engagement activities are clearly already part of the ICO’s mandate, I suggest that the 
incentive to engage with data controllers in this way and provide this guidance will only 
increase because of the GDPR (and later, Brexit), whereby the public interest 
conditions will have increased relevance for a variety of processing contexts and data 
controllers.  
 
In contrast to the rather successful use of the public interest concept in freedom of 
information law, in the section below I consider the public interest defence in 
copyright. Despite a series of landmark cases on the issue, the public interest defence 
in copyright remains subject to significant uncertainty as to its scope and legal status. 
                                                
702 ibid. 
703 ‘Audits’ (ICO, 2016) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/improve-your-practices/audits/>. The 
ICO conducts ‘audits’ to offer more formal assessments of whether an organisation is following good 
data protection practice.   
704 ‘Action We’ve Taken’ (ICO, 2016) <https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/>. Including 
enforcement notices, monetary penalties, undertakings and prosecutions.  
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3. The Public Interest Defence in Copyright Law 
A common law defence to a claim of copyright infringement is that the unlicensed use 
of a protected work is allowable on public interest grounds. Section 171(3) of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) stipulates that Part I of the CDPA 
will have no impact on ‘…any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of 
copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.’705  Section 171(3) does not 
further define the scope of this ‘defence’. Indeed, the defence predates the CDPA. The 
public interest defence was originally developed in a series of cases involving both 
claims of copyright infringement and breaches of confidence where the public interest 
in disclosure was considered to outweigh the public interest in protecting the 
intellectual property and confidentiality of the information in question.706 The public 
interest defence in copyright is best understood as ‘…a defence sitting outwith the 
statutory regime that would justify the publication of copyright material in certain 
circumstances.’707 Thus it can be distinguished from the range of statutory permitted 
acts which allow the use of copyrighted material for particular purposes, such as for 
research708, news reporting709 and more recently caricature, parody and pastiche710. 
 
The role of the public interest concept is seemingly vaguer and more limited in 
copyright than in other areas of law such as whistleblowing (examined below) and 
freedom of information. The public interest is not integral to interpreting copyright 
law but instead provides a ‘failsafe’ defence for alleged copyright infringers who cannot 
otherwise defend their use of protected works. In this more limited role, the public 
                                                
705 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), s 171(3). 
706 Notably including Beloff v Pressdram [1973] 1 All ER 241 and Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 
526. As examined in Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell 
2002); Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016).; on Lion: 3-432, 3-
436, 21-107.  
707 Robert Burrell and Allison Coleman, ‘The Public Interest Defence’, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital 
Impact (CUP 2005) 80. 
708 CDPA, s 29. Research and private study are permitted acts but they must be for non-commercial 
purposes and provide appropriate acknowledgement.  
709 CDPA, s 30(2). This applies to the reporting of current events so long as appropriate 
acknowledgement is given. Acknowledgement is not required where the reporting is by sound 
recording or film. 
710 In October 2014, the UK Government added ‘caricature, parody and pastiche’ to the list of 
permitted acts in the CDPA, Section 30(a). These were ‘optional’ exceptions in under the Information 
Society Directive i.e. it was permissible but optional for Member States to implement these. (Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001), Art 5(3)(k). 
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interest defence offers courts an uncertain scope of discretion in their enforcement of 
copyright, to ensure that it does not run counter to an overriding ‘public interest’. The 
question is, does the law sufficiently define what sorts of public interests may outweigh 
a ‘…copyright owner’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his/her property’711 and the 
conditions where this defence would be successful? What comparisons can be made 
to the data protection context and what might be learned from the uncertainty which 
surrounds the public interest defence? 
 
3.1 The evolution of the public interest defence at common law 
To understand the current uncertainty surrounding the defence and any relevant 
lessons for data protection, it is important to trace the key elements of the defence as 
it developed at common law.  
 
The public interest defence in copyright was initially developed in the case of Beloff v 
Pressdram.712 In Beloff, Mr Justice Ungoed-Thomas explained that the public interest 
defence was available in copyright because of its role as a general principle of common 
law rather than being a defence specific to copyright, such as fair dealing.713 He did not 
provide that the defence would be available in all copyright right cases, only that it was 
available as a ‘tool’ to the Courts as it would be in any case. The public interest defence 
was to be limited to disclosures of copyrighted material that revealed illegal or 
otherwise immoral behaviour including: 
 
…matters carried out or contemplated, in breach of the country's security, or 
in breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud, or otherwise destructive of the 
country or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and 
doubtless other misdeeds of similar gravity.714 
 
                                                
711 John Bowers QC and others, ‘Whistleblowing and Copyright’, Whistleblowing: Law and Practice (OUP 
2012) 308. 
712 Beloff (n 706). The origins of the public interest defence is considered in more detail by Robert 
Burrell, ‘Defending the Public Interest’ [2000] European Intellectual Property Review 394, 400–403; 
Alexandra Sims, ‘The Denial of Copyright Protection on Public Policy Grounds’ (2008) 30 European 
Intellectual Property Review 189, 189–191; Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Pre-Empting Conflict – a Re-
Examination of the Public Interest Defence in UK Copyright Law’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 76, 79. 
713 Beloff (n 706) [259]. 
714 ibid [260]. 
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This narrow conception of the public interest defence can be traced back to the breach 
of confidence case Gartside v Outram where the defence was limited to cases where 
disclosure would expose iniquity: ‘… there is no confidence as to the disclosure of 
iniquity. You cannot make me the confidant of a crime or a fraud’.715 Although it is not 
the purpose here to further analyse the defence in breach of confidence, it is important 
to acknowledge that the defence in copyright arose out of the reasoning applied in breach 
of confidence cases including in particular Gartside, Initial Services Limited v Putterill and 
Fraser v Evans.716 The application of breach of confidence reasoning to the copyright 
context would later contribute to the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the defence 
in copyright. 
3.1.1 A broader public interest defence: Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans 
By 1985, the public interest defence in copyright had seemingly evolved from the 
narrow parameters of its birth in Beloff while leaving important questions relating to the 
scope of the defence unanswered.  
 
In Lion Laboratories Lord Justice Griffiths broke away from this narrower scope of the 
defence. Lion Laboratories was a case involving whistleblowing (a topic to be discussed 
in Section 4 below), where a manufacturer of breathalyser devices was claiming both 
breach of confidence and copyright infringement. Their former employees removed 
internal memoranda which questioned the reliability of the plaintiff’s breathalyser 
devices and these were subsequently disclosed to the press. Although the documents 
were confidential and protected by copyright, the plaintiff’s interlocutory injunction 
was overturned. It was deemed in the public interest to expose the unreliability of the 
devices given the potential for wrongful convictions of drink-driving. While failing to 
distinguish between the scope of the defence in breach of confidence versus in 
copyright, Lord Justice Griffiths explicitly stated that the public interest defence was 
not limited to matters of iniquity (as provided in Beloff): 
 
I am quite satisfied that the defence of public interest is now well established 
in actions for breach of confidence and, although there is less authority on the 
point, that it also extends to breach of copyright…I can see no sensible reason 
                                                
715 Gartside v Outram (1857) 26 Ch 113 [114]. 
716 Gartisde (n 715); Initial Services Limited v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396; Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349. 
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why this defence should be limited to cases in which there has been 
wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff…it is not difficult to think of instances where, 
although there has been no wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff, it may be vital in the public 
interest to publish a part of his confidential information.717 
 
It seems that the Court was attempting to strike a balance between the various public 
interests at stake, including 1) protecting the rights of copyright holders, 2) maintaining 
confidentiality between an employer and their employees and 3) the public interests 
served through disclosure. In this case, preventing the possible miscarriage of justice 
through disclosure was considered to outweigh the other public interests at stake, not 
least because of the potential for false positives on the faulty breathalysers which raised 
‘…a serious question concerning a matter which affects the life, and even the liberty, 
of an unascertainable number of Her Majesty’s subjects’.718  
 
Nevertheless, the judgment in Lion Laboratories provided little that could be generalised 
when considering the applicability of the defence in other copyright cases; that is, other 
than the fact that the defence would not be limited to cases where the copyright holder 
is guilty of some wrongdoing. The Court failed to clarify the boundaries between the 
defence in copyright versus in breach of confidence. Is the defence available in all 
copyright cases (as in breach of confidence) or just part of the Court’s inherent 
discretion to refuse an injunction?719 This question remained unanswered as the Court 
conflated consideration of the public interest in copyright and in confidentiality as the 
public interest in confidential information:  
 
The first public interest is the preservation of the right of organisations, as of 
individuals, to keep secret confidential information. The courts will restrain 
breaches of confidence, and breaches of copyright, unless there is just cause or 
excuse for breaking confidence or infringing copyright.720 
 
The Court further failed to address the range of reasonable and permissible public 
interests that may outweigh the interests of a copyright-holder in any given case, only 
to provide that ‘…“[iniquity] is merely an instance of just cause or excuse for breaking 
                                                
717 Lion Laboratories (n 706) [550] (emphasis added). 
718 ibid [546].  
719 A question raised by Griffiths (n 712) 80. 
720 Lion Laboratories (n 706) [536]. 
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confidence.”’ 721  Lord Justice Stephenson did place certain limitations on the 
applicability of the defence including ‘…(i) that it would only apply where disclosures 
genuinely served the public interest and (ii) that it would generally only cover 
disclosures to the appropriate authorities rather than to the public at large’.722 Without 
further defining what types of disclosures would genuinely serve the public interest in 
the context of copyright (as opposed to breach of confidence) this reasoning did not 
improve understandings of the range of public interests that could be relevant to 
consider in copyright infringement. As discussed in Section 2.4 above, regarding 
freedom of information law, the provision of examples of the public interest coupled 
with relevant principles or criteria can better support decision-makers’ application of 
the public interest in a particular context – something which seems lacking in copyright 
(and data protection). 
3.1.2 One step forward and two steps back: the narrowing of the public 
interest defence in Hyde Park and Ashdown 
The scope of the defence was later significantly narrowed in Hyde Park Residence Ltd v 
Yelland723 where the Court of Appeal ruled that the CDPA did not provide a generally 
applicable public interest defence to copyright infringers.724 The facts surrounding Hyde 
Park are well known as they relate to claims of copyright infringement and breach of 
confidentiality in regards to still images from security footage capturing Diana Princess 
of Wales and Mr. Dodi Fayed the day before their deaths in 1997.725 Copies of these 
images were given to a reporter at The Sun from a security guard who worked at the 
villa where the security footage was originally captured. The Sun defended publication 
based on fair dealing under section 30(2) of the CDPA and that publication was not 
unlawful because it was in the public interest. Mr Justice Jacobs upheld both these 
defences and dismissed the claim. 
 
                                                
721 Lion Laboratories (n 706) [537]. 
722 Griffiths (n 712) 80. 
723 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2000] 3 WLR 215 (‘Hyde Park II’). 
724 ibid [43] (Aldous LJ). 
725 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland and others [1999] EWHC Patents 247 (‘Hyde Park I’). 
 
Chapter 5 Apples and Oranges? (In)consistencies of the Public Interest Concept in Freedom of 
Information, Copyright and Whistleblowing Law 
 
210 
On appeal, the Court reversed this judgment concluding that neither a defence based 
on fair dealing or the public interest could succeed.726 Of relevance to the discussion 
here is how Lord Justice Aldous interpreted the scope of the public interest defence. 
Seemingly reverting to the narrow scope in Beloff, he stated that section 171(3) of the 
CDPA merely acknowledged a court’s inherent jurisdiction to refuse to enforce an 
action for infringement if it would be contrary to public policy.727 Thus it would seem 
the public interest, at least in terms of this ‘defence’, had no independent meaning from 
the defence more generally available at common law. The Court of Appeal endorsed 
this narrower version of the defence, where it would be applicable only if wrongdoing 
would be prevented and or revealed through disclosure: 
 
…a court would be entitled to refuse to enforce copyright if the work is: (i) 
immoral, scandalous or contrary to family life; (ii) injurious to public life, public 
health and safety or the administration of justice; (iii) incites or encourages 
others to act in a way referred to in (ii).728 
 
Lord Justice Aldous argued this on a principled basis; that the statutory nature of 
copyright law versus the judicial origins of breach of confidence made it inappropriate 
for the courts (in cases of copyright infringement) to subvert the clear intentions of 
Parliament to limit the use of protected works to those permitted in the CDPA.729 He 
considered that these permitted acts ‘…would therefore appear to set out in detail the 
extent to which the public interest overrides copyright’ and on this basis it would be 
inappropriate for the Court to disrupt this carefully constructed balance between 
copyright and other public interests.730  
 
Moreover, Lord Justice Aldous considered this narrower form of the defence more 
appropriate for copyright (than the broader form in breach of confidence) because: ‘(i) 
copyright protected only form, and not underlying facts or ideas, and (ii) international 
copyright treaties did not permit the maintenance of a broad “public interest” 
principle.’ 731  In his concurring opinion, Mance LJ distinguished reasons why the 
                                                
726 Hyde Park II (n 683) [40], [67] (Aldous LJ). 
727 ibid [44]. 
728 ibid [66]. 
729 ibid [43]. 
730 ibid. 
731 Griffiths (n 712) 82.  
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broader form of the defence is acceptable and appropriate in the breach of confidence 
context versus in copyright. As to breach of confidence, Lord Justice Mance provides 
that: 
 
Confidential information is information about A’s affairs which B possesses, 
but in respect of which B may owe A a duty not to disclose the information to 
others. Confidence and secrecy on the one hand and disclosure and publication 
on the other lie at opposite ends of one and the same continuum. Protection 
of confidence depends on the force of A’s interest in maintaining secrecy. 
Freedom to publish depends on the force of competing considerations such as 
the public interest in knowing the truth.732 
 
He then contrasts this to copyright: 
 
Copyright is by contrast a property right, conferring on A alone the exclusive 
right to do certain acts in relation to certain works including sound recordings 
and films. It protects the form of such works and not any information which 
they contain as such. And it is regulated by statute. Section 30 of the Act of 
1988 expressly allows fair dealing with certain works for the purpose of 
criticism or review or of reporting current events. Copyright does not lie on 
the same continuum as, nor is it the antithesis of, freedom of expression. The 
force of an owner’s interest in the protection of his copyright cannot be weighed in the same 
direct way against a public interest in knowing the truth.733 
 
On this reasoning, Lord Justice Mance considered that the range of public interests 
that could legitimately outweigh the rights of a copyright holder should be interpreted 
narrowly because the CDPA had already ‘spoken’ on this issue (i.e. in its explicit 
provision of permitted acts). The different purpose and nature of rights and interests 
at stake in copyright versus breach of confidence cases meant that the public interest 
concept was intended to play different roles. Although, it should be noted, that Lord 
Justice Mance could not define the precise circumstances in which the public interest 
could legitimately play a role in copyright.734 
                                                
732 Hyde Park II (n 683) [75] (Mance LJ). 
733 ibid [76] (emphasis added). 
734 Mance LJ stated: ‘…the circumstances in which the public interest may override copyright are 
probably not capable of precise categorisation or definition.’ ibid [83]. 
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3.1.3 Narrow versus broad approaches to interpreting the public 
interest  
A comparison, or rather clarification should be made at this juncture as it pertains to 
arguments for and against ‘broad versus narrow’ interpretations of the public interest 
concept. In Hyde Park II we see that the Court of Appeal interpreted the list of 
permitted acts under the CDPA as Parliament explicitly (and exhaustively) defining the 
circumstances in which other public interests may outweigh copyright. A similar 
argument can be imagined in the data protection context by someone opposed to a 
broad interpretation of the public interest conditions. One might argue that the DPA 
1998 already provides a significant ‘list’ of public interests uses of data that are to 
greater and lesser extents exempt from various provisions of the legislation. 735 
Furthermore, if we are to take account of the examples of public interest processing 
provided under the DPD, cumulatively, those might be the only plausible uses of data 
that could be justified based on the public interest. In the often-overlapping context of 
Article 8 of the ECHR, the ECtHR has found that a Member State’s interference with 
an individual’s rights must relate to one of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 
8(2).736  
 
To counter such arguments for the data protection context, first consider that Schedule 
2 paragraph 5(d) of the DPA 1998 provides an explicit and lawful ground for 
processing personal data based on the ‘public interest’ which may be availed by ‘any 
person’, clearly defining the relevant conditions that must be met to rely upon it. 
Compare this to section 171(3) of the CDPA which seems to only reiterate what was 
already true at common law – that no court would have to enforce a copyright if 
enforcement would run counter to opposing (and greater) public interests. Indeed, 
section 171(3) was introduced to ensure that the public interest defence at common 
law would be maintained and not eroded (even accidentally) by the CDPA. 737 
Furthermore, section 171(3) does not provide in any detail what circumstances might 
                                                
735 For example, processing personal data only for the ‘special purposes’, which include journalism, 
literature and art, is exempt from complying with all but the seventh data protection principle so long 
as certain conditions are met. DPA 1998, s 32. 
736 See Chapter 4 Section 3.2.2.A. 
737 HL Deb 23 February 1988, vol 493, col 1162.  
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give rise to a valid public interest defence, potentially indicating that this is a matter 
ultimately decided by the courts on a case-by-case basis, not something for individual 
decision-makers to engage with. In contrast, data protection legislation indicates the 
relevant procedural conditions so that data controllers may rely on the public interest 
conditions i.e. processing must be ‘necessary’, ‘for the exercise of any other functions 
of a public nature’ and ‘in the public interest’. 
 
A second counter argument can be made based on the relevant legislative history. As 
revealed in Chapter 3, the travaux to the DPD clearly demonstrated that the public 
interest provisions and examples given in the recitals were merely examples and not an 
exhaustive list of public interest uses of data.738 The way in which the UK Parliament 
transposed these provisions into the DPA 1998 was done without any reference to 
these examples, arguably leaving this determination even more open to interpretation 
in the UK, including by data controllers who could interpret the public interest concept 
within their relevant context. Moreover, the ‘examples’ of public interests given in the 
DPD were included only because these were lobbied for by particular Member 
States.739 They were added to the DPD without any reference to an overriding theory 
or logic of understanding how the public interest concept relates to data protection. 
Thus, it is entirely unconvincing to argue that data controllers’ or courts’ interpretation 
of the public interest should be confined to this arbitrary list provided in the law.  
 
Third and finally it can be said that in data protection the focus of the public interest 
conditions is on content; whereas in copyright it seems that the law is intended to focus 
upon the form of the work in question. The CDPA confers a negative right on the 
copyright holder; it does not provide the owner a positive right to publish their works. 
Rather, it prohibits others from publishing those works in the same form and does not 
generally prevent the publication of the ideas (the content) within that work. Given the 
focus on form underlying copyright law, there is no authority to assess the public 
interest in the content of a copyrighted work as this would be outside the purpose of the 
                                                
738 See Chapter 3 Sections 2.6.1.3 and 2.7.  
739 See Chapter 3 Section 2.6. 
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statute. The reason for this focus on form rather than content in copyright may be 
attributed to: 
 
an appreciation on the part of the legislature that it is unwise to spell out in too 
much detail what ‘a work’ will look like and from an understandable reluctance 
on the part of the judiciary to engage in consideration of the aesthetic merits 
of a work.740 
 
Now let us reconsider the argument posed at the beginning of this chapter, that the 
public interest is not capable of precise definition and that it may be counter to the public 
interest to claim to have defined it in a final sense. If we consider the approach taken 
by Parliament to copyright, it is arguable that in the data protection context, they 
deliberately did not define the substantive content of the public interest in the 
conditions for processing under the DPA 1998. Just as Parliament was aware of its 
inability to predetermine the aesthetic content of a copyrightable work, there seemingly 
was also an awareness that they could not conclusively define the types of data 
processing which might serve the public interest. Both the aesthetics of a copyrightable 
work and the processing of data require normative judgments that are best left to fact-
sensitive determinations in context. 
 
Nevertheless, as opposed to the regulatory focus of the CDPA on the form of 
copyrighted works, the public interest determination required by Schedule 2, paragraph 
5(d)741 is inherently about content. To justify the processing of personal data on this 
condition, it must be substantively considered to be ‘in the public interest’. It is 
impossible to exhaustively define all forms of data processing that are or would be 
considered in the public interest for the purposes of Schedule 2 of the DPA 1998 (or 
conditions under the DPPSPD 2000). Likewise, it is impossible to say that a public 
interest determination made at one point in time would be valid in the future. This is 
arguably why the public interest is not defined in the DPA 1998 or DPD. Thus, in the 
case of data protection (as opposed to copyright) the same valid (or persuasive) reasons 
to be confined to any predetermined understanding of the public interest are absent. 
Indeed, if we accept the theoretical conclusions reached in Chapter 4, there is no settled 
                                                
740 Burrell and Coleman (n 707) 103. 
741 Or indeed by the DPPSPD 2000, para 9. 
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and pre-determined understanding of the public interest in data protection that could 
be referred to on an ongoing and consistent basis as this would be counter to the essential 
contestability of the concept and its multiplicity (the need to cater for multiple public 
interests, including the protection of informational privacy and in certain uses of data). 
 
3.1.4 The current state of the defence post-Ashdown 
Only months after the decision in Hyde Park II, the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 
1998’) came into force (on 2 October 2000) incorporating into UK law the rights 
contained within the ECHR.742 The impact of this would be that once again the Court 
of Appeal would change tack and re-adjust the apparent scope of the public interest 
defence to give full effect to the HRA 1998 and in particular to Article 10 and the 
freedom of expression.  
 
Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd (‘Ashdown I’) involved a claim for copyright infringement 
on the basis of publication of confidential memoranda belonging to the former leader 
of the Liberal Democrats, Mr Paddy Ashdown.743 These memoranda detailed among 
other events, an important meeting after the general election in May 1997 regarding 
formal co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats and for review of the 
voting system.744 Ashdown publicly discussed his desire to publish these memoranda 
in a memoir. Before Ashdown could publish his memoirs, the Sunday Telegraph obtained 
a copy of the memoranda detailing Ashdown’s meeting minutes from 21 October 1997 
and published three stories on this basis. Ashdown lodged a claim for copyright 
infringement and succeeded, the Vice Chancellor ruling that the HRA 1998 did not 
extend the available defences for copyright infringement. 745  The Sunday Telegraph 
claimed that by section 171(3) of the CDPA the Court could give effect to the right to 
freedom of expression and in certain cases consider it to outweigh the interests of the 
copyright holder. 
 
                                                
742 Incorporated into Scottish law by the Scotland Act 1998 s 57(2) and in Northern Ireland by the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 s 24(1).  
743 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWHC Ch 28 (‘Ashdown I’). 
744 [2001] EMLR 44 [4]-[5] (‘Ashdown II’). 
745 Ashdown I (n 703) [15], [32]. 
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The Court of Appeal in Ashdown II reversed the Vice Chancellor’s ruling and reinstated 
the broader version of the public interest defence developed in Lion Laboratories. First, 
the Court held that:  
 
…rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will 
come into conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act, 
notwithstanding the express exceptions to be found in the Act. In these circumstances, 
we consider that the court is bound, insofar as it is able, to apply the Act in a 
manner that accommodates the right of freedom of expression.746 
 
Second, and specifically as to the public interest defence, the Court found that 
 
Now that the Human Rights Act is in force, there is the clearest public interest 
in giving effect to the right of freedom of expression in those rare cases where this 
right trumps the rights conferred by the Copyright Act. In such circumstances, 
we consider that s 171(3) of the Act permits the defence of public interest to 
be raised.747 
 
Similar to the remarks of Lord Justice Mance in Hyde Park II, the Court did not think 
it was possible to define the scope of the defence any further, beyond that it would 
only arise in very ‘rare’ circumstances.748 Further clouding the discussion around the 
defence, the Court stated that ‘quite apart from the ambit of the public interest defence 
under section 171(3)’ the Court must always consider the potentially overriding public 
interest in the protection of human rights such as the freedom of expression. The 
impact of Ashdown II on the public interest defence is best described by Griffiths: 
 
…the Court of Appeal couched its decision in such dissuasive terms and 
refused so ostentatiously to prescribe a workable definition of the defence that 
it effectively killed it off again. As a result, contemporary commentators 
describe the defence with something approaching bemusement.749 
 
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of the defence has since been exacerbated by 
the introduction of the Information Society Directive which does not permit Member 
States to retain exceptions to copyright in their domestic law that are not explicitly 
provided in the Directive.750 Crucially, there are no exceptions in the Directive which 
                                                
746 Ashdown II (n 704) at [45] (emphasis added). 
747 ibid [58] (emphasis added). 
748 ibid [59].  
749 Griffiths (n 712) 83. 
750 Information Society Directive, Recital 32. 
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are clearly equivalent to the public interest defence in section 171(3) of the CDPA 
calling into question the validity of the defence in the UK. While some have argued 
that a more purposive reading of the Directive supports the application of the public 
interest defence in UK law, 751  it remains subject to considerable uncertainty in 
practice.752 Nor has subsequent case law since Ashdown II clarified the scope of the 
defence. For example, in HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd, Mr Justice 
Blackburne held that the public interest defence did not apply because ‘There is 
nothing in the material before me to indicate that this is or may be one of those rare 
cases where the public interest trumps the rights conferred by the 1988 Act.’753  
 
In attempting to unpack the purpose and function of the public interest defence, 
Griffith persuasively argues that it is intended to act as a form of pre-emption:  
 
When pleaded successfully, the defence has functioned as a form of pre-
emption doctrine, allowing the apparently binding rules of the CDPA, or its 
statutory predecessor, to give way before other, more compelling, legal 
norms.754  
 
This is evident from the case law where the defence has been raised: in those cases, the 
Courts have been tasked with balancing the aims of copyright with the adjacent causes 
of action (mostly breach of confidence). On this analysis, the public interest defence 
in copyright law must be read as part of the wider legal schema that applies to 
information society and should be interpreted with a view to achieving external 
coherence with cognate areas of law. Commentators have considered whether a general 
‘freedom of expression’ exception to copyright law might fare better at achieving this, 
although the precise contours of such a defence is far from certain; moreover, it could 
inevitably lead back to the same normative considerations required under the public 
interest defence – what is sufficiently in the public interest to justify the use of 
                                                
751 Burrell and Coleman (n 707) 107–108; Kevin Garnett, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 
on UK Copyright Law’, Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (OUP 2005) 177–
178. 
752 Griffiths (n 712) 85–88. 
753 [2006] EWHC 522 2008] Ch 57 [180].  
754 Griffiths (n 712) 92. 
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copyrighted material?755 From this bed of uncertainty what can be learned for the data 
protection context? 
 
3.2 Generalisable and distinguishing features of the public interest in 
copyright 
From examining the development of the public interest defence in copyright law, it 
appears that the defence will only succeed in rare cases 1) where a specific statutory 
exception does not apply and 2) that the ‘routine’ use of the defence would undermine 
the compromises made by Parliament to recognise certain discrete exceptions to the 
protection of copyright. The examination of the public interest at work in copyright, 
in this more narrow and uncertain scope, contrasts with and highlights the broader 
function and important role of the public interest conditions for processing personal 
data.  
 
The public interest conditions are not failsafe ‘exceptions’ upon which data controllers 
may ‘defend’ their use of personal data. Rather, the conditions are one of several means 
by which they can legitimise their use of personal or sensitive personal data. It is 
important to distinguish between a defence or exemption on the one hand and a 
provision promoting or facilitating lawful action on the other as this difference in 
function already indicates a great deal about how the public interest should be deployed 
in either context. In the former case, as in copyright, a defence that is without clear 
definition such as under section 171(3) of the CDPA, should (and will) logically apply 
in more narrow circumstances. This can be contrasted to more defined action-
promoting provisions, such as the public interest conditions under the DPA 1998.  
 
To further support this distinction, consider that there is no explicit hierarchy between 
the conditions under Schedule 2 or 3 of the DPA 1998, and thus no risk of 
‘undermining’ the efforts of Parliament if data controllers were to routinely rely upon 
the public interest conditions. To rely upon the public interest to justify the processing 
                                                
755 Yin Harn Lee, Emily Laidlaw and Daithí Mac Síthigh, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression: A 
Literature Review’ (2015) 206–210 <http://www.create.ac.uk/publications/copyright-and-freedom-
of-expression-a-literature-review/>. 
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of personal data is not subverting an otherwise valid statutory route to processing; it is 
specifically in line with the relevant statute (negating such concerns as when applying 
the public interest defence in copyright).  
 
The key lesson learned from copyright is that we must not leave the important task of 
clarifying the function and scope of the public interest conditions to the courts. While 
this may be understandable, if not appropriate, to the application of the narrow public 
interest defence in copyright, the action promoting and integral role played by the 
public interest conditions requires significantly more attention if the conditions are to 
be deployed consistently with the aims of data protection law. Amended legislation and 
authoritative guidance can more successfully guide the application of the public interest 
conditions, as evidenced by the implementation of the public interest concept in 
freedom of information law. 
4. Public Interest Disclosures under Whistleblowing Law  
Whistleblowing refers to ‘…the disclosure by organization members (former or 
current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.’756 In the UK, 
whistleblowing is another area of law where the public interest concept is used without 
being plagued by ambiguity. Under the UK’s Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’), 
as amended by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (‘PIDA’), whistleblowers are 
protected if their disclosures are in the public interest.757 Until June 2013758, the term 
the ‘public interest’ was not explicitly used within the ERA or PIDA; its use was limited 
to the title and introductory text of the PIDA. This prefacing material is nonetheless 
instructive as to the concept’s intended role within the legislation: ‘An Act to protect 
individuals who make certain disclosures of information in the public interest; to allow 
                                                
756 Marcia P Miceli and Janet P Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for 
Companies and Employees (Lexington Books 1992) 15. 
757 The Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’); The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (‘PIDA’). 
758 ERRA, s 17. In 2013, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (‘ERRA’) amended the ERA. To 
qualify as a protected disclosure, individuals would now have to reasonably believe their disclosure was 
‘in the public interest’. I will discuss this point further below.  
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such individuals to bring action in respect of victimisation; and for connected 
purposes.’759  
 
4.1 The meaning of the public interest in whistleblowing law 
The public interest in whistleblowing is in part encapsulated by the subject matter of 
disclosures that qualify for protection, listed under section 43(b) of the ERA. 
‘Qualifying’ disclosures must relate to one of the six specific types of ‘relevant failures’ 
by the employer organisation: 
 
(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely 
to be committed, 
(b)that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal 
obligation to which he is subject,760 
(c)that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, 
(d)that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be 
endangered, 
(e)that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or 
(f)that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the 
preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately 
concealed.761 
 
Thus, in whistleblowing, public interest disclosures are confined to a subset of factual 
circumstances. To be ‘in the public interest’ and qualify for protection under the ERA, 
the disclosure must implicate the subject matter provided in section 43(b). This is 
clearly in contrast to data protection where the meaning of the public interest has been 
left open to interpretation and moreover, the subject-matter of processing that may be 
justifiable in the public interest is impossible to define in a similarly exhaustive sense. 
This is not least because of the constantly growing range of data processing possibilities 
which may serve the public interest in uniquely innovative ways.  
 
In reviewing this list of qualifying disclosures, we can understand the meaning of the 
public interest concept in whistleblowing. Here it seems that the ‘public interest’ is used 
to prevent, shed light on, rectify or mitigate apparent harms to societal interests. In 
                                                
759 PIDA, Introductory text. 
760 Parkins v Sodexho Ltd [2002] IRLR 109 (EAT). After Parkins, Section 43(b) was considered to 
include disclosures regarding the breach of the individual employee’s own contract with the defendant 
employer organisation.  
761 ERA, s 43(b), as inserted by PIDA, s 1. 
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other words: ‘It is in the public interest that negligence in the workplace be eliminated, 
health and safety violations be corrected, and criminal wrongdoing be exposed and 
prosecuted.’762 Concomitantly, the ‘public interest’ in whistleblowing is also clearly 
about protecting the individuals who make disclosures regarding such matters. 763 
Although not made explicit in the introductory text of the PIDA, employee-employer 
confidentiality is also a public interest that is valued and protected within the legislation. 
 
On confidentiality, under section 43(G)(3)(d) of the ERA, the reasonableness of an 
individual’s disclosure will be assessed as to ‘…whether the disclosure is made in 
breach of a duty of confidentiality owed by the employer to any other person’.764 
Protection for whistleblowers is more easily secured when disclosures are made 
internally to employers, seen by the stricter requirements imposed for protection of 
external disclosures to third parties. Therefore, the public interest in maintaining 
confidentiality between an employee and his/her employer is prioritised over the public 
interest in disclosure: ‘[whistleblowing] is perceived as a justified breach of 
confidentiality; hence, intra-organizational disclosure is required, because it permits 
correction of the problem without confidentiality being breached.’765  In summary, 
whistleblowing legislation attempts to: 
 
…strike an intricate balance between (a) promoting the public interest in the 
detection, exposure and elimination of misconduct, malpractice and potential 
dangers by those likely to have early knowledge of them, and (b) protecting the 
respective interests of employers and employees. There are obvious tensions, 
private and public, between the legitimate interest in the confidentiality of the 
employer’s affairs and in the exposure of wrong.766 
 
                                                
762 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, ‘Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998’ (2000) 63 The Modern Law Review 25, 38 (emphasis added). 
763 Consider the introductory text to PIDA: ‘An Act to protect individuals who make certain disclosures 
of information in the public interest; to allow such individuals to bring action in respect of victimisation; and for 
connected purposes’ (emphasis added). 
764 ERA, s 43(G)(3)(d), as inserted by PIDA, s 1. 
765 Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Terry Morehead Dworkin and David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing: Australian, 
U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest’ Virginia Journal of International Law 
879, 899 (emphasis added). 
766 ALM Medical Services Ltd v Bladon [2002] EWCA Civ 1085, [2002] Emp LR 1054 [2]. 
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4.2 The remedial role of the public interest in whistleblowing 
It may seem that it is the role of whistleblower protections to promote a particular 
public interest i.e. in whistleblowing. However, the legislation has been primarily 
motivated by its desired remedial effects; as provided by Callahan et al:  
 
…the discussion of the U.K. legislation emphasized ending ‘the “culture of 
fear” among workers who are afraid to reveal wrongdoing,’ but did not 
mention promoting whistleblowing. Thus, at least publicly, the statute was 
presented as a remedial measure.767 
 
In support of this view, consider that the legislation imposes no positive duties on 
employers to promote whistleblowing or otherwise support it within their 
organisations: ‘…while PIDA may protect whistle-blowers from reprisals, it does not 
obligate an employer to give credence to or do anything about a whistle-blower’s 
charges.’768 Indeed, ‘The Act itself neither encourages nor discourages whistleblowing 
except indirectly.’769 Rather the legislation focuses on deterring organisations from any 
retaliatory action if protected disclosures are made by their employees.770 How does 
this contrast with the public interest conditions? 
 
Under the DPA 1998 the public interest conditions are there to facilitate or further a 
particular public interest served by lawful data processing. Thus, in contrast to the 
ameliorative and protective role of the public interest in whistleblowing, the concept is used 
in data protection to promote certain forms of processing that are perceived as publicly 
beneficial.771 
                                                
767 Callahan, Dworkin and Lewis (n 765) 884. 
768 Gobert and Punch (n 762) 38. 
769 ibid (emphasis added). 
770 In specific sectors, whistleblowing may be more explicitly promoted in future. Consider the recent 
changes to whistleblowing policies in the financial sector, promulgated by the Financial Conduct 
Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority. As of 7 March 2016, large financial institutions (e.g. 
deposit takers with more than £250 million in assets) must have appointed ‘whistleblowing 
champions’ who have ‘…the responsibility for ensuring and overseeing the integrity, independence 
and effectiveness of the firm’ s policies and procedures on whistleblowing’. These new rules seem to 
more explicitly promote whistleblowing than in the more generally applicable ERA. Financial Conduct 
Authority, ‘Accountability and Whistleblowing Instrument 2015’ s 18.4.4 
<https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2015/FCA_2015_46.pdf>. 
771 Similar distinctions can be made, for example, between the role of the public interest in 
whistleblowing as preventative and that in publicity cases. Black argues that ‘Where use of persona is 
necessary to communicate cultural meaning, as advanced by Madow, Coombe, Carty and de Grandpre, 
amongst others, then it should be permitted, on the basis of the public interest in allowing such use. 
Whereas the public interest is typically cited in the context of criminal behaviour or iniquity or public 
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A further distinction should be made here as to the public interest in confidentiality 
protected within the ERA, whereby whistleblowing will almost always violate 
confidentiality between an employee and his/her employer. This contrasts with data 
protection law because the use of personal data is not a violation, per se, of an 
individual’s rights and interests in his/her data. The DPA 1998 does not consider 
individuals’ rights and interests as automatically compromised merely because their 
personal data are processed based on the public interest conditions as opposed to 
consent or some other justification. Moreover, the conceptualisation of the public 
interest put forward in this thesis is that a public interest use of personal data can also 
be directly or indirectly in the interests of an individual, as a member of the relevant 
public.  
 
4.3 The procedure for assessing the public interest in whistleblowing 
To be ‘protected’ a whistleblower’s disclosure must pertain to the subject matter 
referred to in section 43(b) of the ERA (as provided above). The disclosure must also 
conform to a variety of other requirements: 
 
• The individual must actually make the disclosure;772 
• The individual must have a reasonable belief that their disclosure ‘tends to show’ the 
occurrence (or likely occurrence) of one of the relevant failures in section 43(b) of 
the ERA;773 
• The individual must have a reasonable belief that their disclosure ‘is in the public 
interest’;774 
                                                
protection, this alternative ground would see it employed in a more creative and positive context.’ 
Gillian Black, ‘A Right of Publicity in Scots Law’ (University of Edinburgh 2009) 247–248 
<https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/5943/Black2009.pdf?sequence=1>. 
772 The disclosure must convey facts, not merely make an allegation or state the position of the 
whistleblower. Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] IRLR 38 (EAT) [24]-
[26]. 
773 Whereby the whistleblower’s belief must be ‘objectively reasonable’ even if it turns out to be wrong. 
Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] EWCA Civ 174 [75], [79]. 
774 The requirement that disclosures were to be made in ‘good faith’ was repealed in the ERRA, s 18 
and replaced with this requirement to reverse Parkins (n 760). As provided in subsequent case law, 
reviewing the meaning of the ‘public interest’, Mr Justice Supperstone reminded the parties that ‘The 
words “in the public interest” were introduced to do no more than prevent a worker from relying 
upon a breach of his own contract of employment where the breach is of a personal nature and there 
are no wider public interest implications.’ Chesterton Global Ltd (t/a Chestertons) and another v Nurmohamed 
[2015] UKEAT [36].  
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• The individual must abide by the requirements when disclosing to particular parties 
(i.e. to the employer ‘internally’ or to a third party ‘externally’)775. 
 
As stated above, until 2013 there was no explicit use of the term ‘public interest’ in the 
ERA. However, in response to the ruling in Parkins v Sodexho Ltd.776, which provided 
that a qualifying disclosure could encompass the breach of an individual employee’s 
employment contract, the ERRA created a public interest requirement for disclosures. 
Section 18 of the ERRA repealed the requirement that disclosures had to be made in 
‘good faith’777, and replaced this with section 17 which requires disclosures to be made 
in the reasonable belief that it is in the public interest.778 This effectively created a ‘public 
interest’ test to determine whether a disclosure would qualify for protection.  
 
In subsequent case law interpreting this requirement, the Employment Appeals 
Tribunal (‘EAT’) found that a disclosure regarding a potential wrongdoing impacting 
upon ‘100 senior managers’ was sufficiently ‘in the public interest’.779 It did not matter 
that the claimant was primarily concerned with the effect on himself or that the 
employer was a private sector firm as opposed to a public authority.780 Importantly, the 
EAT stated that it was not its duty to consider whether the disclosure was in fact ‘in 
the public interest’ but rather that the claimant reasonably believed it was.781 The 
standard for reasonable belief remained the same as provided for in Babula782 and thus:  
 
…the public interest test can be satisfied where the basis of the public interest 
disclosure is wrong and/or there was no public interest in the disclosure being 
made provided that the worker’s belief that the disclosure was made in the 
public interest was objectively reasonable.783 
 
                                                
775 Disclosure to employers (internally) is promoted within the ERA. There are significantly more 
requirements for disclosures to be protected if the disclosure is made to third parties; particularly strict 
rules are in place for disclosures to the media. ERA, s 43(c)-43(h). 
776 Parkins (n 760). 
777 Previously, ERA, s 43(c)(1). 
778 ERRA, s 17-18. 
779 The claimant’s disclosure was regarding the alleged manipulation of accounts by his employer, with 
potential adverse effect on the bonuses of 100 senior managers including himself: Chesterton (n 774) 
[38]. 
780 Chesterton (n 774) [38]-[39]. 
781 ibid [28]. 
782 Babula (n 773) [75]. 
783 Chesterton (n 774) [34]. 
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When contrasting the public interest test in whistleblowing with the public interest 
conditions in data protection, we see the importance of procedural principles that can be 
applied across different factual circumstances in a consistent manner. Here there are at 
least broad similarities between the procedural requirements for 1) relying upon the 
public interest to protect disclosures and 2) justifying the processing of personal data 
based on the public interest. However, in data protection there lacks a specific 
procedure or standard for reviewing a data controller’s reliance on the public interest 
conditions. The result of this is a lack of consistency in how data controllers, regulators 
and courts will assess the public interest in data processing. How can this consistency 
be achieved?  
 
It is arguable that the more that guidance is provided, within the legislation itself or in 
subsequent cases and regulatory guidance, decision-makers are at least more capable of 
taking a consistent approach to assessing matters of the public interest. For example, 
in freedom of information law, both the ICO and SIC have provided clear guidance in 
extrapolating guiding principles from specific examples of where the public interest in 
maintaining an exemption would outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Both the 
ICO’s and SIC’s guidance allows public authorities to engage more consistently with 
the public interest test. This contrasts with the copyright context where neither the 
CDPA nor subsequent case law has provided guiding principles or clear examples of 
the range of ‘rare’ circumstances in which the public interest test might be applicable. 
Considering the narrower role of the public interest defence, the courts take a far more 
active approach to interpreting the circumstances in which the public interest defence 
applies in copyright.  
 
As argued throughout this thesis, the public interest is an inherently context-sensitive 
concept. Thus, contextual analysis will be required whenever the concept is deployed. 
Nevertheless, it is possible and indeed necessary to draw from specific cases, guiding 
principles for applying the public interest to a context where it plays an action 
promoting role as it does in the public interest conditions in data protection. This level 
of guidance is required if decision makers are to avoid the conceptual vulnerabilities of 
the concept highlighted in Chapter 4 and thus achieve any form of consistency when 
applying the public interest in a legal context. 
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Would introducing a standard of reasonable belief as exists under whistleblowing law 
add any certainty and consistency to the application of the public interest conditions 
in data protection? Using the mixed test of reasonable belief under whistleblowing law 
as a potential model for assessing public interest considerations,784 the reasonableness of 
a data controller relying on the public interest in their data processing would be 
assessed from an objective standpoint but their belief would be assessed subjectively. There 
are at least three distinctions to make between whistleblowing and data protection 
which may explain 1) why such a standard was not introduced in the public interest 
conditions and 2) why it is difficult to anticipate what standard would apply. These 
distinctions centre around the focus in data protection on the substantive content of 
the public interest claim, the lack of any standard, and lack of any requirement, to assess 
a data controller’s reliance on the public interest conditions. 
 
First, in whistleblowing, the focus is on the whistleblower and the reasonableness of 
their belief that their disclosure is in the public interest, as opposed to the focus in data 
protection’s public interest conditions on the substantive and normative content of the 
‘public interest’ claim. In data protection, the focus is on the nature of processing in 
question – whether that processing is necessary for a function ‘of a public nature’ and 
is in the public interest. The focus is not on the data controller and how reasonable their 
beliefs are that any of these requirements have been met. Thus, in data protection, data 
controllers and courts must directly engage with the substance of the question – is this 
processing in the public interest? – a question which is explicitly avoided in 
whistleblowing law.785  
 
                                                
784 In reference to the standard of ‘reasonable belief’ under the ERA where ‘the word belief is subjective 
but the reasonableness of it is to be determined objectively.’ This can be understood as a ‘mixed’ test of 
reasonable belief, as in general legal understandings an ‘objective’ test of reasonable belief requires the 
fact finder to assess the relevant facts from the viewpoint of the hypothetical reasonable man/woman. 
In contrast, a purely ‘subjective’ test would assess the circumstances taking into account the particular 
characteristics of the person/persons in question. A ‘mixed test’, as used in whistleblowing, combines 
these elements (e.g. ‘reasonable belief’ with reasonableness assessed from an objective standpoint but 
belief from a subjective one). David Lewis, ‘Ten Years of Public Interest Disclosure Legislation in the 
UK: Are Whistleblowers Adequately Protected?’ (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 497, 499. 
785 As provided in Chesterton (n 774) [28].  
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Second, and relatedly, unlike the requirements for protected disclosures under the 
ERA, there is no explicit standard for evaluating a data controller’s reliance on the 
public interest conditions. Compared to the freedom of information context, the ICO 
has remained silent on what approach they might take to evaluating data controllers’ 
claims that their processing is justified based on the public interest conditions.786  
 
A third distinguishing characteristic of the public interest in whistleblowing is the fact 
that whistleblowing claims will often revolve around the veracity of the employee’s 
disclosure versus the employer’s own defensive assertions, thus requiring a clear 
standard upon which to evaluate those competing claims. Employees’ (the 
whistleblowers’) disclosures are scrutinised as to the facts conveyed; the reasonable 
belief and public interest in the disclosure and in terms of who the disclosure was made 
to. In data protection, there are currently no requirements for data controllers to 
account for or otherwise substantiate their reliance on a condition for processing 
(although it may be prudent to do so). As such, the ‘legitimacy’ of a data controller’s 
reliance on the public interest is not as explicitly scrutinised as are the claims of a 
whistleblower. It is worth bearing in mind, again, the guidance on the public interest 
test in the freedom of information context where the Information Commissioner 
advises public authorities to identify the public interest arguments on both sides and 
document this.787 It is reasonable to assume that whatever approach is taken by the 
ICO when assessing data controllers’ reliance on the public interest conditions, that it 
would be beneficial for data controllers to produce documentation that demonstrates 
their consideration of the issues. I raise this point specifically in my suggestions for 
amending the public interest conditions in Chapter 6. 
 
In data protection, the principle of proportionality is likely to be key to evaluating a 
data controller’s reliance on the public interest conditions. If the data processing in 
question was proven to not be particularly risky or harmful to the relevant publics and 
                                                
786 While this is not precedent setting for, or directly applicable to interpreting the public interest 
conditions, I consider the application of a reasonable belief standard to s 32 of the DPA 1998 when I 
suggest a mixed test of reasonable belief should be introduced as an amendment to the public interest 
conditions. See Chapter 6 Section 3.2. 
787 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 9. 
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individuals in question, and a data controller could demonstrate that they have thought 
through such considerations, then a potentially more forgiving standard would apply. 
Such a standard could take into consideration the subjective, albeit objectively reasonable, 
belief of the data controller that the processing was necessary in the public interest.788 
This remains pure speculation until such a case arises in the context of the public 
interest conditions.  
 
4.4 Generalisable and distinguishing features of the public interest in 
whistleblowing 
There are clear distinctions in substance, purpose and procedure between the public 
interest in whistleblowing and in data protection law. In whistleblowing, the 
substantive meaning of the public interest is more tightly confined to a set of factual 
circumstances provided in the legislation as opposed to the non-exhaustive list of 
examples of public interest uses of data provided in data protection law. Where the 
public interest plays a more corrective and defensive role in whistleblowing, in data 
protection it takes on a more positive, action supporting role, promoting publicly 
beneficial forms of processing personal data. Although in both areas of law reliance on 
the public interest is conditioned on the satisfaction of particular procedures, the focus 
is materially different. In whistleblowing, the focus is on the claimant: is their claim to 
the public interest reasonable? Whereas with regards to the public interest conditions, 
the focus is on the substance of the claim: is the processing substantively in the public 
interest? It is possible that the lack of an approved standard for evaluating a data 
controller’s claim, that a type of processing is ‘in the public interest’, has been a source 
of discomfort and uncertainty for data controllers. In the following chapter, I will 
explore the need for and viability of introducing a standard of review to evaluate claims 
that the processing of personal data is justified in the public interest.  
                                                
788 See note 784. 
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5. Conclusion: Common and Context Specific Features 
of the Public Interest Concept 
In examining the use of the public interest across freedom of information law, 
copyright and whistleblowing, certain features of the public interest are generalisable and 
applicable to understanding and deploying the concept in data protection.  
 
First, from freedom of information law, we see that the provision of descriptive 
examples is helpful to guide the discretionary and context-sensitive nature of public 
interest determinations. Providing examples where the public interest threshold would 
be met but also examples where the threshold would not be met can provide substance 
to the inherent ambiguity of the concept. Furthermore, although the concept must be 
assessed in context, there are likely to be key principles that can be extracted from 
particular factual circumstances where the public interest is deployed. These can be 
used to focus decision-makers on relevant criteria to consider when applying the public 
interest to their own circumstances, while alerting them to factors which are irrelevant 
and should not play a role in such considerations. The point being, even if bright line 
rules are impossible to give in any context where the public interest concept is 
deployed, it is possible to provide legal clarity on the range of plausible applications in 
a particular context. Comprehensive guidance, including relevant, practical examples 
and guiding principles, is even more critical where individual decision-makers are 
tasked with independently making public interest determinations in the first instance.  
 
Second, from the uncertainty surrounding the role and status of the public interest 
defence in copyright, we see the importance of understanding the role and scope of 
public interest within legislation and how this should dictate the level of guidance 
provided. If the public interest is operating as an exemption or defence in law, this lends 
to narrower boundaries of application. Where the public interest plays this more 
limited role, it may be more appropriate for the courts to determine the circumstances 
where such an exemption or defence applies. In contrast, where the public interest is 
intended to function in a more action-promoting and positive role within the law, this 
requires substantially different legal intervention. The latter case, which applies to the 
public interest conditions in data protection, necessitates authoritative guidance (as 
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opposed to ad hoc judicial interpretations) to provide the detail necessary for the public 
interest to be deployed in these broader circumstances. 
 
Third, from the whistleblowing context, we see the importance of individual decision-
makers knowing in advance how their claims of the public interest will be evaluated by 
regulators and courts. Are their claims evaluated based on what was subjectively 
reasonable to them, will a stricter objective standard apply or a mix of the two as is the 
case in whistleblowing? At what point is the public interest threshold met in a 
particular, legal context? The lack of an approved standard for evaluating a data 
controller’s claim that a particular type of processing is ‘in the public interest’ has been 
a source of uncertainty, a point which I will return to in the following chapter.  
 
The table on the following page summarises the three areas of law considered in this 
chapter as compared with the parameters of data protection law as they currently stand. 
It is the cumulative legal and theoretical analysis undertaken in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 that 
allows me to formulate a new understanding of the public interest concept in data 
protection and to propose new procedures for deploying the public interest conditions 
in Chapter 6. 
 
Table 4 
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Chapter 6 Key Components and 
a New Approach to Making Public 
Interest Determinations in Data 
Protection Law 
1. Introduction 
Data protection law uses the public interest concept at critical legal junctures without 
providing a means to deploy it consistently with either the public interest in protecting 
informational privacy or in certain publicly beneficial uses of data. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the predominant means of compliance with data protection law, through 
consent or anonymisation, is unable to account for, in any meaningful way, the full 
spectrum of rights and interests at stake in any given data processing situation. Indeed 
it hinders both the protection of informational privacy and the undertaking of publicly 
beneficial forms of research. The extensive legal analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 exposed 
conceptual gaps in understanding what the public interest means in data protection. 
This lack of a fuller public interest concept has hindered its deployment in the public 
interest conditions for processing. The theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 provided 
insight on the conceptual boundaries of the public interest and highlighted relevant 
and non-relevant factors for deciding on matters of the public interest in a normative 
sense.  
 
To further test this developing understanding of the public interest as a concept, and 
to broaden the legal evidence base, I examined the use of the public interest in cognate 
areas of law. Analysis of the public interest test in freedom of information, the public 
interest defence in copyright and the public interest test in whistleblowing emphasised 
what should be done and what should be avoided if we are to develop a more objective 
and consistent approach to the public interest conditions in data protection. 
 
Based on this legal and theoretical analysis, in this chapter I set forth the key 
components of a proposed new approach to understanding the public interest concept 
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in data protection and a series of suggested changes to the law and related procedures 
for making public interest determinations. The conceptual insights offered and the 
practical changes suggested present a framework for making public interest 
determinations in data protection law where there currently is none, and for actively 
and more openly considering the multiple public interests at stake.  
 
This chapter begins with a review of the key vulnerabilities of the public interest 
concept (discussed in Chapter 4) which any theory on the public interest must avoid. 
Following this I suggest four key components which should be used to assess the 
public interest in processing and cumulatively represent a new understanding of the 
public interest concept in data protection. I translate this into a public interest 
‘checklist’ for data controllers, which highlights the key questions they must answer 
when assessing the public interest in their processing. This format was devised based 
on the guidance provided by the ICO and SIC (discussed in Chapter 5), which 
successfully enables public authorities to apply the public interest test in the freedom 
of information context. 
 
The remainder of the chapter focuses on establishing for the first time a robust 
procedure for making public interest determinations in UK data protection law. My 
approach builds upon the current law, fills the conceptual gaps identified in Chapter 4 
and takes heed of the lessons learned from freedom of information, copyright and 
whistleblowing legislation in Chapter 5. I suggest both legislative changes and two 
alternative procedures for deploying the new understanding of the public interest 
concept presented. I propose changes to the existing public interest conditions to 
explicitly recognise the public interest (in addition to the private interest) in the 
protection of informational privacy. I further suggest how public interest 
determinations can be made more transparently, and consistently, by introducing a 
mixed test of reasonable belief for assessing a data controller’s reliance on the public 
interest conditions.  
 
The suggested procedural changes are drawn from both the legislation examined in 
Chapter 5 as well as currently working solutions in analogous legal contexts, notably in 
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Australia, where legislation and authoritative guidance make clear how and when public 
interest determinations are made within the scope of federal privacy law. The chapter 
concludes by explaining the key differences between the conceptual and practical 
approach developed in this thesis and the status quo, and therefore how my 
contribution improves and progresses current understandings of the public interest in 
data protection. 
 
2. Vulnerabilities of the public interest 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the public interest concept is inherently difficult to deploy 
in decision making and particularly in legal settings as it is an essentially contested concept.789 
The public interest cannot be defined in any conclusive sense and the ambiguity of the 
term makes it easy to exploit by those in power.790 In any legal setting, not only in data 
protection, the deployment of the public interest concept can become ‘questionable’ 
especially where decisions justified on the basis of the public interest are made in private 
and are not subject to public scrutiny.791 The opacity of such decision-making is not 
only problematic from an individual rights perspective. Where obtaining consent or 
anonymising data are not possible, and despite the potential public interest served by 
processing, data controllers lack the confidence to take decisions based on the public 
interest conditions given the absence of an accepted approach to do so under data 
protection law. In this scenario, publicly beneficial processing may not occur or the 
paradigm of consent or anonymisation is perpetuated to the detriment of individuals, 
data controllers and wider society.792 
 
Below I will review the theoretical problems which plague the deployment of the public 
interest concept to reveal more clearly the vulnerabilities I seek to avoid in the key 
components to the public interest I propose in Section 3.  
 
                                                
789 See Chapter 4 Section 2. Gallie (n 49) 168–169. 
790 Mansbridge (n 49) 4–5. 
791 Flathman (n 573) 527–531; Mansbridge (n 49) 5. 
792 As discussed in Chapter 2. 
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2.1 Beyond empiricism  
Utilitarian conceptions of the public interest equate the concept with that which 
benefits the majority. Thus, the public interest lies in the decision which delivers the 
greatest good to the greatest number of people. Termed ‘preponderance theories’ in 
Held’s typology, these understandings of the public interest favour the majority interest 
despite any possibility that the ‘good’ delivered to the majority is minor if compared to 
the disproportionate, negative harm caused to a smaller number of people. Sorauf 
labels such theories as nothing more than counting noses, 793  meaning that this 
conception can only ever indicate what the majority opinion is. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the public interest is distinct from the majority opinion, or in decision-making terms, 
is different from what is good for the greatest number. What is missing from 
preponderance theories is a way to jump from the empirical fact that ‘x’ course of 
action serves ‘y’ number of people to ‘x’ course of action is normatively in the public 
interest, which is the role assigned to the public interest in the data protection context.  
 
Furthermore, if favouring majority interests, over all other interests, this neglects the 
values and protections embedded within data protection law including the overarching 
scheme of human rights legislation applicable to data processing. Preponderance 
theories do not provide sufficient weight and consideration of compelling minority 
interests which may outweigh the majority interest. The danger here, as described by 
Townend, is that:  
 
[If] one operates with the balance of the individual against the mass, the inevitable 
imbalance in favour of the majority can immediately be understood: a substantial 
damage to the particular individual is soon outweighed by the sum of the 
individually negligible benefits to the other individuals within the collective.794  
 
In data protection, to move beyond current and ineffective approaches to compliance 
where the public interest in privacy is neglected and treated as a mere private interest, 
it is critical that any new theory of the public interest can identify cases where 
protecting individuals’ informational privacy outweighs the benefits of a given form of 
                                                
793 Sorauf (n 56) 625. 
794 Townend (n 28) 99 See also: Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ 
[2009] International Journal of Constitutional Law 471. 
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processing, even if more people stand to benefit from the processing than would be 
harmed from it.  
 
What role does public opinion play in determining which course of action serves the 
public interest? Is ‘the public’ not the best source of knowledge on what is in ‘their’ 
best interest? As Held asserted, the majority interest may well be one of many reasons 
to believe that ‘x’ course of action is in the public interest. 795 However, the deployment 
of the public interest in any given context means that ‘… we want to know something 
else than the empirical fact that it is in the interests of a preponderance of individuals.’796 
The public interest cannot be verified by empirical fact because empirical facts do not 
answer why ‘x’ is or is not normatively in the public interest.797  
 
Nevertheless, meaningful public engagement is crucial to any reliance on the public 
interest to justify the processing of personal data. As evidenced by the care.data debacle 
in England discussed in Chapter 2, data controllers are simply not doing enough 
meaningful public engagement to support their reliance on the public interest to justify 
the processing of personal data. As Taylor argues in context with genetic data, it is not 
at all clear that the law accurately reflects and or understands the expectations of 
individuals as to certain uses of their data; this calls into question the legitimacy of any 
reliance on the public interest to justify such uses.798 The results of meaningful public 
engagement can provide data controllers with a more informed and justifiable basis for 
relying upon the public interest for a given form of processing. Even if public 
engagement exercises cannot conclusively settle the conflicts of interests between those 
for or against a use of data, it can ‘minimize the element of whim and caprice’ and 
accusations of arbitrariness, when relying upon the public interest in decision-
making.799 Certainly, data controllers will be in a better position to make a decision 
regarding the public interest after engaging in public dialogue than before it.800  
                                                
795 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 84. 
796 ibid. 
797 As also argued by: ibid. 
798 Taylor (n 28) 34. 
799 Flathman (n 573) 531. 
800 ibid. 
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In summary, at least three important lessons emerge from my analysis, and ultimately 
my rejection of, preponderance theories:  
• The need to identify cases where the protection of informational privacy 
outweighs the need to pursue a public interest use of data;  
• The need to distinguish between an empirical tabulation of individual 
preferences and the public interest in a normative sense; 
• The value in facilitating public dialogue on data processing initiatives 
justified on the public interest. 
 
These lessons play important roles in my key components of the concept and proposed 
legislative solutions in Sections 3 and 4 below. 
 
2.2 The impossibility of unanimity  
Under common interest theories, the public interest is equated to what is in the 
interests of all individuals, at least in the long run. It is difficult if not impossible to 
imagine any interest that is truly unanimously shared amongst all individuals, or a 
procedure which could accurately tabulate this. Some have tried to compensate for this 
by theorising on the potential for ‘net’ common interests, where on balance, an interest 
can be said to be in everyone’s interest. Under such theories, individuals are understood 
to play various roles in society, as a mother, father, employer, employee, and so forth. 
The one role everyone plays is the role as a member of the public. In this role individuals 
‘will naturally tend to favour goods or policies that are in the interest of everyone in 
society, rather than goods or policies that benefit us in some more particular role.’801  
 
What is problematic with common interest theories is that the public interest is 
conceived as something that can be defined conclusively, once all the ‘pluses’ and 
‘minuses’ of individuals’ interests are balanced. In data protection legislation, the 
examples of public interest processing, (e.g. for research), were not included because 
they would always be in the public interest. For example, as discussed by Beyleveld, 
‘…not all medical research is well-designed and constructed. Some of it might be very 
speculative, even fanciful, and some of it might be directed to ignoble ends and involve 
                                                
801 O’Flynn (n 49) 305 Similarly: Brian Barry, ‘32. Public and Common Interests’ in Richard E 
Flathman (ed), Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy (Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc 1973). 
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means that are very serious violations of human rights.’802 In such circumstances, 
clearly the research would not be justifiable in the public interest, even if medical 
research is recognised in data protection legislation as an example of processing that 
may be justifiable in the public interest. 
 
Therefore, like preponderance theories, common interest theories do not allow for the 
identification of cases where individuals’ interests and rights may outweigh the public 
interest in processing. Under common interest theories the public interest would 
become ‘absolute’ once the balancing is undertaken (or unanimity is found). Even if 
we accept that individuals play different roles in society, including as a member of the 
public, and that these roles translate to different types of interests, this does not mean 
the public interest can be defined conclusively by reference to this commonly held role. 
Instead, what can be taken from this analysis is the importance of context when 
determining precisely who will be impacted by a decision and thus which interests 
should be accounted for in any decision-making process.  
 
Thus, the key lessons learned from my exploration and rejection of common 
interest theories include: 
• The need for a public interest concept to account for the full spectrum of 
interests at stake, regardless of how commonly or uncommonly held they 
are; 
• The importance of context for assessing what the relevant interests are for a 
particular decision. 
 
As proposed in my key components in Section 3 below, the public interest is capable 
of multiple meanings which change over time and require contextual based assessments. 
  
2.2.1 Beyond proceduralism  
Within Chapter 4 I briefly considered an offshoot of common-interest theories which 
focus on the procedure involved in determining the public interest. Under such 
theories, the public interest only becomes meaningful in terms of the operation of 
                                                
802 Beyleveld (n 28) 287. 
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decision-making procedures. 803 According to such theories, the public interest is the 
outcome of an agreed upon procedure. However, just as the public interest is more than 
mere empirical facts, it is also more than procedure. Taylor argues that if decisions 
based on the common interest are to be legitimate, the decision-making processes must 
be transparent and justifiably account for the displacement of one interest over 
another. 804 A new approach to the public interest in data protection must indeed be 
capable of legitimately determining whether reliance on the public interest is appropriate 
in a processing context. Where currently no procedure exists for transparently 
determining whether a given form of processing is justifiable on the public interest 
conditions, in Sections 4 and 5 I suggest how data protection legislation should be 
amended to introduce such a procedure for the benefit of both data subjects and data 
controllers.  
  
2.3 Beware of philosopher kings 
The final theory of the public interest examined (and ultimately rejected), was unitary 
theories which define the public interest by reference to an absolute system of values 
that guide individual actions, even if individuals are unaware of it. 805 Individuals hold 
no place within this theory as neither the majority consensus nor any minority 
conflicting interest can impact what is in the public interest, as it is understood in an 
absolute sense. As argued in Chapter 4, in the data protection context, there are no 
‘philosopher-kings’ who have the authority to determine conclusively what processing 
is justifiable in the public interest. Indeed, as argued above, the approach developed in 
this thesis rejects the idea that the public interest is representative of anything in a final 
or absolute sense. Data protection law simply does not provide fixed distinctions 
between what is and is not considered to be justifiable in the public interest. This would 
be counter to the primary aims of data protection law which recognises both the public 
interest in the protection of informational privacy and in some uses of data, the latter 
being subject to meeting the applicable legal standards.  
 
                                                
803 Buchanan and Tullock (n 589) 285. 
804 Taylor (n 28) 31. 
805 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (n 58) 135. 
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Along similar lines to my rejection of common interest theories, no use of data will 
always be justifiable in the public interest in a final sense (which unitary theories 
demand). Nor is deciding that a type of processing is justifiable in the public interest 
an indication that informational privacy is not also a public interest. Any theory that 
does not recognise the prospect of multiple public interests existing within a context, 
makes reliance on the concept more susceptible to misuse by those who claim to have 
‘the authority to make such determinations.  
 
Thus the crucial lesson learned from unitary theories of the concept is: 
• That we must recognise the prospect of valid yet conflicting public 
interests: the public interest in a use of data and in protecting 
individuals informational privacy may conflict but are both valid public 
interest claims in data protection. 
 
The key components of the public interest and legislative changes I propose in Sections 
3-4 allows for legitimate conflicts between concurrently held public interests rejecting 
the idea that there is only one, conclusive public interest in any given context. 
Furthermore, it explicitly recognises, what many implicitly have understood as part of 
data protection legislation – that the protection of informational privacy is a public 
interest in itself. 
 
2.4 Summary: what the public interest is and is not  
To derive a legitimate approach to the public interest that is workable within a legal 
(and therefore normative) context, one must avoid certain conceptual vulnerabilities. 
The public interest must account for many component parts, which sometimes may 
conflict, including the views of individuals (majorities, minorities, and everything in 
between) and interests which transcend those individuals and exist at the group and 
societal level. The way in which these interests are resolved through decision-making 
practices impacts the legitimacy of any reliance on the public interest.  
 
If we are to move towards more justifiable reliance on the public interest concept in 
data protection, we must accept that the public interest represents:  
1) more than mere empirical facts, such as where the majority interest lies;  
2) more than any single interest which may purport to be unanimous;  
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3) more than the outcome of any procedure and  
4) more than what any single ‘authority’ may claim is justifiable in the public 
interest.  
 
In the section below I set forth key components and changes to data protection 
legislation that can provide decision-makers with a means to engage with the 
substantive and normative qualities of the concept. The key components and legislative 
amendments suggested avoid the conceptual vulnerabilities identified above and are 
consistent with the aims of data protection law which are both protective and 
facilitative in nature. 
3. Key Components of the Public Interest Concept  
Below I introduce four key components to assessing the public interest in the 
processing of personal data. These components represent a new substantive 
understanding of the public interest concept in data protection. These components go 
beyond any previous contribution on this topic by combining the extensive legal and 
theoretical analysis undertaken in this thesis to offer a fuller outline of the concept in 
data protection. The components I suggest provide an understanding of the public 
interest that avoids the vulnerabilities identified and discussed in depth in Chapter 4, 
and reviewed above. On a practical level, the key components suggested below are 
translatable into guidance – a public interest checklist – for data controllers to assess 
the public interest in their processing (Section 3.5 below). 
 
3.1 Contextual analysis required 
A crucial component to making legitimate public interest determinations is that such 
decisions are first and foremost framed by the relevant context. This component is 
derived from the previous analysis on common interest theories and particularly 
influenced by Barry’s understanding of ‘publics’ whereby:  
 
the qualifications for being ‘a member of the public’ vary from one situation to 
another, and we cannot therefore speak of what ‘the public interest’ requires 
until we know the particular context in which the question is being raised.806 
 
                                                
806 Barry (n 801) 504. 
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Within the limited but notable body of work addressing the public interest concept in 
data protection, the importance of assessing the concept in context is recognised.807 
Indeed, in Chapter 3, deep analysis of the legislative history to the DPD revealed a 
broad and contextual approach was intended for interpretation of the public interest 
provisions in Member States. In freedom of information law, even where strong public 
interest arguments are advanced for disclosure, it is the facts (and context) of each case 
which will determine the appropriate balance between withholding information and 
disclosure.808  
 
Furthermore, in rejecting any absolute or unitary conception of the public interest 
concept, this also necessarily requires contextual analysis which is intertwined with the 
notion of who the ‘public’ is, in the public interest. Thus, in terms of data processing, 
this requires identification of the relevant public, or more often, publics. In any given 
data processing context, the publics which processing relates to, and or affects, will 
vary: 
 
…membership of the public is not fixed. It changes with the issue: the actors 
in one affair are the spectators of another, and men are continually passing 
back and forth between the field where they are executives and the field where 
they are members of a public.809  
 
Therefore, the first key component of the public interest is the identification of:  
 
What public or publics does the data processing in question relate to, 
and/or who may be affected by this processing?  
 
The idea of the ‘public’ is understood here to encompass both a public as ‘a concrete 
audience, a crowd witnessing itself in visible space, as with a theatrical public’ and the 
public as ‘a kind of social totality…thought to include everyone within the field in 
question.’810 By adopting an understanding of the public that encompasses multiple 
groups and individuals, decision-makers are steered away from flawed notions of the 
public interest as somehow equivalent to what they believe is the majority interest or 
                                                
807 Laurie (n 28) 279–282; Townend (n 28) 98–100; Taylor (n 28) 34. Also called for in the context of 
Article 8 jurisprudence: Handyside (n 386) para 48. 
808 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 6. 
809 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (10th edn, Transaction Publishers 2011) 100. 
810 Warner (n 50) 49–50. 
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is beneficial to the ‘most’ individuals (thus avoiding the weaknesses of preponderance 
theories). The notion of relevant publics directs decision-makers to a more nuanced and 
contextually sensitive analysis of the public interest. This can avoid the perpetuation of 
unsound theories (i.e. unitary theories) that conceive of the public interest as an 
immutable and static concept disconnected from the rights, interests and expectations 
of actual publics which are multiple. It also helps to avoid any conception of the public 
interest that is oppositional to the protection of informational privacy. 
 
The relevant public or publics can be identified by determining whether:  
 
• Data being processed relate to them directly or indirectly; and/or  
• They are affected, indirectly or directly, by the processing in question.  
 
The first prong to this test refers to the legal definition of personal data and therefore 
encompasses data which fall within the current scope of data protection law. The 
second prong to this test goes further and may avoid problems associated with the 
treatment of anonymised data as outside the scope of data protection law. The current 
legal dichotomy between ‘personal’ and ‘anonymised’ data does not account for 
harmful uses of the latter. Even if technically anonymous (or at least meeting the 
uncertain legal standard for anonymisation), anonymised data can be manipulated to 
cause real-life damage to specific individuals and groups, not to mention harm to 
broader societal interests in informational privacy.811 This necessarily leaves out a wide 
array of data processing scenarios from legal scrutiny. While it is beyond the remit of 
this thesis to address these more fundamental defects within data protection law, the 
approach suggested recognises these and attempts to compensate, at least partially, for 
them specifically in context with reliance on the public interest conditions.  
 
Thus the effect of processing must be understood more broadly than what data 
protection law currently recognises as ‘harmful’ data processing, and the law must attach 
to these wider circumstances.812 The idea of ‘effect’ advocated for here encompasses 
                                                
811 danah boyd, Karen Levy and Alice Marwick, ‘The Networked Nature of Algorithmic 
Discrimination’; Rauhofer (n 48). 
812 In work undertaken with colleagues for the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and Wellcome Trust’s 
Expert Advisory Group on Data Access, we recommended a broader conception of harm be adopted 
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not just emotional distress or financial damage but wider effects that are subjectively 
felt and perceived by data subjects individually, or by groups, even if not formally 
recognised in the law.813  Through a broader understanding of ‘effect’ in the data 
protection context, ‘the public’ in the public interest is afforded an interpretation which 
is less likely to leave any individuals or groups ‘behind’, at least in a procedural sense. 
As discussed in reference to preponderance theories (and to a lesser extent unitary 
theories), the public interest concept in data protection must be deployed in a way that 
is able to identify those situations where the protection of individual privacy must be 
prioritised over a case of public interest processing. Framing the question of who the 
relevant publics are by reference to who the processing relates to as well as those who 
may be affected (directly or indirectly), allows:  
 
1) decision-makers to more readily identify whose expectations should be 
accounted for when determining whether a form of processing is justifiable on 
the basis that it is in public interest, and  
2) facilitate the identification of cases where data processing must not proceed, to 
avoid the danger of perpetually placing the individual or smaller groups who 
may be disproportionately impacted from processing at risk of being 
outnumbered by a majority that may benefit, or favours, or simply does not 
object to, the data processing in question.  
 
3.2 Public engagement to understand the impact of processing 
Once data controllers have determined who the relevant publics are for a data 
processing initiative, they should engage with them to understand 1) what their 
expectations are and 2) any potential effects of processing which may not have been 
anticipated. As discussed in relation to preponderance theories, although empirical 
facts cannot fully populate the normative understanding required by a concept such as 
the public interest, public dialogue is important to identify the relevant interests and 
context surrounding a public interest decision. With the ‘facts’ (or preferences) gleaned 
from public dialogues, those that stand to be affected by a particular data processing 
initiative have at least more reason to believe that any decisions taken based on the 
                                                
to encapsulate the myriad of ways individuals and groups may be affected by data processing but are 
not necessarily recognised formally in data protection law. Laurie and others (n 48). 
813 Similarly: ibid 41–46; Rauhofer (n 48). 
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‘public interest’ are not arbitrary or made on a whim. Whereas decision-makers (data 
controllers) will certainly have a more reasoned basis for making their decision.  
 
However, it is not enough for a data controller to undertake a large-scale engagement 
exercise and simply report that ‘x’ number of people support ‘y’ data initiative. This 
would also be to fall prey to preponderance theories which wrongly equate the public 
interest with the majority interest. The results of a single public engagement exercise, 
no matter the sample size, can only ever represent the views and/or expectations of 
that particular public (at that time). It is unable to represent ‘the’ public interest because 
there is no singular public or public interest. While a vital source of information for 
data controllers, the results of public engagement (whether one or several) is not in 
itself dispositive of the issue of what is or is not normatively justifiable in the public 
interest. 
 
Nevertheless, as Taylor indicates, there is a scarcity of understanding on the views of 
publics as to novel uses of their data, such as the reuse of genetic data for research.814 
Meaningful public engagement is particularly needed to inform our understandings of 
what is and is not acceptable when it comes to the reuse of data, when the reuse is not 
obviously related to the reasons for collection. Understanding publics’ expectations is 
crucial to making informed and legitimate decisions which rely on the public interest 
to justify the reuse of data. Publics must be informed and engaged with regularly, and 
prior to the use of data. Justifying processing based on the public interest does not mean 
that data controllers relinquish their responsibilities to communicate and inform data 
subjects as to the processing of their data.815 If anything, their duties to engage with 
their publics becomes heightened. And moreover, justifying processing based on the 
public interest conditions merely satisfies a data controller’s obligations under the first 
data protection principle, that processing be lawful. It does not exempt data controllers 
from fair processing and other requirements under data protection law.  
                                                
814 Taylor (n 28) 34. 
815 The first data protection principle under the DPA 1998 requires that processing be both lawful and 
fair. Satisfying a condition under Schedule 2 (and Schedule 3 if processing sensitive personal data) only 
fulfils the requirement that processing be lawful; to be fair, among other things, would require that the 
data controller plainly communicate with data subjects about the processing of their personal data, 
especially when the purposes of processing differ from the original reasons for collection.  
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The frequently cited care.data debacle in England reveals that without meaningful 
public engagement, data initiatives can fail.816 NHS England failed to adequately inform 
the public as to: 
 
…who will be able to access care.data for which purposes with which risks, 
how the credentials of bona fide researchers can be established, and what 
mandate commercial organisations will have to use data that originated from 
private consultations between patients and their GPs.817 
 
NHS England similarly failed to articulate the benefits of the proposed scheme in a 
way that was meaningful and understandable to their publics.818 The failure of care.data 
demonstrates the importance of communicating with the public prior to the undertaking 
of a new data initiative and the value in understanding the expectations of the relevant 
publics. Clearly communicating the intended benefits of a new data initiative is crucial 
where the public interest is the justification for processing. However, communication 
is only one aspect of public engagement. 
 
Meaningful public engagement is a dynamic and two-way process: if public engagement 
reveals that a new use of data runs counter to the reasonable expectations of certain 
members of the public, that data controller must demonstrate how these views will be 
addressed within a robust framework of governance. Again, in considering the case of 
care.data, NHS England had not effectively communicated how individuals could opt-
out of the scheme; their efforts at ‘engagement’ were strongly criticised and clearly did 
not have the intended effect as the scheme was eventually abandoned.819 To engender 
a social licence to process personal data beyond the initial reasons for collection data 
controllers must demonstrate that their engagement efforts are not tokenistic. Thus, 
the second key component of the public interest is: 
 
What are the reasonable expectations of the relevant public/publics as 
to uses of their data and how will these expectations be translated into 
the governance of those data? 
                                                
816 Carter, Laurie and Dixon-Woods (n 152). 
817 ibid 407. 
818 ibid. 
819 ibid. 
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Meaningful public engagement will assist data controllers to understand the questions 
of ‘effect’ raised in the first component of the public interest suggested above. It will 
avoid accusation of capriciousness and arbitrariness; it will also avoid any perception 
that a data controller is claiming to be the ultimate ‘authority’ on what is and is not a 
public interest use of data (thus avoiding the dangers associated with unitary theories). 
The nature of established interactions between data controllers and ‘their’ public(s) (i.e. 
whether the interaction is developed in the private sector, charitable or public services 
context), will influence the expectations of said public(s). For example, in the case of 
public sector organisations (which are most likely to rely upon public interest 
justifications for processing820) the publics’ reasonable expectations will be largely 
shaped by that organisation’s governing legislation and mandate. What services do they 
provide? What is the nature of their interaction with individuals: voluntary or required 
by law? The nature of these interactions informs an important benchmark for public 
interest determinations: what are the reasonable expectations of the individuals, groups 
and wider public as they arise out of these interactions?821  
 
Conflicts arise when data controllers decide to act in ways that are contrary to these 
reasonable expectations. The expectations of relevant publics are reasonable because 
they specifically arise out of the established conduct and character of interactions with 
a data controller. To avoid accusations of arbitrary and capricious use of the public 
interest ground for processing, data controllers’ actions should be in accordance with 
these expectations unless such actions are necessary and justifiable. The key lesson 
taken from analysing Held’s own conception of the public interest was her focus on 
the concept’s approbative value – that its attachment to a particular statement or 
                                                
820 While Sch 2, para 5(d) technically provides that ‘any person’ may justify the processing of personal 
data based on the public interest, that person must process data in regards to a function of a ‘public 
nature’. The precise application of this provision remains untested in the UK courts, and therefore it 
remains uncertain how this might apply to third sector bodies or quangos. Under the equivalent 
provision in the forthcoming GDPR, Article 6(1)(e), it was again left to Member States to determine 
what type of data controller (public or private) may rely upon the provision. Under the GDPR, public 
authorities are explicitly forbidden from relying upon the legitimate interests’ condition (Article 6(1)(f)) 
and thus are steered towards other justifications for processing, including consent, or the public 
interest condition. See Chapter 3 Section 3.1.2. 
821 Discussed in: Laurie and Stevens, ‘Developing a Public Interest Mandate for the Governance and 
Use of Administrative Data in the United Kingdom’ (n 63) 388. 
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decision expresses a level of justification, that ‘x’ ought to occur or that ‘x’ is defensible. 
In the present context, decisions to process data based on the public interest should 
be justified in terms of the potential benefits to accrue from processing, where the 
processing of data is necessary to deliver these benefits, which should outweigh any 
‘effect’ upon the rights and interests of the relevant publics. This standard of 
justification is currently missing from the public interest conditions and must be added 
to our understanding of the concept if it is to have any normative and defensible 
meaning in data protection law.  
 
New data initiatives will inevitably challenge pre-existing expectations and the mere 
fact that they do challenge these expectations does not necessarily mean this challenge 
is wrong. Rather, where data processing initiatives do counter existing expectations, 
the justifications for acting in this way must be subject to public scrutiny and data 
controllers should transparently set forth their reasoning in a forum of engagement 
prior to acting. Bright line rules cannot (and should not) be developed as to when the 
positive effects of data processing may outweigh any negative effects if we are to avoid 
the dangers associated with unitary theories of the public interest. What is critical and 
called for in this second component is that the publics’ expectations are identified, 
considered and transparently accounted for before any decisions are taken based on the 
public interest. Only then could such decisions be said to be justified in the public 
interest. 
 
3.3 The importance of transparent and legitimate procedures 
The way public interest determinations are taken impacts upon the legitimacy of the 
public interest claim being made. The lack of an agreed decision-making process for 
relying upon the public interest has called into question the legitimacy of any reliance 
on the public interest conditions. As discussed in Chapter 2, this has privileged and 
perpetuated the consent-or-anonymise paradigm. While I have rejected any theory or 
outcome of procedure that claims to locate the public interest in a static, absolute or 
purely empirical sense, as both Taylor and Flathman argue, to be defensible a decision 
based on the public interest must be supported by reasons why ‘x’ is in the public interest 
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instead of ‘y’.822  Currently, data controllers are not required to (publicly) give any 
reasons for relying on the public interest condition (even if it would be ethical and 
legally prudent to do so); nor does the public interest condition for processing ordinary 
personal data explicitly require them to consider the impact of their processing vis-à-
vis individuals/groups/society. Thus, I propose that third key component of the public 
interest is: 
 
To be justifiable, a data controller’s reliance on the public interest to 
process personal data must be based on the objective consideration of 
the impact of processing and this must be transparently documented 
and articulated to the relevant publics. 
 
This component can support data controllers in providing appropriate ‘reasons’ why 
‘x’ processing is in the public interest. This can be best supported by the development 
of an agreed procedure for making public interest determinations when relying on the 
public interest conditions, something I propose in more detail in Section 4 below. This 
component advocates the idea that processing data is only justifiable in the public 
interest to the extent that a data controller can demonstrate reasons why processing is 
defensible on this basis, reasons which speak to the impact of processing and that are 
communicated transparently to those who stand to be affected. In this sense, pointing 
only to empirical facts such as the majority interest in a matter (preponderance 
theories), stating claims of apparent unanimity behind a particular cause for data 
processing (common interest theories) or appealing to a supposed superior or wise 
interest (unitary theories), would not be a defensible use of the public interest 
condition.  
 
This third component and the procedures I suggest in Section 5 would support fuller 
consideration of the relevant contextual factors of data processing in a more objective 
and consistent basis than is currently the case. A clear procedure for making public 
interest determinations has certainly enabled the successful operation of the public 
interest test in the freedom of information context. The procedure this component 
suggests could provide clarity to a particularly ambiguous area of data protection law 
                                                
822 Flathman (n 573) 527–531; Taylor (n 28) 31. 
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and potentially instil confidence in data controllers to consider public interest 
justifications where consent and other avenues to lawfully process personal data are 
not open. The obvious question is: what should this procedure entail and how does it 
differ from current practice? 
 
I have already answered at least part of this question with the key components 
suggested here and I will address this in more detail in Sections 4 and 5 below. Briefly, 
and on the broadest level, any agreed procedure would need to be informed both by 1) 
changes to the legislative provisions and 2) by authoritative guidance which in the UK 
would be provided by the ICO. Changes to the public interest conditions would 
substantively inform what legal standards should be deployed when assessing a data 
controller’s reliance on these conditions. Guidance from the ICO would direct data 
controllers to the critical considerations of the public interest and offer key principles 
to guide their application of the legal standards to their own processing circumstances.  
 
3.4 The public interest is a multiple concept  
The development of a more transparent procedure for determining the public interest 
in data protection does not take away the importance of context which is crucial to 
understanding the concept. Indeed, I have explicitly rejected a purely processual 
understanding of the public interest; it is more than the outcome of an agreed procedure 
and requires more than substantiating compliance with that procedure. However, in also 
rejecting the prospect of unanimous, non-conflicting and absolute conceptions of the 
public interest, we are left with a conception that is potentially only descriptive (and 
essentially devoid of normative content). Where does this normative content come 
from, aside from the contextual (and situational) analysis required by my proposed first 
component? This content can and should be derived from theories of the public 
interest and from what is known of the intentions and aims of data protection law. 
From these sources, general principles of the public interest can be derived that are 
appropriate for assessing the public interest in data processing. The plausibility of this 
is evidenced from the principles offered in comprehensive guidance on the public 
interest test in the freedom of information context, which are derived from the 
intentions and aims of the relevant legislation. 
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What principles can be derived in the data protection context? Data protection law 
helps focus our attention on two broad public interests: the protection of informational 
privacy and in some uses of data – but crucially neither are absolute and both must be 
analysed in context. Thus, in principle, the public interest in each data processing 
scenario would be at least inclusive of 1) the public interest in protecting informational 
privacy (whether that be of the individuals to which the processing relates and/or 
will/could affect and 2) the public interest aim of processing. Within each of these two 
broad categories, could also be the interests/rights of groups, society and the private 
rights/interests of any of these, if processing is or is not undertaken. The number of 
public interest examples identified in data protection legislation is even further 
indicative of the multiplicity of interests at stake when considering the processing of 
personal data (and the limitless subject matter data processing can encompass). In 
recognition of this multiplicity of interests at stake in data processing, the fourth and 
final component is: 
 
The public interest is multiple. 
 
By starting any analysis of the public interest conditions from the position that there 
are at least two broad public interests at stake in any given situation recognises the 
inherent multiplicity of the public interest concept. It further supports the recognition 
that protecting informational privacy is a public interest in itself. Embracing the 
context sensitive and multiple nature of the concept avoids any use of it that may stake 
a claim to the public interest in a static or absolute sense to the detriment of other, and 
in particular, minority interests. 
 
3.5 A public interest ‘checklist’ for data controllers 
The proposed components of the public interest concept are directly translatable into 
a tool to guide data controllers through the decision-making process, when assessing 
the public interest in their processing. The components were derived from the 
theoretical analysis in Section 2 above specifically to avoid the conceptual 
vulnerabilities of the public interest, and therefore provide a means for data controllers 
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to engage with the difficult substantive and normative questions surrounding 
application of the concept to data processing. Translating theory into the key 
components, as illustrated in this checklist, can provide guidance to data controllers in 
a similar fashion to the guidance that has enabled public authorities to routinely apply 
the public interest test in the freedom of information context.823  
 
The table on the following page translates the key components into a ‘checklist’ that 1) 
directs data controllers to the questions that should be asked when determining 
whether their processing is justifiable based on the public interest conditions and 2) 
highlights relevant factors, and those that are not typically dispositive, on whether the 
processing is ultimately (and normatively) justifiable in the public interest.  
 
A checklist like this could be incorporated into any guidance developed by the ICO. 
  
                                                
823 See Chapter 5 Section 2.3.2.A-2.3.2.B. 
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Table 5 Public interest checklist for data controllers 




• What individuals 
does the dataset 
relate to? 
• What individuals, 
groups or publics 
are affected by 
the processing? 
• Who is intended to 
benefit from the 
processing? 
• Who may be 
negatively affected 
(indirectly/directly) 
from the processing? 





affected vs a 
potential 






• What steps have 
been taken to 
engage with the 
relevant publics? 
• What evidence do 
you have that 
indicates the 
relevant publics 






• What relationship do 
you currently have 




• Is the processing 
consistent with 
previous 
interactions? (i.e. is 
this use of data 
reasonably expected?) 
• How have you 
informed the relevant 
publics about the 
processing? 





3. Objectivity & 
transparency 
 
• This would be 





Sections 3 and 4 
below. 
• How has the data 
controller complied 
with the legislative 
procedure and 
guidance? 
• That relevant 
procedures 








• How does the 











• What are the specific 
risks posed by this 
processing, whether 
to private or public 
interests? 
• What are the specific 
and intended benefits 
of processing?	
• What is the impact if 
processing is not 
undertaken?	
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To implement the new understanding of the public interest suggested, legislative and 
procedural changes are required. Below I propose critical amendments to the public 
interest conditions in the DPA 1998.  
4. Legislative Changes to the Public Interest Conditions  
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, we currently lack any criteria or consistent procedure 
for assessing the public interest in processing beyond the descriptive examples in the 
legislation or relevant legal procedures.824 The public interest conditions were included 
to justify various ‘important’ types of processing outside of consent and were to be 
interpreted and elaborated upon within the context of each Member State.825 This task 
has been largely neglected in the UK context. The comparative analysis from Chapter 
5 emphasised the integral and action promoting role of the public interest conditions 
and thus the need for clarity. Below I set forth ways in which UK legislation should 
change in line with the arguments made in this thesis regarding the newly developed 
understanding of the public interest concept. Even if there is little political appetite for 
further legislative changes to data protection law, considering the forthcoming GDPR 
and other more pressing items on the political agenda, the suggestions I make are what 
I contend is required to objectively and consistently deploy the public interest 
conditions.  
 
4.1 Legislative change #1: Privileging informational privacy 
Currently data controllers will not have to justify their reliance on the public interest 
conditions, only if and until their processing is the subject of disciplinary action by the 
ICO or a legal claim, (or questionable processing is brought to light in a public forum 
which instigates the intervention of the ICO and/or courts). Furthermore, the public 
interest conditions do not explicitly require data controllers to consider the effect of 
their processing on individuals, groups or broader interests. Thus, it is possible that 
potentially harmful processing which benefits some public but harms others may go 
unchecked if and until a legal claim is brought, by which time the damage may well be 
                                                
824 See Chapter 4 Section 3.2. 
825 See Chapter 3 Section 2.7. 
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done. As the status quo, this is patently unacceptable from an individual rights 
perspective but equally from the perspective of data controllers as they have not been 
equipped with the appropriate guidance to apply the public interest conditions in a way 
that is consistent with the aims of data protection law.  
  
To direct data controllers to the relevant considerations, the protection of 
informational privacy must be privileged explicitly in the legislative provision. Such 
considerations must be built into the law if we are to move away from the current 
flawed thinking that informational privacy is merely an individual and not a public 
interest. This is also necessary if we continue to reject unitary theories which do not 
allow for multiple and valid but conflicting public interests to co-exist, which in data 
protection must be provided for. We see the success of this legislative approach from 
our consideration of the freedom of information context where disclosure is 
unambiguously privileged in the public interest test. Explicit recognition and 
privileging of the public interest in informational privacy would steer data controllers 
to consider the effect of their processing not only in terms of the impact upon specific 
individuals (potentially very few individuals) but also upon society, which has an 
interest in informational privacy being protected. Thus, the public interest condition 
for processing ordinary personal data could be revised to reflect the public interest of 
informational privacy: 
 
The public interest in processing must outweigh any negative effect, 
direct or indirect, upon the public and private interests in protecting 
informational privacy, and any other public interests to not processing. 
 
This could also be introduced to qualify the Schedule 3 conditions for processing 
sensitive personal data based on the ‘substantial’ public interest, including those 
introduced by the DPPSPD 2000 such as for research. It is worth noting that my 
suggested legislative amendment is not beyond the bounds of reason. For example, in 
Germany, under the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) the 
processing of data for research is allowed if ‘necessary’ and ‘where the scientific interest 
in carrying out the research project substantially outweighs the data subject’s interest in 
excluding collection and the purpose of the research cannot be achieved in any other 
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way or would otherwise necessitate disproportionate effort.’ 826  Further consider 
Australian privacy legislation (examined in Section 5 below) where the Information 
Commissioner can exempt certain uses of personal data on the basis that the public 
interest in processing data ‘substantially outweighs’ the public interest in abiding by the 
Australian Privacy Principles or a particular code of practice.827  
 
My suggested reformulation places the burden of proof on data controllers to 
substantiate reasons why that the public interest in processing outweighs any counter 
effects on the public and private interests in protecting informational privacy (or 
considering any other public interest in not processing). Recall that in the freedom of 
information context, public authorities must substantiate reasons why the public 
interest in maintaining a qualified exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure 
because disclosure is privileged within that legal context.828  
 
Shifting the burden of proof to data controllers is justified in the context of data 
protection law, and specifically in the public interest conditions for similar reasons as 
proposed by Frederick Schauer in the human rights context: while rights such as 
privacy are often non-absolute, they ‘are worth more than non-rights protected 
interests’ such as the public interest in certain uses of data.829 This suggests a reverse 
framing of our consideration of the public interest conditions:  
 
Is the effect on informational privacy (and other public/private interests) 
justified in light of the public interest benefits the processing of data is expected 
to bring?  
 
However, unlike the context of human rights law, which is solely focused on protecting 
individuals from interferences by the State, data protection law has dual aims which are 
facilitative in nature. Thus, it is crucial to remember that the reformulation suggested 
                                                
826 The Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz), s 13(2)(8). English translation available 
here: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bdsg/englisch_bdsg.html>(emphasis added).  
827 Federal Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), s 72(2). 
828 See Chapter 5 Section 2.1. 
829 Frederick Schauer, ‘Proportionality and the Question of Weight’, Proportionality and the Rule of Law: 
Rights, Justification, Reasoning (CUP 2014) 177. 
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here still presupposes ‘…that we assign weights to the gains and losses on each side of 
the equation’830 – the effect of processing and the effect of not processing data.  
 
By amending the legislation in this way, crucially, the presumption remains in favour of 
protecting informational privacy. It is not the case that the loss associated with the 
public interest pursued by ‘x’ processing may be no more than necessary than in light 
of protecting informational privacy.831 Risk mitigation would not be enough, as is 
arguably the case under the legitimate interests condition.832 Data controllers would 
need to demonstrate that they have not only accounted for potential effects (both 
direct and indirect) of their processing but that the public interest aims sought outweigh 
these potential effects, settling the inherently normative determination of deciding 
when processing is justifiable in the public interest. It offers the crucial and normative 
reasons why reliance on the public interest would be justifiable, if we recall Held’s 
interpretation of the concept. The level of justification called for would require the data 
controller to engage in a more rigorous analysis of their proposed data initiative before 
relying upon the public interest conditions. 
 
4.2 Legislative change #2: Introducing a standard of reasonable belief 
for public interest determinations 
Even with the first legislative change suggested above, a key question remains 
unanswered: how will a data controller’s reliance on the public interest condition be assessed? As 
argued throughout this thesis, public interest determinations are inherently context 
sensitive. However, data controllers must still initially decide the legal basis for 
processing based on their assessment of the issues. Currently, there is no prescribed 
                                                
830 ibid 180 (emphasis added). 
831 Argued by Schauer as to freedom of expression: ‘The courts do not typically say that the loss in 
public order can be no more than necessary in light of the goal of pursuing freedom of expression, but 
they do say that the restriction on freedom of expression can be no more than necessary in light of the 
goal of pursuing public order.’ ibid. 
832 Under the legitimate interests condition, data controllers may process personal data on the basis 
that it is necessary for their or a third parties’ legitimate interests ‘except where the processing is 
unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate 
interests of the data subject.’ This is a substantially higher threshold of ‘effect’ (‘unwarranted’) than 
what I suggest for the reformulation of the public interest conditions - that the public interest benefit 
of processing outweigh any negative ‘effect’. 
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standard for assessing a data controller’s reliance on the public interest conditions nor 
on any other condition for processing.  
 
We cannot derive a bright line rule defining when processing is justifiable based on the 
public interest if we are to avoid the conceptual vulnerabilities associated with (in 
particular) unitary theories. However, from our examination of whistleblowing 
legislation, we have learned that legal standards can play an important role in lending 
legal certainty to public interest determinations. The public interest test under 
whistleblowing law requires courts to consider whether the whistleblower reasonably 
believed their disclosure was in the public interest under a mixed test of reasonable 
belief. 833  A whistleblower is still protected by the law even if the public interest 
disclosure is wrong and/or there was no public interest in the disclosure being made, 
so long as the worker’s belief (assessed subjectively), that it was in the public interest, 
was objectively reasonable. 834 Is it appropriate to also apply this mixed standard of 
reasonable belief to the public interest conditions in data protection law? If so, how 
would such a standard operate and would it improve the uncertainty surrounding the 
deployment of the public interest conditions?  
4.2.1 Is a mixed test of reasonable belief appropriate? 
To answer the first question, it is important to remind ourselves of the distinctions 
drawn between the public interest conditions in data protection and whistleblowing 
law where the reasonable belief standard is currently applied.  
 
As opposed to whistleblowing law, the focus in data protection’s public interest 
conditions is on the substantive and normative content of the ‘public interest’ claim. Is 
this processing in the public interest? 835  The applicability of the public interest 
condition for processing ordinary personal data rests upon the processing being 
‘necessary’, related to a function of a ‘public nature’ and being substantively ‘in’ the 
‘public interest’. Therefore it would seem that if a court found that processing was not 
substantively ‘in’ the public interest, then another lawful basis would be required.  
                                                
833 ERA, s 43(b) as amended by the ERRA, s 17; Chesterton (n 774) [28]. See also note 784 above. 
834 Chesterton (n 774) [34]. 
835 ibid [28].  
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Nevertheless, courts will always consider whether processing is in the public interest 
based on the facts presented and thus whether a data controller’s reliance on the public 
interest condition was justified in the circumstances. Even if data protection law requires 
engagement with the substance of the public interest claim being made, on review, it is 
the data controller’s consideration and/or demonstration of the public interest in 
processing that is assessed. It is the data controller that must make this initial 
assessment to determine the legal basis for processing. Thus, it is arguable that 
introducing a standard for making such assessments is appropriate and can lead to more 
consistent review of the public interest conditions.  
4.2.2 How would a mixed test of reasonable belief operate? 
To answer the second question, again, the operation of the reasonable belief standard 
in whistleblowing is instructive, where ‘the word belief is subjective but the 
reasonableness of it is to be determined objectively.’836 In data protection, it is the data 
controllers’ assessment of their processing (and that it is justifiable ‘in the public interest’) 
that is subjective and akin to a worker’s belief that a whistleblowing claim is in the 
public interest. Crucially, this subjective assessment of processing would need to be 
reasonable and this introduces an element of objectivity, just as in context with 
whistleblowing.837 Thus, a further qualification must be added to the public interest 
conditions: 
 
The data controller(s) must demonstrate their reasonable belief that the 
processing is in the public interest.838 
 
As to an argument that this legislative amendment ‘lowers the bar’ for relying upon the 
public interest conditions, I would counter that the wrong question is being asked. It 
is not a matter of lowering or raising standards, but ensuring that the right questions 
are being asked – that reliance on the public interest conditions are being scrutinised 
appropriately and in line with the protective and facilitative aims of data protection law. 
                                                
836 Lewis (n 784) 499. Citing Babula (n 773) [82], which provides for this ‘mixed test’ of reasonable 
belief (see note 784). 
837 Babula (n 773). 
838 This legislative amendment could equally apply to the Schedule 3 conditions for processing 
sensitive personal data and those introduced by the DPPSPD 2000. 
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It is data controllers’ assessment of their processing circumstances that will be under 
review, either by the ICO or by a court. Thus I would argue that while the public 
interest in processing would still be assessed objectively in line with the current 
legislative provisions (that the processing is necessary, of a public nature and ‘in’ the 
public interest), it is appropriate and indeed sufficient that a data controller satisfy this 
mixed test of reasonable belief when relying upon the public interest conditions. To 
afford legal certainty to this assessment where there currently is none, this requires a 
standard that is explicitly provided within the law. Consider section 32 of the DPA 
1998 where the reasonable belief standard is already deployed in relation to the public 
interest: 
 
(1) Personal data which are processed only for the special purposes are exempt 
from any provision to which this subsection relates if— 
(a) the processing is undertaken with a view to the publication by any person 
of any journalistic, literary or artistic material, 
(b)the data controller reasonably believes that, having regard in particular to the special 
importance of the public interest in freedom of expression, publication would be in the public 
interest, and 
(c)the data controller reasonably believes that, in all the circumstances, 
compliance with that provision is incompatible with the special purposes.839 
 
The ICO has dedicated guidance to interpreting the public interest and reasonable 
belief requirement in section 32, which advises data controllers in the media to have 
clear and documented reasons why publication is in the public interest (this is reflected 
both in the ICO’s evidence to the Leveson inquiry on the use of section 32, as well as 
in the subsequent ‘guide for the media’.840 It is worth noting, that the reasonable belief 
standard in section 32 is not without its controversy. After the Leveson inquiry, the 
Information Commissioner indicated that the standard could restrict the ICO’s 
enforcements powers vis-à-vis the media, given that the ICO would have limited power 
to investigate or challenge a journalist’s reasonable belief. It is arguable that introducing 
a mixed test of reasonable belief might have a chilling effect on enforcement where the 
                                                
839 DPA 1998, s 32(1). 
840 The Right Honourable Lord Justice Leveson, ‘The Leveson Inquiry: An Inquiry Into the Culture, 
Practices and Ethics of the Press’ (2012) Volume 3 1063 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145022/http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780_iii.asp>; ICO, ‘Data Protection and 
Journalism: A Guide for the Media’ (n 251) 32. 
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public interest condition is relied upon. However, the legal certainty offered by 
introducing such a standard, along with the guidance and procedures recommended in 
this thesis, are what I consider is needed to overcome the current gaps in understanding 
which are detrimental to both public interest uses of data and to the relevant publics. 
Furthermore, the guidance and procedures recommended in this thesis would require 
data controllers to document their reasons for believing their processing is in the public 
interest (similar to best practice in freedom of information). Having such 
documentation readily available would allow the ICO to focus on the heart of the issue 
i.e. whether reliance on the public interest condition to processing was reasonable or 
not. 
 
Similarly, as discussed in the freedom of information context, the ICO advises that 
public authorities document their arguments for and against disclosing information 
under the public interest test, resembling an objective standard of assessment. 841 By 
introducing a mixed test of reasonable belief as a qualification to the public interest 
conditions, explained in ICO guidance, data controllers would be directed to a more 
objective consideration of the range of public interests at stake in any given processing 
context whilst allowing for the relevant contextual factors to also be taken into account. 
As a final point, it is worth noting that mixed tests of reasonable belief are not unusual 
in law.842 The observations made here (and originally in Chapter 5) contribute to an 
understanding of how data protection law might be amended to address the gaps in 
practice and procedure identified through my analysis of the public interest. 
 
                                                
841 ICO, ‘The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act’ (n 651) 9. 
842 For example, mixed tests of reasonable belief are used in various criminal defences. For certain 
sexual offences, the accused’s belief that the complainant consented must be objectively reasonable 
but is balanced against subjective considerations as to whether the complainant had capacity to 
consent in the circumstances. As a further example, in cases where self-defence is claimed, the jury will 
consider 1) whether the accused subjectively believed the use of force was necessary and reasonable and 
2) whether based on the facts of the case as the accused believed them to be, whether a reasonable 
person would consider the force used as reasonable or excessive. 
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4.2.3 Would introducing a mixed test of reasonable belief improve legal 
certainty? 
Introducing a mixed test of reasonable belief would provide data controllers with more 
legal certainty. They could better anticipate how their reliance on the public interest 
conditions would be assessed, by both the ICO and courts, and could make their 
decisions to process personal data accordingly. It would be in data controllers’ best 
interests to document their consideration of the effect of processing on informational 
privacy along with any impact from not processing. For example, data controllers could 
document their answers to the questions posed in my public interest checklist. Their 
reliance on the public interest conditions would be assessed based on their reasons why 
the public interest in processing outweighs any counter interests (public or private). 
Data controllers could be assured that if their answers are objectively reasonable (while 
their belief would be subjectively assessed), that their reliance on the public interest 
conditions would be considered legitimate. From a data subject’s perspective, 
introducing this standard would support a more balanced consideration of whether 
reliance on the public interest is justified. The public interest checklist and 
accompanying documentation could explicitly demonstrate how a data controller has 
considered and addressed the effects of processing, on either side of the argument. 
 
More broadly, by introducing the standard into the legislation itself, the action-
promoting role of the public interest conditions would be better supported. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, the role of the public interest conditions are 
misinterpreted as ‘exceptions’ to obtaining consent, when my examination of the 
legislative history to the DPD and DPA 1998 demonstrates that this is not the case.843 
Furthermore, drawing from my consideration of the public interest defence in 
copyright, it is critical to clarify and support the function of the public interest 
conditions as action promoting which requires a level of detail that is more 
appropriately addressed in legislation and authoritative guidance rather than being an 
ad hoc task for the courts.844  
 
                                                
843 See Chapter 3 Section 2.7. 
844 See Chapter 5 Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2. 
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As the public interest conditions are not fail-safe exemptions from obtaining consent, 
nor from a data controller’s other obligations under the DPA 1998, it is certainly 
appropriate to provide more detail and instruction as to how reliance on the condition 
would be assessed, not least because data controllers must determine their legal basis 
for processing. This contrasts with the public interest defence in copyright which 
remains relatively undefined due to the more limited role prescribed to it within the 
CDPA, as confirmed by the courts. Introducing a clear standard of assessment for 
reliance on the public interest conditions would explicitly indicate to data controllers 
the conditions as ‘reasonable’ (and not merely failsafe exceptions) to rely upon if the 
relevant qualifications are satisfied.  
 
In summary, introducing a mixed test of reasonable belief for assessing reliance on the 
public interest conditions would help to initiate important but incremental changes to 
how data controllers conceive of their justifications for processing personal data, 
including when appropriate, based on the public interest. Introducing this standard and 
implementing it through routine use of an agreed decision-making procedure (an 
example being the public interest checklist) would incentivise data controllers to 
routinely identify and document their consideration of the public and private interests 
implicated by their processing when relying on this legal basis. Thus, data controllers 
would be directed to a more consistent and transparent basis for taking public interest 
decisions, which is crucial if such decisions are to be legitimate. Such an approach is 
clearly possible, given the successful deployment of the reasonable belief standard in 
the whistleblowing context. A summary of my revised public interest condition for 
processing ordinary personal data is as follows (added onto the current provision in 
Schedule 2 paragraph 5(d): 
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In Section 5, I suggest two alternative procedures to deploy the new understanding of 
the public interest and accompanying legislative amendments.  
5. New Procedures for Making Public Interest 
Determinations in Data Protection Law 
How would data controllers, the ICO and courts implement the key components of 
the public interest and recommended legislative amendments? I suggest two alternative 
procedures which could improve how public interest determinations are initially made 
by data controllers and later direct how the ICO and courts would scrutinise data 
controllers’ reliance on the public interest conditions. These procedures are: 
 
1. A code of practice for public interest determinations: if data controllers 
document their compliance with the code of practice on the public interest 
conditions, upon regulatory intervention by the ICO or judicial review, this 
could be used as evidence of compliance with data protection law.  
 
2. Administrative authorization outside the judicial process: the ICO 
could provide data controllers with a ‘stamp of approval’ (authorization) to 
process personal data on the basis that it is in the public interest for certain 
processing circumstances. This authorization could provide a presumption of 
compliance with data protection law upon judicial review. 
 
When presenting each procedure, I will consider it in terms of: 1) the data controller’s 
initial decision to process personal data; 2) any ICO intervention; and 3) judicial review.  
  
The processing is necessary: 
(d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised 
in the public interest by any person. 
 
The public interest in processing must outweigh any negative effect, 
direct or indirect, upon the public and private interests in protecting 
informational privacy, and any other public interests in not 
processing. 
 
The data controller(s) must demonstrate their reasonable belief that 
the processing is in the public interest, where the reasoning will be 
assessed objectively and belief assessed subjectively. 
   
  266 
Chapter 6 Key Components and a New Approach to Making Public Interest Determinations in Data 
Protection Law 
 
5.1 A code of practice for public interest determinations 
My first proposed procedure is premised on the idea that data controllers begin to 
routinely apply and document their use of a decision-making procedure set forth in 
authoritative ICO guidance applicable to the public interest conditions – a ‘code of 
practice’ for making public interest determinations. A data controller could document 
their consideration of the issues presented by the code of practice, which could be 
considered by the ICO or courts as evidence of legal compliance, upon future 
complaints or commencement of adjudicative processes. 
5.1.1 Guiding the data controller’s initial decision to process personal 
data 
To implement this new procedure, first, relevant guidance would need to be produced 
by the ICO which explains to data controllers how to assess the public interest in their 
processing. The key components of the public interest concept and the public interest 
checklist are examples of what could form the basis of a ‘code of practice’ on the public 
interest conditions. The key components of the public interest (suggested in Section 2) 
provide guiding principles which are accompanied in the checklist by more context-
specific questions, which data controllers could use to assess their processing. Thus, 
the checklist exemplifies a potential decision-making procedure. Within the code of 
practice, the ICO could add further examples where the public interest conditions have 
been successfully (or unsuccessfully) relied upon, based on the ICO’s extensive and 
ongoing engagement efforts with data controllers (more on this in Section 6 below). 
As considered in Chapter 5, with regards to freedom of information law, the provision 
of guiding principles and context specific examples in authoritative guidance, is crucial 
to enabling decision-makers to independently assess the public interest.  
 
Second, a further legislative change would be required to direct data controllers to this 
guidance, but also to create the statutory impetus for the ICO to produce it and to 
enable both the ICO and courts to consider abiding by the code of practice as evidence 
of compliance. There is already precedent for such a procedure in context with the 
exemptions for journalism, literature and art under section 32 of the DPA 1998: 
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…whether the belief of a data controller that publication would be in the public 
interest was or is a reasonable one, regard may be had to his compliance with 
any code of practice which— 
(a)is relevant to the publication in question, and 
(b)is designated by the [F1 Secretary of State] by order for the purposes of this 
subsection.845 
 
Here, the relevant codes of practice are developed by industry and include the Editors’ 
Code of Practice, the Ofcom Broadcasting Code and the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines.846 
Data controllers are incentivised to comply with the codes of practice as this may be 
considered (favourably) as evidence of legal compliance. A similar addition could be 
added as a further qualification to the public interest conditions. Thus, my revised 
public interest condition to processing ordinary personal data would now read: 
Considering the lessons learned from examining the public interest defence in 
copyright, and thus the risk of leaving interpretation of the public interest conditions 
to the courts, providing this level of detail within the legislation is necessary. This is 
because: 1) the role of the public interest conditions are action promoting as opposed to 
                                                
845 DPA 1998, s 32(3). 
846 ‘Editors’ Code of Practice’ (Independent Press Standards Organisation, 2016) 
<https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/>; ‘The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (incorporating 
the Cross-Promotion Code)’ (Ofcom, 2016) <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-
demand/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code>; ‘Editorial Guidelines’ (BBC, 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines>. 
The processing is necessary: 
(d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the 
public interest by any person. 
 
The public interest in processing must outweigh any negative effect, direct 
or indirect, upon the public and private interests in protecting informational 
privacy, and any other public interests to not processing. 
 
The data controller(s) must demonstrate their reasonable belief that the 
processing is in the public interest, where the reasoning will be assessed 
objectively and belief assessed subjectively. 
 
Whether the reasoning of a data controller that processing is in the public 
interest was or is objectively reasonable, regard may be had to his 
compliance with any code of practice which— 
(a)is relevant to the processing in question, and 
(b)is designated by the [Secretary of State] by order for the purposes of this 
subsection. 
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being a fail-safe exemption or defence and 2) data controllers must independently make 
these determinations in the first instance. To ‘benefit’ from the code of practice, data 
controllers would need to substantiate their use of it. Here, the ICO’s guidance on the 
application of section 32 is informative. There, the ICO suggests the following 
documentation:  
 
In practice, we are likely to accept there was a reasonable belief that publication 
was in the public interest if an organisation:  
• has clear policies and procedures on public interest decisions,  
• can show that those policies were followed,  
• can provide a cogent argument about the public interest, and  
• has complied with any relevant industry codes.847  
 
The ICO goes on to list factors which may indicate a data controller’s assessment of 
the public interest was not reasonable: 
 
Organisations might find it more difficult to rely on the exemption if: 
• they have no clear policies or procedures, 
• journalists acted outside of company policies or accepted practice, 
• there is no evidence that anyone thought about the public interest, or 
• an industry body finds them in breach of a code of practice.848 
 
Such guidance can be adapted to the public interest conditions. This would explain to 
data controllers the purpose of the code of practice and broadly what is expected of 
them when relying upon the public interest conditions:  
 
In practice, we are likely to accept there was a reasonable belief that the 
processing was in the public interest if the data controller:  
• has clear policies and procedures on public interest decisions,  
• can show that those policies were followed,  
• can provide a cogent argument about the public interest, and  
• has complied with this code of practice, including the public interest 
checklist. 
 
Data controllers might find it more difficult to rely on the public interest 
conditions if: 
• they have no clear policies or procedures, 
                                                
847 ICO, ‘Data Protection and Journalism: A Guide for the Media’ (n 251) 36. 
848 ibid. 
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• the processing of data is undertaken contrary to the relevant policies, 
• there is no evidence that anyone thought about the public interest, 
or 
• the ICO determines the processing is in breach of this (or any other 
relevant) code of practice. 
 
In considering the key components to the public interest presented in Section 2, and 
the importance of transparent procedures subject to public scrutiny, any 
documentation could be made available on the data controller’s website and potentially 
on the ICO’s website. As to the latter option, this could create a central ‘register’ of 
data processing activities that are justified on the public interest conditions. However, 
this may be more relevant for processing which has been specifically reviewed and 
‘authorised’ by the ICO, a procedure considered in Section 5.2.849  
5.1.2 Evidence of legal compliance upon ICO intervention 
Abiding by the code of practice could be used by data controllers as evidence of legal 
compliance with the first data protection principle if complaints were later investigated 
by the ICO. As the author of the code of practice, the ICO would be in the prime 
position to investigate the extent to which the data controller appropriately applied the 
guidance and may already have a history of interactions with the data controller to 
guide an assessment of the circumstances. In the freedom of information context, the 
ICO routinely assesses public authorities’ application of the public interest test and has 
generated a consistent approach to making decisions on this area of the law.850 The 
ICO’s adoption of a decision-making procedure, akin to my suggested public interest 
checklist, could play a role in generating a consistent approach to the review of what is 
a currently unsettled and particularly ambiguous area of data protection law.  
5.1.3 Evidence of legal compliance upon judicial review 
A data controller’s compliance with the code of practice could also be used as evidence 
of legal compliance upon judicial review. As discussed above, there is already precedent 
for this is in data protection law in the exemptions for journalism, literature and art, 
                                                
849 Indeed, this is the case with public interest determinations for processing personal data, authorised 
under Australian privacy legislation. See Section 4.2 below. Australian Government Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Public Interest Determinations: Privacy Registers’ (2015) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-registers/public-interest-determinations/>. 
850 See Chapter 5 Section 2.3. 
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where the relevant codes of practice are developed by industry.851 This contrasts with 
the code of practice suggested here, which would be developed by the ICO.  
 
The ECtHR in Mosley v United Kingdom paid significant attention to the section 32 
exemption and were thusly directed to the codes of practice applicable to the UK 
media; these influenced their determination that there was not a violation of Article 8 
of the ECHR in the absence of the UK imposing a duty on the News of the World to 
pre-notify Mosley prior to publication.852 As the adjudicative process would normally 
commence after any intervention of the ICO (in a data protection claim), the courts 
could make use of the ICO’s findings on a data controller’s compliance with the code 
of practice before making a final judgment. However, the recommendation being made 
here would certainly not preclude the judiciary from coming to an alternative 
conclusion than the ICO (or indeed the data control). If the code of practice integrates 
the mixed test of reasonable belief suggested above, it is possible that a UK court would 
defer to the approach taken in Mosley to the reasonable belief standard vis-à-vis a public 
interest claim:  
 
The Court considers that in order to prevent a serious chilling effect on 
freedom of expression, a reasonable belief that there was a ‘public interest’ at 
stake would have to be sufficient to justify non-notification, even if it were 
subsequently held that no such ‘public interest’ arose.853 
 
This approval of the reasonable belief standard would of course only apply to the 
extent that a data controller could also demonstrate that the public interest in 
processing outweighed the public and private interests in protecting informational privacy 
and any other public interests in not processing (in line with the legislative change 
suggested in Section 3.1 above).  
 
Any argument that this type of code of practice takes significant elements of 
interpretation of an important legal concept outside parliamentary scrutiny, and 
potentially, judicial review is easily addressed by reiterating the circumstances 
                                                
851 ‘Editors’ Code of Practice’ (n 846); ‘The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (incorporating the Cross-
Promotion Code)’ (n 846); ‘Editorial Guidelines’ (n 846). 
852 Mosley v United Kingdom App no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 12 April 2012). 
853 Mosley (n 852) [126]. 
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surrounding the current lack of guidance and interpretation on the public interest 
conditions. As discussed throughout this thesis, neither the DPD nor DPA 1998 define 
the public interest aside from the provision of examples (where political motivations 
featured strongly and objective criteria were lacking). Furthermore, it is the data 
controller that must initially decide their legal basis for processing, and thus, where 
relevant, whether their processing meets the requirements of the public interest 
condition. The provision of any guidance for public interest processing could only be 
beneficial considering the types of processing and potential societal impacts at stake. 
As suggested, compliance with the code of practice could serve as evidence of 
compliance with Schedule 2 and Schedule 3, but would not be dispositive nor supplant 
the judiciary’s right to override a data controller’s determination on the matter. 
Ultimately the public interests at stake are best served by the provision of guidance 
where there currently is none, regardless of the legal status of the code of practice.854 
5.1.4 Benefits of a code of practice for public interest determinations 
There are several benefits to introducing a code of practice for public interest 
determinations, and subsequently using a data controller’s application of it as evidence 
of legal compliance. First, the introduction of the code of practice would enhance legal 
certainty for data controllers. It would highlight the relevant considerations for data 
controllers’ initial (and unsupervised) decisions on determining a legal basis for 
processing (set forth in my public interest checklist), while alerting them to the 
processing circumstances which would be unlikely to meet the relevant legal 
conditions. It would also provide an element of foreseeability as a data controller’s use 
of the code of practice could become a source of evidence of legal compliance upon 
regulatory intervention or judicial review.  
 
                                                
854 The issue of the proper distribution of power between Parliament, courts and other administrative 
bodies, lies beyond the scope of my thesis. However, the suggested code of practice remains within the 
bounds of the UK’s unique political settlement. To address this in full would require a different debate 
entirely, to analyse if judicial review is still fit for purpose. If the ICO is legally obligated to draft the 
code, it is itself, as a public authority, subject to judicial review in terms of whether the code of practice 
complies with the DPA and general administrative law requirements. There are also non-data protection 
law examples of a court being forced to take compliance with (in this case a non-statutory) code into 
account – see Section 12(4) Human Rights Act 1998 and, for example Max Mosely v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [16], [110], [141] and [144]. 
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Second, by introducing the code of practice and referring to it explicitly in the 
legislation, the transparency of public interest determinations will be promoted beyond 
the currently uncertain means in which public interest decisions are taken. Moreover, 
if data controllers place their code of practice documentation online, this provides data 
subjects and relevant publics an opportunity to scrutinise these otherwise opaque 
decision-making processes.  
 
Third, the introduction of the code of practice and its availability as evidence of legal 
compliance could help initiate incremental culture change surrounding the use of 
personal data in the UK. The current culture is risk averse and predisposed to several 
legal myths including that the public interest conditions are exemptions to consent. 
Once the principles espoused in the code of practice became routinely applied by data 
controllers and consistently assessed by the ICO and courts, legal uncertainty could be 
diminished, contributing to a more holistic perspective on the protective and 
facilitative aims of data protection law, beyond consent or anonymisation.  
 
Fourth, and finally, introducing the code of practice is a ‘resource light’ option, and 
already within the remit and capabilities of the ICO. As discussed, the ICO has already 
produced comprehensive guidance on matters of the public interest in the freedom of 
information context and even in data protection on the section 32 exemptions. Using 
these as a template, the introduction of a code of practice and its role in substantiating 
evidence of legal compliance is a procedure which is potentially highly beneficial, vis-
à-vis the relatively little resources required to deploy it. 
 
5.2 Administrative authorization of public interest determinations 
The second procedure suggested is the extrajudicial authorization of public interest 
determinations in advance of certain forms of particularly risky, novel, pervasive or 
unexpected processing (from the perspective of data subjects/publics). The ICO 
would assess applications to justify such processing based on the public interest 
conditions. The ICO could ‘authorize’ a data controller to process personal data based 
on satisfaction that the public interest conditions have been correctly applied to the 
processing circumstances.  
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An analogous procedure already operates successfully within England, with the reuse 
of health data for research, audit and other medical purposes. The Confidentiality 
Advisory Group (‘CAG’) is an independent body of experts (established by the UK’s 
Health Research Authority (‘HRA’)855) that advises the relevant decision-makers856 on 
whether it is ethical and appropriate to reuse patient data, without consent, for a 
purpose such as research. CAG assess applications based on ‘…whether the activity is 
in the public interest, if it fulfils a medical purpose, and that there is no other reasonable 
way in which to carry out the activity’.857  
 
However, even more similar to what is being suggested here is the Australian procedure 
for making public interest determinations (‘PIDs’) under federal privacy legislation.858 
The Australian Information Commissioner can make a PID which provides that an act 
or practice that would otherwise breach an Australian Privacy Principle, or relevant 
code of practice, will not be regarded as having done so.859 PIDs are made on the basis 
that: 
 
…the public interest in the entity doing the act, or engaging in the practice, 
substantially outweighs the public interest in adhering to that code or principle; 
                                                
855 The HRA was established in 2011 as part of the Care Act 2014 to ‘…protect and promote the 
interest of patients and the public in health and social care research, co-ordinate and standardise 
practices relating to regulation, recognise and establish Research Ethics Committees (RECs), be a 
member of UK Ethics Committee Authority (UKECA), promote transparency in research and 
provide approvals for the processing of confidential information relating to patients.’ ‘About Us’ 
(NHS: Health Research Authority) <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/>. 
856 In England and Wales, this would be the Secretary of State for Health or HRA, that can approve 
applications to use identifiable patient data without consent. Health Service (Control of Patient 
Information) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1438.  
857 NHS HRA, ‘Recommendations and Approval Decisions’ 
<http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2014/02/cag-frequently-asked-questions-3.pdf>. 
858 A similar procedure applies under Section 31 of Victoria’s Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 
and in New South Wales under Section 41 of their Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
1998. Commissioner for Privacy and Data Protection State Government of Victoria, ‘Guidelines to 
Public Interest Determinations, Temporary Public Interest Determinations, Information Usage 
Arrangements and Certification’ (2014) 
<https://www.cpdp.vic.gov.au/images/content/pdf/Guidelines_to_Public_Interest_Determinations.
pdf>; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (n 849); ‘Public Interest Directions’ 
(Information and Privacy Commission New South Wales, 2016) <http://www.ipc.nsw.gov.au/public-interest-
directions>. 
859 Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), s 72(2). 
   
  274 
Chapter 6 Key Components and a New Approach to Making Public Interest Determinations in Data 
Protection Law 
 
the Commissioner may, by legislative instrument, make a determination to that 
effect.860 
 
The Australian experience can be used to inform the discussion below. 
5.2.1 Data controller preparations for authorization 
Under this authorization procedure, data controllers could apply to the ICO to approve 
their processing of personal data based on the public interest conditions. This contrasts 
with the current process whereby data controllers independently determine their legal 
basis for processing, possibly with the assistance of legal counsel and/or an in-house 
data protection officer. These initial data controller decisions are not assessed by the 
ICO or any other official body: they only are scrutinised if legal complaints are later 
lodged and/or the ICO is prompted to investigate a data controller’s processing 
operations. Authorization would require further legislative changes and a set procedure 
for 1) determining how applications should be put forward, 2) how they will be 
assessed and 3) how the outcome of an application can be contested. For these 
purposes, the Australian procedure for making PIDs is instructive. 
 
The Australian Information Commissioner can make a PID on the basis that the public 
interest in a use of data ‘substantially outweighs’ the public interest in complying with 
the legislation and/or a relevant code of practice.861 The purpose of a PID is to exempt 
a use of data from a particular legislative provision or a relevant code of practice.862 
The Privacy Act 1988 details: 
 
• who may apply for a PID;863 
• the circumstances in which the Information Commissioner may make 
a PID;864 
• the legal effect of providing a PID;865 
• how applications are to be assessed;866 
                                                
860 ibid s 72(2)(b). 
861 Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), s 72(2). 
862 ibid s 72(2)(a)(i)-(ii). 
863 ibid ss 71, 73. 
864 ibid ss 72, 73. 
865 ibid s 72(3)-(5). 
866 ibid ss 72(2), 73(1)(A), 78, 79. 
   
  275 
Chapter 6 Key Components and a New Approach to Making Public Interest Determinations in Data 
Protection Law 
 
• that applications should be published with the consent of the 
applicant;867 
• a process for the applicant and the Commissioner to consider a ‘draft’ 
PID before the final determination is made;868 
• a process for inviting the public to consider and make comments on 
the application to the Commissioner;869 
• a process for making ‘temporary’ PIDs which are only effective for a 
period of up to 12 months;870 and 
• that a register of PIDs must be maintained and made available to the 
public.871  
 
Considering the legal ambiguity surrounding the current iteration of the public interest 
conditions, the lack of ICO guidance and interpretative case law, I suggest a similarly 
robust procedure to the Australian system be explicitly provided for in amended UK 
data protection legislation.  
 
The data processing circumstances in which this procedure may be particularly useful 
is when a form of processing is determined by the data controller to be particularly 
‘risky’, in terms of the potential negative affect/impact on individuals, groups and/or 
society. This level of risk could be determined by the data controller during their 
routine privacy impact assessments for new processing operations, in light of the 
potential for the processing to cause physical, emotional, financial or reputational harm 
or even harms to wider public interests (e.g. damaging confidence in a particular public 
service).872 If we think of the case of care.data, or more recently, the research initiative 
involving Google DeepMind and London’s Royal Free Hospital,873 one could also 
                                                
867 ibid s 74. 
868 ibid s 75. 
869 ibid ss 76, 77. 
870 Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), ss 80(A)-(B), (D). 
871 ibid s 80(E). 
872 In other work, myself and colleagues conducted an evidence review triangulating the cause and 
effect (harms) of types of personal data misuse. Our review revealed a broad range of potential harms 
that can befall an individual if their personal data are misused. For the present discussion, it is 
important to consider ‘risk’ and ‘harm’ as it relates to data processing in a much broader sense than 
currently understood in data protection legislation (where harm is typically connected to being able to 
prove actual harm or financial damages). When determining whether authorization is appropriate, this 
broader understanding of harm should be referred to. Laurie and others (n 48) 50. 
873 Where Google’s DeepMind were provided London Royal Free Hospital patient records to develop 
an app that would alert doctors to patients at risk for acute kidney injuries. In May 2017, a letter from 
the UK’s National Data Guardian (Dame Fiona Caldicott) to the Royal Free NHS Trust and to 
DeepMind, was leaked; this letter indicated that implied consent was claimed by the parties as the legal 
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imagine that authorization may be appropriate where particularly novel and pervasive 
data processing initiatives are proposed, which may be unexpected from the 
perspective of data subjects and publics in terms of factors such as the scale, and who 
will be conducting the processing (such as a private company as opposed to the public 
sector body in question). In this sense, and following on from the brief discussion of 
purpose limitation in Chapter 2, one could imagine that such an authorization 
procedure might also be used to determine compliance with other data protection 
requirements such as the compatibility of reuses of data.874 
 
Nevertheless, to avoid disproportionate impact on the processing of data for research, 
a concern raised throughout this thesis, it would be important that ICO authorization 
should not be a mandatory requirement.  Instead, it could operate as another 
(invaluable) tool for data controllers to use, as part of their entire pre-processing risk 
and compliance assessment. Where a data controller wishes the additional comfort of 
ICO authorization in advance, it should be possible to apply for this. It could be 
expected that such authorization would be sought only where there are risk thresholds 
met or other serious concerns raised which warrant this level of regulatory intervention. 
Particularly when considering the processing of personal data for research, not only 
are individuals’ data protection rights and freedoms at stake, but also individuals’ rights 
and freedoms as to the arts and sciences guaranteed by Article 13 of the CFR875. 
Therefore, pragmatism and risk-based assessment are crucial to applying the proposed 
authorization procedure. Given the broad understanding of personal data, 876  it is 
                                                
basis for sharing but that this was invalid. Jane Wakefield, ‘Google DeepMind’s NHS Deal under 
Scrutiny’ (BBC News, 17 March 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-39301901>; Natasha 
Lomas, ‘DeepMind NHS Health Data Deal Had “no Lawful Basis”’ (TechCrunch, 15 May 2017) 
<https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/15/deepmind-nhs-health-data-deal-had-no-lawful-basis/>. 
874 As indicated in Chapters 1 and 2 it is critical for the reader to understand that the focus of this 
thesis is on the application of the public interest conditions to processing; whether a form of 
processing falls awry of other data protection provisions is not the subject of this thesis. 
875 Given my focus on research processing based on the public interest conditions, this clearly 
implicates Article 13 of the CFR where ‘The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. 
Academic freedom shall be respected.’  
876 In its guidance for journalism, the ICO provides that ‘…information does not have to be ‘private’ 
to be personal data. Anything about a person can be personal data, even if it is innocuous or widely 
known. For example, a public figure’s job title can be personal data, as can a photograph taken in a 
public place, a listed phone number, or information posted online.’ As such, a pragmatic and risk 
based approach would be appropriate to determine when authorization may be required. ICO, ‘Data 
Protection and Journalism: A Guide for the Media’ (n 251) 22. 
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neither desirable nor necessary for every reliance on the public interest condition to 
require prior authorization. For particularly novel and large scale research initiatives, 
however, the legal certainty it would provide would be a useful improvement upon the 
current ambiguity when it comes to the application of the public interest conditions to 
research.  
The authorization procedure could be added as an additional Schedule to the DPA 




Part I – Public Interest Authorizations 
 
1. Interpretation 
(1) For the purposes of this Schedule, a data 
controller is interested in an application being 
made under paragraph 3 if, and only if, the 
Information Commissioner is of the opinion 
that the data controller has a real and 
substantial interest in the application.  
 
2. Power to make, and effect of, 
authorizations 
Authorization of processing based on Schedule 2, 
paragraph 5(d) 
(1) The Information Commissioner may 
authorise processing based on Schedule 2, 
paragraph 5(d) if he or she is satisfied that: 
(a) the processing of personal data satisfies the 
conditions of paragraph 5(d), and 
(b) the public interest in the processing of 
personal data outweighs the public and private 
interests in protecting informational privacy 
and any other public interest against 
processing. 
 
Effect of an authorization under subsection (1) 
(2) The data controller is taken to have satisfied 
Schedule 2, paragraph 5(d) if processing occurs 
while the authorization is in force under 
subsection (1). Upon regulatory intervention 
by the Information Commissioner or in 
subsequent judicial proceedings, lawfulness, as 
required by Schedule 1, paragraph 1, may be 
presumed in light of the authorization made 
under this Schedule. 
 
3. Application by a data controller 
                                                
877 Adapted from Part VI of the Privacy Act 1988 (Australia).  
(1) A data controller may apply for an 
authorization of processing based on Schedule 
2, paragraph 5(d) subject to paragraph 1. 
 
(2) If: 
(a) an application is made under subsection (1); 
and 
(b) the Information Commissioner is satisfied 
that the application is frivolous, vexatious, 
misconceived, lacking in substance or not made 
in good faith, the Information Commissioner 
may, in writing, dismiss the application. 
 
(2) The Information Commissioner shall create 
and disseminate guidance which explains:  
(a) the procedure and format of the application 
process; and 
(b) the basis upon which applications are 
assessed. 
 
4. Publication of application etc. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Information 
Commissioner shall publish, in such manner as 
he or she thinks fit, notice of: 
(a) the receipt by the Information 
Commissioner of an application; and 
(b) if the Information Commissioner dismisses 
an application under paragraph 3(2)—the 
dismissal of the application. 
 
(2) The Information Commissioner shall not, 
except with the consent of the data controller, 
permit the disclosure to another body or 
person any information contained in a 
document provided by the data controller as 
part of, or in support of, an application made 
under this Schedule if the data controller has 
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informed the Information Commissioner in 
writing that the data controller claims that the 
document is exempt from disclosure within the 
meaning of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
or the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, 
or subject to any other legal obligation to 
withhold the information or otherwise keep the 
information confidential . 
 
5. Draft authorization 
(1) The Information Commissioner shall 
prepare a draft of his or her proposed 
authorization in relation to the application 
unless he or she dismisses the application under 
paragraph 3(2). 
 
(2) If the applicant is an organisation, the 
Information Commissioner must send to it, 
and to other persons (if any) who are interested 
in the application, a written invitation to notify 
the Information Commissioner, within the 
period specified in the invitation, whether or 
not they wish the Information Commissioner 
to hold a conference about the draft 
authorization. 
 
(3) An invitation under subsection (2) shall 
specify a period that begins on the day on 
which the invitation is sent and is not shorter 





(1) If a data controller, or any other interested 
organisation, or person notifies the 
Information Commissioner, within the period 
specified in an invitation sent under paragraph 
5, that they wish a conference to be held about 
the draft authorization, the Information 
Commissioner shall hold such a conference. 
 
(2) The Information Commissioner shall fix a 
day, time and place for the holding of the 
conference. 
 
(3) The day fixed shall not be more than 30 days 
after the latest day on which a period specified 
in any of the invitations sent in relation to the 
draft authorization expires. 
 
(4) The Information Commissioner shall give 
notice of the day, time and place of the 
conference to each party to whom an invitation 
was sent. 
 
7. Conduct of the conference 
(1) At the conference, a person to whom an 
invitation was sent, or any other person who is 
interested in the application and whose 
presence at the conference is considered by the 
Information Commissioner to be appropriate, 
is entitled to attend and participate personally 
or, in the case of an organisation, to be 
represented by a person who is, or persons each 
of whom is, a director, officer, employee of the 
organisation. 
 
(2) The Commissioner may exclude from the 
conference a person who: 
(a) is entitled neither to participate in the 
conference nor to represent a person who is 
entitled to be represented at the conference; 
(b) uses insulting language at the conference; 
(c) creates, or takes part in creating or 
continuing, a disturbance at the conference; or 
(d) repeatedly disturbs the conference. 
 
 
8. Assessment of the application 
(1) The Information Commissioner shall, after 
complying with Part I in relation to the 
application, make: 
(a) such an authorization under paragraph 2 as 
he or she considers appropriate; or 
(b) a written statement dismissing the 
application. This dismissal shall be considered 
as final as to the particular processing assessed 
in the application under specific consideration. 
 
9. Making an authorization 
(1) The Information Commissioner shall, in 
making an authorization, take account of all 
matters raised at the conference. 
 
(2) The Information Commissioner shall, in 
making an authorization, take account of all 
submissions about the application that have 
been made, whether at a conference or not, by 





Part II—Register of authorizations 
 
1. Register of authorizations 
(1) The Information Commissioner must keep 
a register of authorizations made under Part 1. 
 
(2) The Information Commissioner may decide 
the form of the register and how it is to be kept. 
 
(3) The Information Commissioner must make 
the register available to the public in the way 
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that the Information Commissioner 
determines. 
 
(4) The Information Commissioner may charge 
fees for: 
(a) making the register available to the public; 
or 
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In Australia, data controllers applying for PIDs are broadly required to provide: 
 
• A detailed and precise description of their intended processing 
activities; 
• Why non-compliance with the relevant legislative or code of practice 
provision is necessary; 
• ‘[Detailed] arguments demonstrating why the public interest in doing 
the act or practice outweighs, to a substantial degree, the public 
interest in adhering to the identified APP or APP code provision’;878 
and 
• ‘[Alternative courses of action that have been considered that would 
not lead to a breach of an APP or registered APP code, with 
explanations as to why such alternatives are not feasible’.879 
 
Although my draft Schedule largely tracks the Australian legislation and the 
requirements for PIDs, there are important distinctions I would make. First, it is 
important to distinguish the role of the PIDs under Australian law from the public 
interest conditions under the DPA 1998. In the UK, the legislative provision for 
authorization would need to account for the fact that 1) the processing of personal 
data based on the public interest conditions is not considered a breach of data 
protection law and 2) nor does it provide an exemption from any of a data controller’s 
other obligations under the DPA 1998. The public interest conditions simply satisfy a 
data controller’s obligation to process data lawfully, in line with the first data protection 
principle in Schedule 1. Second, I would assert a further four distinctions as to what 
data controllers in the UK would be required to explain when applying for 
authorization. 
 
1. A detailed and precise description of their intended processing activities 
and its potential effect on the relevant publics. 
 
This differs from the Australian PID procedure to incorporate the first key 
component of the public interest I suggested in Section 3 above (What public 
or publics does the data processing in question relate to, and/or who may be affected by this 
processing?). Data controllers must describe their processing and specifically 
account for any effects on 1) the individuals which are indirectly or directly 
                                                
878 ‘APP’ refers to an ‘Australian Privacy Principle’. Australian Government Office of the Australian 
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implicated by the dataset(s) and 2) any other individuals, groups or publics that 
may be indirectly or directly affected by the processing in question. 
 
2. Why their processing is necessary. 
 
This is like the Australian PID requirement above where alternative courses of 
action must be considered. In the UK, this requirement would reflect that 1) 
the public interest conditions do not exempt data controllers from any of their 
other obligations under the DPA 1998; and 2) reliance on the public interest 
conditions still hinges on the use of personal data being necessary (i.e. the 
purpose for processing must not be capable of being satisfied by other means, 
including by using anonymised data).  
 
3. The extent to which they have engaged with their data subjects and 
relevant publics on this use of data, the results of these engagements 
and how these have been incorporated into decisions taken. If no 
engagement activities have been undertaken, a detailed explanation as 
to why this is not possible. 
 
This incorporates the Australian procedure for pre-authorization ‘conferences’ 
which allow interested parties to put forward questions and concerns regarding 
the proposed processing. This also incorporates my suggested, second key 
component of the public interest: What are the reasonable expectations of the relevant 
public/publics as to uses of their data and how will these expectations be translated into the 
governance of those data? Here, data controllers must demonstrate their efforts to 
engage with publics on the proposed use of data and how these views are 
accounted for in decision-making. The conference procedure in para 6 of the 
Schedule supports this engagement, while not precluding the broader 
engagements suggested in the key components and public interest checklist. 
 
4. Detailed arguments demonstrating why the public interest in their 
proposed processing outweighs the public and private interests in 
protecting informational privacy and any other public interests against 
processing. 
 
This is consistent with the Australian procedure and reflects what I propose 
to be the normative justification underlying my reformulation of the public 
interest conditions: that the public interest in processing must outweigh any 
negative effect to the public and private interests in protecting informational 
privacy and any other interests against processing. I have removed the qualifier 
‘substantially’ outweighs considering the procedure authorises the processing 
of ordinary personal data. If it were extended to sensitive personal data, it may 
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5.2.2 Authorization by the ICO 
The ICO would play a central role in this authorization scheme. Where applications 
for authorization are sought (or potentially required for particularly risky, novel or 
pervasive data processing initiatives) this would shift the burden of determining the 
appropriate legal basis from a data controller to the ICO, at least in context of 
processing that would be justifiable based on the public interest conditions. The ICO 
would be required to: 
 
• Develop the guidance detailing: the circumstances in which applications 
may be made or where it may be required, the application procedure, 
format and assessment process (the application could be populated from 
content similar to what is suggested for the code of practice in Section 4.1 
above); 
• Be available for initial consultations with data controllers to discuss 
whether it is ‘appropriate’ to apply for an authorization (per paragraph 1 of 
the Schedule); 
• Administer the applications process from initial consultation with data 
controllers, to receipt of the application, to making the authorization or 
dismissing the application; 
• Facilitate public scrutiny of the application process through the mandated 
‘conference’ procedure (per paragraph 6 in the Schedule); and 
• Manage a register of applications received and dismissed, and 
authorizations made (per Part II of the Schedule).  
 
Undoubtedly this is a resource intensive procedure for the ICO to administer, and 
potentially burdensome for data controllers. However, if authorization is not 
mandatory for processing relying on the public interest conditions, and indeed is only 
suggested for exceptionally risky, novel, pervasive or unexpected cases (as discussed 
above) this would provide legal certainty to data controllers, and security and 
confidence where it is needed most. As to data controllers, if this were not mandatory 
but optional, then whether to seek ICO authorization would simply be another factor 
in their overall risk assessment of the processing in question. And as to the resource 
implications for the ICO, I would argue that considering their already extensive 
interactions with the data controller community in the UK, they are best placed to 
effectively implement this. Moreover, as a body of decisions starts to build, this in itself 
will provide clarity and guidance as to future processing, which will benefit data 
controllers and reduce the costs of compliance. 
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A crucial aspect of the procedure and the ICO’s role in it, is the initial consultation 
with data controllers to assess their suitability for authorization. This would allow the 
ICO to further guide a data controller’s assessment of the public interest and indeed if 
the public interest conditions apply to the circumstances. Paragraph 3(2)(b) of the 
Schedule would allow the Commissioner to dismiss applications for several reasons, 
including if he or she considers the application frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, 
lacking in substance, or not made in good faith. For these reasons, the procedure 
should filter out applications which are not likely to satisfy the public interest 
conditions.  
 
After assessing applications, the ICO would refer to the requirements of the public 
interest conditions. This would include my suggested legislative changes from Section 
4, including the privileging of informational privacy and introducing a mixed test of 
reasonable belief. Upon determining that a data controller met these requirements, the 
Information Commissioner would need to approve that the public interest in the 
proposed use of data outweighs the public and private interests in protecting 
informational privacy and any other counter public interest.  
 
It is this final ‘stamp of approval’ – that the processing is indeed justifiable in the public 
interest – that would be most helpful to improving the uncertainty surrounding 
particularly complex applications of the public interest conditions (e.g. where data 
processing is novel, pervasive, unexpected etc.). A data controller’s hesitancy to rely on 
the public interest conditions without assistance or supervision, and the (justifiable?) 
suspicion cast over such opaque decision-making, would be minimised by the creation 
of this alternative procedure and the role of an independent body to scrutinise these 
decisions. 
5.2.3 Judicial review of the ICO’s authorization 
Given the detailed nature of the procedure suggested here, courts would have a 
substantial body of evidence to consider if a legal complaint was lodged against a data 
controller in receipt of an authorization. I suggest that a presumption of legal compliance 
(with at least the first data protection principle of the DPA 1998) should attach to the 
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proposed authorization procedure. Unlike the code of practice suggested in Section 5.1 
above, the ICO’s authorization of a data controller’s decision to process data based on 
the public interest conditions reflects a level of regulatory and public scrutiny that can 
more legitimately presume legal compliance.  
 
5.2.4 Benefits of administrative authorization of public interest 
determinations 
The authorization of a data controller’s decision to process personal data based on the 
public interest conditions would enhance legal certainty, improve transparency and 
offer meaningful opportunity for public scrutiny that is currently unavailable under the 
DPA 1998. The detailed and explicit nature of the procedure would introduce a level 
of objectivity and consistency to a decision that is inherently context sensitive and 
normative. Even though authorization may only apply to particularly risky or complex 
data initiatives, offering this type of procedure would instil confidence in data 
controllers by removing the perceived risk of taking processing decisions based on the 
public interest conditions. To satisfy the normative dimension of the public interest, this 
authorization process could further support reliance on the public interest conditions 
that stays true to the new conceptual understanding offered in this thesis. 
 
The authorization procedure would make data controllers more accountable under the 
law and to their data subjects and relevant publics, given the transparency of measures 
provided for. This is particularly important in the complex and pervasive processing 
circumstances that have been discussed as potentially requiring authorization. In such 
circumstances data subjects could be informed about the ‘how’, ‘when’ and ‘why’ of 
processing that is justified based on the ‘public interest’. The mandated register of 
applications would introduce a further level of transparency and could engender trust 
with relevant publics. The ‘conference’ procedure would allow relevant publics to 
intervene and scrutinise public interest justifications prior to processing taking place.  
 
Crucial to either of the procedures suggested, is an active ICO. In Section 6 I suggest 
specific ways in which the ICO can secure the implementation of the public interest 
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conditions through additions to its already robust approach to engagement with data 
controllers. 
6. Supporting the New Approach to Public Interest 
Determinations in Data Protection: The Crucial Role of 
the ICO 
In this chapter I have suggested four key components to redeveloping our 
understanding of the public interest in data protection. To assist data controllers with 
the assessment of the public interest in their processing, I translated these components 
into a public interest checklist to guide them through the relevant considerations. To 
further implement this new understanding I have suggested changes to the legislation 
and two alternative procedures for deploying the public interest conditions. However, 
as addressed in Chapter 2, the problem is not only with the law, but also with the 
culture of caution surrounding the use and sharing of personal data, perpetuated in 
part by legal uncertainties. To initiate cultural change, data controllers must become 
confident in their own abilities to meet the requirements of data protection law and 
better understand the full range of rights and interests that are at stake when they 
process data. Below I suggest two ways in which the ICO can play a crucial role in 
addressing these cultures of caution through its engagement and guidance publication 
scheme. 
 
6.1 The importance of legal myth busting 
The literature illustrates a landscape which is dominated by a culture of caution where 
the mantra is to consent or anonymise all uses of personal data.880 From this we can 
deduce that public authorities (and potentially other data controllers) are working 
under several misconceptions about: 1) the purpose of data protection law; 2) the 
hierarchy between different processing conditions, and 3) the relative security in 
anonymisation.  
 
                                                
880 See Chapter 2 Section 2. 
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The proposed legal and procedural changes could only partially resolve these 
misconceptions. Legal amendments are not in themselves capable of instilling 
confidence in data controllers. The ICO already plays a vital role in enforcing data 
protection law in the UK and in promoting best practice in line with the aims of the 
legislation. From its informal engagement to its more official enforcement activities, 
the ICO guides data controllers on the contours of data protection law. What is 
required is a clear and distinct programme of engagement activity that is focused on 
legal myth busting, catered to specific applications of the law within particular sectors.  
 
Through this programme of engagement, the ICO would be able ‘set the record 
straight’ and be clear about what data protection law is and is not within a sphere of 
activity. The content of such engagement could be developed for a particular data 
controller audience. From my own experience in engaging with public authorities in 
the UK, this audience would benefit from clear messages and myth busting around the 
role and limits of consent and anonymisation as well as on the purpose of data 
protection law. The ICO could explain within the particular context, how and why data 
controllers might consider their legal and ethical duties outside the consent or 
anonymisation box; e.g. if the public interest condition is a viable legal basis for 
processing or if other conditions are relevant to consider. More broadly, the ICO could 
continue to relay the protective and facilitative aims of data protection law, the latter 
which are frequently forgotten.  
 
6.2 Principles and best practices in new ICO guidance 
If data controllers were provided with a clearer understanding of the purpose of data 
protection law, and the role and relationship between various provisions within it, they 
would be better equipped and more confident to conceive of their obligations beyond 
the perceived safety of the consent-or-anonymise paradigm. Data controllers typically 
lack the tools to engage with the public interest concept in a consistent and objective 
manner and this can be addressed in the development of new guidance by the ICO. 
From the freedom of information context, we know that even if the public interest 
cannot be defined in a final sense, certain principles can be generalised and that more 
specific guidance can be drawn from a particular context. The ICO is uniquely placed 
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to derive these principles and more context specific best practice examples, drawing 
from its rich and varied experiences of engagement with data controllers.  
 
On the ICO website, it already provides guidance on the conditions for processing and 
explains the meaning of ‘necessary’ which is part of the public interest conditions.881 
To this, they could add examples of when a data controller might justifiably rely on the 
public interest conditions. Under the current law, this would reference its guidance on 
the meaning of ‘necessary’ but would additionally require defining ‘functions of a 
public nature’ and the ‘public interest’ (and ‘substantial’ public interest as to sensitive 
personal data). Here it would also be appropriate to reference the standard by which a 
data controller’s reliance on the public interest conditions would be assessed, i.e. under 
a mixed test of reasonable belief as suggested in Section 4.2 above. More nuanced 
advice could be given in sector-specific guides that covered how different types of data 
controllers and processing activities might rely upon the public interest conditions.  
 
In the context of processing personal or de-identified data for research, there currently 
is no dedicated guidance, but this is an area which suffers acutely from the culture of 
caution and legal uncertainty.882 In guidance tailored to the context of research, the 
ICO could direct data controllers to different legal bases depending on the purpose of 
research and how such processing would occur.  
 
More broadly, depending on the purposes for processing (e.g. for improving public 
service delivery) the ICO could explain relevant and non-relevant factors for data 
controllers to consider their reliance on the public interest conditions, as opposed to 
other legal bases for processing. This follows the model of the ICO and SIC guidance 
on the public interest test in freedom of information law. As to the public interest 
conditions, relevant factors could include the key components and public interest 
checklist presented above. This could be complemented by specific case studies of 
‘successful’ and non-successful reliance on the public interest conditions. Overall, such 
                                                
881 ICO, ‘The Conditions for Processing’ (n 159). 
882 See Chapter 2 Section 4. 
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guidance would breakdown the currently ambiguous task of data controllers 
independently assessing the public interest in their processing.  
 
7. Improving the Status Quo for the Benefit of Individuals 
and Data Controllers 
The new approach to the public interest suggested in this chapter can improve the way 
in which data controllers currently conceive of their obligations under data protection 
law for their benefit and for data subjects.  
 
What I suggest as the key components of the public interest specifically avoid the 
conceptual vulnerabilities of the concept, and the ambiguity that casts its deployment 
with suspicion. The emphasis on meaningful public engagement, the importance of 
legitimate procedures, and the multiplicity of the concept could appropriately reshape 
what is understood as ‘justifiable’ reliance on the public interest in different data 
processing contexts. My suggested procedural approach opens data controller 
reasoning to public scrutiny, forming a crucial component to deriving legitimate 
determinations on the public interest. 
 
Data controllers derive specific benefits from the approach developed here by 
enhancements to legal certainty and foreseeability. By privileging the protection of 
informational privacy within the legislation, data controllers would have a clear and 
unambiguous steer on the normative weighting to assign in their application of the 
public interest conditions. And by introducing a standard for assessing their reliance 
on the public interest conditions, data controllers would know before processing data 
how their decisions could be reviewed – based on a mixed test of reasonable belief. 
The creation of specific guidance on the public interest conditions, including a 
‘checklist’ of key questions with relevant and typically non-dispositive factors, could 
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Most importantly, however, the legal changes and procedures suggested offer a 
necessary alternative to the predominant paradigm of compliance based on consent or 
anonymisation. Throughout this thesis I have argued that neither consent nor 
anonymisation on its own is capable of fully attending to either the public interest in 
the protection of individuals’ informational privacy or the public interest in certain uses 
of data. Only by privileging the protection of informational privacy in a legal 
reformulation of the public interest conditions, could we ensure that its protection is 
understood for its public interest, as opposed to only its private interest value. This 
could be further secured through the authorization process suggested above and 
reinforced in a code of practice or authoritative guidance by the ICO. Crucially, within 
all the legal and procedural suggestions I have made, data controllers would not only 
have to mitigate risks to informational privacy, they would have to articulate how the 
potential public interests served by processing outweigh any impact presenting the 
normative justification for using personal data based on the public interest.  
 
Underpinning the approach suggested in this chapter is an active ICO. Even with the 
uncertainty cast by Brexit, the GDPR will come into force for a period in 2018. This 
fact and any subsequent post-Brexit interpretation of this legislation will require a 
strong and proactive approach to enforcement and guidance by the ICO. The 
suggestions made in this chapter are in keeping with the ICO’s current remit and 
important role it must play in distilling legal guidance against a build-up of 
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Chapter 7 The Meaning, Value 
and Utility of the Public Interest 
Concept for Data Protection Law 
1.Future challenges 
To bring together the legal and theoretical analysis of this thesis, it is helpful to consider 
briefly what effect the forthcoming GDPR may have on the issues and potential 
solutions raised. A comprehensive examination of the impact of the GDPR is beyond 
the scope of this thesis but my initial analysis indicates that the issues I have identified 
are not only left unresolved but will potentially worsen under the new Regulation.  
 
The legal grounds for processing in the GDPR are essentially the same as under the 
current legislation. This means that research may be justified based on consent, the 
legitimate interests of the data controller or the public interest provision.883 Critically, 
however, where a UK university is the data controller, it may no longer be able to rely 
on the legitimate interests provision, as Article 6(1)(f) prohibits this: ‘Point (f) of the 
first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the 
performance of their tasks’ (universities being ‘public authorities’ within the UK and 
‘research’ arguably being an implicit if it not explicit task within their remit).884 As to 
consent, it will be increasingly difficult to obtain valid consent under the GDPR, 
especially in the research context, given the specificity required and the impact of rights 
to withdrawal of consent.885  
 
Regarding the ‘public interest’ provision, the scope of Art 6(1)(e) remains inadequately 
defined as it has again been left to Member States to determine how the provisions are 
applied in practice within their jurisdiction, so long as they ‘meet an objective of public 
interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.886 There still lacks 1) any 
                                                
883 GDPR, Art 6(1)(a), (e). 
884 It is unclear whether this was an unintentional result from the narrowing of the legitimate interests 
provision. 
885 GDPR, Art 7. 
886 GDPR, Recital 45 and Article 6(3). 
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criteria which data controllers can routinely apply when relying upon the public interest 
provision or 2) a transparent procedure for making public interest determinations that 
would be subject to appropriate public (and potentially legal) scrutiny. Thus, while it 
will be increasingly more difficult to obtain valid consent or to sufficiently anonymise 
data (given the expanded definition of personal data)887, the alternatives, such as those 
based on the public interest, remain without sufficient guidance for data controllers to 
apply in practice. 
 
It follows that the issues identified in this thesis and proposed solutions will remain 
relevant to the UK post-2018 when the GDPR will come into force. This is so even 
when considering the uncertain implications of Brexit. It is entirely unclear the extent 
to which UK data protection legislation will diverge from the GDPR post-Brexit. And 
moreover, it is unlikely that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will be negotiated and 
unanimously agreed in less than the two-year period stipulated by Article 50 of the 
Lisbon treaty. Thus, the GDPR will apply in the UK on 25th May 2018 as it will in all 
other EU Member States.  
 
2. The Contribution of This Thesis 
In this thesis, I sought to examine: under what conditions can an individual or 
organisation justify its processing of personal data based on the public interest, and 
how is this to be assessed within data protection law? This required an understanding 
of what the concept means and how it can be more successfully deployed by data 
controllers in the first instance, and when their decisions are later reviewed by the ICO 
and courts.  
 
The problematic status quo 
In Chapter 2, I stressed the need for developing a better understanding of the public 
interest conditions. The consent-or-anonymise paradigm was critically evaluated as 
detrimental to both the protective and facilitative aims of data protection law. Not only 
does the consent-or-anonymise paradigm neglect the broader public interests in 
                                                
887 GDPR, Recital 26. 
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protecting informational privacy, on a technical level, neither consent nor 
anonymisation can sufficiently ensure data subjects’ rights and interests in their data 
are respected. The emphasis on either anonymising data prior to use or obtaining 
consent for ‘consent’s sake’ also negatively impacts the undertaking of publicly 
beneficial research. In the social sciences and humanities, the consent-or-anonymise 
paradigm means that certain forms of research may be abandoned if not fundamentally 
altered to meet the perceived requirements of consent or anonymisation. 
 
To derive a viable public interest alternative to consent or anonymisation, the legal 
analysis in Chapter 3 provided novel insight into the intended role and scope of the 
public interest provisions in the DPD. Investigation of the travaux préparatoires to the 
DPD revealed that the public interest concept was included to secure various 
‘important’ forms of processing, including research. The travaux demonstrated the lack 
of any ‘hierarchy’ between the different legal grounds for processing; consent was one 
of several alternatives and thus the public interest provisions were not mere 
‘exceptions’ to consent. In this sense, the examination of the travaux was critical to 
establishing the intended role of the public interest conditions as translated into the 
UK’s DPA 1998. However, the travaux was unable to provide any indication of how 
data controllers, in the first instance, could assess the public interest in their processing.  
 
The way in which the public interest provisions evolved during the drafting of the 
DPD demonstrated the utter lack of objectivity or rationales used to assess whether a 
type of processing was in the public interest. The result was a purely descriptive 
understanding of the concept, seen in the public interest examples in Recital 34 of the 
DPD. These examples were added simply because of the lobbying efforts of Member 
States. EU legislators intended for the public interest provisions to be further 
elucidated by Member States when introducing their implementing data protection 
legislation. However, as we saw from the legislative history to the DPA 1998 and the 
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Towards a new understanding of the public interest in data protection 
In Chapter 4, I expanded this legal analysis to the Article 8 context to consider whether 
Article 8 jurisprudence in the ECtHR could further substantiate how the public interest 
in processing should be assessed. The review of Article 8 cases demonstrated the way 
in which certain procedural principles should apply to public interest determinations, 
namely, legality, necessity and proportionality. However, the ECtHR’s application of 
these principles was inherently driven by context just as its consideration of the public 
interest (‘legitimate aim’ in Article 8).  
 
With only a descriptive and procedural understanding of the public interest, I 
continued Chapter 4 by looking to theory to derive a fuller and substantive 
understanding of what the concept can reasonably mean in the context of data 
protection. Theory revealed the key vulnerabilities of concept, and in turn, what would 
be required to normatively justify the processing of personal data based on the public 
interest.  
 
To further test this developing conceptual knowledge on the public interest, and to 
expand our understanding of what is required to successfully deploy the concept, in 
Chapter 5, I examined the operation of the public interest in cognate areas of law. In 
evaluating the use of the public interest in freedom of information, copyright and 
whistleblowing, both generalisable and distinguishing features of the public interest 
concept were highlighted. Despite the inherent context-sensitive nature of the public 
interest, where the public interest is deployed, it is possible to derive guiding principles 
on its operation in different contexts. This guidance is crucial where the public interest 
plays an action-promoting function within legislation, as opposed to a narrower 
defence or exemption. Such guidance should include the provision of the standard 
upon which public interest determinations will be assessed. 
 
The value of the public interest to data protection law and practice 
Based on the foregoing legal and theoretical analysis, in Chapter 6, I proposed four 
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1. What public or publics does the data processing in question relate to, 
and/or who may be affected by this processing? 
2. What are the reasonable expectations of the relevant public/publics as 
to uses of their data and how will these expectations be translated into 
the governance of those data? 
3. To be justifiable, a data controller’s reliance on the public interest to 
process personal data must be based on the objective consideration of 
the impact of processing and this must be transparently documented 
and articulated to the relevant publics. 
4. The public interest is multiple. 
 
Crucially, these components avoid the vulnerabilities highlighted by the examination 
of contested public interest theories and thus overcome the current difficulties in 
applying the concept to the processing of personal data. They can be used to reshape 
what is normatively understood as ‘justifiable’ reliance on the public interest in different 
data processing contexts. And moreover, the components as translated into my public 
interest checklist, offer data controllers a way to assess the public interest in their 
processing where currently they lack any meaningful way of doing so.  
 
To support this reconceptualisation of the public interest in data protection, I proposed 
crucial amendments to the DPA 1998’s public interest conditions. First, to rely on the 
conditions, data controllers would need to demonstrate that the public interest in their 
processing of personal data outweighs the public (and private) interests in protecting 
informational privacy (and any other public interests at stake). This could correct the 
fundamental and damaging misperception that the protection of informational privacy 
is only a private as opposed to a public interest. It more clearly directs data controllers 
to an objective consideration of whether to base their processing on the public interest 
conditions, and settles the normative dimension of the public interest consideration. 
Second, I proposed the introduction of a mixed test of reasonable belief. Introducing 
an explicit standard for assessing a data controller’s initial determination that its 
processing is ‘in the public interest’, would 1) enhance legal certainty on the scope of 
the provisions 2) provide transparency on how these determinations are made in the 
first instance and 3) demonstrate how reliance on the conditions would be assessed in 
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Implementing this reconceptualisation of the public interest and the revised legislative 
provisions also requires clear and agreed procedures. To this end, I suggested two 
alternative procedures for making public interest determinations. I first proposed that 
the ICO should develop a code of practice on how to apply the public interest 
conditions, with my proposed key components and public interest checklist as practical 
examples of what this code should contain. The ICO has the knowledge base to derive 
both principles and context-specific examples for this code of practice from its already 
extensive engagement efforts with the UK data controller community. The 
comprehensive guidance already provided on the public interest test in context of 
freedom of information law, and even on the public interest and reasonable belief 
standard under section 32 of the DPA 1998, demonstrates the practical feasibility of 
this option. A code of practice containing practical tools akin to my public interest 
checklist would offer data controllers a clear method for objectively and consistently 
assessing the public interest in their processing, and thus whether the public interest 
conditions apply to their circumstances. By allowing substantiated ‘compliance’ with 
the code of practice to serve as evidence of the lawfulness of processing, data 
controllers would be incentivised to routinely scrutinise the relevant public and private 
interests at stake in their processing. 
 
The second procedure I suggested was based on the successful operation of a ‘public 
interest determination’ scheme in Australia. In the UK, I proposed that the ICO could 
give prior authorization of a data controller’s reliance on the public interest conditions 
as the legal basis for processing in certain processing circumstances, to be determined 
potentially by the risks posed by processing. Given the integral role of the conditions 
for processing and the lack of guidance or interpretation on the deployment of the 
public interest conditions, I recommended a detailed formulation of a similar 
procedure to be added as a Schedule to the DPA 1998. Although resource intensive to 
the ICO, the benefits to operating such a scheme outweigh these costs – not least 
because of the potential impact of the forthcoming GDPR and thus the more frequent 
consideration of the public interest conditions by data controllers. For particularly 
novel, pervasive, unexpected and/or risky forms of processing, authorization would 
be beneficial from the perspective of uncertain data controllers as well as data subjects 
who stand to be affected by the processing in question.  
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The introduction of an authorization procedure in such circumstances could introduce 
objectivity and consistency to the currently ambiguous scope of the public interest 
conditions. It could instil confidence in data controllers by offering the opportunity for 
specific consultation and potentially authorization on their decisions to process 
personal data based on the public interest. The public scrutiny measures within my 
suggested procedure, including the suggested ‘conference’ and ‘register of 
authorizations’ would ensure that the views of relevant publics are accounted for prior 
to any use of data based on the public interest conditions.  
 
Overall, the new understanding of the public interest offered in this thesis can 
more fully attend to the interests at the core of data protection – in the protection 
of informational privacy and in the use of personal data – and ensure they are 
accounted for in practice. The hope is that these proposals liberate the research 
community from the uncertainties surrounding data protection law and enable 
a wide range of publicly beneficial research to be carried out on a solid legal 
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